Ayn Rand ought not to be included. Marx is arguable, he was a political theorist, not a philosopher as such.

Ayn Rand ought not to be included. Marx is arguable, he was a political theorist, not a philosopher as such. — Wayfarer

I was going to leave her out, but I needed at least one philosopher.

Speaks volumes.

Speaks volumes. — Wayfarer

Speaks no volumes.

Marx is arguable, he was a political theorist, not a philosopher as such. — Wayfarer

:up:

I was going to leave her out, but I needed at least one philosopher. — Garrett Travers

Immanuel Kant would've been enough if so.

Immanuel Kant would've been enough if so. — Agent Smith

Immanuel Can't.

Immanuel Kant — Garrett Travers

So, one of the key Kantian doctrines, synthetic apriority, had been largely formulated with the example of Euclidean geometry in mind that Kant used. But unfortunately, Kant's ideas were prior to the awareness that there could be what is non-Euclidean geometry: that is, hyperbolic, spherical and the many other we know from our contemporary perspective thanks to the discoveries of Gauss and Schweikart. So the perceived synthetic status of geometry is deflated to analytic status based on axioms and definition, and indeed the sides of a triangle really didn't have to add up to 180 degrees or whatever other purported synthetic facts we knew apriori. These were not in virtue of innate connection of predicate concepts but definition, reducing Kant's project to analytic apriority.

:smirk:

Karl Marx —> statist; critical socioeconomist; not a philosopher

Immanuel Kant —> noumena (plurality) is self-contradictory by his own definitions.

Ayn Rand —> dogmatic sophist and ideologue; not even a bad philosopher (but shitty novelist).

Michel Foucault —> 'historical epistemes' constitute epochal (incommensurable) truths, which begs the question of the truth-value of "historical epistemes constitute epochal truths" ... (i.e. like "relativism" – if consistent, then relativism is relative; if inconsistent, then relativism refutes itself).

So, one of the key Kantian doctrines, synthetic apriority, had been largely formulated with the example of Euclidean geometry in mind that Kant used. But unfortunately, Kant's ideas were prior to the awareness that there could be what is non-Euclidean geometry: that is, hyperbolic, spherical and the many other we know from our contemporary perspective thanks to the discoveries of Gauss and Schweikart. So the perceived synthetic status of geometry is deflated to analytic status based on axioms and definition, and indeed the sides of a triangle really didn't have to add up to 180 degrees or whatever other purported synthetic facts we knew apriori. These were not in virtue of innate connection of predicate concepts but definition, reducing Kant's project to analytic apriority. — Kuro

You would pull the geometry out first go. Alright, let's go.

So then, what you'll have to do is describe how someone would concluded such a fact, moreso than simply stating as much. Which is to say, explain how your Gauss and Schweikart discoverd the complex nature of non-euclidean geometry without reference to any principles theretofore established by which to do so?

Karl Marx — 180 Proof

Marx is not only the most influential philosopher of the of the past two centuries, he is the person who first fully understood and posited the idea of the definition of the nature of the human-being as a relationship between separate aspects of his specific culture that is foisted upon his being without his consent. Which is fundamentally the nature of Capital accrual, and how those who accrue Capital maintain control of said Capital, while keeping those him, the one exploited for it, coerced into labor and traditions determined by them through enclosure, heavy taxation, and war. So, I'd say Marx is the first philosopher to posit something actionable, making him more of a philosopher than, say, any of you here, or any of the people you regard as philosophers. The navel gazers, in other words.

Immanuel Kant — 180 Proof

Noumena cannot be self-contradictory, as what ever is itself, is itself a priori. Thus, any human invested concept into a thing that is itself a priori is, by definition, a contradiction of its nature that he places on it, not a contradiction of itself. And is especially so if a thing in itself is ascribed the characteristic of being contradictory to itself.

Ayn Rand — 180 Proof

Sophist: a fallacious argument, especially one used deliberately to deceive.

P1. If humans need reason to survive
P2. and if to survive in accordance with his/her own point of statisfaction and standards, he/she must at all times produce by means by use of his/her reason
P3. and Capitalism is the only known system that respects all of a human's affects of their own actions and production
C. then Capitalism is the only system known to be conducive to the human's life, and is the only moral system

Name the fallacy.

Also, provide an example of a good book.

Michel Foucault — 180 Proof

To demonstrate the truth of that, given that humans aren't some sort of proposition, you're going to have to describe which epochal truth you have in mind that he highlighted, or described, and describe to me how it DIDN'T happen. Because A=A is, in fact, a factual statement, irrespective of whether or not it is begging the question.

So then, what you'll have to do is describe how someone would concluded such a fact, moreso than simply stating as much. Which is to say, explain how your Gauss and Schweikart discoverd the complex nature of non-euclidean geometry without reference to any principles theretofore established by which to do so? — Garrett Travers

I'm a little confused by the nature of your request here. Axioms and first principles are first principles for a reason, namely that they're not a "conclusion," a sort of proposition entailed by some prior set of propositions. Because had they been conclusions, they'd simply be a theorem of some prior proposition instead of an axiom. And if these propositions they're entailed from aren't axioms, then you just run the theorem game forever until you reach the axioms: the stopping points.

Our subjunctive mood would be that given different definitions & axioms, we get different theorems and therefore geometries, so there's little reason to not abandon the synthetic thesis because the analyticity is conspicuous.

I'm a little confused by the nature of your request here. Axioms and first principles are first principles for a reason, namely that they're not a "conclusion," a sort of proposition entailed by some prior set of propositions. — Kuro

Yeah, you know this specific topic in Kant I thought I might be able to pull off, but it's been kind of done and dusted for a while. The only thing I could challenge with, would be to say that irrespective of which axioms you discover or geometries you develop from them, any proposition posited with those axioms will be themselves predicated on synthetic truths that preceded them in practice. That, of course, analytically established axioms will produce analytical propositions.

Do you really think Kant didn’t know about spherical geometry? And didn’t take care to qualify his postulates accordingly?

:cry:

:cry: — 180 Proof

It's a game, damnit, just play along! lol

Capitalism is the only system known to be conducive to the human's life, and is the only moral system. — Garrett Travers

Found it: capitalism.

Below is an argument I'm kind of fond of.


1. Laissez-faire market forces reflect some set of human desires.
2. Said set of human desires includes immoral desires.
3. Laissez-faire market forces in part reflect immoral desires.

Do you really think Kant didn’t know about spherical geometry? And didn’t take care to qualify his postulates accordingly? — Mww

Kant died in around the early 1800's. Bolyai made the first publication of non-Euclidean geometry around three or so decades afterwards. Gauss had the same ideas for the majority of his life in drafted notes but never published them for fearing controversy.

And these were top mathematicians. I'd suspect Kant didn't somehow discover non-Euclidean geometry decades before the mathematicians did, let alone keep it in his head despite discovering it especially when it offered such a strong challenge against a central doctrine of his work.

Mathematicians before this time (aside Gauss) thought that only Euclid's axioms could consistently capture geometry, in other words, that Euclidean geometry is the only geometry. This (mistaken) idea is what set ground for one of Kant's important ideas, which was corrected briefly after his death.

So yes, I "really" think that. In fact, I don't see what's so surprising or unusual about thinking that people generally don't discover things that were discovered after their death, because had they, they'd be the ones who actually discovered them, and for the reasons provided earlier I can't imagine anyone seriously thinking Kant, instead of Gauss, Bolyai & Schweikart is who truly discovered non-Euclidean geometry, especially considering not only the lack of evidence but the severe implausibility that comes along this sort of claim.

You are correct with respect to the advent of a non-Euclidean axiomatic system. I misspoke by asking about spherical geometry, the determinant axioms of which Kant would not have known, when I should have been more calculating, by addressing spherical trigonometry, the distinguishing logical conditions of which he would. My fault....the subject was triangles, so I just figured, you know....spherical triangles. I find it absurd to think Kant didn’t comprehend a necessary difference between the two shapes.

It is reasonable to suppose he used planar figures and predications, without actually saying so, merely for simplicity, it being tacitly understood that any triangle, including those with spherical predicates known about since Greek mathematicians wrote of them, will still have but three sides and three interior angles, two sides together will be longer than the remaining side, and none of those conceptions alone will give a triangle as a constructed figure. Hence, synthetic apriority holds no matter the axiomatic set, and it becomes clear it makes no difference whatsoever that he didn't know non-Euclidean geometry.

It is worth remembering that Kantian transcendental philosophy has to do with objects in general, and not the specific empirical examples which only follow from them. In Kant, then, synthetic a priori is a condition in itself, respecting the connection of different conceptions to each other in judgements, for which an empirical example is nothing but a possible consequent.

So.....while it is true non-Euclidean geometry falsifies some Euclidean axioms, it is not true non-Euclidean geometry falsifies Kantian synthetic a priori judgements. Or, I must say, a more complete demonstration that it does, would be appreciated.

1. Laissez-faire market forces reflect some set of human desires.
2. Said set of human desires includes immoral desires.
3. Laissez-faire market forces in part reflect immoral desires. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What are we defining as immoral?

So.....while it is true non-Euclidean geometry falsifies some Euclidean axioms, it is not true non-Euclidean geometry falsifies Kantian synthetic a priori judgements. Or, I must say, a more complete demonstration that it does, would be appreciated. — Mww

Not that Kantian Mathematics is my particular strong point, my focus is ethics, but the fact that falsifiablity can't be applied to the subject is kind of the issue. From what I can gather, this particular problem has been done and dusted for some time, in accordance with the fact that all geometry is indeed analytical. This isn't something people still adhere to as a position, and is impossible to subject to anything other than linguistic scrutiny. Which is kind of a first clue that there isn't much substance there. A priori synthetic knowledge is itself an interpolation of values into a given framework that requires us to work backward to conclude that, in accordance with that framework's vlues, the values contained within were already present and known to us. They weren't, these are just the symbols we give to phenomena to understand certain aspects of them that are not necessarily fixed. You can tell this by taking any a priori proposition and replacing a key term with the letter x. Unless you know what that value is, you have no clue what it is saying, meaning the proposition has to have prearranged symbols of meaning injected into it before one can conlude such a staetment to be "a priori synthetic knowledge."

What are we defining as immoral? — Garrett Travers

That's the question.

To my view, desires that reflect an exorbitant greed ought to be considered immoral.

That's the question.

To my view, desires that reflect an exorbitant greed ought to be considered immoral. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Exorbitant greed isn't something that falls within laissez-faire. It's a human characteristic. But such a characteristic is present in all societies. In laissez-faire, such characteristics would not be institutionalized via a monopoly on force. And immoral market forces would be entirely subject to the moral response of the rest of society. Greed that is not predicated on either survival, or otherwise rational pursuit is always evil, because such actions can harm oneself, or others. When greed in such a market extends beyond harm of the individual, they will face backlash not only from customers, but also competition. Unlike today where our greedy corps are granted tax breaks, contracts, patent protections, regulatory protections, and access to millions of dollars in treasuries. Which one sounds more greed inclusive.

Exorbitant greed isn't something that falls within laissez-faire. — Garrett Travers

What is there to restrain it?

What is there to restrain it? — ZzzoneiroCosm

You'll need to read the rest of my statement to figure that out. But, apart from that, a laissez-faire system does not necessarily imply an absence of a state that could be used to protect citizens from harm, only one that is limited in its direct access to influence the economy. Which is the proper place of government: no where near the labor, or products of the labor, of humans. With the only exception being the protection of the rights of every individual.

And immoral market forces would be entirely subject to the moral response of the rest of society. — Garrett Travers

The creation of government agencies to redistribute wealth is "the moral response of the rest of society."

The creation of government agencies to redistribute wealth is "the moral response of the rest of society." — ZzzoneiroCosm

"Redistribution" is a fake term that only means robbery backed by lethal force. Nothing else. It isn't a moral response to anything. Morality does not consist in violating the human consciousness. Robbing someone of their wealth does not create wealth, nor does it help the people to whom it is distributed. It simply creates the perception that robbery is a justifiable means of income, thus perpetuating an eternal system of government expansion, as we now see all over the world.

Robbing someone of their wealth does not create wealth, nor does it help the people to whom it is distributed. — Garrett Travers

I want to remind you that we're talking about wealth-accumulation motivated by immoral desires.

Redistribution of wealth accumulated immorally is hardly robbery. You might even call it justice.

I want to remind you that we're talking about wealth-accumulation motivated by immoral desires. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Wealth generation, correction there - it doesn't just get accumulated, it has to be generated- cannot be motivated by immoral desires, unless an organization is protected by a government. An organization after generating enough wealth, which requires the production of value that is determined by a democratic consensus via monetary votes, can then use such money to do something that is immoral, but that is when either force can be used to stop them from violations, or customers can boycott, and businesses can compete. The market will provide corrections in and of itself for harmful market activity, including the generation of unions and co-ops- yes, that's laissez-faire too. Which, mind you, is infinitely preferable in any variation, than state depridations and harmful activity. Businesses haven't committed genocide after all.

Redistribution of wealth accumulated immorally is hardly robbery. You might even call it justice. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Wealth accumulated immorally would imply violations of human rights. Theft, extortion, money laundering, etc. Businesses are predicated on, and generate wealth via the production of socially useful products and customer satisfaction standards. The only exceptions are state protected corps, and even they do this for the most part as often as they can to stay afloat. They just get away with a good deal more shady shit than they would in laissez-faire, because of said protections. So, you aren't thinking this through. You've been trained to hate business people- while wearing clothes, using computers, and shopping at grocery stores no doubt- by the people who want you to vote for them, who also happen to be protecting the behavior you abhor. You've proposed nothing that sounds anything like justice. And it may do some good to consider that the term justice, has absolutely no meaning. It is a completely relative term to anyone and everyone who uses it. My justice would be never violating my consciousness for as long as I live. Which is the first ethical principle, without which no ethical doctrine can call itself legitimate.

Wealth accumulated immorally would imply violations of human rights. — Garrett Travers

Of course. The exploitation of labor. Exorbitant profits and starvation wages. The usual.