I don’t fully comprehend the distinction between stage theory and worm theory, but they are both consistent with a 4-D block universe, and a 4-D block universe is consistent with a static, motionless universe. Endurantism, on the other hand, is consistent with a 3-D dynamic (presentist) universe. I believe that the perdurantist “stage theory” is an attempt to incorporate some dynamic aspect into the static 4-D block universe, but I consider these to be irreconcilable.
... — Luke
I have proposed an alternative conception of "now", describing the "temporal region in which I exist" as a better description of what I would mean when I would have to use the word now. I even gave an analogy involving our use of "here" to support it. After all, "here" simply specifies my location, not that of the utterance, and it seems like "now" should similarly specify the location in time, not of the utterance, but of myself, whatever that may be. — Mr Bee
Apparently that didn't sit well with you because that is not what the word "now", as commonly construed in our everyday language, is used. Technically, under something like a layman presentist framework, the word "now" can refer to both the time in which I exist and the time of the utterance, but that is certainly not true under something the worm view (or really any view that allows for a temporally extended experience). If this type of view isn't satisfactory to you then I will probably need more of an argument to be convinced.
You seem to expect the 2017 component of yourself to experience the 2010 joys as if they were 2017 experiences. Sort of a dualistic thinking that what you are is an external experiencer that has time of its own, and should have access to the entire physical worm-being 'at once'.I am not saying that you cannot (in face, P2. explicitly states that you must have them). I am just saying that you do not have them (or maybe you do, but I don't). If part of me really did exist at 2010, then I would've felt the experiences of 2010 as part of my overall experience. But I simply do not. The pains the joys of that year should be present as part of my total experience, but I simply do not find them to be there. — Mr Bee
I would have thought that "here" refers to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance. (This is how, at any rate, I would make explicit what the reference of "here" is, in particular occasions of its use, without this being meant as an explanation of its Fregean sense.) — Pierre-Normand
If ordinary language is to retain a pragmatic use (and some of its meaningfulness) as interpreted within a stage theoretical framework, then, although indexicals may be taken to make no (direct) tacit reference to the time of the utterance, they would still have to make tacit reference to the specific stage of the individual to whom later stages of this individuals (and of other people) are referring back to while interpreting the original utterance. This still seems to amount to making a tacit (albeit indirect) reference to the time of utterance. — Pierre-Normand
You seem to expect the 2017 component of yourself to experience the 2010 joys as if they were 2017 experiences. Sort of a dualistic thinking that what you are is an external experiencer that has time of its own, and should have access to the entire physical worm-being 'at once'. — noAxioms
You should perhaps understand the view before writing a paper on it. It is merely a different interpretation, and the view is entirely consistent with your empirical experience. — noAxioms
The only difference between eternalism and presentism is the existence of a preferred present that moves through time. — noAxioms
The interpretation says this being does have the 2010 joys, but it does not say that the 2017 subcomponent has direct access to 2010 state (or 2020 for that matter). There seems to be an assumption that one must have simultaneous access to the experience of all of your being, which is not a property of a temporally extended definition of a being, since the being is not simultaneous (by definition).So much as the whole spacetime worm has the 2010 person as a temporal part, then we should expect this spatio-temporally extended being to have the 2010 joys. — Mr Bee
Fine. The model as you explain it is clearly conflicting, as you demonstrate in your OP. The only mistake is labeling the model 'eternalism'. What you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else.And you should perhaps get a better understanding of what I am saying first before making such claims. — Mr Bee
OK, I grant that. Growing block seems to adopt the worst features of both views. Not sure what problem is solved by the block history, but the lack of block-future seems to be an attempt to get around one's discomfort with the free will implications.Not really. Presentism also denies that any time other than the present exists. There are views that have a priveliged present but do not deny the entire structure of the block universe (growing-block views for example). — Mr Bee
The interpretation says this being does have the 2010 joys, but it does not say that the 2017 subcomponent has direct access to 2010 state (or 2020 for that matter). There seems to be an assumption that one must have simultaneous access to the experience of all of your being, which is not a property of a temporally extended definition of a being, since the being is not simultaneous (by definition). — noAxioms
Fine. The model as you explain it is clearly conflicting, as you demonstrate in your OP. The only mistake is labeling the model 'eternalism'. What you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else. — noAxioms
What I have insisted is not true was mainly the identification of "now" as "the specific moment in which this utterance is had". Nowhere does that notion come up when I say that I only have a certain set of experiences and nowhere do I even mean anything like that. — Mr Bee
I have proposed an alternative conception of "now", describing the "temporal region in which I exist" as a better description of what I would mean when I would have to use the word now. — Mr Bee
Technically, under something like a layman presentist framework, the word "now" can refer to both the time in which I exist and the time of the utterance, but that is certainly not true under something the worm view (or really any view that allows for a temporally extended experience). — Mr Bee
If you want to convince me that this usage of "now" is somehow mistaken, then you would need to give me more in way of an argument. — Mr Bee
But I was describing them in general, at least I wasn't intentionally specifying a specific time in which something like "I only experience x" rings true. I just mean "I only experience x simpliciter". Just because the set of experiences I have in general happens to be limited to the contents of a single time does not mean that I am saying they are limited to those contents only within that specific context, so I am not sure how you made that connection. — Mr Bee
You need to clarify your claim. What is "I" in that statement above? The 2017 component that has no direct experience of 2010, or the entire-worm-self "I"?I think your objection falls into the same mistake of mixing up my claim that I am only experiencing a certain set of experiences (my P3.) as a claim that I am having a certain set of experiences at a particular time. I am simply not making the latter sort of claim. — Mr Bee
Point out my inconsistency please.Correction, what you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else unrelated to my argument. That is what I mean when I say you are making strawmen. — Mr Bee
The B-view is almost necessary when discussing from a block viewpoint. To say 'existed' is to reference a moment in time that the view denies. The A-view is not wrong, but leads to misleading usage of language such as:Existence is always tensed, so when, for instance, noAxioms says "As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017,' it's clear that something is amiss. noAxioms does not exist in 2010 though it's true (I imagine) that he existed in 2010. — csalisbury
But from the reference point of 2005, the 2010 version will exist, without conflict. Confusing since the language used carries an implication of a point of reference without the need to have it explicitly stated. So the verb tenses used by the A-view are inappropriate, but not incorrect.But as a worm being, does he exist in 2010? No more than he existed in 2010, or will exist in 2010. But if, qua worm being, he simultaneously existed, exists, and will exist at all times (during the life of the worm being), then we're using 'exist' in an entirely novel and extremely fuzzy way. — csalisbury
It doesn't matter what you 'mean.' What I am saying is that the sentence you uttered, a sentence of English, cannot mean what you are saying it does. That is just not what the words mean. — The Great Whatever
If your claim is 'I only experience being at my computer during the time that I exist,' then this is clearly false – surely, you experience all sorts of other things during your life. — The Great Whatever
If you want instead to say you only experience sitting at your computer during the temporal duration of your entire existence, you should instead say that, since it means something different from your only experiencing it now. — The Great Whatever
So, in general you only experience sitting at your computer? No, clearly not, unless that's all you ever do. — The Great Whatever
But then, that sentence isn't even plausibly true. So the argument doesn't work. — The Great Whatever
You need to clarify your claim. What is "I" in that statement above? The 2017 component that has no direct experience of 2010, or the entire-worm-self "I"? — noAxioms
Point out my inconsistency please. — noAxioms
Mr Bee is using A-references (such as ambiguous "I") in discussion of absolute things, and getting the expected conflicts. Eternalism is an objective view of time, and objective terms should be used at every step. — noAxioms
Right, and furthermore, any felicitous use of 'exist' will involve it being tensed in accordance to a reference point (a 'now'). From the reference point of 2017, 2010's noAxiom existed. And from the reference point of 2017, 2017's noAxiom existsBut from the reference point of 2005, the 2010 version will exist, without conflict
As far as I can tell the only reason why you seem to believe my claim to be false is because it is inconsistent with what the worm theory says we should experience. — Mr Bee
You've been insisting that I use the present tense and I tried to comply with your demands up until this point. — Mr Bee
Thus there is a clear tension between experience and theory here and something's gotta give. However, whereas I take this as "so much worse for the worm theory", it seems that you take the opposite conclusion from me prioritizing theory over experience, which I consider to be a wrong-headed approach. — Mr Bee
Not at all. I believe it's false because they don't seem to be true, independent of theoretical position. If someone asked me what sorts of things I experience, I would probably say I experience all sorts of things, not just sitting at my computer.
Your entire argument therefore seems to rest on insisting that something that we would ordinarily say is false is true – that you only experience one thing, sitting at your computer. But of course you don't, you experience many other things as well. — The Great Whatever
Of course you might only experience that right now. But then... &c &c. — The Great Whatever
I think we may be at a roadblock here, but I genuinely think your argument is based on a linguistic confusion and so can't both be interesting & valid. And the block can't be overcome until you recognize at the very least that there is an obviously false construal of P3, on its habitual reading, which makes it uncompelling as a premise. Do you agree with that? — The Great Whatever
Of course I am not saying that the sorts of things I experience is limited to sitting in a computer, if by that you mean the types of experience I tend to experience. That is not what I am saying at all. — Mr Bee
I thought we were going with the notion of that "I only experience sitting at my computer during the temporal duration of my entire existence" — Mr Bee
In other words, so much as I am subject to a certain set of experiences only I am making the claim with regards to the whole temporal duration in which I exist (whether it be an instant or a lifetime). — Mr Bee
Right you are, illustrating the danger of using A-forms. I used 'exist' without a definition of it. If it means any presence in the block, then there is no valid use of the tense 'existed' or 'will exist'. I suppose the growing block view invalidates only the former of those two tenses.Right, and, furthermore any felicitous use of 'exist' will involve it being tensed in accordance to a reference point (a 'now'). From the reference point of 2017, 2010's noAxiom existed. And from the reference point of 2017, 2017's noAxiom exists[/i.] — csalisbury
I meant what I described above, but yes, I used the word differently in a later post. I was using B-series terminology in saying I exist in 2010. There is no 'existed' tense at all in B-series.What is the reference point you were making use of when you said "As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017'? The answer is no reference point at all. In other words, you're using 'exist' to mean something radically different than it means in ordinary usage.
Right you are, illustrating the danger of using A-forms. I used 'exist' without a definition of it. If it means any presence in the block, then there is no valid use of the tense 'existed' or 'will exist'. I suppose the growing block view invalidates only the former of those two tenses.
So what are you saying? You're not saying that the only sort of thing you experience is being on a computer. You're not saying that all you're experiencing now is this. What other construal of your claim can there be? — The Great Whatever
Well, I mean exists, but I was trying to express a definition, and it seemed circular to use the word in its own definition.What do you mean by 'presence'? — csalisbury
It went sort of bad in those two lines. The question above mixed A and B references in the same sentence, rendering its meaning ambiguous. The reply is related to what I posted in my prior post, but not worded carefully.'So,' I'd say, 'it is both true that dodos exist and that they don't exist (any longer)'?
'It depends' you'd say 'whether you're speaking as someone in 2017 or as someone speaking from a block-perspective.' — csalisbury
B-series statements are never given from any perspective that one can occupy. The location of the utterance or the receiving of the statement is irrelevant to the content of the statement.'But both apply to you!' I'd say. 'Are you saying that you can hold two contradictory statements to be true, by reference to two different perspectives? Two perspectives you're incapable of occupying separately (since, try as you will, you'll still be talking in 2017.)? That doesn't make sense.'
Maybe not. Does 2+2 objectively equal 4 or is that just property of this universe? OK, now we're waaay off topic.(Note that the conversation would have gone smooth as butter if we weren't talking about whether dodos exist, but whether 2+2=4 or the pythagorean theorem)
Didn't think I claimed that. The statement references 2017, and I chose the iceberg as my example of something that does not exist in that year.I think the question is ill formed. By definition, there cannot be the iceberg which takes out the Titanic in 2017-- neither the Titanic nor the object it hits are present in that moment. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Not following this. I'm thinking of subsequent states (different icebergs??) as being the same event or state as the Titanic sinking one? I'm probably parsing you wrong here.In the reasoning you are giving here, you are only accounting for identity in terms of the past. We realise the particular iceberg exists in 1912. But it doesn't account for the change of the future. Instead of realising any iceberg after the Titanic is a different state, a new moment, which the Titanic does not hit, you still thinking of it as the same state and moment of the crashing Titanic.
OK, that makes somewhat more sense, but seems to be more the identity thing that distinguishes the stage theorist from the worm theorist. We were discussing "as a worm being" which retains identity of a thing over a finite duration. Under the worm definition of identity, the iceberg continues existence after the Titanic hits it but eventually breaks up/melts.It's not. The iceberg in question ceased to be at the end of the Titanic's crash. (and not because it broke apart or anything like that, but rather because it is a different state of time).
Please explain to me how the only experience you have, during the temporal duration in which you exist, is sitting at your computer, while also you tend to have other sorts of experiences besides sitting at a computer. I literally cannot make sense of this conjunction of claims, except as a contradiction. — The Great Whatever
Is that the "I" that has no experience of 2010? How does your 2017 component come by memory of that year if it is not part of your experience? — noAxioms
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