His research was flawed and useless, but there's other research that concentrates on color. — frank

I remember being under the impression that Sapir-Whorf had been straight-up refuted by the color research, and being disappointed to find it isn’t quite that simple, because research is fucking hard.

One way to read this: people who speak languages that don’t have separate words for blue and green can still reliably distinguish blue and green color samples; one way to look at that is that this strongly suggests they are capable of learning a language that does have words like “blue” and “green”. So, perhaps, “my language” doesn’t mean English or German or Xhosa or something, but something more like “my linguistic faculty”. And then we could say the limits of what I could grasp, conceivably expressed in a conceivable language, are the limits of my world.

A soft version of Sapir-Whorf (and by implication Witt's assertion about the limits of his world) is accepted by linguistic scientists and can be supported by research. So your language can be demonstrated to influence your outlook on the world.

A hard version of the thesis isn't generally accepted or seen to be supported by research.

Wittgenstein's actual statement has been lost during these communications! For example, a lot of people have argued about "the language limiting our world". This is true and obvious. However, the exact statement is, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". This is quite different. As far as I am concerned and as I have described it in my topic, it means that my world is limited to what I can communicate with words (language). Which is false. My world also contains all sorts of knowledge where language is not part of it, e.g. skills, music & dancing, playing games, etc. Some of them, e.g. like music, painting and other arts, are forms of communication where words are completely absent. Face expressions and body language are also forms of communication with which people can exchange information and transmit knowledge in the absence of words. And so on and so on. The list is endless.

Wittgenstein's statement was indeed was biased and/or superficial. And this was what I tried to show with my topic.

On one side of the limit is what can be said, on the other is what can be shown, or seen, or experienced.

Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and æsthetics are one.)

— T 6.421

They are not in the world. They are not facts. This does not mean he denies their importance or significance for our lives, only that they are not part of the logical structure of the world. It is only what is within the world of facts that can be addressed by language.

People do tend to read that statement taking "language" as the ground term, and deriving the limits of the world from language's limits. But it could be the other way around, as you point out: the limits of language are derived from the limits of the world, and its logical structure, leaving room, as you also point out, for the transcendent. That looks like a somewhat Kantian move...

The thing is, the logical structure LW finds in the world is clearly deduced (not to say "projected") from the logical structure of language. That's fine for logical primacy -- what's discovered is the conditions of possibility of the given -- but there's a whiff of circularity about such an inference as a philosophical act. Which is also fine -- at least I think so, since I don't see a way around that sort of hermeneutic circle -- but ought to be faced up to, acknowledged, and looked at squarely.

That looks like a somewhat Kantian move... — Srap Tasmaner

He used 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense of the conditions for the possibility of experience, but not according to the categories of the understanding.

The thing is, the logical structure LW finds in the world is clearly deduced (not to say "projected") from the logical structure of language. — Srap Tasmaner

He assumed that there are simples, but I don't know if this was deduced from language. It might have been that he accepted a picture of the world based on irreducible building blocks. Of course such a picture can be applied to language, but Democritus' atoms, for example, were not derived from language.

On one side of the limit is what can be said, on the other is what can be, or experienced. — Fooloso4

I agree.

it is only what is within the world of facts that can be addressed by language. — Fooloso4

The "world of facts" is an ambiguous expression. Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. And it is independent of language. It can be subjective: what I believe is a fact, it's a fact for me. It can also be a "common" fact: it is a fact, for me and other people who know me or to people to whom I can show/prove it, that I know how to ride a bicycle. It has nothing to do with language.

Anyway, this may be indeed Wittgenstein's viewpoint. But it is not explicit or implied from the immediate context, from what I have read regarding this statement. Yet, I can accept it as true. But even in that case, it's a limited view of what a "fact" is, as I expleined above.

However, the most important of all is that when we say "my world", we mean my reality, everything that is in it, including experiences. Words (language) are only a part of it.

So, whatever Wittgenstein's viewpoint is, it's quite limited, anyway.

The "world of facts" is an ambiguous expression. Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. — Alkis Piskas

Wittgenstein is unambiguous as to what he means by a fact.

2 What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of affairs.

A state of affairs is not dependent on anyone knowing or proving it to be true. This is not say that this is the correct or only meaning of a fact, but if we are to understand him we need to begin with the way he uses terms, otherwise we argue for or against things he did not say or mean.

when we say "my world", we mean my reality, everything that is in it — Alkis Piskas

That may be what you mean but not what he means.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the
world.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye.

This is not say that this is the correct or only meaning of a fact, but if we are to understand him we need to begin with the way he uses terms — Fooloso4

That's true. I have certainly not studied his work, but from what you tell me, I undestand that one needs to learn a new language, different from the language most philosophers --and people, in general-- use!
Then, we should quote him with thriftiness, and only to people that we know they have studied his work.
Well, if I knew all that, I will have certainly not started such a discussion! :smile:

when we say "my world", we mean my reality, everything that is in it
— Alkis Piskas
That may be what you mean but not what he means. — Fooloso4

I think that this is --more or less-- what most people mean too. See, Wittgenstein is not "public material".

Well, all what you said seem very correct, and thank you for sharing that knowledge. :pray:
But for me, all this is more than enough. I'm going now to take a long break from Wittgenstein! :grin:

I undestand that one needs to learn a new language, different from the language most philosophers --and people, in general-- — Alkis Piskas

Many of the philosophers have some terms idiosyncratically. Why they do is an interesting question.

Many of the philosophers have some terms idiosyncratically. Why they do is an interesting question. — Fooloso4

This may be true. But they shouldn't. If they do, it means they are themselves "idiosyncratic" or even not so stable mentally. Yes, as extreme as this might sound. Mental health depends a lot on rationality. When it is not stable, one can write or say things that don't make sense or are unsound, not based on logic. Rationality includes or implies analytical ability. Without that, one cannot go far philosophising!

Philosophers, as well as people talking about philosophical matters, have to be as much exact in the language they use as possible. This is required by logic (rationality) --which characterizes philiosophy-- and communicativeness. "Idiosyncrasy" should only be tolerated in their viewpoints, not in their language.

We often read quotes from known, well established philosophers, that we find somewhat "strange", the truthfulness of which we easily question or disagree with. A classic example is Descartes's "I think therefore I am", which has been, and still is, discussed a lot. In such cases, one has to find out why, the context in which, the philosopher said what he said. And usually, this can be easily found and explained. It's rearily a question of language.

Another case of misundestanding or having a difficulty to undestand what a philosopher says or means, is lack of rationality and ability to understand from our side. I remember, since my school days, having read quite a few times referring to Heraclitus as "the dark philosopher". He was never "dark" for me. He was very clear and his views can still stand today; they are timeless. He was/is "dark" only to people who couldn't/cannot understand the meaning of what he said. His language, however, was very clear and exact!

If they do, it means they are themselves "idiosyncratic" or even not so stable mentally. — Alkis Piskas

I do not find Wittgenstein's use of 'fact' unusual. My comments here are in regard to hermeneutics and the history of philosophy. We tend to be more receptive to those who seem to share our views. A shared terminology leads to the assumption of a shared understanding. It is a rhetorical device. It has been used to avoid censorship.

A classic example is Descartes's "I think therefore I am", which has been, and still is, discussed a lot. In such cases, one has to find out why, the context in which, the philosopher said what he said. And usually, this can be easily found and explained. It's rearily a question of language. — Alkis Piskas

Descartes is a good example! He was keenly aware of what happened to Galileo and his work. He had to give the appearance of writing in support of the Church. When Descartes doubts everything this must include the teachings of the Church, but that is not something he could safely say. When he points to himself and reason as certain he points away from the authority of the Church.

Earlier than this is the example of Plato and Socrates. Although reason is a primary concern of the philosopher it is not the only concern. Plato found a way to write so as to avoid the fate of Socrates.

He was never "dark" for me. He was very clear and his views can still stand today; they are timeless. He was/is "dark" only to people who couldn't/cannot understand the meaning of what he said. His language, however, was very clear and exact! — Alkis Piskas

Given that there is wide ranging disagreement among competent scholars, I take a more modest view. Perhaps what you take to be clear and exact is only an appearance that hides the obscurity of his words.

But a thread on Wittgenstein is not the place to pursue these other matters.

I do not find Wittgenstein's use of 'fact' unusual — Fooloso4

You mean ... you can undestand its use, right? Which is OK. But it is far from usual, i.e. from what one can find in a standard dictionary and from what most people understand by it, isn't it? This was exactly was I was talking about! I add here something that I hope will make my point more clear: 1) People should be able to look up the words in dictionaries to know/undestand their meaning, 2) In a discussion one must use terms with their most common meaning or else use other words/terms in their place, which convey better what they actually mean and 3) one should not have to study the work of a philosopher to understand what he means by a term! I can't make my point more clear than that. I have already done a lot!

But it is far from usual — Alkis Piskas

How so? You say:

Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. — Alkis Piskas

How could that be if a fact is not what is the case? For something to be the case we do not have to know that it is the case. We cannot, or more to the point, should not make factual claims about things we do not know, but the facts are what is the case whether we know them or not. We attempt to determine the facts of the matter.

one should not have to study the work of a philosopher to understand what he means by a term! I can't make my point more clear than that. — Alkis Piskas

You made your point clearly, but if we are to understand a philosopher we must not make demands on them but rather understand what demands they makes on us. I think it important to write simply and clearly, but the great philosophers throughout history have been singular in their unwillingness to follow my advice.

Language is a conceptual framework created by human consciousness to coherently, or attempt to coherently, describe the world and build upon the descriptions until we have full blown structures of established linguistic paradigms. The world, and its environment, is the source of the limitations imposed on the human mind that allow for language to even be created at all. It's exactly the opposite. However, as we grow more ensconced in a language adapted world, the more we rely on it to navigate said world. A bit like going blind and relying on other senses which naturally adapt and increase in acuity, or the expansion of areas of the brain through muscle memory. It is an adaptive trick of the light, but is true in its on little way.

But it is far from usual
— Alkis Piskas
How so? — Fooloso4

I think we lost the ball ... So I'll bring it back. All started from the definition/use you gave of the term "fact" as "the existence of states of affairs". Then you said you don't find this unusual, and talked about "hermeneutics" etc. That is where the thing got off track and my reaction was the above statement: "it is far from usual". And I gave three (more) simple reasons why this is so. No "hermeneutics" and that kind of stuff, which make things go out of track ... Now, after all that, you still ask "How so?"! The only explanation I can give is that you are thinking --or trying to think-- in a complicated way, instead of thinking in simple terms and using simple, pure logic. And that is the only way in which any discussion can take place and have a meaning. Otherwise, the ball gets lost. Which is what happened here.
I don't take pleasure in this. I am out.

I think we lost the ball — Alkis Piskas

You have to keep your eye on the ball. I was trying to put the problem of interpreting Wittgenstein in the larger context of the problem of interpretation of philosophy. If we are to understand a philosopher we cannot simply look at standard dictionary definitions. We have to look at how they use terms.

You said:

The "world of facts" is an ambiguous expression. Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. — Alkis Piskas

This is not what Wittgenstein means by 'fact'. Once you see how he uses the term it is no longer ambiguous. But Wittgenstein's use, although it does not fit the dictionary definition you provide, is not [edit; unusual]. What is known or proved to be true is what is the case. How could it not be?

The only explanation I can give is that you are thinking --or trying to think-- in a complicated way, instead of thinking in simple terms and using simple, pure logic. — Alkis Piskas

Yes, by like technical definition. Fallacy is argument disrupting invalidity. Which is why it's the first thing we learn as philosophy students.

Which is why it's the first thing we learn as philosophy students — Garrett Travers

What's the first thing people learn as philosophy students?
I have never been one --not in a University-- and it is useful to know!

What's the first thing people learn as philosophy students?
I have never been one --not in a University-- and it is useful to know! — Alkis Piskas

My bad, I meant among the first things. Typo. But, if I recall, the first thing I learned as a student was the history of the tradition. So, you kind of start with just a general back ground, then over view of thoughts and systems, then individual systems, then go into informal logic to learn how to cut through everyone's arguments. Which, I'm sure you've noticed here, are trash. But, you may be a bit more modest than I on that subject. You seem pretty good at calling nonsense.

go into informal logic to learn how to cut through everyone's arguments. Which, I'm sure you've noticed here, are trash — Garrett Travers

I sure have! :smile:

But, you may be a bit more modest than I on that subject. — Garrett Travers

I would say that I am "more strict" on that subject.

You seem pretty good at calling nonsense. — Garrett Travers

Thanks. But it's most probably because I am a little too strict! :smile:

***

I thought ... I hoped you were going to mention things like clarity, precision, etc. in statements.
(It would help me in my next topic I plan to launch ...)

I thought ... I hoped you were going to mention things like clarity, precision, etc. in statements.
(It would help me in my next topic I plan to launch ...) — Alkis Piskas

For this, do you mean clarity in logical propositions and arguments as standardized by academia, oe something else?

do you mean clarity in logical propositions and arguments as standardized by academia, oe something else? — Garrett Travers

Exactly! And if they are not standardized, or one doesn't use terms in their standardised meaning, he should then clarify what he actually means by them. There are cases where key or important terms in a statement-argument have different meanings, or their meaning is debatable, etc. (A classic example is the term "reality".)

There are cases where key or important terms in a statement-argument have different meanings, or their meaning is debatable, etc. (A classic example is the term "reality".) — Alkis Piskas

Yes, that's why you have to watch out for reduction fallacies, which delimit the meaning of a word in the argument. Ambiguity fallaicies, which employs a word in an unsual way that is used as an argument. Etymological fallacies, which rely solely on a words historical meaning, or etymological roots to make an argument. And Kant's a priori synthetic knowledge propositions, which are demonstrably ridiculous.

Plus, you have categorical propositions that are characterized by: all are, some are, all are not, some are not statements, respectively. These have usage rules.

Is this what you're highlighting, or am I rambling to you?

that's why you have to watch out for reduction fallacies, — Garrett Travers

I'm not familiar with the term "reduction fallacies" so I skipped it! (Sorry. I do that sometimes! That's another thing one must not do in philosophical discussions! :grin:)
So, I just looked it up ... Reductio fallacy: "An informal fallacy of questionable cause that occurs when it is assumed that there is a single, simple cause of an outcome when in reality it may have been caused by a number of only jointly sufficient causes." ... Great! (I bring up this issue sometimes, but I dind't know there was a term for it.)

I will also look up the other kinds of fallacies. Thanks for bringing all this up! :up:

(I will make a long break now ...)