Do, you have something more important to do with your time on Earth? If so, why are you wasting it on feckless Philosophy? :smile: — Gnomon
So if "the theory" exists within the rational mind, manifested as the activity which is "understanding", then we cannot accurately call it "the theory" any more, because each person has one's own unique interpretation of what is called "the theory", so we would have a multitude of different instances of the same theory. — Metaphysician Undercover
The substantial difference, is that I posit a non-physical activity, which is the cause of a physical thing (the theory in its physical manifestation), while Wayfarer posits a non-physical static immaterial object called the theory. (Correct me if I'm wrong please↪Wayfarer ) — Metaphysician Undercover
Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate.
if we say that the theory itself, is what exists within the human mind, as that which is understood, or the understanding which the mind has, then we have to account for particular differences in understanding between individual people. The fact that such differences in the way that different people understand "the same" theory are very real, is evident from this forum. So if "the theory" exists within the rational mind, manifested as the activity which is "understanding", then we cannot accurately call it "the theory" any more, because each person has one's own unique interpretation of what is called "the theory", so we would have a multitude of different instances of the same theory. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'... also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts. — Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy - The World of Universals
Not so. This "theory" is composed of a number of specific theorems not open to individual interpretation. But the "meaning" of this theory certainly is an individual's prerogative. — jgill
But nevertheless, it is real independently of your or my mind or anyone's mind. As Augustine says:
Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. — Wayfarer
Which is similar to the kind of Platonism that Frege advocated. The problem for empiricists and materialists is that such 'objects' are non-physical but real, so they can't accept that. In actual fact the fundamental elements of reason itself - ideas, in the true sense - are themselves intellectual in nature, not physical. Our experience and judgement always contains elements of both the sensory and the intellectual, but empiricism will only admit the reality of the sensory and will insist that the intelligible must be dependent on or produced from that (which is then explained with reference to evolutionary theory). But this is a backwards way of looking at it (as explained by Maritain.) — Wayfarer
Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. — Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy - The World of Universals
So, for example, no two people can really disagree about fundamental physical laws, like the laws of motion; it's not a matter of opinion how they will determine the outcome of motion. In fact, that is the very meaning of 'objectivity'. But in many areas of science, for example atomic physics and evolutionary theory, there is enormous scope for disagreement about what the theories mean. — Wayfarer
As I said, I believe a theorem is literally the terms that state it. Therefore any and all theories or theorems are open to individual interpretation. Each of us understands them according to one's own experience of learning and practicing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I may interpret them the wrong way, just as you have on countless occasions misinterpreted the simplest of mathematical symbolism. If I were to insist it was my right to reinterpret results I would be ridiculed for my stance - as I should be. — jgill
Pass two people the same proposition or axiom and have them each explain it. They will not explain it with the exact same expressions. Therefore they do not have the same interpretation. It's a very simple and obvious fact which you seem to be in denial of. — Metaphysician Undercover
The fact they may explain it using slightly different words does not imply they interpret a theorem differently. — jgill
This discussion concerns the obvious: yes, we may interpret differently. — jgill
But it leads to a more challenging notion: intentional ambiguities, like neckers cube. And I recently posted a short note concerning a math expression that implies two distinct conclusions depending on how one interprets it. Both interpretations are correct simultaneously. — jgill
it's that no two people will produce the same interpretation of the same set of symbols, so we necessarily interpret differently. — Metaphysician Undercover
I would argue that intentional ambiguity results in neither one being correct — Metaphysician Undercover
(Cambridge English Dictionary)Intentional ambiguity is the use of language or images to suggest more than one meaning at the same time
But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously (although I have an ominous feeling..... :scream: ) — Wayfarer
But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously — Wayfarer
But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously (although I have an ominous feeling..... :scream: — Wayfarer
Intentional ambiguity is the use of language or images to suggest more than one meaning at the same time
(Cambridge English Dictionary) — jgill
That I agree with you indicates a specific type of relationship between us, it does not mean that the non-physical aspect of me is the same as the non-physical aspect of you. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore we must conclude that in the case of intentional ambiguity neither is the correct interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover
I do not know the answer to this question. For I fear that the immaterial, or the metaphysical, or the non-physical, or whatever we want to call it, is long gone trampled underfoot by the immense pressure of the materialist or the physicalist. In my view, it is interesting that the primary cause for this total rejection of the non-physical is well, non-physical.Are there any non-physical aspects of reality that are proper topics of calm collegial philosophical dialog? — Gnomon
Sad, but true. Philosophy has become polarized around political positions, usually hinging on the definition of "admissible evidence". See the thread below for more on that angle.In my view, it is interesting that the primary cause for this total rejection of the non-physical is well, non-physical. — IP060903
Your conclusion does not logically follow. I have a mathematical expression that can be interpreted two distinct ways, each of which is valid and "correct". However, it is a novel idea and something I haven't seen in math before. Maybe I'm wrong? Who knows . . — jgill
Demonstrate that the nonphysical is not just possible, but actual. — Agent Smith
Reality is objective and material, — Garrett Travers
What does it mean to be objective and material, if you may explain? — IP060903
Being valid does not necessarily imply "correct", because the conclusion must also be sound.In the case of meaning, the true meaning is the one intended by the author, that is what is meant. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore we can conclude that the true meaning is that neither is the correct one. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is matter? — Wayfarer
Nowadays it boils down to the standard model of particle physics. — Wayfarer
tested against observation — Wayfarer
Large Hadron Collider — Wayfarer
there is no ultimate physical point-particle or unit — Wayfarer
incommensurable disagreements about the meaning of physical theories — Wayfarer
But just as there is no ultimate object to be found in physics, there is not ultimate objectivity in any general sense. — Wayfarer
arguing for what I call 'handrail materialism' — Wayfarer
science and objectivity are the supreme and only arbiters of truth — Wayfarer
you're not actually thinking philosphically at all. — Wayfarer
Thank you, continuing on with further questions.
1. What is a fact?
2. What does it mean to be "physical"? — IP060903
Demonstrate that the nonphysical is not just possible, but actual.
— Agent Smith
What I've been arguing is very simple: that meaning, or acts of interpretation, can't be accounted for in any type of materialist of physicalist philosophy. Of course, the materialist will always insist on being shown a non-physical thing, but there are no non-physical things. — Wayfarer
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