They did exist. — The Great Whatever

They don't exist anymore.

If you mean in the ordinary sense, of course I believe in the passage of time, because time passes. — The Great Whatever

Then why didn't you say that earlier? There is only one sense of the passage of time I know of.

But if you require this to be an argument contingent on eternalism, as it seems to be in your OP, it seems you can just as easily convert any such notion into there just being distinct times at which things happen. I mean, I think eternalism is stupid, but that isn't my point, I'm just focusing on your argument, which has an unconvincing premise. — The Great Whatever

It's not contingent upon eternalism. The argument is meant to refute a view of eternalism, but the premise in question does not require one to adopt eternalism like I keep saying.

Every theory of time says that something exists. The presentist says the present moment exists, the eternalist says that all times exist, and the growing block theorist says that the past and present exist. As well, the worm theorist says that the me that exists is a temporally extended worm, while the stage theorist and presentist say that me only refers to a single time. So much as my P3. talks about me only experiencing a single time, I am talking about the me that exists, not what will exist and has existed (which strictly speaking, no longer exist).

I can't parse this clause. — The Great Whatever

Just corrected that phrase (Just take out the "am"). Sorry about that.

If I think about my total experiences, I find that I have had some, have some now and will have others later. So clearly they aren't limited to a single time. Why would I believe P3, then? — The Great Whatever

If your "total experiences" include experiences that don't exist (such as experiences that existed or will exist), then that is not the total experience I am talking about. I only mean the experiences that exist.

There is only one sense of the passage of time I know of. — Mr Bee

Because throughout this conversation you have not used English words with their ordinary meanings, so it's difficult to know what you mean.

It's not contingent upon eternalism. The argument is meant to refute a view of eternalism, but the premise in question does not require one to adopt eternalism like I keep saying. — Mr Bee

Good. Then let's drop references to eternalism altogether and just talk about P3. So no more saying "but on an eternalist view..." etc. That is simply irrelevant.

I am talking about the me that exists, not what will exist and has existed (which strictly speaking, no longer exist). — Mr Bee

"The me that exists?" Isn't that just you? It's not "another you." You exist and you will exist. It's not like you won't exist anymore and "another you" will spring into existence instead.

If your "total experiences" include experiences that don't exist (such as experiences that existed or will exist), then that is not the total experience I am talking about. I only mean the experiences that exist. — Mr Bee

I assume that my "total experiences" are all those that happen over the course of my life. Apparently you don't mean this. Apparently you mean only the experiences that exist. Okay, but the word 'exist' is inflected for the present tense, such that for an experience to exist is for it to be happening (or being undergone) now. But you've said this is not what you intend.

Reading P3 naively, it doesn't sound plausible. If you change it to something like "the only experience I am currently having," or "the only experience that exists, by which I mean the only experience occurring now," it does. But you've said this is not what you want to say.

Good. Then let's drop references to eternalism altogether and just talk about P3. So no more saying "but on an eternalist view..." etc. That is simply irrelevant. — The Great Whatever

References to eternalism would help me understand what you are saying better. I will drop it once I feel like we are on the same page and understand what we both mean by the things we say. That said...

Apparently you mean only the experiences that exist. Okay, but the word 'exist' is inflected for the present tense, such that for an experience to exist is for it to be happening (or being undergone) now. But you've said this is not what you intend. — The Great Whatever

When an eternalist says that the Big Bang exists, do they mean that in the present tense? That it is happening now?

If so, then it certainly doesn't mean it is happening "now" as in "at the moment of this utterance" because the Big Bang doesn't exist "now". Unless, by now, you do not mean "at the time of this utterance" but something more general than that? If so, then I will agree with saying that I am experiencing only sitting in my room now.

When an eternalist says that the Big Bang exists, do they mean that in the present tense? That it is happening now? — Mr Bee

If they are using the English language, that's all that sentence can mean. It's not up to them to decide what it means. "Exists" must mean "exists now," since it's inflected for the present tense as a grammatical fact (that's what that little -s morpheme means). Notice how it's semantically anomalous to say "x exists yesterday." That doesn't make grammatical sense, regardless of your metaphysical position. You might be able to say it "x existed yesterday" or "x will exist tomorrow."

Unless, by now, you do not mean "at the time of this utterance" — Mr Bee

That is what "now" means. It is not a question of what I mean by it. If I mean something other than that by it, then I am not using the word – I am either misusing the English language or trying to speak in some sort of technical jargon, in which case using a word homophonous with the English word "now" should be foregone to avoid confusion.

If they are using the English language, that's all that sentence can mean. It's not up to them to decide what it means.
...
That is what "now" means. It is not a question of what I mean by it. — The Great Whatever

So the eternalist view in your opinion, is completely incoherent? You did say that you considered the view to be stupid, so is that the reason why?

My argument, despite its goals, was meant to be expressed in a manner that is neutral to the different views of time. My main target here would be the eternalists (who would believe eternalism to not only be coherent, but true) who are also worm theorists. I suspect your disagreement lies in the fact that you don't think that it is possible to do so, because you find one of those views to be internally inconsistent.

So the eternalist view in your opinion, is completely incoherent? You did say that you considered the view to be stupid, so is that the reason why? — Mr Bee

It is a fact about English that things stated in the present tense are anchored to the speech time (for the most part – it's more complicated than that). A theory that denies this cannot be correct. I don't have any views on whether eternalism is committed to such a thing. My guess is they would plead that they are using 'exists,' if they're inclined to do so, in some technical sense that differs form how it's used in ordinary English. I would also be skeptical, however, that they have a coherent notion of the sense in which they are using it. My position on these subjects tends to be that these metaphysical disputes are not actually disputes about anything, but are a performance of verbal confusions (that is, they are not about verbal issues like what words mean, but exist only in the real-time enactment of confusion over words).

My argument, despite its goals, was meant to be expressed in a manner that is neutral to the different views of time. I suspect your disagreement lies in the fact that you don't think that it is possible to do so, because you find one of those views to be internally inconsistent. — Mr Bee

It may be a potentially convincing premise infelicitously worded. But I think any felicitous wording of it would make it mean something like 'Right now, I only find that I have the experiences I have right now.'

It is a fact about English that things stated in the present tense are anchored to the speech time (for the most part – it's more complicated than that). A theory that denies this cannot be correct. I don't have any views on whether eternalism is committed to such a thing. My guess is they would plead that they are using 'exists,' if they're inclined to do so, in some technical sense that differs from how it's used in ordinary English. I would also be skeptical, however, that they have a coherent notion of the sense in which they are using it. — The Great Whatever

I am not an eternalist but I am not sure if the eternalist view in itself is nonsensical. As far as I can tell, the sense in which they use the word "exists" is pretty much how a presentist would say the present "exists". I don't see much of a problem with that, but apparently you do.

Like I said earlier, eternalism can be interpreted as a version of presentism, albeit a strange version of it. It's just that, apart from rejecting the flow of time, the present moment that they consider "now" includes events from the Big Bang to the end of the universe. What they would call the "speech time" when they say that the "Big Bang exists" would be much bigger than the instantaneous moment that presentists would normally call "now" and include all the moments in the universe's history. Of course, this may sound incoherent at first, because how can the speech time refer to multiple times in the universe's history? How can the present moment consist of multiple moments in time? It doesn't make sense. However I suspect that the eternalist here would distinguish between two different senses of time in order to get around that. The speech time is the time that we are usually familiar with and operates like it usually does, but the "time" in which we take events like the BIg Bang to exist in, the time of the block universe, is introduced as an extra dimension (let's call it "sime" to differentiate it from time) within which all the different moments in the universe's history, all the years of our history, can be laid out. Events are laid out in order like they are in time, where the Big Bang exists at an earlier sime than that of the creation of the Earth, and 2018 is at a later sime than 2017. Put this way, there doesn't seem to be a problem anymore. The eternalist can talk about the past, the present, and the future existing at different simes while still being able to say that they all exist at the time of this utterance (and please note that here this time of utterance that our present tense claims are anchored to does not refer to a particular sime, which was a fact that I have been trying to emphasize throughout our discussion). Technically, they are still making use of the present tense, and framing their claims in a temporal manner, but now they are able to make sense of events such as the Big Bang and 2018 existing. I am not sure if this way of describing eternalism is satisfactory to you, but that is just how I see it.

It may be a potentially convincing premise infelicitously worded. But I think any felicitous wording of it would make it mean something like 'Right now, I only find that I have the experiences I have right now.' — The Great Whatever

Like, I said before, depending on your views on time, the premise could be read differently, some of which may probably be acceptable to you. For instance, the non-eternalist presentist could read P3. as "At the time of this utterance, I only experience the contents of a single time", and that is because nothing exists but the present moment, which would necessarily have to be the moment in which you make the utterance. Of course such a premise would sound trivial when expressed this way, and I agree that it doesn't sound remotely interesting, but this speaks more to the fact that you aren't an eternalist than any triviality of P3. itself. I imagine that this reading of the premise shouldn't be difficult to accept for you, at least I think.

I was giving you an example of what I mean when I talk about what a larger experience is. Nowhere does this definition refer to anything like having to experience red and blue "simultaneously". You were the one who imposed that restriction earlier and here you continue to insist upon it now. But I see no reason for this restriction.

[...]

But that doesn't stop me from having a combined experience which includes both. I can have a combined experience which is described as "red at the left side of my vision and blue on the right". In fact, I always find I do have to have such an experience if I were to have them both. — Mr Bee

Personally, I have never had a "combined experience" of two distinct, temporally distant experiences, and I'm pretty sure that nobody else ever has, either. Humans just don't experience things in this way. Why you are so intent on attributing experience to a hypothetical aggregate of your temporal existence (i.e. your temporal worm) is beyond me.

Similarly, I see no reason why a temporal worm extended in time, who would be exposed to, say, experiencing skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2 would not have a combined experience of "skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2" in a manner similar to how we can experience "red on the left side of my vision and blue on the right". — Mr Bee

Because "we" have experiences. Why make the bizarre assumption that temporal worms do, too?

Personally, I have never had a "combined experience" of two distinct, temporally distant experiences, and I'm pretty sure that nobody else ever has, either. — Luke

Does that matter? The point in contention is merely whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y together means that they have an experience of x and y. I argue that that is just a general fact about having multiple experiences together, just as much as having the property of being bald and the property of being a man means having the property of being a bald man.

Why you are so intent on attributing experience to a hypothetical aggregate of your temporal existence (i.e. your temporal worm) is beyond me. — Luke

Um, because according to the worm theory I am actually supposed to be a temporally extended being that should, presumably, have multiple experiences together?

If you want to say that such a temporally extended entity cannot possibly have any sort of experiences then it would seems the worm conception of time is obviously false because evidently, you and I do have experiences. Of course that would also work to rejecting the view (which is my goal anyways) as will TGW's overall rejection of eternalism in general, but I find it either to be question begging or uncharitable to the view. I think it reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings can have experiences just as much as spatially extended beings do, and my argument is simply to show how the implications of those facts lead to conclusions that we just don't find in our own experiences.

Does that matter? The point in contention is merely whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have an experience of x and y. — Mr Bee

You misrepresent the point in contention. The point in contention is whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have a combined experience of x and y. My going to Disneyland when I was five years old and my going to Disneyland last week do not constitute some "combined experience" - they are separate and distinct experiences. I suppose I could talk about the singular "experience" of my entire life, but this strikes me as a virtual misuse of the word, and it is not the same meaning of "experience" as you have used when describing our 'point in contention' above. Also, you are not referring to the experience of a person, but of a person's worm.

If you want to say that such a temporally extended entity cannot possibly have any sort of experiences then it would seems the worm conception of time is obviously false because evidently, you and I do have experiences. — Mr Bee

Eternalism (and the worm conception of time) is an ontological theory of existence, not experience. You are importing your own bizarre assumptions about experience.

Of course that would also work to rejecting the view (which is my goal anyways) as will TGW's overall rejection of eternalism in general, but I find it either to be question begging or uncharitable to the view. — Mr Bee

Presentism is a theory of time which is consistent with the way we have experiences and apparently move forward in time. It is up to eternalism to try and account for why it seems this way to us. You can presume that a temporal worm has experiences, and has all of the experiences that an individual will have across their lifetime, but this still won't account for (temporally-speaking) the main issue: why does time appear to flow and why do we appear to have these experiences in a presentist way, moving forward in time from one moment to the next? It's not being uncharitable to eternalism that it cannot account for this; that's just the problem with eternalism.

I think it reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings can have experiences just as much as spatially extended beings do, and my argument is simply to show how the implications of those facts lead to conclusions that we just don't find in our own experiences. — Mr Bee

I agree that it is reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings, like us, can have experiences. However, I disagree that some aggregate of our entire existence, unlike us, can have its own consciousness or experience, including any meta-experience (or "larger experience") of two distinct, temporally-distant experiences at once.

You misrepresent the point in contention. The point in contention is whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have a combined experience of x and y. My going to Disneyland when I was five years old and my going to Disneyland last week do not constitute some "combined experience" - they are separate and distinct experiences. I suppose I could talk about the singular "experience" of my entire life, but this strikes me as a virtual misuse of the word, and it is not the same meaning of "experience" as you have used when describing our 'point in contention' above. Also, you are not referring to the experience of a person, but of a person's worm. — Luke

An experience of x and y is a combined experience. I am not sure what the distinction is to you. Similarly an experience of a red patch on my left side of my vision and a blue patch on my right is a combined experience of red and blue. It is an experience of red and blue.

Eternalism (and the worm conception of time) is an ontological theory of existence, not experience. You are importing your own bizarre assumptions about experience. — Luke

The worm conception of time is an ontological theory of time that has implications on what we should experience. I am making no such assumptions about the experience of temporally extended beings apart from those we usually make to spatially extended beings.

Presentism is a theory of time which is consistent with the way we have experiences and apparently move forward in time. It is up to eternalism to try and account for why it seems this way to us. You can presume that a temporal worm has experiences, and has all of the experiences that an individual will have across their lifetime, but this still won't account for (temporally-speaking) the main issue: why does time appear to flow and why do we appear to have these experiences in a presentist way, moving forward in time from one moment to the next? It's not being uncharitable to eternalism that it cannot account for this; that's just the problem with eternalism. — Luke

There is a difference between saying that eternalism says that we shouldn't be consciousness whatsoever (that the phenomenon of conscious experience necessarily requires a flow of time) and that eternalism cannot account for our experiences of feeling like time flows. The former is not charitable because it assumes that beings in an eternalist world are zombies which we evidently are not. However this seems like too strong a stance to take.

I agree that it is reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings, like us, can have experiences. However, I disagree that some aggregate of our entire existence, unlike us, can have its own consciousness or experience, including any meta-experience (or "larger experience") of two distinct, temporally-distant experiences at once. — Luke

I am sorry, but what is the difference between being temporally extended and being an aggregate of more than one time?

An experience of x and y is a combined experience. I am not sure what the distinction is to you. Similarly an experience of a red patch on my left side of my vision and a blue patch on my right is a combined experience of red and blue. It is an experience of red and blue. — Mr Bee

I thought that was the point in contention? An experience of x and an experience of y need not be a combined experience, as they can be two distinct, separate, temporally-distant experiences. Although you could refer to them as a singular experience, I take you to mean that the experience of red on my left and blue on my right are not temporally-distant experiences. If they were temporally-distant, then it would be peculiar to refer to them as a single experience, instead of two individual experiences.

Besides, if any two (x and y) experiences must be combined into a single experience, then all experiences must be combined into a single experience. How, then, can you distinguish, or even speak about, one experience as distinct from the rest? It then all becomes just one big experience. This seems to create some problems for your OP, where you speak of having more than one experience.

The worm conception of time is an ontological theory of time that has implications on what we should experience. I am making no such assumptions about the experience of temporally extended beings apart from those we usually make to spatially extended beings. — Mr Bee

How does it have implications on what we should experience? I don't know what beings you are talking about, but I'm talking about normal human beings and the way that we actually have experiences. You are talking about some abstract nonsense which has little to do with human beings.

There is a difference between saying that eternalism says that we shouldn't be consciousness whatsoever (that the phenomenon of conscious experience necessarily requires a flow of time) and that eternalism cannot account for our experiences of feeling like time flows. The former is not charitable because it assumes that beings in an eternalist world are zombies which we evidently are not. However this seems like too strong a stance to take. — Mr Bee

Charitable or not, I find it impossible for us to have consciousness or experiences, or for there to even be the illusion of a flow of time, in a static, motionless universe. I don't think that beings in an eternalist world would be zombies, because even that suggests some sort of motion. If the eternalist theory proposes that the universe is truly motionless, then why be charitable about it? Advocates of the theory are welcome to explain it.

I am sorry, but what is the difference between being temporally extended and being an aggregate of more than one time? — Mr Bee

I was attempting to distinguish between the sequence of experiences that we actually have, and the type of abstract aggregate experience that you are proposing our worms might have (over and above our actual ones).

I thought that was the point in contention? — Luke

I'm not sure I understand you. Earlier I said that the disagreement laid with me saying that having an experience x and an experience y means having an experience of "x and y". You said I misrepresented you and said that the real disagreement laid with the fact having both experiences entails having a combined experience. This suggests that you see a difference between the two. Explain what that difference is.

An experience of x and an experience of y need not be a combined experience, as they can be two distinct, separate, temporally-distant experiences. Although you could refer to them as a singular experience, I take you to mean that the experience of red on my left and blue on my right are not temporally-distant experiences. If they were, then it would be peculiar to refer to them as a single experience, instead of two individual experiences. — Luke

Let's say that both experiences are had at the same time. Is it possible to have an experience of x and an experience of y without having a combined experience? If so, can you imagine what that would even be like? For instance, is it possible to have an experience of seeing red and seeing blue without seeing an image of red and blue?

Besides, if any two (x and y) experiences must be combined into a single experience, then all experiences must be combined into a single experience. — Luke

Indeed. I believe that is a general feature of a single conscious subject having two experiences.

How, then, can you distinguish, or even speak about, one experience as distinct from the rest? It then all becomes just one big experience. This seems to create some problems for your OP, where you speak of having more than one experience.. — Luke

We can distinguish individual parts of our experiences easy. If I am looking at a picture of the Mona Lisa, then I can identify the visual experience of her hair, and the visual experience of her eyes. In fact I can even identify and compare the different parts that visual experience I have. Nothing wrong or problematic with that. But that doesn't mean that I have those experiences separately or that I do not have the visual experience of the Mona Lisa in full.

How does it have implications on what we should experience? — Luke

If I am a being who is extended through space and time, and the parts that I have at every spatio-temporal contain experiences, then shouldn't be relevant to what I, as a being who is composed of those parts, experience?

I don't know what beings you are talking about, but I'm talking about normal human beings and the way that we actually have experiences. You are talking about some abstract nonsense which has little to do with human beings. — Luke

So you think the notion of temporal worms itself is nonsensical? I am not sure what else you think I am talking about here.

Charitable or not, I find it impossible for us to have consciousness or experiences, or for there to even be the illusion of a flow of time, in a static, motionless universe. I don't think that beings in an eternalist world would be zombies, because even that suggests some sort of motion. If the eternalist theory proposes that the universe is truly motionless, then why be charitable about it? Advocates of the theory are welcome to explain it. — Luke

The problem is that most such arguments as far as I have heard them, seem to be unjustified. I have heard people say that if time doesn't flow then experience cannot happen, but they usually misinterpret eternalism or assume requirements about conscious experience that aren't plausible. The eternalist, for instance, wouldn't say the world is motionless because motion does not require the flow of time, it only requires that objects change position over time. In addition, I do not see how consciousness would require the flow of time either.

If someone were to say physicalism on the grounds that it says we are all zombies, then I believe they would also be acting unfair because I see no reason to believe physicalism in general to reject conscious experience (unless of course you are an eliminativist about it). Maybe you think it is satisfactory to reject eternalism in that manner, but for me, I find it insufficient.

I'm not sure I understand you. Earlier I said that the disagreement laid with me saying that having an experience x and an experience y means having an experience of "x and y". You said I misrepresented you and said that the real disagreement laid with the fact having both experiences entails having a combined experience. This suggests that you see a difference between the two. Explain what that difference is. — Mr Bee

I've explained it several times and you continually fail to address it: I find it peculiar to consider two distinct, temporally-distant experiences (e.g. decades apart) to be referred to as a singular experience. How do you justify this unusual use of the term?

Let's say that both experiences are had at the same time. Is it possible to have an experience of x and an experience of y without having a combined experience? If so, can you imagine what that would even be like? For instance, is it possible to have an experience of seeing red and seeing blue without seeing an image of red and blue? — Mr Bee

I've already granted that a person can have more than one experience at a time, and I provided the example of having a conversation and hearing background noise simultaneously. Now let's say that the two experiences are not had at the same time, and that they are temporally-distant, since this has been my unaddressed counter-argument for several posts now.

Indeed. I believe that is a general feature of a single conscious subject having two experiences. — Mr Bee

I believe that it is a general feature of a single conscious subject to be continually ageing and moving forward in time.

We can distinguish individual parts of our experiences easy. If I am looking at a picture of the Mona Lisa, then I can identify the visual experience of her hair, and the visual experience of her eyes. In fact I can even identify and compare the different parts that visual experience I have. Nothing wrong or problematic with that. But that doesn't mean that I have those experiences separately or that I do not have the visual experience of the Mona Lisa in full. — Mr Bee

The relevant difference being that we don't experience our lives all at once, or have every experience of our lives available to us "in full" at a single glance. For example, two distinct experiences might be had decades apart, where they do not form a combined, singular experience.

If I am a being who is extended through space and time, and the parts that I have at every spatio-temporal contain experiences, then shouldn't be relevant to what I, as a being who is composed of those parts, experience? — Mr Bee

I don't know, should it? Why should it? You are attributing the experiences that you actually have (in the real world) to the eternalist model, and then subsequently make the assumption that the eternalist model has implications on what we should experience. Sounds backwards to me.

So you think the notion of temporal worms itself is nonsensical? I am not sure what else you think I am talking about here. — Mr Bee

No, I think that your talk of worms having experiences is nonsensical. Also, how you seem to think that it is unproblematic for a worm to have a combined experience of two distinct experiences which may be years or decades apart. Worms don't have experiences of a person's entire lifetime; people have experiences throughout their lifetime, and in a particular sequence.

The problem is that most such arguments as far as I have heard them, seem to be unjustified. I have heard people say that if time doesn't flow then experience cannot happen, but they usually misinterpret eternalism or assume requirements about conscious experience that aren't plausible. The eternalist, for instance, wouldn't say the world is motionless because motion does not require the flow of time, it only requires that objects change position over time. In addition, I do not see how consciousness would require the flow of time either. — Mr Bee

How do objects "change" their position over time without a flow of time? You need to implicitly assume a flow of time for the concept of change to make any sense. Changing where I focus my attention on the static timeline does not constitute any real change, it's just an attempt to smuggle in change via my attention (which really does change!). And I'm pretty sure that if (e.g.) blood doesn't flow through our veins, if our brain impulses don't fire, and if we don't continue to breathe in and out, then we will soon lose consciousness.

Tell me, when you talk about having two experiences together, are you bringing in some notion of the flow of time into the mix? That is, when a person has two experiences, one of skydiving and one of smelling burnt toast, then do you see the person as having them in sequence with the passage of time, according to an A-theory of time?

I've explained it several times and you continually fail to address it: I find it peculiar to consider two distinct, temporally-distant experiences (e.g. decades apart) to be referred to as a singular experience. How do you justify this unusual use of the term? — Luke

I have given reasons, if you have been reading. We have no problems considering having multiple experiences in space for a single subject that would necessarily combine together. Experiences may be "separated by space" but that doesn't mean anything to saying they are had together. Space is not time, but they are very similar to one another (even more so under eternalism, where it is often claimed that time is another dimension of space), so it seems there is no reason for us not to say the same applies for a being who is temporally extended through time.

The only reason why I think you would disagree is if you just simply assume that having a larger experience means that all the experiences are had "at the same time". But I see no reason for this understanding. Furthermore, your sense of "together" as "together at a time" is too restrictive. The worm theory says that a temporally extended being has their temporal parts "together". Do they mean "together at a time" where "time" means one of the moments of the worm's life? Certainly not, any more than we would say that have all of our body parts at a single point in space. But does this mean that the worm theory is obviously false? Maybe it is to you, but it seems like a lot of people are fine with saying that a person has their temporal parts together without trouble, so either they're wrong or you are.

Whether you have read these reasons or not, you certainly haven't addressed them, instead repeating the same unjustified assumption that just because two experiences that a subject experiences are temporally separated, there is no larger experience which contains both.

I've already granted that a person can have more than one experience at a time, and I provided the example of having a conversation and hearing background noise simultaneously. — Luke

I was asking if it is possible for you to not have a larger experience featuring them both. And again I should note that we are talking about both experiences being had at the same time.

The relevant difference being that we don't experience our lives all at once, or have every experience of our lives available to us "in full" at a single glance. For example, two distinct experiences might be had decades apart, where they do not form a combined, singular experience. — Luke

And I imagine that this "single glance" implicitly means "at a time", "simultaneously", and "at the same moment" right?

I don't know, should it? Why should it? You are attributing the experiences that you actually have (in the real world) to the eternalist model, and then subsequently make the assumption that the eternalist model has implications on what we should experience. Sounds backwards to me. — Luke

Okay, let's just consider the spatial case. I am a body extended through space. My eyes register visual experiences, my ear audio, etc. Does this have any implication for what I experience, as the body who has all of these different body parts as a part of myself? If not, then what does?

No, I think that your talk of worms having experiences is nonsensical. Also, how you seem to think that it is unproblematic for a worm to have a combined experience of two distinct experiences which may be years or decades apart. Worms don't have experiences of a person's entire lifetime; people have experiences throughout their lifetime, and in a particular sequence. — Luke

I am not sure if you are just instinctively saying "no" whenever I ask you for clarification, because I've found more than once that your responses to my questions have no connection to what I have asked about, I mean at all.

Do you think the temporally extended worms of human lives are not "human beings"?
Do you think that temporally extended worms cannot possibly have experiences?

I believe that it is a general feature of a single conscious subject to be continually ageing and moving forward in time. — Luke

How do objects "change" their position over time without a flow of time? You need to implicitly assume a flow of time for the concept of change to make any sense. Changing where I focus my attention on the static timeline does not constitute any real change, it's just an attempt to smuggle in change via my attention (which really does change!). And I'm pretty sure that if (e.g.) blood doesn't flow through our veins, if our brain impulses don't fire, and if we don't continue to breathe in and out, then we will soon lose consciousness. — Luke

The situation with you is starting to sound like the one I have with TGW. Even though you reject my argument, you don't reject my conclusion. In fact, you would go one step further and deny eternalism altogether. To you the very concept of the block universe doesn't make sense, and so much as we have been disagreeing, as far as I can tell, we have been disagreeing about whether or not the notion of temporally extended worms and their experiences even make sense.

Tell me, when you talk about having two experiences together, are you bringing in some notion of the flow of time into the mix? That is, when a person has two experiences, one of skydiving and one of smelling burnt toast, then do you see the person as having them in sequence with the passage of time, according to an A-theory of time? — Mr Bee

Yes, of course. Do you know of any other way to experience something?

I have given reasons, if you have been reading. We have no problems considering having multiple experiences in space for a single subject that would necessarily combine together. Experiences may be "separated by space" but that doesn't mean anything to saying they are had together. Space is not time, but they are very similar to one another (even more so under eternalism, where it is often claimed that time is another dimension of space), so it seems there is no reason for us not to say the same applies for a being who is temporally extended through time.

The only reason why I think you would disagree is if you just simply assume that having a larger experience means that all the experiences are had "at the same time". But I see no reason for this understanding. Furthermore, your sense of "together" as "together at a time" is too restrictive. The worm theory says that a temporally extended being has their temporal parts "together". Do they mean "together at a time" where "time" means one of the moments of the worm's life? Certainly not, any more than we would say that have all of our body parts at a single point in space. But does this mean that the worm theory is obviously false? Maybe it is to you, but it seems like a lot of people are fine with saying that a person has their temporal parts together without trouble, so either they're wrong or you are.

Whether you have read these reasons or not, you certainly haven't addressed them, instead repeating the same unjustified assumption that just because two experiences that a subject experiences are temporally separated, there is no larger experience which contains both. — Mr Bee

You address my concerns by complaining that I have not addressed your concerns?

Time is considered to be a space-like dimension under eternalism, not "another dimension of space". Time is not considered to be a dimension of space.

Clearly the term "experience" is problematic here, due to its many shades of meaning. However, I disagree because I don't necessarily consider any two of my experiences to be part of the same "larger experience". Your use of the term to cover one's entire lifetime seems a stretch of the meaning of the term, especially when used to combine two clearly separate and otherwise unrelated experiences in one's life.

I was asking if it is possible for you to not have a larger experience featuring them both. And again I should note that we are talking about both experiences being had at the same time. — Mr Bee

I have experiences (or an experience) at a particular time. I don't agree that this must necessarily be a part of some larger experience, which I can only take you to mean something like the rest of my life. Please correct me if you are referring to some other "larger experience" than this. To be clear, I consider an experience to be a part of my entire life, I just take issue with calling my entire life "an experience".

And I imagine that this "single glance" implicitly means "at a time", "simultaneously", and "at the same moment" right? — Mr Bee

Perhaps. I was trying to imagine how a worm might experience two temporally distant experiences as a combined experience. I imagine that they would have to be experienced together, at the same time.

Do you think the temporally extended worms of human lives are not "human beings"?
Do you think that temporally extended worms cannot possibly have experiences? — Mr Bee

I think that a worm is a representation of a person/object's lifetime/existence. I don't think that a representation or a lifetime can have its own experiences. I believe that a person can have experiences over their lifetime, however.

Yes, of course. Do you know of any other way to experience something? — Luke

Well, given that we are talking about having multiple experiences in the sense of the eternalist worm theory, then of course that is irrelevant. According to the eternalist, time does not pass. You apparently think that this means that they cannot have conscious experiences, but I am willing to grant that they do, and then work towards what that would mean.

The idea of having multiple experiences together as a combined experience that I am referring to is pretty much like the idea of having multiple experiences at the same time combined into a larger experience. The way I see things, the eternalist is just like the presentist in that it regards everything as, in the A-theoretic sense, "present". It is just what they consider "now" includes alot more than a single moment. It includes all times, the Big Bang, the death of the Universe, and whatnot. This is why the eternalist would say they all exist on a par. The time in which these events exist in, can be treated pretty much like an extra dimension of space, in which the different events are located. It is for this reason why I think the analogies I made with space are convincing.

The block universe would functionally be no different, say, from a world with no flow of time and 4 dimensions of space, 3 of which are the usual xyz coordinates the the 4th including the contents of all the different time slices. If there were a being who is spatially extended across the 4 dimensions, then she would be exposed to whatever experiences that her parts have. It seems reasonable to believe that, given that she has each of these experiences, that she would necessarily have an experience of them all together, does it not?

You address my concerns by complaining that I have not addressed your concerns? — Luke

That is how I think you've been addressing my concerns. But if you look more carefully at the text you quoted, you would see there are two large paragraphs above the third one where I specifically try to show the error in your reasoning. I have given you my reasons, but you haven't really addressed them.

Time is considered to be a space-like dimension under eternalism, not "another dimension of space". Time is not considered to be a dimension of space. — Luke

Indeed, but I did say that it was claimed by some to be just like space. The fact that they are very similar under eternalism than presentism should make the analogy more convincing, no?

I have experiences (or an experience) at a particular time. I don't agree that this must necessarily be a part of some larger experience, which I can only take you to mean something like the rest of my life. Please correct me if you are referring to some other "larger experience" than this. To be clear, I consider an experience to be a part of my entire life, I just take issue with calling my entire life "an experience". — Luke

Yes, I am not referring to the sense of having multiple experiences that you describe, one that involves the passage of time. Remember the context in which I am referring to having a larger experience over time is within the context of the eternalist worm theory, in which the passage of time isn't real. Given that you seem to have a strong stance against the eternalist view, then I am not sure if you would even think the latter makes sense, but understand that I am certainly not saying that we have multiple experiences as through the passage of time.

I think that a worm is a representation of a person/object's lifetime/existence. I don't think that a representation or a lifetime can have its own experiences. I believe that a person can have experiences over their lifetime, however. — Luke

According to the worm theory, the temporally extended worm isn't just a representation. The block universe isn't neither. There literally is a real sense in which the Big Bang exists and 2018 exists, because the block universe isn't just a map, but the real territory. The worm is actually a real entity that is composed of multiple times.

Again, I think the situation with you is similar to TGW. You think that the very ideas of the worm theory itself are nonsensical, which is why when I try to frame my argument in a way that tries to accommodate the theory and remain neutral among all the theories of time, you either find it unnecessary or equally nonsensical. Of course, I don't really share that same feeling and am willing to grant that the view makes sense. At this point my job isn't just to clarify what my argument says, but to actually convince you that a metaphysical position that you reject is worth considering, which is a bigger order.

Well, given that we are talking about having multiple experiences in the sense of the eternalist worm theory, then of course that is irrelevant. According to the eternalist, time does not pass. You apparently think that this means that they cannot have conscious experiences, but I am willing to grant that they do, and then work towards what that would mean. — Mr Bee

It seems that we are each referring to something different by the word "experience". I am using the common definition, while, to be charitable, you are using your own 'technical' definition. As a result, it seems that we have been talking past each other.

We are indeed talking past each other, because you were, like I said, inappropriately applying A-theorist ideas in a context that was explicitly eternalist. More specifically, your sense of "having multiple experiences" required these different experiences to pass according to the flow of time was different from what I meant. I am not sure what you mean when we say that our use of "experience" differ, unless you mean the idea of "having multiple experiences" above.

So, do you understand now why you should drop this idea of having multiple experiences in the dynamic sense here? When I say that we have multiple experiences over time, it is in the context of the static worm theory.