I don't think so. Just like the Moon isn't mine, neither are the thoughts I experience or the dreams I have. The inner world is as distant from me as the world around me. — Dijkgraf

They are generated by your brain which is a constituent element of you and the sole source of all cognition that distinguishes your will from everyone else's. You are simply not assessing this properly.

but it is informed by memory, sensory receptive field expansion — Garrett Travers

Here I disagree. Memories are just patterns of broadened synapses (connection strengths). Most thoughts follow these patterns, like all brain activities. There is a constant parallel sensory input, the world is projected into our brain world, but we can't control the new thoughts, though we can influence them. I don't consider my brain part of me, though useful.

All points well taken.
Regarding the Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt looked deeply at how both torturer and the tortured became products of the destruction of man as Man. I think her later works always kept that danger in view.

The pre-frontal cortex has been described as a ‘control center’, the executor of actions, but this a misnomer. It receives inputs from the rest of the brain , the body and the environment and forms expectations and anticipations in order to interpret this input as something recognizable, but is at the same time affected and altered by these inputs. — Joshs

That is specifically what I said, "and is connected to the entire neural, and emotional processing networks of the body." The prefrontal cortex is the hub of the entire network that regulates emotions and subconscious activity that informs and regulates behavior. The point was that the control center responsible for executive action is the same control center that processes emotion that certain other areas of the brain, cingulate cortex, amygdala and other structure both cortical and subcortical are all responsible for; all of which inform behavior, thought, desire, and directed actions. This is not a misnomer, this is science: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6003711/

So its decisions are not purely pre-figured by its prior state, as if it already knew what it wanted to will. — Joshs

Never said it was, I said that will was the sum total of all indivudal human action and thought, the emergent expression of the content of the information the brain processes, integrates, values, and enacts, and all activities of the brain that contribute to that process. This definition is informed by the assertions you made about the brain and the scientific understanding of the process as is presently understood, article above. It also dispenses with the mind-body dualism that has plagued this topic for centuries, there is no difference, it is an illusion generated by the perceptive capacities allotted to us by PFC that allows us to witness the patterns in our own behavior, as superior-pattern-processing mamal, and evaluate them. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4141622/

Rather , we FIND ourselves willing or deciding. The distinction here is that there is no purely logical connection between the desire or thought that occurs to us and the ‘us’ that exists just prior to what pops into our head. — Joshs

Yes there is, I just explained it and you can read for yourself what the phenomenology is. We do not find ourselves, we percieve ourselves and our behavioral patterns as a result of PFC executive action. There is no you that exists before the thought, you are the progenitor of said thought, via the brain. You find yourself as much as you find your eyeballs when you glance at yourself in the mirror, it's an illusion dude.

This is why to will is always in some respect to be surprised by what one wills. — Joshs

That's because some of the content of YOUR will - the illusory you that you think you are finding when a thought pops up - is not the result of executive function, but subconscious activity, or olfactory memory stimulation, or immediate perception, and so on. It's all your will, just maybe not all your chosen will.

This I think comes close to what Arendt means when she says action precedes rational deliberation. — Joshs

She meant raw, praxiological action, as in movement and the initiation of behavior. What she didn't consider, is that there is no such state as inaction when it comes to a living being. The brain is in perpetual operation, as you have pointed out in my message. And action is informed by ALL activity of the brain in a vast network of processing. Meaning, it's not that action DOES precede rational deliberation, as non-rational deliberation is happening at all times, but that it CAN precede it. How is this? It turns out, that along with executive function, memory storage, and emotional processing also comes the ability of value placement, or neuro-economics. Values have the ability override more basic desire functions and replace them with ones that align with values. Meaning, if one values rational thought before action, over time that value placement, if truly valued, will overrride non-rational predicates for action, as far as executive function is concerned. In other words, she's flat wrong, and most people develop a value for healthy skepticism and trepidation prior to action early on, as a result of getting endlessy hurt as a kid doing stupid shit. Here's an article on neuro-economics, you'll love it:https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1002174

So, no it isn't a misnomer, I haven't misunderstood Arendt, and I don't buy her ill-informed conclusions. Modern neuroscience demonstrates to us that our will is the expression of the content of our mind, that it is limited in executive agency, and that values are the method by which to override behaviors that are undesirable and replace them with new ones.

Here I disagree. Memories are just patterns of broadened synapses (connection strengths). Most thoughts follow these patterns, like all brain activities. There is a constant parallel sensory input, the world is projected into our brain world, but we can't control the new thoughts, though we can influence them. I don't consider my brain part of me, though useful. — Dijkgraf

I'm sorry, dude. But, you're not equipped to have this discussion. Here, take these, I just posted them in an above forum. Read these and after that, if you haven't changed your mind, or come to different understandings, then this really isn't the place for you. Not trying to be mean, but this statement is something that can't be responded to.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6003711/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4141622/
https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1002174

I'm sorry, dude — Garrett Travers

Don't be sorry... I know what I'm talking about,...dude.

Don't be sorry... I know what I'm talking about,...dude. — Dijkgraf

I think you get along alright. Check out those journals, they're cutting edge frontier kind of stuff, no kidding.

From the third article:

"Over the past two decades, neuroscientists have increasingly turned their attention to the question of how the brain implements decisions between differently valued options. This emerging field, called neuroeconomics, has made quick progress in identifying a plethora of brain areas that track or are modulated by reward value."

This applies to dogs maybe. Obey the master and get a reward. Not to humans.

Nevertheless, interesting.

After a few days, the field around the corner at the end of the street got engraved into the brain of our dog. She knows a lot of its peculiarities. If I'm on the phone, she wants me to pay attention. She barks with crying voice. There is a continuous interacting between parallel incoming processes, via eyes and ears, and these processes running around in her brain. She sees her favorite treetrunk, the image falls in the memory trail it made earlier (strengthened connection between the neurons involved in earlier playing), she recognizes it, she remembers she can play with it (bite in it, carry it away, make me run after her...), and wants to run to it. It is time to go home though... I constrain her will. The processes in our brains never stop. If we dream neurons fire faster than in wake state. Same experience takes less time.

This applies to dogs maybe. Obey the master and get a reward. Not to humans. — Dijkgraf

You understand that when they say "reward," they're talking about what happens in the brain as far as which chemicals are released into the synapses, and to what receptors they bind to issue a response that can be observed by the part of your brain that allows ofr external perception? Not a, "hey boy, get your treat," kinda thing. It's more, what happens in the brain to reinforce a behavior, so that it happens again.

For example, eating. The reason why you eat when you do, is because you are hungry. That feeling of hunger comes from a chemical that is released to ensure that you eat by initiating that feeling. And the good, relaxing feelings you get when you start eating when hungry, are also the result of chemicals being released to ensure you continue eating in the future. It's why drug addicts don't eat much, because those chemical processes are being hot wired by external chemical solutions that initiate those pathways in the brain prematurely or out of sync, which override their original function.

will was the sum total of all indivudal human action and thought, the emergent expression of the content of the information the brain processes, integrates, values, and enacts, and all activities of the brain that contribute to that process. — Garrett Travers

This definition is informed by the assertions you made about the brain and the scientific understanding of the process as is presently understood, article above. It also dispenses with the mind-body dualism that has plagued this topic for centuries, — Garrett Travers

Cognitive science has gone through several evolutions. The first generation of cognitive theory I think is most compatible with your ideas about the relation between rationality, emotion and will. It thinks of mind as an input -output device that receives data, processes and stores it , and then outputs it as action. In this approach, affect is separate from and peripheral to the rational functions of cognition. More recently, embodied approaches view affect as not only inseparable from rationality , but what determines its sense and relevance. They abandon the idea of cognition as internal processing and representing of an outer world in favor of an integrated mind-body-world system. Volition is not fundamentally a calculative or logical process taking place within the brain but a matching process of interaction between person and environment.

More recently, embodied approaches view affect as not only inseparable from rationality , but what determines its sense and relevance. They abandon the idea of cognition as internal processing and representing of an outer world in favor of an integrated mind-body-world system. Volition is not fundamentally a calculative or logical process taking place within the brain but a matching process of interaction between person and environment. — Joshs

Yeah, that's fundamnetally what the articles I posted suggest from data, when read together. And what I mean when I say "will is the sum total of all indivudal human action and thought, the emergent expression of the content of the information the brain processes, integrates, values, and enacts, and all activities of the brain that contribute to that process." Meaning, will is of itself so in accordamce with the functions of the brain that allow for emergence of thoughts, actions, and value placements.

These assertions from Arendt are being informed by outdated notions of will and freedom, across multiple philosophical interpretations, without the context of modern neuroscience. — Garrett Travers

I don't know if the notions of will and freedom here are outdated, I'd say they're just heavily influenced by determinism. The best a determinist can do toward a proper notion of free will is compatibilism. But trying to make a concept of free will which is compatible with determinist principles will inevitably lead to problems like the apparent paradox expressed by Banno.

For the will to not necessarily be free, you will have to describe an instance where the brain is not in operation, integrating data, processessing stimuli, recalling memories of interest or value, regulating the body's core structure, organizing emotion, processing patterns for recognition, formulating values, anticipating threats, etc. The will is quite literally everything that the brain uses to contribute to cognition and action.

Meaning, freedom of will is going to be the natural state of the brain, without the trauma requisite to make it stop being applied. Thus, the principle to be integrated is freedom from the application of interpersonal force, or otherwise uninvited interference with the will's natural and independent expression. — Garrett Travers

I think you missed the point here Garrett. The reason why the will is not necessarily free, is that we are free to define "will" and "free" as we please. There is really nothing we can point to which "will" refers to, and nothing which "free" refers to, therefore the terms can be defined in a way in which "free" is not consistent with willed acts. Then the will is not free. However, some ways of describing will and freedom give us a better understanding of reality than others.

For example, eating. The reason why you eat when you do, is because you are hungry. — Garrett Travers

This is not actually true. Much human eating is just habituated activity. We eat at mealtime. And because we have designated mealtimes, we do not allow ourselves to get hungry. If you've ever fasted, you'd understand that the feeling of hunger is quite a bit different from the feeling you get at mealtime, before you eat. I believe that to understand the issues being discussed in this thread, it is necessary to differentiate such habituated activities, often learnt as societal norms (including education and ways of thinking) , from activities which are truly motivated by internal forces. When we assume that the habit is what moves the will, we deny our freedom to break a habit.

Your inclination to not have the same faculty at odds with itself certainly echoes a sensibility evident in the Greek philosophical tradition. The matter of sin being a choice between two possible lives is the source of the duality involved here. Otherwise, there is no choice. — Paine

The problem with the passage you presented is that it defines "sin" in such a way that turning inward towards the maintenance of one's own well-being, is by definition sinful. This is the problem inherent within the distinction between apparent good, and real good, first proposed by Aristotle. In your passage, the real good would be the common good (contrary to which is "sin"), and the apparent good would be the private good (necessarily sinful). However, you'll see that Christian moral philosophy does not accept such a dichotomy, as the goal is to make the apparent good consistent with the real good.

However, if we maintain Platonic principles, the good is what moves the will toward understanding and accepting intelligible principles. And since this is a personal act of judgement and acceptance, it must be the internal, private good. Therefore, since the reality of the situation is that "the good" which moves the will is the private good, this must be represented as the true, or real good. And "the good" which is presented to us as the common good, being presented from an external source, is the apparent good, requiring judgement in relation to the internal private good, which ais the true good, is the good which moves the will to accept such common goods.

It is necessary that we proceed in this way, with the true good being the internal private good, to account for the fact that human beings often act in a way which is contrary to what is presented as the common good. The private good is what moves the will, so this must be represented as the real good. But to let the private good move the will is to "sin" in the words of your quote. And, we might even say that in the vast majority of instances, if the private good is inconsistent with the common good, such an act would truly be a sin.

But there is in some cases a discrepancy between the common good, as understood and represented by the human mind, and the good as would be understood by a more powerful mind, the human mind having some inherent deficiencies. In these cases it is necessary that an individual, with one's own mind, recognizes and understands the deficiency in what is presented as the common good. And because this comes from inside the mind of an individual, it is necessary to say that the true, or real good, is the internal, private good. Therefore the common good must be conformed to be consistent with the private good.

I don't know if the notions of will and freedom here are outdated, I'd say they're just heavily influenced by determinism. The best a determinist can do toward a proper notion of free will is compatibilism. But trying to make a concept of free will which is compatible with determinist principles will inevitably lead to problems like the apparent paradox expressed by Banno. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, a little bit of information on this subject, as I happened to have the bandwidth available from work, school, and writing to make it to the end of Arendt's 30 page essay on freedom; Link below. It actually turns out that we've been, all of us, arguing with a phantom that does not exist. Arendt, through the entirety of the essay, never once actually makes an argument. That is because she is ONLY covering the geonological history of the terms and how their usage have changed between epochs and cultures. And it would be almost impossible to gather this unless you've reached, quite literally, the last page of the essay. As for the particular views on will and freedom that have been highlighted here in the form of argument, yes they're outdate. I mean that technically, they are not informed by the science, of which I have linked numerous times in ths thread with very few response, which divulges critical information on this topic. There is no apparent paradox that Banno expressed, the human will is of itself so. Any expression of the individual mind is the expression of of the same entity. The will can no more oppress itself, than can the ocean drown or flood itself. It is not an assertion that makes no sense. The tounge cannot taste itself, the eye cannot see itself, the stomach cannot digest itself. The will IS itself and cannot will itself to be anything else.
https://grattoncourses.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/hannah-arendt-what-is-freedom.pdf

I think you missed the point here Garrett. The reason why the will is not necessarily free, is that we are free to define "will" and "free" as we please. There is really nothing we can point to which "will" refers to, and nothing which "free" refers to, therefore the terms can be defined in a way in which "free" is not consistent with willed acts. Then the will is not free. However, some ways of describing will and freedom give us a better understanding of reality than others. — Metaphysician Undercover

I beg to differ, within the combined context of the historical views, linguistic common usage, and modern cognitive neuroscience I am 100% confident that we can agree that will is the sum total of all human thought and action, the emergent expression of the content of the information that the brain processes, integrates, values, and enacts, and all activities of the brain that contribute to that process. I will be happy to build my argument again for you, which.... again, still has not been attempted to be challenged by more than one person, or so. And hasn't been bested in argument.

This is not actually true. Much human eating is just habituated activity. We eat at mealtime. And because we have designated mealtimes, we do not allow ourselves to get hungry. If you've ever fasted, you'd understand that the feeling of hunger is quite a bit different from the feeling you get at mealtime, before you eat. I believe that to understand the issues being discussed in this thread, it is necessary to differentiate such habituated activities, often learnt as societal norms (including education and ways of thinking) , from activities which are truly motivated by internal forces. When we assume that the habit is what moves the will, we deny our freedom to break a habit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not, it's actually quite true, appetite is broadly regulated by the brain and the chemicals and structures associated with its operation are directly responsible for eating, except in cases of being overriden by exectutive function in the form of value placement, which is a topic for neuroeconomics, an article for which I've posted in this thread. Yes, sure you can habitualize times to eat, and yes you can upset the process via fasting, I've done all of that myself. That has nothing to do with why I said what I said. That was a low resolution understanding conveyed to someone not equipped to be in this discussion. As far as habituated activities, societal norms, and internal forces, this is the kind of statement that shows me that the reason my arguments aren't being address, is because they're straight up not even being read. I have already covered this and posted an up-to-date journal on the nature of neuroeconomics and explained a position on it. Nobody assumed habit moves will, habit is an element of will. Will is all individual expression of thought and action via the brain's processes.
Here's an article on hunger regulation: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fendo.2013.00103/full

The problem with the passage you presented is that it defines "sin" in such a way that turning inward towards the maintenance of one's own well-being, is by definition sinful. This is the problem inherent within the distinction between apparent good, and real good, first proposed by Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you speak of a 'passage presented by me' rather than address it as what St. Augustine says? To my knowledge, it is representative of what he says in other places. If you find this statement of his problematic, should that not be taken up as a challenge to his intent?

I disagree that turning 'toward its private good' is equivalent to "turning inward towards the maintenance of one's own well-being." Augustine says, " It turns to its own private good when it desires to be its own master. The will wanting to be its own master is not a concept in Aristotle's practical art of distinguishing what is good from what only seems to be. Turning 'inward' for Augustine is accepting that one must choose one life or another. The experience of the conflict is given through Paul's terms in the Letter to the Romans:

We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want I agree that the law is good. So then it is no longer I that do it but sin which dwells within me. — Romans 7:13

However, if we maintain Platonic principles, the good is what moves the will toward understanding and accepting intelligible principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please give an example of that language in Plato. In so far as doing bad things is the result of ignorance, isn't a 'faculty of choice' an idea that Socrates makes problematic? When will is spoken of as a cause, Socrates says things like:

And is this not a general truth? If a man acts with some purpose, he does not will the act, but the purpose of the act. — Gorgias, 467d

The distance between Plato and Paul on these matters causes me to think that the term "Christian Platonism" is an oxymoron.

I don't know if the notions of will and freedom here are outdated, I'd say they're just heavily influenced by determinism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying that Arendt’s own notion of freedom as action is deterministic, or that her representation of Enlightenment concepts of intellect and will that she is critiquing are deterministic?

I believe that to understand the issues being discussed in this thread, it is necessary to differentiate such habituated activities, often learnt as societal norms (including education and ways of thinking) , from activities which are truly motivated by internal forces. When we assume that the habit is what moves the will, we deny our freedom to break a habit — Metaphysician Undercover

Much of our behavior is ‘habituated’ in that our desires are expectations projected forward from previous experience. But this is as true of motivation by ‘internal forces’ as it is of allegedly rote habit. In both cases, an into oak action is involved which implies both past history( habit) and a novel, creative element. Whether i eat out of huger for for some other reason, as long as the act is conscious, it matters to me in some way and has some sense to it.

I think for Arendt the action exposes my ‘will’ to what is other and outside of my already formulated conceptions (my sovereignty).

That would be a truly joyous occasion! Talks and drinks... smokey, non-smokey... smooth and sharp... — Tobias

But in the morning, I'm not making waffles.

, So we see the notion of free will as an outcome of the developing theology of sin, redemption and damnation. It was needed in order for Christianity to appear somewhat coherent.

They are generated by your brain which is a constituent element of you and the sole source of all cognition that distinguishes your will from everyone else's. You are simply not assessing this properly. — Garrett Travers

I agree. Your brain does not make you choose, it is you choosing.

Your brain does not make you choose, it is you choosing. — Banno

"You" are your brain. The part of you controlling your heart beat and motor functions that isn't "you," is the same thing producing executive function, emotion, hunger, perception and everything else you do. The distinction made between functions of the brain and perceptions the brain produces of oneself within one's limited domain of agency, as if describing separate entities altogether, is nonsense. It's like woo woo level nonsense.

One could take the same sequence to say that the result thrust 'Christianity' into incoherence. Pascal spoke of it as scandal to reason. The early Church Fathers told the Gnostics to stop making sense.

The idea of the self as a battleground was the dissolution of a single world that explains our nature in the language of Greek thought. The duality makes sense in the terms of Manicheism where good and evil are essential components of creation. But that world is as far away from the Timaeus used to design Augustine's heaven as Paul of Tarsus is from Aristotle's Ethics.

"You" are your brain. — Garrett Travers

No, I'm not. Self is more complex than that.

Nor do I see much use in bringing neuroscience into what is essential a discussion of intentionality.

I found this of interest as I've had an eye towards identifying the contributions of Christianity to philosophical thought, a continuation of a few threads over the last year. So far I had charity as the only novelty, a positive contribution. I'll add free will, a confusion rather than an improvement.

Yes, it seems we owe free will to the Church Fathers. — Banno

Not so.

From the SEP entry on free will:

The term “free will” has emerged over the past two millennia as the canonical designator for a significant kind of control over one’s actions. Questions concerning the nature and existence of this kind of control (e.g., does it require and do we have the freedom to do otherwise or the power of self-determination?), and what its true significance is (is it necessary for moral responsibility or human dignity?) have been taken up in every period of Western philosophy and by many of the most important philosophical figures, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant.

Questions of moral responsibility and freedom are inevitable in any society where a tradition of thinking about the human situation arises.

You" are your brain — Garrett Travers

You have a brain, like you have a physical world to live in. You function, walk, do your things, between the world outside and the world inside, which you always carry along with you.

Nor do I see much use in bringing neuroscience into what is essential a discussion of intentionality. — Banno

You don't see use in bringing neuroscience into a discussion about something that is produced by the brain..... Gotcha......

You have a brain, like you have a physical world to live in. You function, walk, do your things, between the world outside and the world inside, which you always carry along with you. — Dijkgraf

All of which, except external world, is controlled and maintained by the brain. That's why if an air bubble makes it's way to your brain, you go vegetative, because your brain that governs all that thought and motion, is now damaged. It's more accurate to say that you are your brain's passenger, as you can only even interact me the right now, and I you, because your brain produces pattern recognition and executive function at the highest level of operations. A concussion would change that pretty promptly. But, it is even more accurate to say you and your body are a single entity.

The name dropping, the latin intrusions, the hyperbole and metaphor verge on the incoherent in section IV of the Arendt article. I recall from somewhere that she thought of herself as a journalist rather than a philosopher, and I might agree with her.

Nevertheless I think the notion of freedom she begins to develop interesting and useful. The idea is that the mundane course of events, the "natural process" is interrupted by occasional "unforeseeable and unpredictable" acts in which "men... establish a reality of their own".

Freedom has it's place here not as the compliment of politics but as its progenitor. It's a freedom freedom that comes from the necessity of choice, and not from sovereignty. It's not being free from the other, but being free with the other. Freedom can be thought of as achieving what we are capable of rather than in terms of the restrictions we place on each other.

There's a bridge here between Nussbaum's capabilities and existentialism.

I don't deny the inside world can get damaged. So can the outside physical world. Just send a huge bubble of wind or water through your house.

Your comment does not address the somewhat extensive outline that Arendt sets out in the article. Nothing in the SEP article contradicts Arendt's hypothesis. Not "moral responsibility and freedom" but "free will" is the point at issue.

I don't deny the inside world can get damaged. So can the outside physical world. Just send a huge bubble of wind or water through your house. — Dijkgraf

No, that's an utterly ludicrous analogy. It would be more akin to if a rock flew into your house, hit something that was serving as the foundation for the whole structure and all its functions, and the entire house collapsed. That's what happens. It isn't the "inside world" that gets damaged, it's the outside world that the brain is computing data from data presented to it that goes by-by forever, because the brain computing the outside world has been damaged. The illusion of the "inside world" is nothing more than the capacity of the brain for self recognition, in accordance with memory storage and supiro-pattern-processing.