It's always the same question... — neomac

That's not true. You're mistaken.

I'll answer whatever questions you like, so long as they follow from what I'm arguing or are just plain ole simple questions about basic facts that seem to cause an issue for my position if and when my position is held in light of those facts. I've no problem at all bearing the burden of my claims. Questions based upon non sequiturs are another matter altogether.

I'm asking you (7th time): in the belief report that you claim more accurate, namely "At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock was working.", I see 3 items: broken, clock, was working. Explain what each of them stands for. Start from was working. — neomac

Here's what you've done...

You've broken down the basic belief report that I am arguing for(At time t1, Jack believed that that broken clock was working) into disparate bits of language use, which is to say that you're not focusing upon the meaningful set of marks I've presented, as I've presented them. Then... you're really asking me what the words "is working" stand for, as if - when isolated from the rest of the report - they stand for something that I bear the burden of elaborating upon?

What is it that you believe can be gleaned here by virtue of this procedure of yours? What does that question have to do anything we've discussed? Explain to me the relevance of the question. If it is relevant, I'll be glad to answer it. Teach me something new. I'm always game for that.




You've been asking, in more than one way, how I've tied this novel understanding of "belief" that I have into my report/account of Jack's belief. You held two claims(well... parts of them anyway) beside one another, basically asking me to explain their congruence. You asked about Jack's belief in terms of correlations drawn. It seemed that you wanted to know how I made sense of belief as correlations when it came to Jack's belief at time t1. I've obliged. I've set that out a number of times. The response was basically rhetorical huffing and puffing followed by some insults and handwaving. Simply put, you've ignored and deflected.

All belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature capable of doing so.

At time t1, Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Jack's belief consisted of all the meaningful correlations he drew while wondering what time it was and then looking at a broken clock to find an answer to his question. The content of the correlations Jack drew at that time are the content of Jack's belief at that time. So, I simplified the answer for ease of understanding. The non propositional content included Jack's wondering what time it was, and a broken clock. That satisfies the criterion perfectly.

It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood; to knowingly be mistaken; to knowingly form, have, or hold false belief. Jack's belief is false. Thus, when Jack's false belief is put into proper linguistic form, it will be impossible to knowingly believe.

Propositions are not.

> I'll answer whatever questions you like, so long as they follow from what I'm arguing or are just plain ole simple questions about basic facts that seem to cause an issue for my position if and when my position is held in light of those facts. I've no problem at all bearing the burden of my claims. Questions based upon non sequiturs are another matter altogether.

What I always asked you to argue from the start is to prove the following claim of yours:

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.
Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much? — creativesoul

So I’m following your arguments as long as they focus on what I’ve asked you to argue: to provide support for precisely that claim, and nothing else. And you should expect that kind of questions, because you are challenging our common belief ascription practices. So if you do not make your challenges worth following, I will simply dismiss them.
Besides you have a default tendency of framing other people’s claims by assuming correct your assumptions, which again would simply make pointless any philosophical debate because you are begging the question. And, not surprisingly, this complaint of yours proves it once more: since I removed the part that triggers your framing attitude (like the expression "belief content"), then you accuse me of "non sequiturs" (even when I'm simply quoting your claims and asking questions about them) because you can not trap me in your frames to easily accuse me of conflating things.
So my questions are either conflating things (when you can frame me) or arbitrary (because you can not frame me), therefore you are right. This is not how I understand philosophical debates, this is just your way to preventively censor any potential objections against your philosophical assumptions. Trying to retrain your interlocutors to conform their claims to your theoretical language, to validate your own claims is not philosophy, but - at best - brainwashing.

> What is it that you believe can be gleaned here by virtue of this procedure of yours? What does that question have to do anything we've discussed? Explain to me the relevance of the question. If it is relevant, I'll be glad to answer it. Teach me something new. I'm always game for that.

The relevance is that this is a claim of yours that I find questionable (indeed absurd), so until you provide arguments to support it, I’ll take to be unproven your claim that your belief report is more accurate. The reason why I find it questionable is because you are reporting of Jack that he believes something, which is contradictory because “broken” and “is working” represent contradictory properties of “the clock” (let's see if you can frame this). Indeed it must be so because this is the proper linguistic form which you claim it is impossible to knowingly believe.

Thus, when Jack's false belief is put into proper linguistic form, it will be impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

Jack can not knowingly believe that broken clock is working because “that broken clock is working” is a linguistic form of a contradiction.

> At time t1, Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Jack's belief consisted of all the meaningful correlations he drew while wondering what time it was and then looking at a broken clock to find an answer to his question. The content of the correlations Jack drew at that time are the content of Jack's belief at that time. So, I simplified the answer for ease of understanding. The non propositional content included Jack's wondering what time it was, and a broken clock. That satisfies the criterion perfectly.

I have objections against this claim too, and I have objections also against the claim that “It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood” but let’s do a piece at a time and do not mix everything since you can not clearly follow my objections.


So once more (8th time): is “that broken clock is working” in your report “Jack believes that broken clock is working” a contradiction? Or, if you prefer, does “that broken clock is working” in your report “Jack believes that broken clock is working” have the linguistic form of a contradiction? If not, why not?

The sentence "That broken clock is working" is a contradiction in terms.

I'm not talking about the sentence "That broken clock is working", I'm talking about the proper linguistic form that you claim to be impossible to knowingly believe when put into the belief report "Jack believes that broken clock is working". Isn't this proper linguistic form representing an object ("the clock") with contradictory properties ("broken" and "is working")? Because if it is not the case, then you should explain why it is impossible to knowingly believe it when using this proper linguistic form in your belief report.

Jack believes that broken clock is working.

The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form". Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.

Jack can not knowingly believe that broken clock is working because “that broken clock is working” is a linguistic form of a contradiction. — neomac

Well yes and no. Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true, because it is a contradiction in terms, necessarily false, etc. That's all about language use. Jack's belief is not.

It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work.

We cannot knowingly believe that a broken clock is working.

...you should explain why it is impossible to knowingly believe it... — neomac

:yikes:

See above. There is no need for further explanation. I've more than adequately explained several times over in a variety of ways.

> Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true, because it is a contradiction in terms, necessarily false, etc. That's all about language use. Jack's belief is not.

Why are you changing the example again?
You should write: Jack cannot knowingly believe that broken clock is working
And not: Jack cannot knowingly believe “that broken clock is working” is true

> It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work.

Why are you changing the example again?
You should write: It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working
And not: It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working.


> There is no need for further explanation. I've more than adequately explained several times over in a variety of ways.

That’s because probably you do not understand what I’m asking you to explain. Even though you should have understood because I gave you examples of the kind of answer I was expecting. Anyways, what you are doing is just joggling with truth claims such as:

• Jack believes that broken clock is working (accurate belief report with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form)
• Jack believes “that broken clock is working” is false (accurate belief report with appropriate propositional linguistic form)
• “that broken clock is working” is false (accurate non-belief report with appropriate propositional linguistic form)
• It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working (accurate knowledge report with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form)

And you evidently take this joggling explanatory, because you take as your philosophical task to simply make such claims, contrast their usage so that others do not conflate them, and enforce their usage on your interlocutors without further questions to make you happy. But that has more to do with brainwashing than philosophy to me. And it shows that you are not open to challenges (while challenging others’ views), so why should others be open to your challenges?!
When I ask you for an explanation, I’m asking you about what grounds the truth of all these truth claims of yours. What grounds the truth of all these claims must depend on relevant facts or logic/analytic rules that govern our representations. And if you want to compare the validity of your claims against other claims you should ground your arguments on relevant facts and inferential/logic/analytic rules that govern our representations that must be shared to make our views commensurable. That is why it's utterly pointless to constantly remind us your list of truth claims to prove anything at all. And that's why I keep you telling to not change examples and to provide the truth conditions for your claims in a way that is understandable to us without using your truth claims (which would beg the question) [1]

Now since you insist to distinguish between sentences and belief reports with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form, and you still avoid to answer the very specific question I already asked you 8th times in a row (by changing examples and shifting attention from one truth claim to the other), instead of asking you the same question for the 9th time in a row, I'll ask you:

• what grounds the truth of the claim “the sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ is a contradiction in terms”? My answer is because that sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ represents an object (i.e. that clock) with contradictory properties, namely the properties attributed to the object at the same time by that sentence are terms (i.e. “broken” and “is working”) that by definition are taken to be one the negation of the other. Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim “the sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ is a contradiction in terms”?
• what grounds the truth of the claim “It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working”? My answer is because the non-propositional linguistic form ‘that broken clock is working’ represents an object (i.e. that clock) with contradictory properties, namely the properties attributed to the object at the same time by that non-propositional linguistic form are terms (i.e. “broken” and “is working”) that by definition are taken to be one the negation of the other. Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim “It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working”?
• What grounds the truth of the claim that “if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working”? My answer is because “is broken” is a term that by definition is the negation of “is working”, so they are supposed to refer to the same property respectively as absent and as present, whence the validity of the inference between "we know it is broken" and "we also know it is not working". Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim that “if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working”?

[1]

Jack believes that broken clock is working.
The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form". Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

This is a perfect example of begging the question argument (twice fallacious b/c besides begging the question, it’s also deductively badly formed, as it is!). You take as premises that “Jack believes that broken clock is working” is an accurate report and that that report is in proper linguistic form b/c it is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, to conclude that Jack’s belief’s report is accurate b/c it is in a linguistic form that it is impossible to knowingly believe.
The problem is that the claim that “Jack believes that broken clock is working” is an accurate report of Jack's belief, is precisely what needs to be proven, so you can not use it AT ALL as a premise of a probative argument. Indeed what needs to be proven must figure in the conclusion not in the set of premises !!!

Here another objection for you: you claim that “At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working” [1] is accurate based on the idea that the proper rendering of a false belief should be put into a proper form that it will be impossible to knowingly believe [2] .
Then here are some belief reports put into a form that it will be impossible to knowingly believe:
1. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working
2. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is working and that clock is broken
3. At time t1, Jack believes that is not the case that clock is either broken or working
4. At time t1, Jack believes “that broken clock is working” is true [3]
3. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is not a broken clock
5. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is not a clock
6. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is not a clock
7. At time t1, Jack believes that clock that CreativeSoul knowingly believes to be broken, is working
8. At time t1, Jack believes that he knows that broken clock is working
9. At time t1, Jack believes that he knowingly believes that clock is working and that clock is not working
10. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working and 23765.3456 * 23.456 = 557439.9463936
11. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working and planet Earth is flat and all elephants fly
12. At time t1, Jack believes that working clock is broken
13. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is working and a butterfly is not a butterfly
14. At time t1, Jack believes that 0 / 3 = 5
Since all 14 reports satisfy your requirement of being in a form impossible to knowingly believe, are they all equally accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief?
And if only 1 is the accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief (or you exclude any of them as accurate), then your requirement is at best necessary but not sufficient to determine the proper belief report of Jack's mistaken belief.
And you have to specify what the missing requirement is b/c otherwise you didn't prove yet At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working” from your own explicit assumptions!!!.

[1]

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is. — creativesoul

[2]

a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

[3]

Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true — creativesoul

What grounds the truth of the claim — neomac

That question makes no sense on my view.

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

This is a perfect example of begging the question argument — neomac

:worry:

...if only 1 is the accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief, then your requirement is at best necessary... — neomac

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error...

Why are you changing the example again?
You should write: It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working
And not: It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. — neomac

Either works for me. I'm not picky about it. The only difference is that one is more general while the other(the one you prefer) is about a particular broken clock.

> That question makes no sense on my view.

Then we need your theory of meaning and truth for you to establish when sentences are true, false , or necessary false. Or do you mean that sentences are true, false or necessary false as a brute fact? And, BTW, shouldn't the belief content you attribute to Jack in your report "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working" match the belief content as you describe it in your claim below in order to be accurate?

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief.

The content of Jack's belief are correlations drawn by Jack between directly and indirectly perceptible things. That would include the broken clock and his wondering what time it was, amongst other things less relevant. — creativesoul

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error... — creativesoul

Well if we accept all your premises (and I haven't accepted any so far) maybe you are right, yet it doesn't prove that your report is accurate. I pointed that out b/c this is a problem internal to your theory, not b/c it's enough to prove that our common belief ascription practices are wrong (indeed I think the opposite).

@creativesoul

Let's not forget that you made the following claim:

We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief.

Then, we will see how much sense it makes to ascribe belief to another, because we will have some standard of belief for comparing our ascriptions/attribution to. — creativesoul

So I would expect you to prove that "Jack believes that broken clock is working" is an accurate report of Jack's mistaken belief based on your definition of "belief" [1]. Instead you are trying to support that claim based on a knowledge requirement [2].
Now either your knowledge requirement is based on your definition of belief, but you didn't provide any (valid) argument that deduces this requirement from your definition of belief.
Or your knowledge requirement is not based on your definition of belief, then your claim that "what counts as belief" would set a standard for comparing belief ascriptions is unjustified.


[1]

Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so. — creativesoul

[2]

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work. — creativesoul

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

This is a perfect example of begging the question argument — neomac

:worry: — creativesoul

I misunderstood your argument because this is how you presented it:
Jack believes that broken clock is working.
The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form".Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe
So from the way you presented it, it wasn't clear where the argument was supposed to start.
But if I misunderstood you, then I'll take back my objection that this specific argument was begging the question. One objection less against this specific argument.

Yet I have another objection. Now that you made clear that your argument is only this:
Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.

Then your argument (as it is) is a perfect example of non sequitur, logically speaking. I'll formalise it for you:
premise 1: Jack was mistaken (p)
premise 2: It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken (q)
conclusion: a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe (c)

p
q
-------
c

This is not a valid logic deduction!!! And it's not only fallacious, but it is still far from being conclusive because the conclusion is not that "Jack believes that broken clock is working" is an accurate report of Jack's mistaken belief, as I asked you to prove. So you simply provided a fallacious argument to prove a general claim about how Jack's mistaken belief should be rendered.
In other words, you have yet to provide a deductive argument in a valid form (if that's what you are trying to do), which ends with the right conclusion. And once you did, then we still have to see if it is sound.

the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is... ..."Jack believes that broken clock is working" — neomac


No, it is not.

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief. — creativesoul

This objection is maybe based on my poor phrasing. I re-edited my text to better express what I wanted to say.

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error...
— creativesoul

Well if we accept all your premises (and I haven't accepted any so far) maybe you are right... — neomac

Maybe I am right if you do not.

:brow:

A true belief cannot be false. A false belief cannot be true. It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

Do you agree with all four of the above tenets?

:brow:

I misunderstood your argument because this is how you presented it: — neomac

Has nothing to do with failing to read the next few lines...

...we need your theory of meaning and truth... — neomac

Much, arguably most, of the groundwork has already been offered, here in this very discussion...

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?
— creativesoul

I answered that already. Belief contents express the point of view... — neomac

Cats sometimes believe that a mouse ran behind a tree...

It makes no sense at all to me to say that the cat's belief has content that expresses the cat's point of view.

Belief contents express the point of view...
— neomac — creativesoul

This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief.

A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake. Hence, when we ask Jack at time t1, what he's doing immediately after looking at the clock, he will not say "I believe that that broken clock is working". Rather, he will say something about finding out what time it is/was.

He is unaware of being mistaken. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown.

Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working.

> Maybe I am right if you do not.

Of course, your claims may be correct even if you didn't demonstrate to me any good argument to support them. What I meant it's just that you didn't demonstrate to me you are right. To do that one has to provide a valid and conclusive argument from some assumptions. I didn't accept any of the assumptions specific to your view (your definition of "belief" and your knowledge requirement) nor I saw any valid and conclusive argument that from those assumptions concludes that "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working" is a more accurate report than "At t1, Jack believes that clock is working" wrt to the example of Jack you gave us (which is a case of ignorance of the relevant facts)

> A true belief cannot be false. A false belief cannot be true . It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

I totally agree with the part in bold, for semantic reasons: true and false are contradictory terms.

Concerning the part not in bold, I'm not sure how you understand it. If it simply means that any of the 2 following claims is necessarily false or contradictory:

• The claim "S knows that p and 'p' is false"
• The claim "S knows that p and p does not occur"

Then yes, I totally agree, and that again for semantic reasons: the notion of "knowledge" presupposes that "p" is true or that p occurs, but "true" and "false" are contradictory terms as much as "occur" and "does not occur", so those 2 claims are contradictory or necessarily false.
If the part not in bold means something else (as it seems from your later posts) or the same but for different reasons, then you have to spell it out to me, coz I can't justifiably agree to something I do not even understand.

Has nothing to do with failing to read the next few lines... — creativesoul

Meaning? "Thus" expresses the idea that you are logically inferring your claim "a proper rendering of Jack's belief ..." from "Jack was mistaken" and "It is impossible to knowingly be", aren't you? If so then your argument [1] (as it is) is deductively invalid (in particular, it's a perfect example of non sequitur) and inconclusive (because you didn't conclude with the claim that you were asked to prove). In other words, there is literally nothing else to logically understand in there. Unless you are claiming that the "next few lines" weren't supposed to be an argument to logically support your claim that "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working". But then what else? Can you spell it out?
For now your argument looks nothing more than a wishful thought.

[1]

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

Much, arguably most, of the groundwork has already been offered, here in this very discussion... — creativesoul

Where? can you give me a few links?

It makes no sense at all to me to say that the cat's belief has content that expresses the cat's point of view. — creativesoul

The challenge is: can you justify that claim in a way that is understandable to me (based on assumptions that we both share)?

> This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief [1].
A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake [2].
[…] He is unaware of being mistaken [3]. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working [4]. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown [5].

I agree with claims 2, 3, 5. But totally disagree with claims 1 and 4.

More specifically:

• Claim 4 can neither be equated to nor be implied from 3
• By comparing 3 and 5, it seems that you are equating the notion of “being aware that” and the notion of “knowing that”, or you are presupposing some co-implication between them but it would be better to spell it out appropriately because it is not evident at all: “awareness” is an ambiguous notion per se (e.g. are you familiar with the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness? Or the notion of higher-order consciousness? Or the notions of phenomenal and non-phenomenal awareness?). Also the notion of “knowledge” admits different understanding (e.g. internalist vs externalist notion of “knowledge”) and can not be conflated with the notion of “awareness” yet there might be some equations/co-implications between them, depending how these notions are understood. So I would agree on some equation or co-implication between claims 3 and 5, under the condition that we agree on the specific notions of “being aware that” and “knowing that” as applied in this case.
• I’m noticing a potential claim shift though: from “S knowingly believes that p” to “S knows that he believes that p” or “S is aware that he believes that p” as claim 4 and the equation between “being aware that” and “knowing that” (from claim 3 and 5) would suggest. Indeed you never spelled out what “S knowingly believes that p” is supposed to mean until now. If “S knowingly believes that p” means “S is aware that he believes that p” then say it explicitly b/c there are different understandings of "knowledge" and "being aware". However if this is the case, there would be an additional problem: we are shifting focus from someone's belief about a broken clock to someone's belief about their own belief about a broken clock, which looks yet another bad move for you.

So your claims 3,4,5 put together look twice equivocal: in the first place, wrt to the notion of "awareness" (if it is to be assimilated/correlated to the notion of "knowledge"); in the second wrt the content of such awareness (p or the belief that p?).

> Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working.

I myself can be mistaken and I can figure out what is proper or improper to claim of myself if I were in the situation of Jack. Now, after putting myself in his shoes, even when I recognize that I’m mistaken, I wouldn’t be "ready to admit" to having once believed that broken clock was working. And if I were so disposed it would be only for pragmatic reasons, not for accuracy concerns. So the “unproblematic understanding” argument does not prove to me that your philosophical understanding of Jack’s hypothetical situation is right.

Here other objections:

The major problem of your definition of “belief” [1], among others, is that - in a case of belief based on ignorance of the relevant facts - it either does not prove that “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is a more accurate belief report than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, or it proves rather the opposite, i.e. that “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working”.

Here is why:
- At a first glance, both competing belief ascriptions present Jack as drawing meaningful correlations between the perceptible clock , his wondering what time it is, and whatever other evidence necessary to find out what time it is with that perceptible clock. According to this coarse understanding of your definition of belief, one is allowed to use indifferently “that clock” and “that broken clock” to refer to the clock, as you do when talking indifferently about “a clock” and “a broken clock” [2]. But that means that both belief reports are equally accurate!
- However, according to a narrower understanding of your definition of belief (which we must prefer to be more analytical), then it is true that Jack drew meaningful correlations between that perceptible clock, his wondering what time it is, and whatever other evidence necessary to find out what time it is, but Jack didn’t draw meaningful correlations between that clock and the evidences of its being broken, b/c otherwise we couldn’t claim that he ignored that that perceptible clock was broken! Therefore “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” for a case of ignorance of the relevant facts, indeed the former is true while the latter is false precisely because the former accurately reports between what relevant evidences Jack was drawing correlations [3], while the latter fails to do that!!!

BTW, this line of reasoning shows another wider problem of your definition of belief. Indeed your definition of “belief” doesn’t allow you to distinguish true from false beliefs: since in both cases the believer draws meaningful correlations between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things.

These two objections help better understand the probable reasons why you can not rely on your definition of belief (as you presented it) to prove your belief ascription claims. Indeed your definition of belief (despite being still very inadequate) is more apt to express the p.o.v. of the believer (or what the believer is aware of believing) then your notion of "unaware" belief based on a (for me, equivocal and unjustified) knowledge requirement [4]. And in fact, to support your belief report accuracy claims you still need a suitable linguistic report of the belief content we are aware to believe (which is captured by your definition of "belief") as input for the manipulative rendering of the belief content we are unaware to believe (that's how you select the proper linguistic form for a given belief content)!!! And this is already enough to show how self-defeating your line of reasoning is wrt to your own assumptions!!!
Unfortunately due to the inadequacies of your notion of belief, you feel pushed to rely on another assumption (the knowledge requirement for belief ascriptions) to discriminate true from false beliefs and identify putative "unaware" beliefs to be reported.

[1]

Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so. — creativesoul

[2]

While words are not propositions, on my view, the content of Jack's belief is not words either. The correlations he draws at the time as a means for believing what the clock says do not include language use. Those words are not being thought by Jack at time t1. Jack is wondering what time it is, so he looks towards a clock to know. That's the way it happens. This is well established habit, to the point of it's being nearly autonomous. That is to say that it is something done without much thought at all about the clock aside from believing what it says. We do not look to a clock and think silently or aloud "I believe that that clock is working". We just don't. That's just not how it works. That is a metacognitive endeavor. Believing a broken clock is not. — creativesoul

[3]
Indeed this also consistent with your claim about not being aware of our own mistaken beliefs

Belief contents express the point of view...
— neomac — creativesoul


This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief.
A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake. Hence, when we ask Jack at time t1, what he's doing immediately after looking at the clock, he will not say "I believe that that broken clock is working". Rather, he will say something about finding out what time it is/was.

He is unaware of being mistaken. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown.

Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working. — creativesoul

[4]

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

A gifted shitshow consisting of a gross misattribution of meaning bordering on deliberate obfuscation...

I've much more important matters to be involved in.

A gifted shitshow consisting of a gross misattribution of meaning bordering on deliberate obfuscation... — creativesoul

Look, I didn't mean to wreck your self-confidence. You put yourself into a corner, despite my repeated warnings, and started beating yourself with such an embarrassing determination that it's a bit unfair to make me feel guilty for how bad your catastrophic views look to yourself now.

I've much more important matters to be involved in. — creativesoul

Sure, thing! And may Jack be with you!

And you're proud of your behaviour here...