No. — Garrett Travers
Maybe you'd rather not call it the experience of a projection-apple. I'm open to other terminology. — ZzzoneiroCosm
You're too gone, dude. That article was specifically disagreeing with you. Data comes from sensory data of the material world. That's where the correspondence works, that's what they were saying. I'm moving on now. — Garrett Travers
But at the centre of those reactions, is interpretation - what the sentence means. Animals react to threats or other stimuli, but we alone interpret the meaning of words
Yes, an experience. — Garrett Travers
That said, it doesn't seem like a particularly tough case for physicalist models. We know that sensory organs record incoming information about the world. This information is then procesed and refined, so that it makes a coherent enough picture of the world that an animal can get by as respects fulfilling its biological needs. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Second, information in every form we've studied turns out to be physical — Count Timothy von Icarus
However, if the meaning isn't physical, it seems hard to explain how it could refer to physical things so well, or how physical things like other people or dogs can meaningfully and consistently respond to language and find physical referents based on it. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Creatures are objects. — Garrett Travers
So, before humans existed, force did not equal mass times acceleration? This is something that only exists when it is recognised by humans?
— Wayfarer
That's not what I said. — Garrett Travers
F=ma is a concept that humans generated to understand how to properly categorize it as a pattern. — Garrett Travers
[Cats] appear to know which call means food — Count Timothy von Icarus
What the Empiricist speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients - sense-knowledge in which s/he has made room for reason without recognizing it. A confusion which comes about all the more easily as, on the one hand, the senses are, in actual fact, more or less permeated with reason in man, and, on the other, the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent. — Jacques Maritain
Right, there shouldn't be a need to reduce abstractions to claim they are physical. — Count Timothy von Icarus
If intentionality is a non-physical phenomena, it must at the least still be partly caused by physical things. But then you have the problem of how two totally different things interact, and how they can interact without leaving behind detectable evidence. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So, if a computer generated chat bot can produce language well enough that it will fool most people, and if it can provide answers to questions that are better than those a call center employee generally would, a place we may arrive at in the medium term, it seems that either:
Computers have intentionality; or
Using language doesn't require intentionality.
Some people would argue intentionality doesn't even exist anyhow, but that's aside the point. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It is a projection from my brain being produced from stored memory data in the hippocampus. — Garrett Travers
However, if the meaning isn't physical, it seems hard to explain how it could refer to physical things so well, or how physical things like other people or dogs can meaningfully and consistently respond to language and find physical referents based on it. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Before enlightenment, chop wood carry water, after enlightenment, know that you necissarily must chop wood and carry water. — Count Timothy von Icarus
if the eliminativist vis-á-vis abstractions (or qualia) is correct, we shouldn't expect them to be able to overcome this illusion. So if they continue to say they feel tired, or advocate against racism, etc. it is only because the illusion is so powerful, which is exactly what their theory predicts. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Human beings, Mr. Dennett said, quoting a favorite pop philosopher, Dilbert, are “moist robots.”
“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?” — NY Times
What screen is the apple projected onto? — bert1
That koan is singularly innappropriate, given the context.
begs the question
...none of that negates the kinds of philosophical problems that, for instance, Immanuel Kant set out to solve. In fact there's voluminous literature on Kant's contribution to cognitive science, and Bishop Berkeley wrote a treatise on optics. Schopenhauer also was keenly interested in the science of his day, and saw no conflict between it and his idealist metaphysics.
not just the fortuitous byproducts of a blind watchmaker
First, the term 'intentionality' as I was intending it, and as it is used in phenomenology, refers to the fact that language, at least a good part of it, is about things. I was not intending to use the term in it's "normal" usage as referring to having intentions.
Second, given the sense of 'intentionality' I was using, whether or not the speaker or author has any intentions regarding what the language they are using is about, the language use is, in itself, about whatever it is about (although of course a recipient competent enough in the given language to be able to understand what it is about is required).
And third, even if computers are able to fool us, that is only on account of the fact that we have created and programmed them well enough to be able to achieve that feat of deceit
Some claim that consciousness or intelligence is fundamental, but at present we have no way to settle the issue one way or the other. We cannot even come to agreement on terms. What does it mean to be conscious? What counts as evidence of consciousness? It the self-organization of matter an intelligent process? Is the ability to complete complicated tasks an indication of intelligence? — Fooloso4
Do you see this as a problem for science? If science still has not made progress on these fundamental questions, say, a century from now, do you think people will start questioning the assumption that consciousness can come from matter? — RogueAI
If science still has not made progress on these fundamental questions, say, a century from now, do you think people will start questioning the assumption that consciousness can come from matter? — RogueAI
I know this is not to me but... do facts run to a stopwatch? :wink: What if it takes 200 years? And it isn't just science that hasn't resolved these questions- - there is no agreed upon account outside of science or physicalism either. If we still can't explain consciousness using a superphysical explanation in 100 years, will people start questioning the assumption that consciousness is magic spirit? — Tom Storm
I fully expect people to have abandoned the assumption that mind comes from matter. It will happen a lot sooner than that. — RogueAI
Unless idealists have a good method for explaining how to distinguish sentences with intentionality from those without it, they appear in a bind. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Many of the disputes that arise here are the result of the failure to distinguish between the commitment to find physical explanations and the premature assumption that all explanations must be or cannot be physical. — Fooloso4
At what point do we start questioning the assumption that consciousness comes from matter? — RogueAI
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