...So here is my argument in a nutshell against the worm view:
P1. The worm theory requires that we are temporally extended beings.
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together*.
P3. Our experience is limited to only one time.
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C. The worm theory is false.
* Note that by saying that I should have all of my experiences "together", I do not mean that we have all of our experiences "at once" as in "at a time". Our experience can extend across multiple times, just as much as our bodily experiences at a single time is spatially extended (I see through my eyes and feel through the nerves in my body for example). The point is that we have them all. — Mr Bee
The support for P3. is simply based upon introspection about our direct experience. My judgement I am not experiencing any other times shouldn't be illusory any more than my judgement that I am not in excruciating pain, or that I my judgement that I am having a red experience, which I take to be pretty certain. For me, I find that my experiences are only limited to me sitting here typing up this post at this time and nothing else, and I believe that a similar finding would hold for you too. This experience of me sitting in my room in front of my computer is not had as part of any other experience or together with other experiences at other times. — Mr Bee
Just because something is temporally extended needn't imply that every temporal slice of the extended thing is identical to every other temporal slice. Differences between one slice and another would represent change in this this kind of scheme, and we obviously change during the course of our lives. (That introduces the problem of how to define personal identity.)
Assuming that we are conscious throughout our lives (which isn't likely to be true)...
... we should probably say that our consciousness at time T-1 is consciousness of T-1, while our consciousness at time T-2 is consciousness of T-2. So we can say that our time-slices are experiencing throughout, but only experiencing the time in which that particular slice resides (plus accumulated memories).
Maybe I'm not understanding the distinction between worm-theory and stage-theory properly. It's conceivable that my amendments to your premises and my interpreting personal identity in something other than a strong logical way has moved me towards being a stage theorist and I'm actually conceding your point without realizing it.
I think the worm-theorist would readily accept the way you are characterizing the content of your experience (i.e. what it is you are experiencing) but she would question your portrayal of who it is who is the subject of this experience. The worm-theorist would claim that each separate content of experience had over time is being had (which is a event rather than an ownership relation) not by "your" perduring worm as a whole, but rather by just the one contemporaneous temporal stage of your worm that is occurring at the time when this experience is being had. Hence, the fact that you are truly only experiencing one thing at a time just reflects the fact that those episodes (or events) of experiencing something or other characterize your own temporal stages separately. In yet other words, your saying that you only experience one thing at a given time only boils down to saying that only one single temporal stage of yourself (i.e. just one time-slice of your worm) is involved directly in this experiencing. (There may still be indirect involvement through the exercise of memory and anticipation).
It seems that this type of response collapses to the stage theory does it not? Cause if we are going to grant that there are multiple different conscious subjects who exist at every stage of our lives anyways, then why not just adopt the stage view? — Mr Bee
As far as I know, the worm theory claims that there is one only entity, one conscious subject which identifies with the whole spacetime worm.
Although it is conceivable to argue that such a being could also exist on top of the multiple conscious subjects at every time it would seem unnecessary to do so.
My objection to this theory is that it sure as hell seems like I have thoughts that change over time and not that I'm stuck in my single thought. The concept of change seems impossible under an eternalist theory because there is no becoming, just existing. — Hanover
That's because the eternalist (or the perdurantist) aren't saying that there are different conscious subjects along your world-line. You are the whole worm, and your temporal time-slices are temporal parts of yours just as much as your hands and feets (or rather, their own worms) are spatial parts of yours. What the eternalist may argue is that your having experiences one at a time doesn't contradict your being a worm who is having those experiences anymore that your being touched by someone on specific parts of your body, say, contradicts that it is you, the same individual, who is being touched in each case.
I, as the entity that should be a temporally extended conscious subject, only have an experience of sitting in my room in front of my computer simpliciter. This is just how it feels to me. — Mr Bee
My judgement I am not experiencing any other times
Yes, and the worm theorist need not dispute that.
The worm theorist says that those two events relate you, the very same individual (or space-time worm) to the two separate contents of those experiences.
P3 seems easily deniable by the worm-theorist, who can claim that we experience all times in which we exist (it's just, as you note, temporally extended).
At best you have only the trivial premise that we only experience one time 'at a time,' which can of course be granted. — The Great Whatever
Like I told Pierre, when I say that I find myself as only having the experience of, say, me sitting in my room, I am not saying that I am having them "at a time". Nowhere does such a notion come into my description of what I am experiencing. I only say that I am only having this experience in a general sense. — Mr Bee
It's easy for someone to claim that you experiencing all of your times, — Mr Bee
I am not saying that I am having them "at a time". Nowhere does such a notion come into my description of what I am experiencing. — Mr Bee
But this is just to say that the time at which you are having an experience doesn't figure explicitly as part of the content of this experience. — Pierre-Normand
As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017. You're saying I cannot have experience of 2010 despite my existence there? That makes no sense. 2010 is not a year of sensory deprivation for me.P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together*.
P3. Our experience is limited to only one time. — Mr Bee
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have all of our experiences at every time in which we exist together*. — Mr Bee
You can say, and believe: "I saw my friend earlier"; "I am seeing my friend now" and "I will see my friend later". In those forms of expression the words "earlier", "now", and "later" function as indexicals. The times that they refer to are functions of the time when the expressions are being uttered. (Likewise, the word "I" can refer to you by dint of the fact that it is being used by you; and the word "here" refers to a specific place by dint of its being uttered by someone located at that place.)
When you are enjoying the visual experience a tree, you need not be thinking of this experience under a mode of presentation (i.e. a Fregean sense) that could be expressed thus: "I am seeing this tree at 4:16 PM on April 10th 2017". You could also be expressing the same content under the different mode "I am seeing this tree now", which is equivalent to the content of "I am seeing a tree". — Pierre-Normand
I'm not sure that's right, but in any case it doesn't matter – as long as there's a notion of having an experience at a time, the same holds, since the present tense in your claim will be translated to mean 'I experience only t at t,' t the time of utterance. — The Great Whatever
even if we were to assume that there was a present tense that attaches itself to my claim — Mr Bee
I am not experiencing any other times
I see no reason why we should use the former over the latter. — Mr Bee
I do not experience any other times
As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017. You're saying I cannot have experience of 2010 despite my existence there? That makes no sense. 2010 is not a year of sensory deprivation for me. — noAxioms
Shouldn't this read:
P2. If we are temporally extended beings, then we must have each of our experiences at each time in which we exist. — Banno
The difference is that at any one time one experiences only the experiences for that time. — Banno
I only find myself having the experience of being in my room in front of my computer and nothing more. — Mr Bee
But this is just false, right? Read that back to yourself and ask whether it's true. The only thing you experience is being at your computer? No: you experience plenty of other things as well. — The Great Whatever
I only find myself having the experience of being in my room in front of my computer and nothing more.
Certainly my experience of being in my room describes a complex set of experiences. My visual experience of me of the computer screen in front of me, the feeling of sitting in my seat and the feel of the fingers typing on the keyboard, and the silent hum of the background noise. What more do you expect there to be? — Mr Bee
I can also read the sentence as pertaining to what I am now experiencing. Then, it looks true, as you've said – but you've insisted that this is not how you intend the sentence to be construed. — The Great Whatever
Is obviously a description of what your experiences were at the time of typing, not what they are in general or at different times. Surely you experience different things at different times? — The Great Whatever
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