Butting in, as @Ignoredreddituser has shown a limited capacity for clarification.

Steven French's eliminativism is about material objects. They can't ontologically exist for reasons which remain essentially unclear, as you (and I) pointed out.

@RussellA later clarified that:

To argue against Steven French and argue for the non-eliminativist view, one will also need to argue that relations ontologically exist. — RussellA

( Note that in this context, a "non-eliminativist" is someone -- like most of us -- who thinks that tables and other objects actually exist. )

@Cuthbert said a lot of very funny and insightful things about ontological existence, and how it was akin to canine dogs...

I said that if relations do not exist, the world as we know it cannot exist. And gave a few arguments for that.

@RussellA called upon some paradox by a certain Bradley, as per which relations cannot exist. In my view his paradox is based on a rather suspect use of language.

Bradley was an idealist, who did not believe matter exists. So again, this is not your usual "let's eliminate the mind" jamboree. It's about eliminating matter for a change.

@SophistiCat
Fair enough, usually my iPhone attaches the citation at the bottom, I suppose i must have overlooked it by mistake.

@Olivier5 No need for shade, just bare with me. I’ve had a surprisingly very busy week, I haven’t had the time to give this the attention it deserves and i own that.

Not looking for a summary of the thread, just the paper referred to in the OP, thanks.

You're most welcome. I suggest Google. It's a good search engine.

the table is real enough for me — Olivier5

Is your table real enough for anyone else who does not eat off it?

My table would appear as objectively real to anyone seeing or touching it, yes. Evidently, someone on Mars could not touch my table, too far, but maybe with a very big telescope said Marsian could see my table, and thus ascertain its reality.

Someone in Australia could see a picture of my table, and ascertain that it seems to be the picture of a real table. If he's not convinced, he's welcome to a Roman dinner at my table.

My table would appear as objectively real to anyone seeing or touching it, yes. — Olivier5

I'll have to take your word for it, won't I? So will everyone else. But is that necessary? Is that existentially more evidential than having at a football stadium successive columns of people stand up and raise their arms to create the illusion of a wave? What if some people don't stand up, is there still a wave?

I'll have to take your word for it, won't I? — magritte

You don't. You can come to my place and check the reality of my table.

You can come to my place and check the reality of my table. — Olivier5

Everyone will. Or they can accept your absolute credibility as an eyewitness. And that would be true for every other alleged table in the world. Unfortunately not all people are as credible as you are, or they might mistake a footstool or divan for what they take to be a table. Who can tell?

And this kind of musing is leading you where, exactly?

Tables are tables by convention. We verbally agree that instances of table exist, then I'll accept your word unconditionally about your table. But there are no tea cosies or tables anywhere else in the universe because we are not there to say so.

The reasoning works with any table not just mine. As long as we can depend on certain objects to perdure and maintain certain properties over time, these things exist for us. "My" table was just an example.

If we can rest assured that ONE object exists, then it follows that Steve French's thesis is wrong.

The question being: what is (or is there) a recognized procedure to ascertain the reality of things? I contend that if a thing or another can be perceived by several people independently, and if it maintains its properties over some time, it is real enough. It is dependable, usable, trackable. Empirical, hence real.

Bradley must be wrong. Because it would be a miracle if the human mind had relations and nothing else did. — Olivier5

Not unless there is truth in panprotopsychism.

In that event, there would be a world with proto-consciousness and without ontological relations, and a mind with consciousness and with ontological relations.

In the conscious mind, distinct objects are united by the relationship between them into a single experience (the binding problem).

Not unless there is truth in panprotopsychism. — RussellA

Well, maybe, but I see no reason to believe that my table does not exist, nor any reason to attribute any protopsychism to it.

@SophistiCat
It’s from “There’s are No Such Things as Ordinary Objects” in the bookThe Nature of Ordinary Objects

I don't like using terms like "external" and "internal" because it seems to divide the world into two (dualism) unnecessarily. — Harry Hindu

In any discussion of the mind the concept of dualism is unavoidable, as you say yourself: "We all know that the world has an effect on the mind and the mind affects the world", instantly setting up a dualism between the world and the mind.

Steve French is misusing the term eliminativism...........Not neccessarily. — Harry Hindu

I agree that in principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist.

However, in practice, within philosophy, eliminativism always refers to eliminative materialism, which is a theory about the nature of the mind. Even within your own text - Holbach (1770) are eliminativists with regard to free will - Hume (1739) was arguably an eliminativist about the self. The SEP article concludes with the line: "While it is true that eliminative materialism depends upon the development of a radical scientific theory of the mind, radical theorizing about the mind may itself rest upon our taking seriously the possibility that our common sense perspective may be profoundly mistaken"

Then it seems that if the relations in our mind don't represent the world as it is then our understanding of the world is radically wrong. — Harry Hindu

As you later say about observing an apple: "Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple" and "You can perceive the whole apple tactilely, but not visually".

When observing an apple, our mental representation of the apple must always be incomplete, in that we may only be looking at one or two sides, we may not be looking inside the apple, we may not be smelling the apple, etc. As our representation must inevitable always be incomplete, we can never represent the apple as you say "as it is".

The fact that any representation can never be complete does not mean that such representation is radically wrong, all we need is that such a representation is "good enough" for our present purposes.

If current conditions are not related to past conditions or to future conditions then causation (a type of relation) is false so all of our reasons for believing things would be wrong. There would be no justification for anything and the basis for ethics and politics would be false — Harry Hindu

I agree that causation is a type of relation.

Between two objects in the world A and B we observe a spatial relationship - object A is to the right of object B. Because we observe a spatial relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the space between them, a thing called a "spatial relation" which exists as much as objects A and B.

Similarly, between two objects in the world A and B we observe a causal relationship - object A hits a stationary object B and object B moves. Because we observe a causal relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the interaction between them, a thing called a "causal relation" which exists as much as objects A and B.

For us to apply our reasoning and judgements, it is sufficient that spatial and causal relationships exist in our mind

In denying that relations have an ontological existence then you are implying that solipsism is the case. — Harry Hindu

Solipsism may be defined as the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.

Being an Indirect Realist, I believe the external world exists, but I don't know for certain. Isn't everyone a solipsist to some degree ?

To deny that relations have an ontological existence in the external world is not to deny that time, space, matter and forces don't exist. Why should the existence of an object in the external world depend on its being in an ontological relationship with something else ?

In rejecting dualistic notions of reality, I believe that minds and everything else are the same type of thing, which I identify as relationships, processes, or information. — Harry Hindu

If the mind and everything else, such as a table, are the same type of thing, are tables conscious ?

How is the "internal" contents of ypur mind different than the internal contents of say, your stomach? — Harry Hindu

I assume because my mind is conscious, but my stomach isn't.

Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple — Harry Hindu

Yes, as you say, "you can feel all sides of the apple even though you can't see all sides of the apple".

Because you cannot see the relationships on all sides of the apple, yet can feel the relationships on all sides of the apple, these missing relations must have originated in the mind, not the world.

This is a problem because other minds are external to yours. — Harry Hindu

It comes down to belief. As I believe that tables are not conscious, I believe that other minds are conscious. I may be wrong. I will never know for certain. It is just a working hypothesis.

In asserting that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and that relations only exist in the mind, are you not admitting that relations exist in the external world? — Harry Hindu

I don't know for certain that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and even if it is, it is still beyond my understanding, but it is the least implausible explanation that I have come across.

Yes, it would follow that if I believed in panpsychism this would lead me to concluding that relations ontologically exist in the external world, which is why I tend to protopanpsychism which doesn't require such a conclusion.

Well, maybe, but I see no reason to believe that my table does not exist, nor any reason to attribute any protopsychism to it. — Olivier5

1) I agree that the elementary particles that make up what we call a table exist in the external world, and where each elementary particle is located at a particular time and space. I agree that the table exists as a concept in our minds. The information that this particular set of elementary particles each located at a particular time and space is in the form of a table exists in our mind.

The question is, where in the external world is the information that this particular set of elementary particles each located at a particular time and space is in the form of a table ?

2) The Universe has been around for about 14 billion years. It is estimated that the first neurons appeared on Earth about 600 million years ago.

If consciousness did not come from a pre-existing proto-consciousness, then where did consciousness in the mind come from ?

It’s from “There’s are No Such Things as Ordinary Objects” in the bookThe Nature of Ordinary Objects — Ignoredreddituser

Thanks!

For those who don't have the book, which is probably most of us, this article may help: Defending eliminative structuralism and a whole lot more (or less).

Yeah that’s an excellent article as well but it’s a bit different from his other paper in certain respects, the paper you cited is more about structural realism and the OP is more in the analytic metaphysical tradition. They’re somewhat dissimilar, but there is some overlap though the two are still distinct works.

In any discussion of the mind the concept of dualism is unavoidable, as you say yourself: "We all know that the world has an effect on the mind and the mind affects the world", instantly setting up a dualism between the world and the mind. — RussellA

My point was that the mind is no different than everything else in that everything is both the effect of causes and the cause of subsequent effects. The mind is not special or unique in this regard. What you described wouldn't be dualism as every thing (not just minds) has a causal relationship between it and the world (natural selection). So no, what I said is not dualism and you misinterpreted what I said.

The SEP article concludes with the line: "While it is true that eliminative materialism depends upon the development of a radical scientific theory of the mind, radical theorizing about the mind may itself rest upon our taking seriously the possibility that our common sense perspective may be profoundly mistaken" — RussellA

I can't disagree here. It's not my position to deny the existence of mind or world. I just think that the way we understand the relationship between them is "profoundly mistaken".

When observing an apple, our mental representation of the apple must always be incomplete, in that we may only be looking at one or two sides, we may not be looking inside the apple, we may not be smelling the apple, etc. As our representation must inevitable always be incomplete, we can never represent the apple as you say "as it is".

The fact that any representation can never be complete does not mean that such representation is radically wrong, all we need is that such a representation is "good enough" for our present purposes. — RussellA

That's the thing though - is skepticism about what something is as opposed to how useful it is for our purposes warranted? Since we have different senses informing us of the same thing (the smell, taste and color of the apple informs us that it is ripe), is there anything else to an apple other than its ripeness? Why wouldn't our different senses inform us of other aspects of the apple if there were any? It seems to me that perceiving things more as how they actually are would provide an evolutionary advantage.

Between two objects in the world A and B we observe a spatial relationship - object A is to the right of object B. Because we observe a spatial relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the space between them, a thing called a "spatial relation" which exists as much as objects A and B.

Similarly, between two objects in the world A and B we observe a causal relationship - object A hits a stationary object B and object B moves. Because we observe a causal relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the interaction between them, a thing called a "causal relation" which exists as much as objects A and B. — RussellA

If these relations did not exist ontologically, then what reason would there be for us perceiving them?

I think that you are confusing the spatial relation as it is in the world with how it is perceived. If I were standing on the other side of A and B I would say that A is to the left of B. We wouldn't be disagreeing if we both understood that what we are talking about is our observation of the spatial relation, not just the spatial relation. Parallax is a concept in science that seems to account for the existence of observers and their locations in space in relation to the objects being observed. We are able to pinpoint the location of objects by incorporating different viewpoints in space, and in accounting for the location of the viewpoints and then canceling them out, we are able to more accurately measure the distance between one object and another.

Why would we observe a causal relation if it isn't there ontologically in some form? I think that you may be confusing the map with the territory here.

For us to apply our reasoning and judgements, it is sufficient that spatial and causal relationships exist in our mind — RussellA

What is the relation between other minds if they are separate?

To deny that relations have an ontological existence in the external world is not to deny that time, space, matter and forces don't exist. Why should the existence of an object in the external world depend on its being in an ontological relationship with something else ? — RussellA

Time, space, matter and forces are the quantified mental representations of the analog relations that exist ontologically. What something is is a relationship between prior causes and what it effects. That's what your mind is, too - an accumulation of long-term memories and a working memory model of the world as it was a fraction of a second ago.

Being an Indirect Realist, I believe the external world exists, but I don't know for certain. Isn't everyone a solipsist to some degree ? — RussellA

Not me. Why would a solipsist have experiences of an "external" world if one didn't exist? How could that happen?

If the mind and everything else, such as a table, are the same type of thing, are tables conscious ? — RussellA

No, they are relations.

I assume because my mind is conscious, but my stomach isn't. — RussellA

What does that mean - "conscious"?

Yes, as you say, "you can feel all sides of the apple even though you can't see all sides of the apple".

Because you cannot see the relationships on all sides of the apple, yet can feel the relationships on all sides of the apple, these missing relations must have originated in the mind, not the world. — RussellA

No, it's because you're using different sensory organs to apprehend the relationship. This is confusing the map (the way something is apprehended) with the territory (what is apprehended). Both senses are informing you of the same thing - the shape of the apple, not different things. How they are apprehended is different, but they refer to the same thing as both confirm what the other is showing to be the case.

I don't know for certain that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and even if it is, it is still beyond my understanding, but it is the least implausible explanation that I have come across.

Yes, it would follow that if I believed in panpsychism this would lead me to concluding that relations ontologically exist in the external world, which is why I tend to protopanpsychism which doesn't require such a conclusion. — RussellA

None of this explains what "consciousness" or "proto-consciousness" is.

The question is, where in the external world is the information that this particular set of elementary particles each located at a particular time and space is in the form of a table ? — RussellA

It's in the form of the table, I suppose. This form is objective.

If consciousness did not come from a pre-existing proto-consciousness, then where did consciousness in the mind come from ? — RussellA

That's a different issue from the reality of tables, though. And if neurons do not exist, how come minds exist?

My point was that the mind is no different than everything else in that everything is both the effect of causes and the cause of subsequent effects. — Harry Hindu

Agree, the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years.

None of this explains what "consciousness" or "proto-consciousness" is. — Harry Hindu

Agree, the nature of consciousness is mysterious. Panprotopsychism is just establishing the map, not explaining the territory.

If these relations did not exist ontologically, then what reason would there be for us perceiving them? — Harry Hindu

The original Steve French article is arguing for an Ontic Structural Realism, the view that structure is ontologically fundamental, and where objects at at both the fundamental and "everyday" levels should be eliminated.

FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of relations.

Question One
If relations only existed in the external world and not the mind, how are we able to perceive things that don't exist in the external world, such as Sherlock Holmes, ghosts and unicorns ?

Question Two
When looking at an object in the external world, our knowledge of it must necessarily be incomplete. Yet when looking at something in the world that is incomplete, the mind will fill in the blanks and make a complete image. When thinking about an object about which we have limited knowledge we still think of it as a complete whole.

If relations only existed in the external world and not the mind, how to explain the principle of closure ?

Question Three
If relations exist in the external world, then a table, which is a particular set of elementary particles, exists as an object. It follows that every possible set of elementary particles in the external world will also exist as an object. For example, a single elementary particle in the apple and a single elementary particle in the table will exist as an object, the set of elementary particles in the table and a single elementary particle in the apple will also exist as an object, etc. It follows that the number of objects in the external world will be more than the number of elementary particles in the world.

How can there be more things existing in the external world than there are elementary particles ?

Question Four
If the apple exists as an object in the external world, then every pair of elementary particles in the external world would also exist as an object. It logically follows that a single elementary particle in the table in front of me and a single elementary particle 90 billion light years away must also exist as an object.

The question is, does this object exist instantaneously, or is its existence dependent of information passing between the two elementary particles at the speed of light ?

Question Five
If relations only existed in the external world, the apple as one set of elementary particles will be an object, the table as another set of elementary particles will be another object, but also the combined set of elementary particles in the apple and table will be another object again.

Where is the information in the external world that the apple as an object exists independently of the table as an object ?

Question Six
We know that we perceive relationships that don't exist in the external world, such as Sherlock Holmes, ghosts and unicorns. Therefore, relationships don't need to exist in the external world in order for us to be able to perceive relationships, meaning that there are some relationships that exist only in the mind.

When we observe the external world and perceive a particular relationship, such as a table, as we are able to perceive relationships that don't exist in the external world, how do we know that the relationship we are perceiving exists in the mind or in the external world ?

Summary
It seems to me that FH Bradley's regress argument makes more sense than relations having an ontological existence in the external world.

Where is the information in the external world that the apple as an object exists independently of the table as an object ? — RussellA

If we eat the apple and the table is still there, then we're done.

Suppose someone (it might be G E Moore) chanced upon me writing this post. What explanation can I give? "Well, look, it's like this. We don't know if an apple and a table exist independently. We don't know how we might, outside of our own imaginations, pick up some clue as to whether they do or don't exist independently. We are pretty stuck on the topic. I'm suggesting we eat the apple and check if the table is still there." G E Moore might reply - "Yes, all right so far, but I would put it as a modus tollens for rhetorical effect. If the world offers no information regarding the independent existence of apples and tables, then I cannot discover whether I just ate an apple or a table." I can see Wittgenstein getting agitated at this apparently sensible reply from G E Moore but I'm not going to hang about to find out what he thinks.

If the apple exists as an object in the external world, then every pair of elementary particles in the external world would also exist as an object. — RussellA

If everything that's true of apples is true of elementary particles, then that is indeed so. If you can pick up apples for sixty pence a pound in Tesco, then you can pick up a pair of elementary particles for the same low price. Every little helps.

If you can pick up apples for sixty pence a pound in Tesco, then you can pick up a pair of elementary particles for the same low price. — Cuthbert

I saw this offer, didn't know what to take. I ended up picking a pair of neutrinos... They're nice but a bit small. :-/

:flower:

If you can pick up apples for sixty pence a pound in Tesco, then you can pick up a pair of elementary particles for the same low price. — Cuthbert

It's even a better deal than that, in that for the low price of 60 pence, one can get from Tesco's 5 * 10 to the power of 29 elementary particles. Though Asda are slightly cheaper. And Waitrose definitely more expensive.

If the world offers no information regarding the independent existence of apples and tables, then I cannot discover whether I just ate an apple or a table — Cuthbert

Because there is no information in the Eiffel Tower that the Andromeda Galaxy exists, it does not follow that we have not been able to discover the existence of either the Eiffel Tower or Andromeda Galaxy.

I regret to inform that the Eiffel Tower does not exist, although on the left bank in Paris there's a bunch of iron atoms shaped in the form of the Eiffel Tower.

I regret to inform that the Eiffel Tower does not exist, although on the left bank in Paris there's a bunch of iron atoms shaped in the form of the Eiffel Tower. — Olivier5

Depends what one means by exist.
We seem to agree that the Eiffel Tower does not exist in Platonic Form, in that it seems a strange idea that prior to 1889 the Eiffel Tower existed below the ground in Algeria in the form of iron.
But your previous comment "As long as I can eat and work on it, and occasionally climb on it, the table is real enough for me" suggests that we agree the Eiffel Tower exists in Aristotelian form, in that we can both eat in the Jules Verne Restaurant and visit the Observation Platform.