They did exist. — The Great Whatever
If you mean in the ordinary sense, of course I believe in the passage of time, because time passes. — The Great Whatever
But if you require this to be an argument contingent on eternalism, as it seems to be in your OP, it seems you can just as easily convert any such notion into there just being distinct times at which things happen. I mean, I think eternalism is stupid, but that isn't my point, I'm just focusing on your argument, which has an unconvincing premise. — The Great Whatever
I can't parse this clause. — The Great Whatever
If I think about my total experiences, I find that I have had some, have some now and will have others later. So clearly they aren't limited to a single time. Why would I believe P3, then? — The Great Whatever
There is only one sense of the passage of time I know of. — Mr Bee
It's not contingent upon eternalism. The argument is meant to refute a view of eternalism, but the premise in question does not require one to adopt eternalism like I keep saying. — Mr Bee
I am talking about the me that exists, not what will exist and has existed (which strictly speaking, no longer exist). — Mr Bee
If your "total experiences" include experiences that don't exist (such as experiences that existed or will exist), then that is not the total experience I am talking about. I only mean the experiences that exist. — Mr Bee
Good. Then let's drop references to eternalism altogether and just talk about P3. So no more saying "but on an eternalist view..." etc. That is simply irrelevant. — The Great Whatever
Apparently you mean only the experiences that exist. Okay, but the word 'exist' is inflected for the present tense, such that for an experience to exist is for it to be happening (or being undergone) now. But you've said this is not what you intend. — The Great Whatever
When an eternalist says that the Big Bang exists, do they mean that in the present tense? That it is happening now? — Mr Bee
Unless, by now, you do not mean "at the time of this utterance" — Mr Bee
If they are using the English language, that's all that sentence can mean. It's not up to them to decide what it means.
...
That is what "now" means. It is not a question of what I mean by it. — The Great Whatever
So the eternalist view in your opinion, is completely incoherent? You did say that you considered the view to be stupid, so is that the reason why? — Mr Bee
My argument, despite its goals, was meant to be expressed in a manner that is neutral to the different views of time. I suspect your disagreement lies in the fact that you don't think that it is possible to do so, because you find one of those views to be internally inconsistent. — Mr Bee
It is a fact about English that things stated in the present tense are anchored to the speech time (for the most part – it's more complicated than that). A theory that denies this cannot be correct. I don't have any views on whether eternalism is committed to such a thing. My guess is they would plead that they are using 'exists,' if they're inclined to do so, in some technical sense that differs from how it's used in ordinary English. I would also be skeptical, however, that they have a coherent notion of the sense in which they are using it. — The Great Whatever
It may be a potentially convincing premise infelicitously worded. But I think any felicitous wording of it would make it mean something like 'Right now, I only find that I have the experiences I have right now.' — The Great Whatever
I was giving you an example of what I mean when I talk about what a larger experience is. Nowhere does this definition refer to anything like having to experience red and blue "simultaneously". You were the one who imposed that restriction earlier and here you continue to insist upon it now. But I see no reason for this restriction.
[...]
But that doesn't stop me from having a combined experience which includes both. I can have a combined experience which is described as "red at the left side of my vision and blue on the right". In fact, I always find I do have to have such an experience if I were to have them both. — Mr Bee
Similarly, I see no reason why a temporal worm extended in time, who would be exposed to, say, experiencing skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2 would not have a combined experience of "skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2" in a manner similar to how we can experience "red on the left side of my vision and blue on the right". — Mr Bee
Personally, I have never had a "combined experience" of two distinct, temporally distant experiences, and I'm pretty sure that nobody else ever has, either. — Luke
Why you are so intent on attributing experience to a hypothetical aggregate of your temporal existence (i.e. your temporal worm) is beyond me. — Luke
You misrepresent the point in contention. The point in contention is whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have a combined experience of x and y. My going to Disneyland when I was five years old and my going to Disneyland last week do not constitute some "combined experience" - they are separate and distinct experiences. I suppose I could talk about the singular "experience" of my entire life, but this strikes me as a virtual misuse of the word, and it is not the same meaning of "experience" as you have used when describing our 'point in contention' above. Also, you are not referring to the experience of a person, but of a person's worm.Does that matter? The point in contention is merely whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have an experience of x and y. — Mr Bee
Eternalism (and the worm conception of time) is an ontological theory of existence, not experience. You are importing your own bizarre assumptions about experience.If you want to say that such a temporally extended entity cannot possibly have any sort of experiences then it would seems the worm conception of time is obviously false because evidently, you and I do have experiences. — Mr Bee
Presentism is a theory of time which is consistent with the way we have experiences and apparently move forward in time. It is up to eternalism to try and account for why it seems this way to us. You can presume that a temporal worm has experiences, and has all of the experiences that an individual will have across their lifetime, but this still won't account for (temporally-speaking) the main issue: why does time appear to flow and why do we appear to have these experiences in a presentist way, moving forward in time from one moment to the next? It's not being uncharitable to eternalism that it cannot account for this; that's just the problem with eternalism.Of course that would also work to rejecting the view (which is my goal anyways) as will TGW's overall rejection of eternalism in general, but I find it either to be question begging or uncharitable to the view. — Mr Bee
I agree that it is reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings, like us, can have experiences. However, I disagree that some aggregate of our entire existence, unlike us, can have its own consciousness or experience, including any meta-experience (or "larger experience") of two distinct, temporally-distant experiences at once.I think it reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings can have experiences just as much as spatially extended beings do, and my argument is simply to show how the implications of those facts lead to conclusions that we just don't find in our own experiences. — Mr Bee
You misrepresent the point in contention. The point in contention is whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have a combined experience of x and y. My going to Disneyland when I was five years old and my going to Disneyland last week do not constitute some "combined experience" - they are separate and distinct experiences. I suppose I could talk about the singular "experience" of my entire life, but this strikes me as a virtual misuse of the word, and it is not the same meaning of "experience" as you have used when describing our 'point in contention' above. Also, you are not referring to the experience of a person, but of a person's worm. — Luke
Eternalism (and the worm conception of time) is an ontological theory of existence, not experience. You are importing your own bizarre assumptions about experience. — Luke
Presentism is a theory of time which is consistent with the way we have experiences and apparently move forward in time. It is up to eternalism to try and account for why it seems this way to us. You can presume that a temporal worm has experiences, and has all of the experiences that an individual will have across their lifetime, but this still won't account for (temporally-speaking) the main issue: why does time appear to flow and why do we appear to have these experiences in a presentist way, moving forward in time from one moment to the next? It's not being uncharitable to eternalism that it cannot account for this; that's just the problem with eternalism. — Luke
I agree that it is reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings, like us, can have experiences. However, I disagree that some aggregate of our entire existence, unlike us, can have its own consciousness or experience, including any meta-experience (or "larger experience") of two distinct, temporally-distant experiences at once. — Luke
An experience of x and y is a combined experience. I am not sure what the distinction is to you. Similarly an experience of a red patch on my left side of my vision and a blue patch on my right is a combined experience of red and blue. It is an experience of red and blue. — Mr Bee
The worm conception of time is an ontological theory of time that has implications on what we should experience. I am making no such assumptions about the experience of temporally extended beings apart from those we usually make to spatially extended beings. — Mr Bee
There is a difference between saying that eternalism says that we shouldn't be consciousness whatsoever (that the phenomenon of conscious experience necessarily requires a flow of time) and that eternalism cannot account for our experiences of feeling like time flows. The former is not charitable because it assumes that beings in an eternalist world are zombies which we evidently are not. However this seems like too strong a stance to take. — Mr Bee
I am sorry, but what is the difference between being temporally extended and being an aggregate of more than one time? — Mr Bee
I thought that was the point in contention? — Luke
An experience of x and an experience of y need not be a combined experience, as they can be two distinct, separate, temporally-distant experiences. Although you could refer to them as a singular experience, I take you to mean that the experience of red on my left and blue on my right are not temporally-distant experiences. If they were, then it would be peculiar to refer to them as a single experience, instead of two individual experiences. — Luke
Besides, if any two (x and y) experiences must be combined into a single experience, then all experiences must be combined into a single experience. — Luke
How, then, can you distinguish, or even speak about, one experience as distinct from the rest? It then all becomes just one big experience. This seems to create some problems for your OP, where you speak of having more than one experience.. — Luke
How does it have implications on what we should experience? — Luke
I don't know what beings you are talking about, but I'm talking about normal human beings and the way that we actually have experiences. You are talking about some abstract nonsense which has little to do with human beings. — Luke
Charitable or not, I find it impossible for us to have consciousness or experiences, or for there to even be the illusion of a flow of time, in a static, motionless universe. I don't think that beings in an eternalist world would be zombies, because even that suggests some sort of motion. If the eternalist theory proposes that the universe is truly motionless, then why be charitable about it? Advocates of the theory are welcome to explain it. — Luke
I'm not sure I understand you. Earlier I said that the disagreement laid with me saying that having an experience x and an experience y means having an experience of "x and y". You said I misrepresented you and said that the real disagreement laid with the fact having both experiences entails having a combined experience. This suggests that you see a difference between the two. Explain what that difference is. — Mr Bee
Let's say that both experiences are had at the same time. Is it possible to have an experience of x and an experience of y without having a combined experience? If so, can you imagine what that would even be like? For instance, is it possible to have an experience of seeing red and seeing blue without seeing an image of red and blue? — Mr Bee
Indeed. I believe that is a general feature of a single conscious subject having two experiences. — Mr Bee
We can distinguish individual parts of our experiences easy. If I am looking at a picture of the Mona Lisa, then I can identify the visual experience of her hair, and the visual experience of her eyes. In fact I can even identify and compare the different parts that visual experience I have. Nothing wrong or problematic with that. But that doesn't mean that I have those experiences separately or that I do not have the visual experience of the Mona Lisa in full. — Mr Bee
If I am a being who is extended through space and time, and the parts that I have at every spatio-temporal contain experiences, then shouldn't be relevant to what I, as a being who is composed of those parts, experience? — Mr Bee
So you think the notion of temporal worms itself is nonsensical? I am not sure what else you think I am talking about here. — Mr Bee
The problem is that most such arguments as far as I have heard them, seem to be unjustified. I have heard people say that if time doesn't flow then experience cannot happen, but they usually misinterpret eternalism or assume requirements about conscious experience that aren't plausible. The eternalist, for instance, wouldn't say the world is motionless because motion does not require the flow of time, it only requires that objects change position over time. In addition, I do not see how consciousness would require the flow of time either. — Mr Bee
I've explained it several times and you continually fail to address it: I find it peculiar to consider two distinct, temporally-distant experiences (e.g. decades apart) to be referred to as a singular experience. How do you justify this unusual use of the term? — Luke
I've already granted that a person can have more than one experience at a time, and I provided the example of having a conversation and hearing background noise simultaneously. — Luke
The relevant difference being that we don't experience our lives all at once, or have every experience of our lives available to us "in full" at a single glance. For example, two distinct experiences might be had decades apart, where they do not form a combined, singular experience. — Luke
I don't know, should it? Why should it? You are attributing the experiences that you actually have (in the real world) to the eternalist model, and then subsequently make the assumption that the eternalist model has implications on what we should experience. Sounds backwards to me. — Luke
No, I think that your talk of worms having experiences is nonsensical. Also, how you seem to think that it is unproblematic for a worm to have a combined experience of two distinct experiences which may be years or decades apart. Worms don't have experiences of a person's entire lifetime; people have experiences throughout their lifetime, and in a particular sequence. — Luke
I believe that it is a general feature of a single conscious subject to be continually ageing and moving forward in time. — Luke
How do objects "change" their position over time without a flow of time? You need to implicitly assume a flow of time for the concept of change to make any sense. Changing where I focus my attention on the static timeline does not constitute any real change, it's just an attempt to smuggle in change via my attention (which really does change!). And I'm pretty sure that if (e.g.) blood doesn't flow through our veins, if our brain impulses don't fire, and if we don't continue to breathe in and out, then we will soon lose consciousness. — Luke
Tell me, when you talk about having two experiences together, are you bringing in some notion of the flow of time into the mix? That is, when a person has two experiences, one of skydiving and one of smelling burnt toast, then do you see the person as having them in sequence with the passage of time, according to an A-theory of time? — Mr Bee
I have given reasons, if you have been reading. We have no problems considering having multiple experiences in space for a single subject that would necessarily combine together. Experiences may be "separated by space" but that doesn't mean anything to saying they are had together. Space is not time, but they are very similar to one another (even more so under eternalism, where it is often claimed that time is another dimension of space), so it seems there is no reason for us not to say the same applies for a being who is temporally extended through time.
The only reason why I think you would disagree is if you just simply assume that having a larger experience means that all the experiences are had "at the same time". But I see no reason for this understanding. Furthermore, your sense of "together" as "together at a time" is too restrictive. The worm theory says that a temporally extended being has their temporal parts "together". Do they mean "together at a time" where "time" means one of the moments of the worm's life? Certainly not, any more than we would say that have all of our body parts at a single point in space. But does this mean that the worm theory is obviously false? Maybe it is to you, but it seems like a lot of people are fine with saying that a person has their temporal parts together without trouble, so either they're wrong or you are.
Whether you have read these reasons or not, you certainly haven't addressed them, instead repeating the same unjustified assumption that just because two experiences that a subject experiences are temporally separated, there is no larger experience which contains both. — Mr Bee
I was asking if it is possible for you to not have a larger experience featuring them both. And again I should note that we are talking about both experiences being had at the same time. — Mr Bee
And I imagine that this "single glance" implicitly means "at a time", "simultaneously", and "at the same moment" right? — Mr Bee
Do you think the temporally extended worms of human lives are not "human beings"?
Do you think that temporally extended worms cannot possibly have experiences? — Mr Bee
Yes, of course. Do you know of any other way to experience something? — Luke
You address my concerns by complaining that I have not addressed your concerns? — Luke
Time is considered to be a space-like dimension under eternalism, not "another dimension of space". Time is not considered to be a dimension of space. — Luke
I have experiences (or an experience) at a particular time. I don't agree that this must necessarily be a part of some larger experience, which I can only take you to mean something like the rest of my life. Please correct me if you are referring to some other "larger experience" than this. To be clear, I consider an experience to be a part of my entire life, I just take issue with calling my entire life "an experience". — Luke
I think that a worm is a representation of a person/object's lifetime/existence. I don't think that a representation or a lifetime can have its own experiences. I believe that a person can have experiences over their lifetime, however. — Luke
Well, given that we are talking about having multiple experiences in the sense of the eternalist worm theory, then of course that is irrelevant. According to the eternalist, time does not pass. You apparently think that this means that they cannot have conscious experiences, but I am willing to grant that they do, and then work towards what that would mean. — Mr Bee
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