Do, you have something more important to do with your time on Earth? If so, why are you wasting it on feckless Philosophy? :smile: — Gnomon

I think there's a place for philosophy even in living as we do.

So if "the theory" exists within the rational mind, manifested as the activity which is "understanding", then we cannot accurately call it "the theory" any more, because each person has one's own unique interpretation of what is called "the theory", so we would have a multitude of different instances of the same theory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not so. This "theory" is composed of a number of specific theorems not open to individual interpretation. But the "meaning" of this theory certainly is an individual's prerogative.

A more philosophical "theory" might fit your description.

The substantial difference, is that I posit a non-physical activity, which is the cause of a physical thing (the theory in its physical manifestation), while Wayfarer posits a non-physical static immaterial object called the theory. (Correct me if I'm wrong please↪Wayfarer ) — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really. The meaning of 'object' in 'intelligible object' is kind of allegorical - a theory isn't really 'an object' except in the metaphorical sense, like when you say, 'the object of the exercise'. As I said, it is something able to be grasped by a rational mind, but not existent like a hammer or a screwdriver. But nevertheless, it is real independently of your or my mind or anyone's mind. As Augustine says:

Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate.

Which is similar to the kind of Platonism that Frege advocated. The problem for empiricists and materialists is that such 'objects' are non-physical but real, so they can't accept that. In actual fact the fundamental elements of reason itself - ideas, in the true sense - are themselves intellectual in nature, not physical. Our experience and judgement always contains elements of both the sensory and the intellectual, but empiricism will only admit the reality of the sensory and will insist that the intelligible must be dependent on or produced from that (which is then explained with reference to evolutionary theory). But this is a backwards way of looking at it (as explained by Maritain.)

if we say that the theory itself, is what exists within the human mind, as that which is understood, or the understanding which the mind has, then we have to account for particular differences in understanding between individual people. The fact that such differences in the way that different people understand "the same" theory are very real, is evident from this forum. So if "the theory" exists within the rational mind, manifested as the activity which is "understanding", then we cannot accurately call it "the theory" any more, because each person has one's own unique interpretation of what is called "the theory", so we would have a multitude of different instances of the same theory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bertrand Russell addresses this:

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'... also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts. — Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy - The World of Universals

Bolds added. So, for example, no two people can really disagree about fundamental physical laws, like the laws of motion; it's not a matter of opinion how they will determine the outcome of motion. In fact, that is the very meaning of 'objectivity'. But in many areas of science, for example atomic physics and evolutionary theory, there is enormous scope for disagreement about what the theories mean.

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Not so. This "theory" is composed of a number of specific theorems not open to individual interpretation. But the "meaning" of this theory certainly is an individual's prerogative. — jgill

As I said, I believe a theorem is literally the terms that state it. Therefore any and all theories or theorems are open to individual interpretation. Each of us understands them according to one's own experience of learning and practicing. You can state that one must understand the words in a specific way (provide definitions), but then the words of the definitions need definitions, etc., ad infinitum. And we do not avoid the reality of individual interpretation.

But nevertheless, it is real independently of your or my mind or anyone's mind. As Augustine says:

Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. — Wayfarer

I do not accept this argument, because what is common to all who think is that they have ideas, but we all have different ideas. So I think it is wrong to say that we all grasp the same thing, we clearly have different ideas. My discussions on this forum with a number of mathematicians has indicated very clearly to me that we do not even understand basic concepts of arithmetic like "+" and "=" in the very same way as each other. And since there is a multiplicity of number systems we do not even understand symbols like "2" in the very same way.

So I've come to what I believe is a more realistic view, that each mind constructs its own understanding which is unique and particular to the person, dependent on each individual's learning process. This is why standardized education is so important in our societies, to create the degree of sameness in our thinking patterns, which is required for us to properly understand each other, and have standard "concepts". I, for instance, cannot understand 180proof's use of the English language, because the thinking patterns which are supposed to be represented by the words are unintelligible to me.

Which is similar to the kind of Platonism that Frege advocated. The problem for empiricists and materialists is that such 'objects' are non-physical but real, so they can't accept that. In actual fact the fundamental elements of reason itself - ideas, in the true sense - are themselves intellectual in nature, not physical. Our experience and judgement always contains elements of both the sensory and the intellectual, but empiricism will only admit the reality of the sensory and will insist that the intelligible must be dependent on or produced from that (which is then explained with reference to evolutionary theory). But this is a backwards way of looking at it (as explained by Maritain.) — Wayfarer

I definitely agree that the fundamental elements of reasoning are non-physical. But I disagree on the character of these non-physical features, and their position in reality. I believe that the fundamental feature, which is at its base non-physical, is the act of thinking. I also believe in a fundamental difference, a categorical separation between an act, and an object. An act is a change over a temporal duration, while an object is what stays the same over temporal duration.

And this is why the non-physical, which has active existence within the human being, ought not be represented as an object. The active, non-physical element (soul, if you like) uses physical objects as signs or symbols for recognition, but is itself not physical yet still active. Think of this as an activity without an object engaged in the activity, because it is a completely non-physical activity. It does have a physical effect though, it creates the signs and symbols.

Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. — Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy - The World of Universals

I believe this is exactly what is the case. No two men think the very same thing, nor does one man ever think the very same thing twice. Aristotle made this point in the part of "On The Soul" which we were discussing in the other thread. So Russell's conclusion here is the opposite of what it should be. What leads him to assert an "object" of thought, instead of simply an activity called "thought", is the idea that two different men think the very same thing when thinking whiteness. We do not though, my images of whiteness which I employ when thinking whiteness, are different from yours.

In reality, the "object" of thought is the word, "white". That's what stays the same, as an object, the symbol. And when I hold that object, or a mental representation of it, within my mind, asking what is the meaning of "white", i.e. what is whiteness, I produce images or descriptions, which are not the same as the ones you would produce when asking yourself what is whiteness.

So, for example, no two people can really disagree about fundamental physical laws, like the laws of motion; it's not a matter of opinion how they will determine the outcome of motion. In fact, that is the very meaning of 'objectivity'. But in many areas of science, for example atomic physics and evolutionary theory, there is enormous scope for disagreement about what the theories mean. — Wayfarer

I conclude you have not encountered me discussing fundamental laws of motion on this forum, clear evidence that two people can disagree on such laws. Take Newton's first law of motion for example. People claim it's a brute fact which cannot be otherwise. But I argue that Newton actually stated that the truth of his first law requires the will of God. This is because it is a statement about what has been, in the past, and it assumes the premise that what has been in the past, will continue to be so, into the future, necessarily, if not caused to change. In reality though, the nature of free will demonstrates that we cannot take the continuity of physical existence, from past to future, for granted. When reality is understood in this way, we see Newton's first law in a completely different way. A cause, "God's will" is required for the continuity of existence which we call "inertia". And many theologians and mystics assume that God must recreate the material world anew, at each passing moment of time, so Newton's first law of motion requires the will of God to be true.

As I said, I believe a theorem is literally the terms that state it. Therefore any and all theories or theorems are open to individual interpretation. Each of us understands them according to one's own experience of learning and practicing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not true. I may open a math paper on a topic with which I am unfamiliar and guess at what it is about, but this in no way opens the theorems therein in any professional sense to individual interpretations. Yes, I may interpret them the wrong way, just as you have on countless occasions misinterpreted the simplest of mathematical symbolism. If I were to insist it was my right to reinterpret results I would be ridiculed for my stance - as I should be.

I don't see how you can believe that what goes on in the minds of two different people, when they read the very same thing, is the same. Pass two people the same proposition or axiom and have them each explain it. They will not explain it with the exact same expressions. Therefore they do not have the same interpretation. It's a very simple and obvious fact which you seem to be in denial of.

Yes, I may interpret them the wrong way, just as you have on countless occasions misinterpreted the simplest of mathematical symbolism. If I were to insist it was my right to reinterpret results I would be ridiculed for my stance - as I should be. — jgill

That you believe there's a boundary, by which you can classify some interpretations as "the wrong way", and some as the right way, is clear evidence that you really recognize that each interpretation is particular to the individual, and you have some means for judging the differences between them. Obviously, if such variance exists, so that you can reject some interpretations as unconventional, or inconsistent with some norm, or standard, therefore "wrong", then you recognize the reality of particular differences, and you are simply in denial of what you actually apprehend as the reality.

Suppose there is such a boundary, which constitutes a division between the right way and the wrong way to interpret a symbol, or set of symbols, or a pattern of symbols. Your claim is that there is only one right way, and everything other than that is the wrong way. What do you suppose is the standard, the criterion which you could refer to in each case of each different theorem, to make the judgement that the person's interpretation corresponds exactly with the criterion, therefore exactly as every other person's, who correctly interprets the theorem, so it is the right interpretation. Unless you can produce this criterion, and demonstrate your mode of judgement, then your claim is no better than a claim that a rock here, and a rock on the other side of the earth are the exact same rock. But to judge two distinct things as the same is very clearly a mistake if truth is what you're looking for. So it appears like it's just an assumption you make, for a metaphysical convenience, some sort of pragmatist principle, but your convenience leads you away from the true reality of the situation.

Pass two people the same proposition or axiom and have them each explain it. They will not explain it with the exact same expressions. Therefore they do not have the same interpretation. It's a very simple and obvious fact which you seem to be in denial of. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact they may explain it using slightly different words does not imply they interpret a theorem differently. Even if they do there is a specific interpretation that is correct.

Of course, I am thinking of theorems I have created (or discovered) that have simple mathematical ideas most mathematicians would agree upon. If you asked me to explain symplectic geometry after a brief exposure to the subject I would surely botch it up. That doesn't mean my interpretation is on some kind of par with an accurate appraisal of SG.

This discussion concerns the obvious: yes, we may interpret differently. No, all interpretations are not correct according to some recognized authority. But it leads to a more challenging notion: intentional ambiguities, like neckers cube. And I recently posted a short note concerning a math expression that implies two distinct conclusions depending on how one interprets it. Both interpretations are correct simultaneously.

The fact they may explain it using slightly different words does not imply they interpret a theorem differently. — jgill

I don't see how you could argue this point. An interpretation is how one explains the meaning of something. To use different words to explain something is to provide a different explanation. Therefore using different words implies a different interpretation.

This discussion concerns the obvious: yes, we may interpret differently. — jgill

It's not that we may interpret differently, it's that no two people will produce the same interpretation of the same set of symbols, so we necessarily interpret differently. This is the difference between a particular and a universal. Each interpretation is particular, unique to the individual, just like each material object is particular. You might say that they are close enough, to say that they are "the same", just like all rocks are "the same", being rocks, but this is a misuse of "the same". The point being that the different members of a universal cannot truthfully be said to be the same. Likewise, when there is a universal understanding of your theorem, we cannot say that each member who understands in that way, has the same understanding, because "the way" is universal, and each member who participates in that universal is a particular, with a particular understanding. So as Aristotle explained, we ignore the accidentals of the particulars, when understanding the essence, which is the universal. In other words, we can ignore the accidentals of a particular interpretation, to say that it meets the criteria of the universal, and is therefore correct.

But it leads to a more challenging notion: intentional ambiguities, like neckers cube. And I recently posted a short note concerning a math expression that implies two distinct conclusions depending on how one interprets it. Both interpretations are correct simultaneously. — jgill

I would argue that intentional ambiguity results in neither one being correct. This is because the intention is to allow the appearance that either one could be correct. Therefore the intention must be to ensure that neither one is the correct one, to allow the apparent possibility that either one is correct. And if the intention is that neither one is correct, then the proper reading is that neither one is correct. This is consistent with Aristotle's fundamental principles of logic. Possibility violates the law of excluded middle, but not the law of non contradiction. So in some cases, to say that both are correct would be a violation of the law of non contradiction, and to say that neither is correct would violate the law of excluded middle. Intentional ambiguity produces the latter, neither is correct, because the correct interpretation is to apprehend the intentional ambiguity.

it's that no two people will produce the same interpretation of the same set of symbols, so we necessarily interpret differently. — Metaphysician Undercover

But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously (although I have an ominous feeling..... :scream: )

I would argue that intentional ambiguity results in neither one being correct — Metaphysician Undercover

Intentional ambiguity is the use of language or images to suggest more than one meaning at the same time

(Cambridge English Dictionary)

But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously (although I have an ominous feeling..... :scream: ) — Wayfarer

How could you!!!!! :worry:

Long experience, and the nagging feeling of having wasted too much time.

But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously — Wayfarer

No, because numbers aren't defined by their arbitrary, corporeally delimited, a priori applications.

Step 1: The idea of the nonphysical, from what I know, doesn't entail a contradiction i.e. it's perfectly possible, as possible as it is for an apple to be red.

Step 2: Demonstrate that the nonphysical is not just possible, but actual. This is where nonphysicalists trip up. For a universe in which the only sense there is are eyes, how do I prove the existence of something that can't be seen or is invisible?

But in the case of simple maths, it's impossible to disagree that the sum of two and two is four, obviously (although I have an ominous feeling..... :scream: — Wayfarer

Yes I agree, but the point is that agreement does not imply "the same". That I agree with you indicates a specific type of relationship between us, it does not mean that the non-physical aspect of me is the same as the non-physical aspect of you. I would say that there is a relationship between the non-physical aspect within me, and the non-physical aspect within you, which constitutes agreement . But it appears to me, like you want to say that the non-physical within you is the same as the non-physical within me, that somehow each one of us grasps within our minds, the very same non-physical conception.

Despite our agreement on that simple point, the difference between you and I, in our understanding of this matter, is a difference of temporal relation, causation. I would say that human minds, in their relations with other minds (communication) are the cause of existence of conceptions. So I locate the conception itself within the physical world, a shared thing, along with other artifacts, which exist as representations (Plato's reflections) of the non-physical reality within the human minds that create them. I think you would say that each human mind apprehends the same non-physical reality. The issue I have with this, is that from your perspective we have to understand how the immaterial realm acts on the human mind, allowing itself to be understood by the human mind, in a way similar to the way that the sense world acts on the senses. So we'd have to assume intelligible objects acting on the human mind, in a way analogous to the way that sense objects act on the senses. But experience demonstrates to us that intelligible objects are acquired through the means of sensation instead of being directly produced by the mind from the non-physical realm.

From my perspective we have no need to say that the non-physical realm is acting on the non-physical aspect of the human being, because the non-physical aspect of the human being (the soul) is what is active in the creative act. The physical aspects of the human being, sense organs etc., are acted upon, and this contributes to to the soul's understanding, influencing it, but the soul as the non-physical part, is what acts to create.

I believe it is important to proceed in this way, to recognize the reality that we do not have any approach to the non-physical except through our internal self. And, when we approach the non-physical through introspection, self-reflection, or whatever internal means, we approach a fundamental division between oneself and others. This is the separation which unless we bridge it through the medium (communication), we are lead toward solipsism. And I believe, that when we grasp this internal isolation of the non-physical aspect within us, we must come to realize that there are no universal non-physical intelligible objects which are acting equally on us all, internally, from the non-physical realm, causing us to understand them. Our only means for unifying the non-physical, which underlies the existence of each one of us, is relationships made through the medium, what Christians call love. Assuming an underlying relationship between us, through the non-physical realm, is the fatal mistake of taking love for granted. Instead, our relationships must be cultivated through the medium, or else they dissolve.

Intentional ambiguity is the use of language or images to suggest more than one meaning at the same time
(Cambridge English Dictionary) — jgill

I have no problem with this. But as I explained, "to suggest more than one meaning at the same time", implies that none of the suggested meanings is the correct one not that they are both correct. That there is a number of correct meanings is an illusion (a suggestion, or proposition) created by the author, you could consider it a type of deception. Meaning is what is meant or intended by the author. So you and I might discuss endlessly the intended meaning of a piece which is ambiguous, each of us claiming to have "the correct interpretation". However, since the ambiguity is intentional, then the author intended neither one nor the other of the interpreted meanings. We cannot say that the author intended both because that would be contradictory, saying that the author performed two incompatible acts of intention at the same time. Therefore we must conclude that in the case of intentional ambiguity neither is the correct interpretation. The correct interpretation is to recognize that the meaning is intentionally ambiguous.

Let me try another way of explanation Wayfarer. See if you can ignore all the riff raff around you, the entire physical world, and place yourself squarely within the reality of the non-physical. I think you'll find that there is a separation between your non-physical reality, and that of others, you and I are not connected through the non-physical. I can assume, from my experience, that you do have a non-physical aspect, just like I do, but my non-physical aspect does not connect directly to yours. In mathematical terms, the non-physical is a non-dimensional point, which is distinct from another non-dimensional point, related to each other by a dimensional (physical) line. If the points were directly connected there would be no need for the line.

This separation is a real problem in metaphysics because it implies that the non-physical is a multiplicity rather than the commonly assumed "One", as Neo-Platonism proposes. Plato's "The Sophist" explores this problem of the relationship between "One" and "multiplicity". Unless we can somehow overcome this separation, the bridge through or across the medium, which I proposed above, then the proposed non-physical "One" is unreal.

That I agree with you indicates a specific type of relationship between us, it does not mean that the non-physical aspect of me is the same as the non-physical aspect of you. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I'm concerned you're in a muddle, and I'm not going to waste any time on it.

Therefore we must conclude that in the case of intentional ambiguity neither is the correct interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your conclusion does not logically follow. I have a mathematical expression that can be interpreted two distinct ways, each of which is valid and "correct". However, it is a novel idea and something I haven't seen in math before. Maybe I'm wrong? Who knows . . .

I am not a materialist or a physicalist. Your post seems to be more of a lamentation over the current state of philosophy, and frankly, the current state of the world.

Are there any non-physical aspects of reality that are proper topics of calm collegial philosophical dialog? — Gnomon

I do not know the answer to this question. For I fear that the immaterial, or the metaphysical, or the non-physical, or whatever we want to call it, is long gone trampled underfoot by the immense pressure of the materialist or the physicalist. In my view, it is interesting that the primary cause for this total rejection of the non-physical is well, non-physical.

In my view, it is interesting that the primary cause for this total rejection of the non-physical is well, non-physical. — IP060903

Sad, but true. Philosophy has become polarized around political positions, usually hinging on the definition of "admissible evidence". See the thread below for more on that angle.

Political worldviews are non-physical, hence not amenable to scientific methods. That's why, after all these years of ascendant physical science, we are still forced to debate Meta-physical questions, for which there are no final answers . And even that ancient term for philosophical analysis is politically fraught. Yet, I reserve "Physics" for Natural questions, and "Meta-Physics" (i.e. Philosophy) for Cultural questions, that arise from the human condition as animals with self-pondering brains. :smile:

Are there thoughts?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12586/are-there-thoughts

Gnomon :point: ↪180 Proof — 180 Proof

Ignoring me? Okay. It safe to assume (you know as well) that the OP is nothing but vacuous twaddle which answering these questions will expose. :shade:

Your conclusion does not logically follow. I have a mathematical expression that can be interpreted two distinct ways, each of which is valid and "correct". However, it is a novel idea and something I haven't seen in math before. Maybe I'm wrong? Who knows . . — jgill

Being valid does not necessarily imply "correct", because the conclusion must also be sound. In the case of meaning, the true meaning is the one intended by the author, that is what is meant. In the case of intentional ambiguity, not one nor the other interpretation, though they are each "valid" interpretations, is intended to be the correct one. Therefore we can conclude that the true meaning is that neither is the correct one.

Reality is objective and material, and there's nothing any of you can do about it.

What does it mean to be objective and material, if you may explain?

Demonstrate that the nonphysical is not just possible, but actual. — Agent Smith

What I've been arguing is very simple: that meaning, or acts of interpretation, can't be accounted for in any type of materialist of physicalist philosophy. Of course, the materialist will always insist on being shown a non-physical thing, but there are no non-physical things.

Reality is objective and material, — Garrett Travers

What is matter? Nowadays it boils down to the standard model of particle physics. Note: model. It's a group of mathematical theorems that are tested against observation, nowadays mainly in the monstrously-expensive Large Hadron Collider. But, within these models, there is no ultimate physical point-particle or unit. Maybe strings, maybe branes, or some other model. The model has many gaps and conundrums, which of course I'm not qualfied to comment on the specifics of, other than that their existence is acknowledged.

As for objectivity, of course it is true that objectivity is a desireable attribute, in judges, scholars, and scientists, as well as in life generally. But just as there is no ultimate object to be found in physics, there is not ultimate objectivity in any general sense. With physics, again, there are vast and incommensurable disagreements about the meaning of physical theories, and no objective way of adjuticating each is correct. (See The Most Embarrasing Graph in Modern Physics.)

My observation about you is that you are arguing for what I call 'handrail materialism' - it gives you something to hang on to. You have this desparate need to convince everyone - but yourself, most of all - that science and objectivity are the supreme and only arbiters of truth. And as long as you cling to that, you're not actually thinking philosphically at all.

What does it mean to be objective and material, if you may explain? — IP060903

Objective : not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.

Material: denoting or consisting of physical objects rather than the mind or spirit.

Thank you, continuing on with further questions.
1. What is a fact?
2. What does it mean to be "physical"?

Being valid does not necessarily imply "correct", because the conclusion must also be sound.In the case of meaning, the true meaning is the one intended by the author, that is what is meant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore we can conclude that the true meaning is that neither is the correct one. — Metaphysician Undercover

In my case the true meaning is a dual observation: giving one piece of information when viewing from one perspective, and another when viewing from the other perspective. Take a Necker cube for example. It can be seen two ways, each a valid cube. What is "the meaning intended by the author"?

What is matter? — Wayfarer

Matter is the substance of which all physical objects are composed. The density of matter is the ratio of its mass to volume and is a measure of the composition of matter and the compactness of the constituent entities in it.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/physics-and-astronomy/matter-physics

Nowadays it boils down to the standard model of particle physics. — Wayfarer

That model is a conceptual framework of human reference that informs human behaviors of interaction with the self-evident and emergents subtances in the Universe that we are ourselves composed of. Not that which whose frameworks declare it so, or not.

tested against observation — Wayfarer

Exactly.

Large Hadron Collider — Wayfarer

Constructed with matter, used to fling matter.

there is no ultimate physical point-particle or unit — Wayfarer

Matter is neither defined by such a reduction, nor is such a reduction required to define matter as the substances that comprise the universe. We live in it everyday. You would know, you just used your material body to send that message.

incommensurable disagreements about the meaning of physical theories — Wayfarer

Disagreements, gaps in knowledge, or otherwise confusions about any aspects of theortical deliberations on matter, are in no way indicative of a non-material-existence, nor an argument against material-existence. One would need to develop a supported theory for specifically non-material-existence separately to make its case. Simply drawing attention to problems within the framework used to accrue undeniable data, including every single human's everyday day experience, is not an argument against said framework.

But just as there is no ultimate object to be found in physics, there is not ultimate objectivity in any general sense. — Wayfarer

Nobody said anything about "ultimate." Nor is it required. The universe is arranged in complex systems of energy, matter, quanta, space, time, nuclear forces, and electromagnetism. "Ultimate reality" is a fake term meaning nothing in such a system.

arguing for what I call 'handrail materialism' — Wayfarer

No, that's what you're arguing for in the opposite direction. You're the one with zero evidence that reality isn't material, not the other way around. This is called "handrail projection."

science and objectivity are the supreme and only arbiters of truth — Wayfarer

No, they are just superior methods of discovering the objective truth that was there before we developed the methods. Nothing to do with arbitration.

you're not actually thinking philosphically at all. — Wayfarer

Asserting things without evidence is not an argument. This is an assertion. What you mean to say is "in my opinion unsupported by any presentable fact..." Nohing more. You'll need to support your claims.

Thank you, continuing on with further questions.
1. What is a fact?
2. What does it mean to be "physical"? — IP060903

No problem,

Fact: a thing that is known or proved to be true.

Physical: relating to physics or the operation of natural forces generally.

Together they make: forces of reality that have been demonstrated to be true.

Demonstrate that the nonphysical is not just possible, but actual.
— Agent Smith

What I've been arguing is very simple: that meaning, or acts of interpretation, can't be accounted for in any type of materialist of physicalist philosophy. Of course, the materialist will always insist on being shown a non-physical thing, but there are no non-physical things. — Wayfarer

Isn't that a self-contradictory position to take? If meaning and acts of interpretation are physically inexplicable, it implies the existence of a nonphysical thing, oui?