Eternalists should be Stage theorists

Mr Bee

I am currently writing a paper for a philosophy class, and I am looking for some feedback/critique on what I am planning to write about. It's a little messy so far (like I said, it's in planning), but hopefully it'll be clear enough to convey what I am talking about.

Eternalism is the view that all times in the universe exist and are equally real. The passage of time, under this view, isn't real and the universe is taken to be a static block universe. Eternalists usually subscribe to 4-dimensionalism as a result, which can be broken up into two separate groups, the worm theorists and the stage theorists.

According to the worm theory, I am a temporally extended being who has all of the times of my life as temporal parts. In other words, I am the whole which constitutes my life. The stage theory, in contrast, states that I am merely a being who exists at one time, and am not numerically identical to other times in my life. Instead, I have counterparts who identify with each and every time as I do with my own. I will be arguing that, based upon our limited experience, the worm theory is false, and that Eternalist 4D-ists should be stage theorists as a result.

So here is my argument in a nutshell against the worm view:

P1. The worm theory requires that we are temporally extended beings.
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together*.
P3. Our experience is limited to only one time.
____________________________
C. The worm theory is false.

* Note that by saying that I should have all of my experiences "together", I do not mean that we have all of our experiences "at once" as in "at a time of the universe's history". Our experience can extend across multiple times within the existing eternalist block universe and need not be restricted to a single time of that universe, just as much as our bodily experiences at a single time is spatially extended (I see through my eyes and feel through the nerves in my body for example). The point is that we have them all.

P1. is based upon the definition of the worm theory as stated above, so I believe it should not be problematic.

P2. seems to me to be a straightforward result of what it means to be a temporally extended being who has temporal parts. If we consist of multiple parts, each of which has an experience on its own, then we should have all of them. After all, at every time we, as spatially extended entities, have all of our bodily experiences together, so I believe that for a temporally extended being it is merely an extension of that case.

The support for P3. is simply based upon introspection about our direct experience. My judgement I am not experiencing any other times shouldn't be illusory any more than my judgement that I am not in excruciating pain, or that I my judgement that I am having a red experience, which I take to be pretty certain. For me, I find that my experiences are only limited to me sitting here typing up this post at this time and nothing else, and I believe that a similar finding would hold for you too. This experience of me sitting in my room in front of my computer is not had as part of any other experience or together with other experiences at other times.

If anyone were to disagree with P2. , then they must not only show why (in light of the reasons I've given), but also, in light of P3., propose an explanation of why we only experience one time. Though I do not know all of the possible explanations, I doubt that this can be done without privileging a specific time (which isn't allowed for an eternalist), in particular the time in which we only experience, since that is ultimately what needs to be explained.

So, if my argument succeeds, the worm theory is shown to be false, and Eternalists should give it up in favour of the stage view. I believe that the stage theory elegantly avoids these issues pretty easily since according to that view our existence is limited to only a single time and in turn our experience. Thus, they are able to accept that our experience is had in accordance with P3.

Thoughts? Comments? Objections?

yazata

Here's my comments on your premises:

P1. The worm theory requires that we are temporally extended beings.

OK, I'll buy that.

P2. if we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together.

Why? That seems like too strong an assumption to me.

Just because something is temporally extended needn't imply that every temporal slice of the extended thing is identical to every other temporal slice. Differences between one slice and another would represent change in this this kind of scheme, and we obviously change during the course of our lives. (That introduces the problem of how to define personal identity. It clearly isn't strong logical identity.)

Here's an analogy: My arm is spatially extended and it has fingers down at its end, but it doesn't need to have fingers all along its entire length.

P3. Our experience is limited to only one time.

I'm going to argue with this one too.

Assuming that we are conscious throughout our lives (which isn't likely to be true) we should probably say that our consciousness at time T-1 is consciousness of T-1, while our consciousness at time T-2 is consciousness of T-2. So we can say that our time-slices are experiencing throughout, but only experiencing the time in which that particular slice resides (plus accumulated memories).

So I'd say that I don't see any contradiction in your premises and your C doesn't seem to me to follow.

If we replace P2 with the expectation that different time slices will differ from each other depending on the changes that the temporally extended being undergoes during the course of its existence, and replace P3 with the expectation that the experience represented by a particular time-slice is limited to awareness of that time-slice, then the worm-theory would still seem to work.

Maybe I'm not understanding the distinction between worm-theory and stage-theory properly. It's conceivable that my amendments to your premises and my interpreting personal identity in something other than a strong logical way has moved me towards being a stage theorist and I'm actually conceding your point without realizing it.

But it seems to me that if we imagine worm-theory as requiring that each cross-section of the worm be absolutely identical to every other cross-section of the worm, that reduces worm-theory to a straw man. I'm not sure that anyone who has proposed this conceptual model has argued for such a thing. They acknowledge that change happens over time and that temporal cross-sections of the same individual can differ radically. (Me at one week old and me at 80 years old.) Certainly anatomical cross-sections through spatially extended biological worms won't all be anatomically identical either.

Pierre-Normand

Welcome to the forum!

...So here is my argument in a nutshell against the worm view:

P1. The worm theory requires that we are temporally extended beings.
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together*.
P3. Our experience is limited to only one time.
____________________________
C. The worm theory is false.

* Note that by saying that I should have all of my experiences "together", I do not mean that we have all of our experiences "at once" as in "at a time". Our experience can extend across multiple times, just as much as our bodily experiences at a single time is spatially extended (I see through my eyes and feel through the nerves in my body for example). The point is that we have them all. — Mr Bee

This note is indeed an important concession for you to make to the proponent of the worm-view, (which is a view about identity also called perdurantism). But its seems to me that it is hard to make consistent with your defense of P3. (See below)

The support for P3. is simply based upon introspection about our direct experience. My judgement I am not experiencing any other times shouldn't be illusory any more than my judgement that I am not in excruciating pain, or that I my judgement that I am having a red experience, which I take to be pretty certain. For me, I find that my experiences are only limited to me sitting here typing up this post at this time and nothing else, and I believe that a similar finding would hold for you too. This experience of me sitting in my room in front of my computer is not had as part of any other experience or together with other experiences at other times. — Mr Bee

I think the worm-theorist would readily accept the way you are characterizing the content of your experience (i.e. what it is you are experiencing) but she would question your portrayal of what it is to be the subject of a singular experience. The worm-theorist would claim that each separate content of experience had by you over time is being had (which denotes a singular event rather than an ownership relation) not by "your" perduring worm as a whole, but rather by just the one contemporaneous temporal stage of your worm that is occurring at the time when this experience is being had. Hence, the fact that you (the whole worm) are truly only experiencing one thing at a time just reflects the fact that those episodes (or events) of experiencing something or other characterize your own temporal stages separately. In yet other words, your saying that you only experience one thing at a given time only boils down to saying that only one single temporal stage of yourself (i.e. just one time-slice of yourself) is involved directly in this experiencing. (There may still be indirect involvement through the exercise of memory and anticipation).

Mr Bee

↪yazata

Just because something is temporally extended needn't imply that every temporal slice of the extended thing is identical to every other temporal slice. Differences between one slice and another would represent change in this this kind of scheme, and we obviously change during the course of our lives. (That introduces the problem of how to define personal identity.)

I am not saying that every part is identical to every other part, or that it is a requirement for composite objects. Certainly such a view would be clearly false because that would mean that there can be no objects with heterogeneous parts.

I am merely saying that the whole, which is identical to the sum of every part (but not identical to each individual part) should itself have the sum of the experiences which every part has. That is, if a time slice has experience x at T1, and another one has an experience y at T2, then, as the being who is composed of both time slices, I should have an experience x at T1 and y at T2. In other words, I have them both together.

Assuming that we are conscious throughout our lives (which isn't likely to be true)...

Even if that weren't the case, we are certainly still conscious for a fair amount more than a single instant, so it doesn't seem to matter for the purposes of my argument.

... we should probably say that our consciousness at time T-1 is consciousness of T-1, while our consciousness at time T-2 is consciousness of T-2. So we can say that our time-slices are experiencing throughout, but only experiencing the time in which that particular slice resides (plus accumulated memories).

This probably has more to do with P2. than P3 IMO. From the looks of it since you don't seem to be disputing what I claim to be experiencing (or really not experiencing) as a conscious subject and are instead focused on what we should be experiencing.

In any case, I think your objection is missing some context. Sure a consciousness at a time has conscious experiences of that time, but what does this say for a temporally extended spacetime worm that is the sum of multiple consciousnesses at multiple times?

Maybe I'm not understanding the distinction between worm-theory and stage-theory properly. It's conceivable that my amendments to your premises and my interpreting personal identity in something other than a strong logical way has moved me towards being a stage theorist and I'm actually conceding your point without realizing it.

Sorry if my explanations aren't clear enough. The wiki on perdurantism distinguishes between both views, so perhaps you can check that out for a quick reference.

Mr Bee

↪Pierre-Normand

Hello and thank you for welcoming me.

I think the worm-theorist would readily accept the way you are characterizing the content of your experience (i.e. what it is you are experiencing) but she would question your portrayal of who it is who is the subject of this experience. The worm-theorist would claim that each separate content of experience had over time is being had (which is a event rather than an ownership relation) not by "your" perduring worm as a whole, but rather by just the one contemporaneous temporal stage of your worm that is occurring at the time when this experience is being had. Hence, the fact that you are truly only experiencing one thing at a time just reflects the fact that those episodes (or events) of experiencing something or other characterize your own temporal stages separately. In yet other words, your saying that you only experience one thing at a given time only boils down to saying that only one single temporal stage of yourself (i.e. just one time-slice of your worm) is involved directly in this experiencing. (There may still be indirect involvement through the exercise of memory and anticipation).

It seems that this type of response collapses to the stage theory does it not? Cause if we are going to grant that there are multiple different conscious subjects who exist at every stage of our lives anyways, then why not just adopt the stage view? As far as I know, the worm theory claims that there is one only entity, one conscious subject which identifies with the whole spacetime worm. Although it is conceivable to argue that such a being could also exist on top of the multiple conscious subjects at every time it would seem unnecessary to do so.

Pierre-Normand

It seems that this type of response collapses to the stage theory does it not? Cause if we are going to grant that there are multiple different conscious subjects who exist at every stage of our lives anyways, then why not just adopt the stage view? — Mr Bee

That's because the eternalists (or the perdurantists) aren't saying that there are different conscious subjects along your world-line. You are the whole worm, and your temporal time-slices are temporal parts of yourself just as much as your hands and feet (or rather, their own worms), say, are "spatial parts" of yourself. What the eternalist may argue is that your having experiences one at a time doesn't contradict your being a worm who is having those experiences anymore that your being touched by someone on specific parts of your body, say, contradicts that it is you, the same individual, who is being touched in each case.

As far as I know, the worm theory claims that there is one only entity, one conscious subject which identifies with the whole spacetime worm.

Agreed.

Although it is conceivable to argue that such a being could also exist on top of the multiple conscious subjects at every time it would seem unnecessary to do so.

Agreed. The defense that I mustered on behalf of the eternalist doesn't need that.

Hanover

↪Mr Bee

I take this as the stage theory:

As I sit here typing, my existence is infinitely small in terms of space and time and the only thing I can say is that this experience, which includes not only of me typing, but of countless other extraneous experiences (like what I just ate, the temperature, my knowledge of my family, my drive in this morning, etc.) is all that is me.

So here I am at T-1 with experiential state E-1 and then there is someone else at T-2 and E-2. We'll call T-1 at E-1, person 1, or P-1 and then T-2 at E-2, P-2. So now we have P-1 and P-2 eternally existing simultaneously, as time is eternal and not sequential. That means what we really have is P-1, P-2, P-3.... all simultaneously existing. We have no reason, of course, to believe that P-1's experiences are at all similar to P-2's. What we have are an infinitely large (or finitely massive) number of people spread out throughout all of eternity with fixed thoughts at a fixed moment thinking that thought forever and ever.

My objection to this theory is that it sure as hell seems like I have thoughts that change over time and not that I'm stuck in my single thought. The concept of change seems impossible under an eternalist theory because there is no becoming, just existing.

Pierre-Normand

My objection to this theory is that it sure as hell seems like I have thoughts that change over time and not that I'm stuck in my single thought. The concept of change seems impossible under an eternalist theory because there is no becoming, just existing. — Hanover

I quite agree. But I think both the views of endurantism (closely associated with stage-theory) and perdurantism (closely associated with eternalism or 4-dimensionalism) make it hard to account for the metaphysics of change. I used to be committed to endurantism, myself, but Sebastian Rödl (see his Categories of the Temporal, HUP, 2012) made me realize that everything that the perdurantist may want to say can be translated without loss in the language of the endurantist, and vice versa. What is really missing to both from those view about time, objects and predication, is the Aristotelian concept of a substance.

On edit: contrary to what I said above, stage-theory is more commonly viewed as a variety of perdurantism. This makes sense, since endurantism entails that when a "stage" is present, then the whole objects is present, although its past "stages" don't exist anymore, and its future "stages" don't exist yet. Hence, worm theory and stage theory are two varieties of perdurantism.

Mr Bee

↪Pierre-Normand

That's because the eternalist (or the perdurantist) aren't saying that there are different conscious subjects along your world-line. You are the whole worm, and your temporal time-slices are temporal parts of yours just as much as your hands and feets (or rather, their own worms) are spatial parts of yours. What the eternalist may argue is that your having experiences one at a time doesn't contradict your being a worm who is having those experiences anymore that your being touched by someone on specific parts of your body, say, contradicts that it is you, the same individual, who is being touched in each case.

I think you are misinterpreting what I mean in my P3 since you seem to be emphasizing the fact that I am only having an experience "at a given time". When I say that I am only experiencing a certain set of experiences, I am not saying that my experience is limited to a certain set of experiences "at a time", I am saying that I am only having those experiences in general. Nowhere when I introspect upon my experience does the notion of my experience being had "at a time" even come in. I, as the entity that should be a temporally extended conscious subject, only have an experience of sitting in my room in front of my computer simpliciter. This is just how it feels to me.

SImilarly, if I told you that I am only seeing red in my vision and you reply by saying that I am "really" saying that I am only seeing red at a particular part of my visual field, then I will tell you that I am not making any such claim at all and that I am only referring to my visual experiences of seeing only red in a general sense simpliciter.

Pierre-Normand

I, as the entity that should be a temporally extended conscious subject, only have an experience of sitting in my room in front of my computer simpliciter. This is just how it feels to me. — Mr Bee

Yes, and the worm theorist need not dispute that. But then, at a later time, you go out and see a tree in the garden. You are having another experience with a different content. The worm theorist says that those two events relate you, the very same individual (or space-time worm) to the two separate contents of those experiences. But just because the same individual is thus related to two separate experience contents doesn't contradict the fact that, as part of the form of those very experiences, you are picturing yourself as having them in isolation (in the "present time" when you are having them). All this goes on to show, from the point of view of the worm theorist, is that the different segments of the "worm" are, indeed distinctive parts of that worm with distinguishable properties.

The Great Whatever

Hi, I'm not going to read the thread, but –

P3 seems easily deniable by the worm-theorist, who can claim that we experience all times in which we exist (it's just, as you note, that this experience is temporally extended). At best you have only the trivial premise that we only experience one time 'at a time,' which can of course be granted.

In other words, given the fact that we expect the experience to be temporally extended, this:

My judgement I am not experiencing any other times

won't cut it, since you need the conclusion 'I will not experience any other times,' which isn't made plausible by introspection in the same way.

Mr Bee

↪Pierre-Normand

Yes, and the worm theorist need not dispute that.

I disagree. The claim that I am having an experience of sitting in my room only is simply inconsistent with the claim that I am also having another experience that is not of me sitting in my room (as you later claim). You cannot have both facts be true so one of them has to be false.

The worm theorist says that those two events relate you, the very same individual (or space-time worm) to the two separate contents of those experiences.

If that was indeed the case, then I should not be introspecting myself as only having one of those experiences (again, not specified as being "at a time"). So much as I have an experience of one of those times, I should've found that that particular experience is had as part of a larger experience which also contains the experience of the other time along with any other times I may have (at least if my introspection on my direct experience is supposed to be certain). This is what it would mean to have both experiences together after all.

Mr Bee

↪The Great Whatever

P3 seems easily deniable by the worm-theorist, who can claim that we experience all times in which we exist (it's just, as you note, temporally extended).

It's easy for someone to claim that you experiencing all of your times, but do you really find yourself having all of them? I can claim that you are in excruciating pain right now despite your protests to the contrary, but I imagine that that is not gonna be convincing if you simply do not find yourself as being in pain.

At best you have only the trivial premise that we only experience one time 'at a time,' which can of course be granted. — The Great Whatever

Like I told Pierre, when I say that I find myself as only having the experience of, say, me sitting in my room, I am not saying that I am having them "at a time". Nowhere does such a notion come into my description of what I am experiencing. I only say that I am only having this experience in a general sense.

Pierre-Normand

Like I told Pierre, when I say that I find myself as only having the experience of, say, me sitting in my room, I am not saying that I am having them "at a time". Nowhere does such a notion come into my description of what I am experiencing. I only say that I am only having this experience in a general sense. — Mr Bee

But this is just to say that the time at which you are having an experience doesn't figure explicitly as part of the content of this experience. You can distinguish, though, right now, between your relating to experiences had by you in the past, in the present, or in the future. You can say, and believe: "I saw my friend earlier"; "I am seeing my friend now" and "I will see my friend later". In those forms of expression the words "earlier", "now", and "later" function as indexicals. The times that they refer to are functions of the time when the expressions are being uttered. (Likewise, the word "I" can refer to you by dint of the fact that it is being used by you; and the word "here" refers to a specific place by dint of its being uttered by someone located at that place.)

When you are enjoying the visual experience a tree, you need not be thinking of this experience under a mode of presentation (i.e. a Fregean sense) that could be expressed thus: "I am seeing this tree at 4:16 PM on April 10th 2017". You could also be expressing the same content under the different mode "I am seeing this tree now", which is equivalent to the content of "I am seeing a tree". In the latter form of expression, the temporal reference of the expression "now" is tacitly encoded into the tense of the verb "seeing" (together with the progressive aspect). It thus has the same Fregean sense. You can't really have a visual experience while being agnostic regarding the time when you are having it (i.e. regarding its being either present, past or future). If you are doubting whether an experience is a present visual experience or a fuzzy memory, for instance, then you are doubting its very status as an experience as opposed to its being a product of your imagination, say.

The Great Whatever

It's easy for someone to claim that you experiencing all of your times, — Mr Bee

Not that you are experiencing all of them, but that you have or will experience(d) (or are experiencing) all of them.

I am not saying that I am having them "at a time". Nowhere does such a notion come into my description of what I am experiencing. — Mr Bee

But it does, via the present tense, which is anchored to the time of the speech act.

Mr Bee

↪Pierre-Normand

But this is just to say that the time at which you are having an experience doesn't figure explicitly as part of the content of this experience. — Pierre-Normand

There's more to it than that actually. If an experience is had as part of a larger experience, then I believe that this fact should figure into the content of that experience itself. Let me give an example of what I mean by that.

Take a visual experience of seeing only blue. Now take an experience of seeing only red. Imagine the two cases where you have them separately, and not together. Now imagine having them both together as parts of a larger visual experience. I imagine that in the latter case, you will probably see the red experience differently in this context then if it were had alone. More specifically, I imagine you will find that the red experience is had at a particular portion of your visual field (of course there are various configurations in which you can imagine this, perhaps the red experience is to the left side of your vision, or perhaps in the centre, while the rest of your vision is engulfed by blue). The same goes for your blue experience as well. The red and blue experiences can no longer be described as being seen simpliciter as they are when they are being had alone. In fact, when I ask myself whether or not I am seeing each of them in that way, I simply find that I do not have such an experience (in fact it seems impossible for me to even imagine what it would be like to see both red and blue simpliciter together). Instead I find that these colour experiences of mine are had "over there" occupying their own particular regions of my experience. Unlike when I have them alone, I have to specify a location to describe precisely how I experience them. In essence, as a result of both experiences not being had alone, they each feel differently.

Of course, I don't believe that this sort of interdependence is limited to just visual experiences. We also have this sort of experience with regards to our other senses as well (for example, I may be having a feeling of coldness in my left hand and heat in my right), but I think it's more general. I believe that any set of experiences had together would exhibit this sort of feature in some form, which also includes having multiple experiences over time. If this is true, then given that the worm theory requires that we are a subject which has all of our experiences, then our experiences at every time should similarly feel distinctly different as opposed to how they would feel if they were had alone. If this sort of distinct feeling can be characterized as the feeling of "being at a particular time" then I would have to disagree with you that the time of an experience does not feature within is felt content.

Mr Bee

↪The Great Whatever

I'm in a rush right now, but I just want to say that the worm theory is an eternalist theory. The notions of "experienced", "will" and "present-tense" do not make sense under that sort of view since there is no such thing as a flow of time.

The Great Whatever

↪Mr Bee

I'm not sure that's right, but in any case it doesn't matter – as long as there's a notion of having an experience at a time, the same holds, since the present tense in your claim will be translated to mean 'I experience only t at t,' t the time of utterance. It doesn't follow from this that for no other t', t'', you experience t' at t'' (which you must allow since as you say you accept experiences are temporally extended). In fact we'd expect for every t', you experience t' at t' so long as you're conscious.

noAxioms

Have not read the entire thread yet, but it seems the only difference between worm theory and stage theory is the assignment of identity relationship between the temporal parts. I am a stage theorist myself, but not for any of the reasons you bring up. So assuming one 4D structure, worm theory works fine.

P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together*.
P3. Our experience is limited to only one time. — Mr Bee

As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017. You're saying I cannot have experience of 2010 despite my existence there? That makes no sense. 2010 is not a year of sensory deprivation for me.

Pierre-N articulates the issue with a spatial analogy, and pretty much hits the mark. I exist from head to toe, but don't expect to feel at my feet an itch at my shoulder. Each part senses its own input. Our experience is not limited to one spatial location on the body, as the logic behind P3 would imply.

Banno

P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together*. — Mr Bee

Shouldn't this read:
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have each of our experiences at each time in which we exist.

And if so, your conclusion does not follow.

Luke

I don’t fully comprehend the distinction between stage theory and worm theory, but they are both consistent with a 4-D block universe, and a 4-D block universe is consistent with a static, motionless universe. Endurantism, on the other hand, is consistent with a 3-D dynamic (presentist) universe. I believe that the perdurantist “stage theory” is an attempt to incorporate some dynamic aspect into the static 4-D block universe, but I consider these to be irreconcilable.

Likewise, the reason given in the OP: “P3. Our experience is limited to only one time” also appears to be an attempt to reconcile the dynamic nature of our experience of time with the assumed scientific reality of a static 4-D block universe. However, an easier way to reconcile them is to drop (or else fully embrace) the assumption of the 4-D block universe, which is simply a model of (static) existence over time. However, if our dynamic experience cannot be considered illusory (because it would undermine the meaning of the terms “experience” or “illusion” - as illusions and other experiences can only be had “in” time), then dynamism must be real, and the problem must lie with the static block universe model.

Mr Bee

↪The Great Whatever

↪Pierre-Normand

You can say, and believe: "I saw my friend earlier"; "I am seeing my friend now" and "I will see my friend later". In those forms of expression the words "earlier", "now", and "later" function as indexicals. The times that they refer to are functions of the time when the expressions are being uttered. (Likewise, the word "I" can refer to you by dint of the fact that it is being used by you; and the word "here" refers to a specific place by dint of its being uttered by someone located at that place.)

When you are enjoying the visual experience a tree, you need not be thinking of this experience under a mode of presentation (i.e. a Fregean sense) that could be expressed thus: "I am seeing this tree at 4:16 PM on April 10th 2017". You could also be expressing the same content under the different mode "I am seeing this tree now", which is equivalent to the content of "I am seeing a tree". — Pierre-Normand

I'm not sure that's right, but in any case it doesn't matter – as long as there's a notion of having an experience at a time, the same holds, since the present tense in your claim will be translated to mean 'I experience only t at t,' t the time of utterance. — The Great Whatever

Maybe I don't understand indexicals well enough, but even if we were to assume that there was a present tense that attaches itself to my claims, I still don't see why it should only refer strictly to the time of the utterance itself and not, say, something less restrictive, like the time in which the person making that utterance exists. It might sound weird to distinguish the two, but that is because in usual cases where we use the term "now" we do not explicitly assume that we are temporally extended beings, and the speaker of a phrase always exists limited to a single time in which they make these utterances (in accord with the common sense views of time). But here, there is a distinction between the time in which an utterance occurs and the temporal region in which the person uttering it exists. I see no reason why we should use the former usage over the latter. In fact, I think the latter is a more reasonable view to take if we consider the similar case for "here".

Just as much as you can say that there is a present tense anchor to all of our experiential claims, you could probably also say that any claim about my experience should have a spatial anchor to it. This requires me to always describe an experience as being had "here". But what is meant by "here"? We can say that it is limited to the location in which the utterance is occurring, more specifically the location of the words themselves coming out of my mouth, but that sounds too limited IMO. It seems more reasonable to me to assume that when I say"here" I mean the spatially extended in which I, as the speaker of the phrase, exist. Similarly, it sounds more reasonable to assume that when I say "now" , I can only be referring to the temporally extended region in which I exist. If this is the case then I as a temporally extended worm cannot mean "the time of this utterance" when I use the phrase "now".

The Great Whatever

even if we were to assume that there was a present tense that attaches itself to my claim — Mr Bee

I don't think this is an assumption – it's a plain fact.

I am not experiencing any other times

That is written in the present progressive, and means that you are not experiencing any other times at the time of utterance. That's just a fact about English, not a metaphysical claim.

I see no reason why we should use the former over the latter. — Mr Bee

Because that is not what the sentence means, because that is not how the present tense in English functions.

If instead you opted for something like

I do not experience any other times

(as a habitual), then this simply rings false, since you do habitually experience other times (viz. you tend to experience whichever time it happens to be). And same with 'will not,' 'have not,' etc.

Mr Bee

↪noAxioms

↪Banno

As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017. You're saying I cannot have experience of 2010 despite my existence there? That makes no sense. 2010 is not a year of sensory deprivation for me. — noAxioms

I am not saying that you cannot (in face, P2. explicitly states that you must have them). I am just saying that you do not have them (or maybe you do, but I don't). If part of me really did exist at 2010, then I would've felt the experiences of 2010 as part of my overall experience. But I simply do not. The pains the joys of that year should be present as part of my total experience, but I simply do not find them to be there.

Shouldn't this read:
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have each of our experiences at each time in which we exist. — Banno

I don't see how that is any different from my P2. Suppose I have three bank accounts, each of which hold a certain sum of money. There doesn't seem to be a difference between these two claims:

- If I own all three bank accounts, I have all of the money that is had in each account together.
- If I own all three bank accounts, then I have each dollar that is in each of the bank accounts that I own.

Maybe this is what you want to say anyways. If so, then please tell me how the rest of my argument fails.

Banno

↪Mr Bee

The difference is that at any one time one experiences only the experiences for that time.

Mr Bee

↪Banno

The difference is that at any one time one experiences only the experiences for that time. — Banno

Just as much as for any bank account, I own only the money in that account. But that doesn't stop me from owning all the money in every account simply by owning all the accounts themselves. I still don't see how this is different from my P2. for our temporal experience since I am perfectly willing to say that at any one time we experience only the experiences at that time. Still doesn't stop someone who is composed of all of those times to have all of those experiences (in fact seems to be a straightforward consequence of having them as parts).

As far as I know, my experience is simply not like that. I only find myself having the experience of being in my room in front of my computer and nothing more. You could object like others that what I am "actually" saying is that I am only having these such experiences "at a time", but then I wouldn't see that as being anything other than dictating what I should claim to be experiencing.

The Great Whatever

I only find myself having the experience of being in my room in front of my computer and nothing more. — Mr Bee

But this is just false, right? Read that back to yourself and ask whether it's true. The only thing you experience is being at your computer? No: you experience plenty of other things as well.

Oh, but you mean right now...?

Mr Bee

↪The Great Whatever

But this is just false, right? Read that back to yourself and ask whether it's true. The only thing you experience is being at your computer? No: you experience plenty of other things as well. — The Great Whatever

Like? Certainly my experience of being in my room describes a complex set of experiences. My visual experience of me of the computer screen in front of me, the feeling of sitting in my seat and the feel of the fingers typing on the keyboard, and the silent hum of the background noise. What more do you expect there to be?

The Great Whatever

↪Mr Bee

So I'm trying to understand how to interpret your claim. If I say this:

I only find myself having the experience of being in my room in front of my computer and nothing more.

My first inclination is that this is simply false. I experience all sorts of things, not only my experience of being in my room in front of my computer. I also experience being outside, for example.

This is the reading I get when 'I only find myself having the experience' is read habitually.

I can also read the sentence as pertaining to what I am now experiencing. Then, it looks true, as you've said – but you've insisted that this is not how you intend the sentence to be construed.

So I'm stuck. The only way it sounds plausibly true to me is on the reading that you insist you are not interested in. And so on neither reading is your argument plausible, since there is no reason to accept P3, or any of the permutations of it you've offered (indeed, P3 simply sounds false, if not read as pertaining to the present time).

The Great Whatever

To be on the nose about it, this:

Certainly my experience of being in my room describes a complex set of experiences. My visual experience of me of the computer screen in front of me, the feeling of sitting in my seat and the feel of the fingers typing on the keyboard, and the silent hum of the background noise. What more do you expect there to be? — Mr Bee

Is obviously a description of what your experiences were at the time of typing, not what they are in general or at different times. Surely you experience different things at different times?

So you seem to be in a dilemma: either construe your claim as plausibly true, and thus restrict it to one time, making your premise trivial, and so not getting the conclusion you want; or construe your claim as obviously false, invalidating the argument.

Mr Bee

↪The Great Whatever

I can also read the sentence as pertaining to what I am now experiencing. Then, it looks true, as you've said – but you've insisted that this is not how you intend the sentence to be construed. — The Great Whatever

So much as I have disagreed with you, it had more to do with the restricted definition of what you want "now" to mean. What I have insisted is not true was mainly the identification of "now" as "the specific moment in which this utterance is had". Nowhere does that notion come up when I say that I only have a certain set of experiences and nowhere do I even mean anything like that.

I have proposed an alternative conception of "now", describing the "temporal region in which I exist" as a better description of what I would mean when I would have to use the word now. I even gave an analogy involving our use of "here" to support it. After all, "here" simply specifies my location, not that of the utterance, and it seems like "now" should similarly specify the location in time, not of the utterance, but of myself, whatever that may be.

Apparently that didn't sit well with you because that is not how the word "now", as commonly construed in our everyday language, is used. Technically, under something like a layman presentist framework, the word "now" can refer to both the time in which I exist and the time of the utterance, but that is certainly not true under something the worm view (or really any view that allows for a temporally extended experience). If you want to convince me that this usage of "now" is somehow mistaken, then you would need to give me more in way of an argument.

Is obviously a description of what your experiences were at the time of typing, not what they are in general or at different times. Surely you experience different things at different times? — The Great Whatever

But I was describing them in general, at least I wasn't intentionally specifying a specific time in which something like "I only experience x" rings true. I just mean "I only experience x simpliciter". Just because the set of experiences I have in general happens to be limited to the contents of a single time does not mean that I am saying they are limited to those contents only within that specific context, so I am not sure how you made that connection.

Eternalists should be Stage theorists

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