I don’t fully comprehend the distinction between stage theory and worm theory, but they are both consistent with a 4-D block universe, and a 4-D block universe is consistent with a static, motionless universe. Endurantism, on the other hand, is consistent with a 3-D dynamic (presentist) universe. I believe that the perdurantist “stage theory” is an attempt to incorporate some dynamic aspect into the static 4-D block universe, but I consider these to be irreconcilable.

... — Luke

This strikes me as a very sharp diagnosis of the motivation of the stage theory.

I have proposed an alternative conception of "now", describing the "temporal region in which I exist" as a better description of what I would mean when I would have to use the word now. I even gave an analogy involving our use of "here" to support it. After all, "here" simply specifies my location, not that of the utterance, and it seems like "now" should similarly specify the location in time, not of the utterance, but of myself, whatever that may be. — Mr Bee

I would have thought that "here" refers to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance. (This is how, at any rate, I would make explicit what the reference of "here" is, in particular occasions of its use, without this being meant as an explanation of its Fregean sense.)

For instance, Sue could be teaching Max how to tidy up the workshop. She tells him: "Go fetch the hammer over there and bring it back here". Then, she accompanies him to the place where the hammer is. It would then be odd for Max to insist that the hammer now is located where Sue wanted it to be on the ground that "here" refers to the place Sue (now) is standing. Of course, if both Sue and Max are stage theorists (and not just armchair stage theorists, but people who strive to live up to stage theory in everyday talk) then they may want to reform the way in which they use indexicals. In that case Max's later counterpart may take himself to be committed to obey the instruction that had been given by Sue's younger counterpart to Max's younger counterpart. In light of Luke's earlier suggestion in this thread, this may be seen as a way of construing the semantics of indexicals that attempts to retain the dynamicism of ordinary presentism within a 4-dimensionalist framework. (Incidentally, Gareth Evans's neo-Fregean account of enduring thoughts that can be re-expressed at successive times without loss of meaning with the use of inter-related classes of demonstratives or indexicals (e.g., "here" and "there"; or "yesterday", "today", "tomorrow"...) characterize such thought as dynamic thoughts).

Apparently that didn't sit well with you because that is not what the word "now", as commonly construed in our everyday language, is used. Technically, under something like a layman presentist framework, the word "now" can refer to both the time in which I exist and the time of the utterance, but that is certainly not true under something the worm view (or really any view that allows for a temporally extended experience). If this type of view isn't satisfactory to you then I will probably need more of an argument to be convinced.

If ordinary language is to retain a pragmatic use (and some of its meaningfulness) as interpreted within a stage theoretical framework, then, although indexicals may be taken to make no (direct) tacit reference to the time of the utterance, they would still have to make tacit reference to the specific stage of the individual to whom later stages of this individuals (and of other people) are referring back to while interpreting the original utterance. This still seems to amount to making a tacit (albeit indirect) reference to the time of utterance. To completely give up on such tacit references to past and future times would lead to the disintegration of 'dynamic thoughts' and the narrowing down of experience (and of the acts of reference therein) to a narrow Cartesian space of private sense data, it seems to me.

I am not saying that you cannot (in face, P2. explicitly states that you must have them). I am just saying that you do not have them (or maybe you do, but I don't). If part of me really did exist at 2010, then I would've felt the experiences of 2010 as part of my overall experience. But I simply do not. The pains the joys of that year should be present as part of my total experience, but I simply do not find them to be there. — Mr Bee

You seem to expect the 2017 component of yourself to experience the 2010 joys as if they were 2017 experiences. Sort of a dualistic thinking that what you are is an external experiencer that has time of its own, and should have access to the entire physical worm-being 'at once'.
You should perhaps understand the view before writing a paper on it. It is merely a different interpretation, and the view is entirely consistent with your empirical experience.

The only difference between eternalism and presentism is the existence of a preferred present that moves through time. Such an entity is undetectable in the exact same way that one cannot determine which point is 'here' except that the measurement always takes place 'here'. But similar to being unable to determine by any experiment where 'here' is tomorrow, one also cannot detect where 'now' is in a place that is not here. That suggests (not proves) that both have the same ontological status: they both exist or both don't. Lack of proof for the nonexistence of this undetectable thing is why it is an interpretation.

I would have thought that "here" refers to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance. (This is how, at any rate, I would make explicit what the reference of "here" is, in particular occasions of its use, without this being meant as an explanation of its Fregean sense.) — Pierre-Normand

I can grant that. "Here" would refer to the spatio-temporal location of the utterance event (or alternatively the speaker of that utterance as I have been trying to argue for).

If ordinary language is to retain a pragmatic use (and some of its meaningfulness) as interpreted within a stage theoretical framework, then, although indexicals may be taken to make no (direct) tacit reference to the time of the utterance, they would still have to make tacit reference to the specific stage of the individual to whom later stages of this individuals (and of other people) are referring back to while interpreting the original utterance. This still seems to amount to making a tacit (albeit indirect) reference to the time of utterance. — Pierre-Normand

If we are talking about the stage theoretic framework, then indexicals such as "now" can still refer to the time of utterance regardless of which use of the word "now" you adopt. That's because, similar to dynamic views like presentism, the time in which the speaker exists and the time of utterance are identical. So reference to individual stages can just as well be taken to be references to the time of the utterance.

You seem to expect the 2017 component of yourself to experience the 2010 joys as if they were 2017 experiences. Sort of a dualistic thinking that what you are is an external experiencer that has time of its own, and should have access to the entire physical worm-being 'at once'. — noAxioms

No I do not. I am the spacetime worm that is composed of all times, not just the 2017 component of me. So much as the whole spacetime worm has the 2010 person as a temporal part, then we should expect this spatio-temporally extended being to have the 2010 joys. Also, I have no idea where this has led to dualism.

You should perhaps understand the view before writing a paper on it. It is merely a different interpretation, and the view is entirely consistent with your empirical experience. — noAxioms

And you should perhaps get a better understanding of what I am saying first before making such claims. As far as I can tell, none of what you have said characterizes what I am saying even remotely, with most of your claims consisting mainly of strawmen.

The only difference between eternalism and presentism is the existence of a preferred present that moves through time. — noAxioms

Not really. Presentism also denies that any time other than the present exists. There are views that have a priveliged present but do not deny the entire structure of the block universe (growing-block views for example).

So much as the whole spacetime worm has the 2010 person as a temporal part, then we should expect this spatio-temporally extended being to have the 2010 joys. — Mr Bee

The interpretation says this being does have the 2010 joys, but it does not say that the 2017 subcomponent has direct access to 2010 state (or 2020 for that matter). There seems to be an assumption that one must have simultaneous access to the experience of all of your being, which is not a property of a temporally extended definition of a being, since the being is not simultaneous (by definition).

And you should perhaps get a better understanding of what I am saying first before making such claims. — Mr Bee

Fine. The model as you explain it is clearly conflicting, as you demonstrate in your OP. The only mistake is labeling the model 'eternalism'. What you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else.

Not really. Presentism also denies that any time other than the present exists. There are views that have a priveliged present but do not deny the entire structure of the block universe (growing-block views for example). — Mr Bee

OK, I grant that. Growing block seems to adopt the worst features of both views. Not sure what problem is solved by the block history, but the lack of block-future seems to be an attempt to get around one's discomfort with the free will implications.

The interpretation says this being does have the 2010 joys, but it does not say that the 2017 subcomponent has direct access to 2010 state (or 2020 for that matter). There seems to be an assumption that one must have simultaneous access to the experience of all of your being, which is not a property of a temporally extended definition of a being, since the being is not simultaneous (by definition). — noAxioms

Again, I never made the statement that the 2010 joys are had by the 2017 temporal part. In fact, I have tried to make that point clear in my OP.

I think your objection falls into the same mistake of mixing up my claim that I am only experiencing a certain set of experiences (my P3.) as a claim that I am having a certain set of experiences at a particular time. I am simply not making the latter sort of claim.

Fine. The model as you explain it is clearly conflicting, as you demonstrate in your OP. The only mistake is labeling the model 'eternalism'. What you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else. — noAxioms

Correction, what you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else unrelated to my argument. That is what I mean when I say you are making strawmen.

What I have insisted is not true was mainly the identification of "now" as "the specific moment in which this utterance is had". Nowhere does that notion come up when I say that I only have a certain set of experiences and nowhere do I even mean anything like that. — Mr Bee

It doesn't matter what you 'mean.' What I am saying is that the sentence you uttered, a sentence of English, cannot mean what you are saying it does. That is just not what the words mean.

I have proposed an alternative conception of "now", describing the "temporal region in which I exist" as a better description of what I would mean when I would have to use the word now. — Mr Bee

If your claim is 'I only experience being at my computer during the time that I exist,' then this is clearly false – surely, you experience all sorts of other things during your life.

Technically, under something like a layman presentist framework, the word "now" can refer to both the time in which I exist and the time of the utterance, but that is certainly not true under something the worm view (or really any view that allows for a temporally extended experience). — Mr Bee

It doesn't matter what your view is. The word 'now' is a word of English whose meaning doesn't depend on your technical view, and you are making a claim using that word based on intuitive experience. If instead you make it using technical vocabulary, as above, then it doesn't sound true anymore, so your argument isn't convincing. You're trading on the sentence sounding true intuitively in English, which trades on it not meaning what you want it to.

If you want to convince me that this usage of "now" is somehow mistaken, then you would need to give me more in way of an argument. — Mr Bee

My argument is that that is not what the word means, and you are wrong to insist that it can mean that. If you want instead to say you only experience sitting at your computer during the temporal duration of your entire existence, you should instead say that, since it means something different from your only experiencing it now. But then, that sentence isn't even plausibly true. So the argument doesn't work.

But I was describing them in general, at least I wasn't intentionally specifying a specific time in which something like "I only experience x" rings true. I just mean "I only experience x simpliciter". Just because the set of experiences I have in general happens to be limited to the contents of a single time does not mean that I am saying they are limited to those contents only within that specific context, so I am not sure how you made that connection. — Mr Bee

So, in general you only experience sitting at your computer? No, clearly not, unless that's all you ever do.

I think your objection falls into the same mistake of mixing up my claim that I am only experiencing a certain set of experiences (my P3.) as a claim that I am having a certain set of experiences at a particular time. I am simply not making the latter sort of claim. — Mr Bee

You need to clarify your claim. What is "I" in that statement above? The 2017 component that has no direct experience of 2010, or the entire-worm-self "I"?

Correction, what you have described and driven to inconsistency is something else unrelated to my argument. That is what I mean when I say you are making strawmen. — Mr Bee

Point out my inconsistency please.

"Growing block seems to adopt the worst features of both views. Not sure what problem is solved by the block history, but the lack of block-future seems to be an attempt to get around one's discomfort with the free will implications."

--NoAxioms

In some of my philosophical moods, I kind of like the growing block idea. The 'block history' captures the idea that the past seems to be fixed. Whatever happened, happened. The idea that the block grows into the future captures the idea that the future is contingent, it doesn't exist in a fixed block-like form yet.

(I guess that the plausibility of that idea will depend on one's views on physical determinism.)

Sometimes I'm inclined to speculate about the future in vaguely quantum-mechanical terms as an almost infinite collection of superimposed possibilities. That captures the idea that the future can evolve in different ways. In this kind of scheme, the present moment would represent the 'collapse of the wave function'. And the past would be the resulting fixed actuality.

I agree with the criticism of the OP's letter, but do we agree with the spirit of the OP? Which I think is something like: 'To exist is to exist at a certain time (I'd add: without choosing to exist at that time.) a 4D worm is a totality of different times which, by definition, cannot exist at a certain time. '

Existence is always tensed, so when, for instance, @noAxioms says "As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017,' it's clear that something is amiss. noAxioms does not exist in 2010 though it's true (I imagine) that he existed in 2010.

But as a worm being, does he exist in 2010? No more than he existed in 2010, or will exist in 2010. But if, qua worm being, he simultaneously existed, exists, and will exist at all times (during the life of the worm being), then we're using 'exist' in an entirely novel and extremely fuzzy way.

If we can say that in an eternalist universe everything exists, we can, with as much right, say everything existed (but no longer does) or will exist (but does not yet). *

What's tacitly being done, when people get metaphysical with these models, is the smuggling in of a higher now in which this worm, as a totality, can exist. But the model was not meant to bear this kind of metaphysical load, and so becomes impossibly strained.

*Try arguing against this without unraveling the idea altogether.

Existence is always tensed, so when, for instance, noAxioms says "As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017,' it's clear that something is amiss. noAxioms does not exist in 2010 though it's true (I imagine) that he existed in 2010. — csalisbury

The B-view is almost necessary when discussing from a block viewpoint. To say 'existed' is to reference a moment in time that the view denies. The A-view is not wrong, but leads to misleading usage of language such as:

But as a worm being, does he exist in 2010? No more than he existed in 2010, or will exist in 2010. But if, qua worm being, he simultaneously existed, exists, and will exist at all times (during the life of the worm being), then we're using 'exist' in an entirely novel and extremely fuzzy way. — csalisbury

But from the reference point of 2005, the 2010 version will exist, without conflict. Confusing since the language used carries an implication of a point of reference without the need to have it explicitly stated. So the verb tenses used by the A-view are inappropriate, but not incorrect.

Mr Bee is using A-references (such as ambiguous "I") in discussion of absolute things, and getting the expected conflicts. Eternalism is an objective view of time, and objective terms should be used at every step.

It doesn't matter what you 'mean.' What I am saying is that the sentence you uttered, a sentence of English, cannot mean what you are saying it does. That is just not what the words mean. — The Great Whatever

When I was using the term "now", I was mainly referring to the temporal manner in which we frame our experience. Earlier, you mentioned that our experience must always be anchored by a present tense. I took this as meaning that our experiences must always be framed in temporal terms, such that we must always refer to them as being had "now", and I later conceded that this was the case. In fact, I went one step further than that and argued that not only are our experiences always framed in temporal terms, but they are also always framed in spatial terms as well (which is referred to similarly by the term "here").

My disagreement with you had to do with what this temporal framing amounts to, and what we mean here when we say that our experiences must always be framed as being had "now". So much as I disputed your use of the word "now", I was disputing it on those grounds. You claimed that this "now" or "present tense" must mean that we always describe our experiences as being had "at a time" to which I disputed that claim and provided my own interpretation on what it meant.

As for how the word "now" is commonly defined in English that is for the most part irrelevant. If you want me to refer to the "now" in the sense above by a different term, then I will be happy to call it "NOW" just to distinguish it from the use of the term in English. So, when I say that my experiences must be framed in temporal and spatial terms, I will say that they must always be described as being had HERE and NOW. That better?

If your claim is 'I only experience being at my computer during the time that I exist,' then this is clearly false – surely, you experience all sorts of other things during your life. — The Great Whatever

Why? I don't find my experience contains anything more than what I have identified. Assuming that you aren't reading this as a habitual claim, then I do not see how you can say it is clearly false without begging the question. If what you are saying that my claim about me only having an experience of being in my room is clearly false on the basis that we should have other experiences according to the worm theory, then it seems like you are already assuming that the worm view is true to begin with and using that as a basis for claiming that I am wrong.

If you want instead to say you only experience sitting at your computer during the temporal duration of your entire existence, you should instead say that, since it means something different from your only experiencing it now. — The Great Whatever

Okay, let's just go with that then. You've been insisting that I use the present tense and I tried to comply with your demands up until this point. But if the above description is satisfactory to you then I think it would be easier to just move on instead of focusing on disputes about meaning. In fact, I am more interested in addressing your rejection of it, so let's just focus on that.

So, in general you only experience sitting at your computer? No, clearly not, unless that's all you ever do. — The Great Whatever

But then, that sentence isn't even plausibly true. So the argument doesn't work. — The Great Whatever

As far as I can tell the only reason why you seem to believe my claim to be false is because it is inconsistent with what the worm theory says we should experience. Surely I must experience things at different times, you have argued as according to the worm view, I have those times as parts of myself. And of course, this is clearly inconsistent with the claim that we have a limited experience.

To this, I would agree wholeheartedly with that assessment because that was the entire point of my argument from the beginning! I should have these other experiences, according to the worm view, but I simply find that I don't. Thus there is a clear tension between experience and theory here and something's gotta give. However, whereas I take this as "so much worse for the worm theory", it seems that you take the opposite conclusion from me prioritizing theory over experience, which I consider to be a wrong-headed approach.

You need to clarify your claim. What is "I" in that statement above? The 2017 component that has no direct experience of 2010, or the entire-worm-self "I"? — noAxioms

Under the worm theory, I am the entity that identifies with the entire worm. There is no other entity I can be.

Point out my inconsistency please. — noAxioms

I said that they were inconsistencies on strawmen that you pointed out, not your inconsistencies.

Mr Bee is using A-references (such as ambiguous "I") in discussion of absolute things, and getting the expected conflicts. Eternalism is an objective view of time, and objective terms should be used at every step. — noAxioms

Is "I" an A-theoretic term? It doesn't seem to me like it is.

But from the reference point of 2005, the 2010 version will exist, without conflict

Right, and furthermore, any felicitous use of 'exist' will involve it being tensed in accordance to a reference point (a 'now'). From the reference point of 2017, 2010's noAxiom existed. And from the reference point of 2017, 2017's noAxiom exists

What is the reference point here: "As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017'? The answer is no reference point at all. You're using 'exist' to mean something radically different than it means in ordinary usage, while nevertheless retaining aspects of its ordinary usage.

Again, I suspect that what's happening is that a model is buckling under a metaphysical weight it was not meant to hold.

@noAxioms
Another way to look at this:

I can say something like 'dodos once existed, but they don't any longer'

'But,' you would say, 'from a block-perspective, its not true that dodos existed, but don't any longer."

'Ok, I would say, 'then show me one.'

'Well, no,' you would say, 'they don't exist now in 2017'

'Right,' I'd say, 'they don't exist. They existed.'

'Yes,' you'd say. From the reference point 2017, they existed.'

'But since it's 2017,' I'd say, 'We can just say, simply, that they don't exist. We don't need to include the reference point'

'Yes,' you would say 'but, since it is 2017 when we say that, then that is included implicitly. @ 2017, dodos existed, but no longer exist.'

'But wait, I'd say, 'When you said 'from a block perspective it's not true that dodos no longer exist', didn't you also say that in 2017? So isn't it implicitly time-stamped in the same way, rendering it false? Since Dodos don't exist, now, in 2017?'

'Ok,' you might say, 'but I said from a block perspective.'

'So,' I'd say, 'it is both true that dodos exist and that they don't exist (any longer)'?

'It depends' you'd say 'whether you're speaking as someone in 2017 or as someone speaking from a block-perspective.'

'But both apply to you!' I'd say. 'Are you saying that you can hold two contradictory statements to be true, simply by claiming to be making use of two different perspectives? Two perspectives you're incapable of occupying separately (since, try as you will, you'll still be talking in 2017.)? I can understand two different perspectives illuminating two different aspects of something. But I don't understand how the same person can hold as true two statements so utterly contradictory as 'dodos don't exist' and 'dodos exist.' It seems like you'll have to give up one or the other!'

(Note that the conversation would have gone smooth as butter if we weren't talking about whether dodos exist, but whether 2+2=4 or the truth of the pythagorean theorem. 2=2=4 is a timeless truth, yet there's nothing contradictory about someone uttering a timeless truth in 2017)

As far as I can tell the only reason why you seem to believe my claim to be false is because it is inconsistent with what the worm theory says we should experience. — Mr Bee

Not at all. I believe it's false because they don't seem to be true, independent of theoretical position. If someone asked me what sorts of things I experience, I would probably say I experience all sorts of things, not just sitting at my computer.

Your entire argument therefore seems to rest on insisting that something that we would ordinarily say is false is true – that you only experience one thing, sitting at your computer. But of course you don't, you experience many other things as well.

Of course you might only experience that right now. But then... &c &c.

I think we may be at a roadblock here, but I genuinely think your argument is based on a linguistic confusion and so can't both be interesting & valid. And the block can't be overcome until you recognize at the very least that there is an obviously false construal of P3, on its habitual reading, which makes it uncompelling as a premise. Do you agree with that?

You've been insisting that I use the present tense and I tried to comply with your demands up until this point. — Mr Bee

I did not insist on anything. You used the present tense yourself in making the claims. I was pointing that out to you. I have adopted no theoretical position and have not held you to comply with anything.

Thus there is a clear tension between experience and theory here and something's gotta give. However, whereas I take this as "so much worse for the worm theory", it seems that you take the opposite conclusion from me prioritizing theory over experience, which I consider to be a wrong-headed approach. — Mr Bee

This is emphatically not my position and I am not defending worm theory. Rather, there is no conflict between theory and experience, and a linguistic confusion is causing you to believe that there is, viz. you are not distinguishing between the habitual and simple present readings of the claim. You require the latter reading in order for it to sound plausible, but the former in order for it to be useful in your argument. There can't be any progress on this point until you recognize this fact about English.

Not at all. I believe it's false because they don't seem to be true, independent of theoretical position. If someone asked me what sorts of things I experience, I would probably say I experience all sorts of things, not just sitting at my computer.

Your entire argument therefore seems to rest on insisting that something that we would ordinarily say is false is true – that you only experience one thing, sitting at your computer. But of course you don't, you experience many other things as well. — The Great Whatever

Huh? Of course I am not saying that the sorts of things I experience is limited to sitting in a computer, if by that you mean the types of experience I tend to experience. That is not what I am saying at all.

I thought we were going with the notion of that "I only experience sitting at my computer during the temporal duration of my entire existence". Unless of course you thought that both the above notion and this one is the same, in which case I'm confused. If not, then I am still interested in why you reject that particular claim.

..

Of course you might only experience that right now. But then... &c &c. — The Great Whatever

I will say that I only have a certain set of experiences "right now" if by "right now" you are referring to the temporal region that I exist in (of course we can go with call it "right NOW" if you want, it doesn't matter to me). This is the closest I can get to making a statement about my experiences in general while still framing my experience within time. However, and again I must emphasize, I am not saying that I only have a certain set of experiences "right now" as in "at the time of my utterance".

In other words, so much as I am subject to a certain set of experiences only I am making the claim with regards to the whole temporal duration in which I exist (whether it be an instant or a lifetime). Is this description okay with you? Or is that something that we still have to work out?

I think we may be at a roadblock here, but I genuinely think your argument is based on a linguistic confusion and so can't both be interesting & valid. And the block can't be overcome until you recognize at the very least that there is an obviously false construal of P3, on its habitual reading, which makes it uncompelling as a premise. Do you agree with that? — The Great Whatever

I am still not entirely clear on what your habitual reading is referring to, but if it refers to the reading that you rejected above then of course I am willing to grant that it is obviously false if it means that much to you. Of course, that is not the P3. I am using and it never was.

Of course I am not saying that the sorts of things I experience is limited to sitting in a computer, if by that you mean the types of experience I tend to experience. That is not what I am saying at all. — Mr Bee

So what are you saying? You're not saying that the only sort of thing you experience is being on a computer. You're not saying that all you're experiencing now is this. What other construal of your claim can there be?

I thought we were going with the notion of that "I only experience sitting at my computer during the temporal duration of my entire existence" — Mr Bee

But this is false, given that as you just admitted, you experience other sorts of things – presumably, you experience them in the temporal duration of your existence (when else would you experience them)?

---

In other words, so much as I am subject to a certain set of experiences only I am making the claim with regards to the whole temporal duration in which I exist (whether it be an instant or a lifetime). — Mr Bee

Please explain to me how the only experience you have, during the temporal duration in which you exist, is sitting at your computer, while also you tend to have other sorts of experiences besides sitting at a computer. I literally cannot make sense of this conjunction of claims, except as a contradiction.

Right, and, furthermore any felicitous use of 'exist' will involve it being tensed in accordance to a reference point (a 'now'). From the reference point of 2017, 2010's noAxiom existed. And from the reference point of 2017, 2017's noAxiom exists[/i.] — csalisbury

Right you are, illustrating the danger of using A-forms. I used 'exist' without a definition of it. If it means any presence in the block, then there is no valid use of the tense 'existed' or 'will exist'. I suppose the growing block view invalidates only the former of those two tenses.

What is the reference point you were making use of when you said "As a worm being, I exist in 2010 as much as I exist in 2017'? The answer is no reference point at all. In other words, you're using 'exist' to mean something radically different than it means in ordinary usage.

I meant what I described above, but yes, I used the word differently in a later post. I was using B-series terminology in saying I exist in 2010. There is no 'existed' tense at all in B-series.

Right you are, illustrating the danger of using A-forms. I used 'exist' without a definition of it. If it means any presence in the block, then there is no valid use of the tense 'existed' or 'will exist'. I suppose the growing block view invalidates only the former of those two tenses.

What do you mean by 'presence'?

So what are you saying? You're not saying that the only sort of thing you experience is being on a computer. You're not saying that all you're experiencing now is this. What other construal of your claim can there be? — The Great Whatever

Identity. The experience of bring on the computer is not any other thing. What matters here is not the limit of you, the world or something else or even a moment in time, it's the identity of a particular thing. For any experience (or state), the extent of it is itself. For anyone, for any moment or lifetime, to have an experience of the computer is only that, no matter what else might happen or what changes might occur.

The eternalist shouldn't be afraid of the present tense. It's actually what defines their position in the end. Since any present state is only itself, time functions as a deterministic block, where any moment may be understood from any point in time.

In terms of identity, any state or experience is always the same, whether it has happened, is present or is past. Regardless of time, by its own presence, the experience of sitting at a computer is just that, no matter how many lifetimes have yet to pass (including the one of sitting at a computer!!), are present at a moment or have wilted away.

What do you mean by 'presence'? — csalisbury

Well, I mean exists, but I was trying to express a definition, and it seemed circular to use the word in its own definition.
I exist. My third grandmother does not. The iceberg that takes out the Titanic exists.

All good and fine, but given that definition, how does one say that something is in the block, but has a finite temporal duration, and the reference-time is not part of that duration? If the iceberg exists period, how does it not exist in 2017? So it seems that the word 'exists' is context dependent. If no temporal reference is given, it just exists or not. But if a reference is given, the word is taken to mean the duration of the thing does not include the referenced time.
That's two different valid usages of the word depending on context. Seems reasonable, no? Else we need a separate word for the two usages. Notice that at not point do I need to fall back to a past/future-tensed usage. The iceberg exists in 1912, not existed, which would be an A-series statement.

I think the question is ill formed. By definition, there cannot be the iceberg which takes out the Titanic in 2017-- neither the Titanic nor the object it hits are present in that moment.

In the reasoning you are giving here, you are only accounting for identity in terms of the past. We realise the particular iceberg exists in 1912. But it doesn't consider the change of the future. Instead of realising any iceberg after the Titanic is a different state, a new moment, which the Titanic does not hit, you are still thinking of it as the same state and moment of the crashing Titanic.

It's not. The iceberg in question ceased to be at the end of the Titanic's crash. (and not because it broke apart or anything like that, but rather because it is a different state of time).

This post was confusing because of the switch between A and B series references.
It illustrates that it needs to be stated up front before declaring something to exist or not.

'So,' I'd say, 'it is both true that dodos exist and that they don't exist (any longer)'?

'It depends' you'd say 'whether you're speaking as someone in 2017 or as someone speaking from a block-perspective.' — csalisbury

It went sort of bad in those two lines. The question above mixed A and B references in the same sentence, rendering its meaning ambiguous. The reply is related to what I posted in my prior post, but not worded carefully.
A-series: Dodos went extinct. (implication that they don't exist now)
B-series without reference: Dodos exist. Jabberwockeys do not.
B with reference: Dodos are extinct after 17th century. Dodos don't exist in 200m BC.

The middle one lacks any reference to a specific time, and thus can only mean exists at some point in time.

'But both apply to you!' I'd say. 'Are you saying that you can hold two contradictory statements to be true, by reference to two different perspectives? Two perspectives you're incapable of occupying separately (since, try as you will, you'll still be talking in 2017.)? That doesn't make sense.'

B-series statements are never given from any perspective that one can occupy. The location of the utterance or the receiving of the statement is irrelevant to the content of the statement.

We seem to be discussing only language usage, which seems to be completely irrelevant to the validity of eternalism.

(Note that the conversation would have gone smooth as butter if we weren't talking about whether dodos exist, but whether 2+2=4 or the pythagorean theorem)

Maybe not. Does 2+2 objectively equal 4 or is that just property of this universe? OK, now we're waaay off topic.

Under the worm theory, I am the entity that identifies with the entire worm. There is no other entity I can be. — Mr Bee

Is that the "I" that has no experience of 2010? How does your 2017 component come by memory of that year if it is not part of your experience?

I'll provide a full response soon, but wanna note now that Mctaggart (from whom all this a series b series stuff derives) made it very clear that if the a series goes, so too the b series.

I think the question is ill formed. By definition, there cannot be the iceberg which takes out the Titanic in 2017-- neither the Titanic nor the object it hits are present in that moment. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Didn't think I claimed that. The statement references 2017, and I chose the iceberg as my example of something that does not exist in that year.

In the reasoning you are giving here, you are only accounting for identity in terms of the past. We realise the particular iceberg exists in 1912. But it doesn't account for the change of the future. Instead of realising any iceberg after the Titanic is a different state, a new moment, which the Titanic does not hit, you still thinking of it as the same state and moment of the crashing Titanic.

Not following this. I'm thinking of subsequent states (different icebergs??) as being the same event or state as the Titanic sinking one? I'm probably parsing you wrong here.

It's not. The iceberg in question ceased to be at the end of the Titanic's crash. (and not because it broke apart or anything like that, but rather because it is a different state of time).

OK, that makes somewhat more sense, but seems to be more the identity thing that distinguishes the stage theorist from the worm theorist. We were discussing "as a worm being" which retains identity of a thing over a finite duration. Under the worm definition of identity, the iceberg continues existence after the Titanic hits it but eventually breaks up/melts.

For other reasons than any stated in this thread, I don't consider my present version to share numeric identity with my 2010 version, and thus, from a numeric identity perspective, am something like that stage theorist, but I also don't apply the label of "I" or "me" to any given state, and I think the stage theorist might do that. I was not particularly aware of the term before this thread.

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Please explain to me how the only experience you have, during the temporal duration in which you exist, is sitting at your computer, while also you tend to have other sorts of experiences besides sitting at a computer. I literally cannot make sense of this conjunction of claims, except as a contradiction. — The Great Whatever

Let's say that the entire duration in which I exist is limited to an instant. During that time, I am only sitting in my room and looking at my computer. My experiences supervene upon my brain states at that time which would include all of the phenomenal states of that time. That is how (of course, we could also be the size of our entire lives as well, not just an instant). These will be what I describe to be all of the phenomenal experiences I find myself having.

NONE of this has any implications upon the question of what sort of experiences my body tends to experience, if we are asking this question in a common everyday sense like you seem to be. Now, if this were a presentist world, the entire duration I exist would change from instant to instant. Over time, I would tend to have other experiences (unless my life were merely me confined to a chair in front of a screen). Under the stage theory "I" is a label to describe the person the counterparts represent, it represents personal identity. In this sense we can also say that "I" also tends to have other experiences. The worm theory, there shouldn't be any other experiences apart from the ones they have in the above, but the above should be meaty enough to include more than just the computer experiences.

Clearer now? We are not going to make any progress unless you see the difference between these two and drop the habitual talk.

Is that the "I" that has no experience of 2010? How does your 2017 component come by memory of that year if it is not part of your experience? — noAxioms

For the last time no. If I just said that I am the temporal worm, the temporal worm that I said should have an experience of 2010 as a result of it being a part.