Someone does not have to know that their life is worth living in comparison to another, to live well. Some people live well without engaging a process of "examination". For them, examining their life is not required to live well, and may only serve as a pointless (or even damaging) distraction.

Examining things is no doubt the basis of philosophy. Philosophy is a critical project. The problem is that ethical action is not. It's it's own state of existence, which may be present without the critical examinations of philosophy. Sometimes people just do good and know what is good. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Living well is not the same as a life worth living. For a person to live a life worth living, it has to be worth living for that person, not for some third-party observer (who does not and cannot live that life), and that requires self-examination.

It is for the person, and that's the sense that counts. A "third party" conclusion that a life is meaningful isn't relevant to whether my life is worth living to me. And for it to be worth living to me, I must examine my life. Thus the unexamined life can never be worth living.

You are making a category error, as if the meaning of one's existence is empirical, when it is existential. Dasein ist je meines - existence is always my existence. — Landru Guide Us

Nope, you're just confusing two separate things: that life is worth living and knowledge or awareness that life is worth living. You therefore fail to account for those cases in which life is worth living despite lacking that knowledge or awareness.

If, for you, life is only worth living with that knowledge or awareness, then, that is fine. But, again, this is reflective of your judgement, rather than a fact about life.

So if a robber holds a gun to your head and you give him the money, you're committing the immoral act of abetting a robbery? Oh the absurdity of imposing morality on people in extremis. — Landru Guide Us

I don't find that to be an instance of abetting a robbery. Nor do I find giving a thief my own money to be something morally wrong. Let me give a better example:

Let's say a robber breaks into my house, and puts a gun to my head demanding I tell him where my sister is hiding because he wants to kill her. He tells me that if I tell him, he will spare me. If I don't, he will kill me, as well as look for my sister. Supposing that I cannot lie and must necessarily tell the truth, or refuse to say anything, what should I do? I should refuse to say, even if this means I will die. However, in real life, I most probably will not refuse to say, and will tell the robber where my sister is. Why? Because I am too weak to uphold my moral values. But that doesn't mean that I shouldn't uphold them.

Like Ben Carson you would have rushed the Wehrmach and let them torture you to death before you would do anything immoral in a concentration camp. Right. — Landru Guide Us

No, probably I wouldn't have sufficient courage. But that is said to my shame, not as a way to justify that the action is somehow not immoral just because I do it, and because I was forced to do it.

My principle: There is no moral way to act when you are beaten, tortured, threatened with death. There are no moral choices in that situation. Just suffering. Now some courageous people act courageously even in extreme situations. We should acknowledge that. But that has nothing to do with morality. — Landru Guide Us

Why do you think that in the face of great suffering people cannot act morally? You think someone who, in self-sacrificing fashion, gives up his food so that a starving child may have it in a place like Auschwitz, you think that person is morally equivalent to one who kills a child so that he may take his food and survive?

Nope, you're just confusing two separate things: that life is worth living and knowledge or awareness that life is worth living. You therefore fail to account for those cases in which life is worth living despite lacking that knowledge or awareness. — Sapientia

I agree with this remark. However, it must be added that someone who lives a good life without examining their life can only live a life worth living accidentally, as opposed to by choice.

However, in real life, I most probably will not refuse to say, and will tell the robber where my sister is. Why? Because I am too weak to uphold my moral values. But that doesn't mean that I shouldn't uphold them. — Agustino

I don't believe in an objective morality, so whether you should or shouldn't isn't as straightforward for my position, but I think that one could quite persuasively argue in favour of doing what is sensible, or doing what's in one's best interest, which, arguably, means that you should tell the robber where your sister is.

That said, as a general point, it does seem that failing to abide by one's own moral values is a vice. But what if those moral values are misguided? Wouldn't it be better in that case, at least from a consequentialist viewpoint, to take actions contrary to those moral values?

Nope, you're just confusing two separate things: that life is worth living and knowledge or awareness that life is worth living. You therefore fail to account for those cases in which life is worth living despite lacking that knowledge or awareness.

If, for you, life is only worth living with that knowledge or awareness, then, that is fine. But, again, this is reflective of your judgement, rather than a fact about life. — Sapientia

I'm not confusing them at all, Sapientia. I'm distinguishing them for the reasons stated. You haven't responded to that but I'll give you one more chance:

Whether a life is worth living is not empirical. It always means is my life worth living to me. Thus it is an existential question, which can only be determined by me examining my life. Thus if my life is not examined by me, it is not worth living.

I don't find that to be an instance of abetting a robbery. Nor do I find giving a thief my own money to be something morally wrong. Let me give a better example: — Agustino

Special pleading won't save your contradictory moral claims.

Why do you think that in the face of great suffering people cannot act morally? You think someone who, in self-sacrificing fashion, gives up his food so that a starving child may have it in a place like Auschwitz, you think that person is morally equivalent to one who kills a child so that he may take his food and survive? — Agustino

Don't avoid answering the important part :) I didn't special plead to avoid your point, I actually tackled it by means of another example, which I would agree with.

Don't avoid answering the important part :) I didn't special plead to avoid your point, I actually tackled it by means of another example, which I would agree with. — Agustino

Sorry, Agustino, it's just special pleading - complying with a robber under threat of death isn't abetting a robbery but complying with a murderer under threat of death is murder (or whatever).

These sort of absurd contradictions is sufficient evidence that your moral claims have no force. I won't get into rebutting the Gish Gallop of claims that follow.

These sort of absurd contradictions is sufficient evidence that your moral claims have no force. — Landru Guide Us

Very well - that doesn't matter. Because I agreed to what was essential in your point, namely that I wouldn't act that way in some situations. But I asked you a question, which has to do with your position more than with mine.

I think I've been clear: it is our human condition that most people will do anything necessary to stop somebody from torturing them or killing them or abusing them under pain of death and bodily injury. It's not a weakness. It's who we are. To moralize that, particularly from a false claim that the judge of morality is stronger than those weak people, is not only obscene, but probably immoral in itself. It's blaming the victims.

Now some people are impervious to threats of death for whatever reason (though nobody is impervious to torture). So they may resist. We conventionally call that courage - though it may be they simply don't care about life, or have a death wish, or are unrealistic or deluded about death and pain, or lack imagination, or are wired in a funny way. In any case, I have no problem calling them courageous, and recognizing their uniqueness, whatever the source. But they aren't more moral since the alternative isn't immoral.

Read the ending of 1984. It illuminates the limits of morality in the face of power.

To moralize that, particularly from a false claim that the judge of morality is stronger than those weak people, is not only obscene, but probably immoral in itself. It's blaming the victims. — Landru Guide Us

The judge of morality doesn't have to be stronger than those weak people. He can be just as weak as them, and yet identify that it would be better if he was stronger.

It's not a weakness. It's who we are. — Landru Guide Us

I say it is a weakness, in-so-far as it would be better if we were different. Would you disagree with the statement "it would be better for someone to act morally under the threat of death/torture"?

But they aren't more moral since the alternative isn't immoral. — Landru Guide Us

What do you think about the Auschwitz situation I presented? Personally I feel very strongly that one of those people is morally superior to the other - one was willing to sacrifice himself to protect others, while the other was willing to sacrifice others to protect himself.

Read the ending of 1984. It illuminates the limits of morality in the face of power. — Landru Guide Us

Why do you think this necessarily is the ending? I believe that man can end it differently in the face of power. It is indeed exceedingly difficult, and few are the ones who can, but why would you think it is impossible? By most accounts, Jesus on the cross said "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they're doing!" - showing that in terrible pain and suffering, he was more concerned about the fate of his killers than about himself - something truly glorious about man, that he can harbour such goodness in him. And historically, if you read for example, Viktor Frankl's Man's Search for Meaning, you'll see that there were prisoners in Auschwitz who did give their last remaining portion to save a fellow prisoner. There were prisoners who risked their lives to save loved ones. There were prisoners who sacrificed themselves for the good of the others. Why do you think this is impossible? In my mind, this is the most admirable thing in man, and no action can be greater than this. The people who have it in them to maintain their goodness in the face of the greatest terrors, they are the only real people, the only ones worthy to be called human beings. All the rest of us, we are merely animals and worms, who deserve to perish as we do. People who are in many regards moral cowards, like myself with many things, do not deserve the contemplation of any sort of eternal life or heaven. Putting such people in Heaven would make Heaven itself miserable. Earth is sufficient for us. Let Heaven be for those who truly deserve it.

Better to be miserable being who we are, than happy being who we're not :)

doing what's in one's best interest, which, arguably, means that you should tell the robber where your sister is. — Sapientia

I disagree that goodness has to be in my self-interest to be goodness. I identify many things which aren't in my self interest, which are in fact damaging to my self-interest, as good. So your theory seems to me to be, prima facie, false.

Wouldn't it be better in that case, at least from a consequentialist viewpoint, to take actions contrary to those moral values? — Sapientia

It would be better to identify what the correct moral values are if that is the case.

The judge of morality doesn't have to be stronger than those weak people. He can be just as weak as them, and yet identify that it would be better if he was stronger. — Agustino

Conflating "what is better" with what is moral is another mistake, among many, that you are making

To me, morality and goodness are intrinsically linked. What is good, in a general sense, is moral. What is good for me, may or may not be moral :)

To me, morality and goodness are intrinsically linked. What is good, in a general sense, is moral. What is good for me, may or may not be moral — Agustino

Hard to see how this claim would survive even cursory scrutiny, and the examples already given seem to do that. But in any case it is yours to defend. You certainly haven't convinced me that this vague claim provides any useful moral guidance or doesn't lead to absurdities.

Hard to see how this claim would survive even cursory scrutiny, and the examples already given seem to do that. But in any case it is yours to defend. You certainly haven't convinced me that this vague claim provides any useful moral guidance or doesn't lead to absurdities. — Landru Guide Us

Is morality anything more than being good, with being good defined in a manner which doesn't necessarily include self-interest?

They are... in a sense.

The problem is that sometimes there are no good options. Sometimes people are putting in a situation where they cannot do good. Ever presence of personal responsibility is actually what gives Landru's argument force here. Since YOU are the one who make a difference in situations where you are coerced, what happens is on YOU. It's up to you whether the Nazi's get the information, which will lead to the murder of many people, or not. A good outcome (that is one without immorality) is impossible. Do you die and leave you friends and family without yourself and anything you provide them? Or do you condemn many other people to horrible deaths? Either option is morally bankrupt.

Where your ignorance lies here is not that the suggested actions are immoral or have bad outcomes, but rather in the supposition that a person in question made a decision to take the good outcome as opposed to a bad one.

I admit there are situations such as the one which you here describe. But the examples I have provided to Landru, and he has provided to me, were not of this type.

Utter falsehood, Agustino.

The bank robber gives you the choice between the evils of dying or handing over someone else's money. A torturer gives you the choice between the evils of betrayal or continuing pain (and frequently the loss of yourself to the world, to you friends and family, though mutilation and death). The example Landru gave are exactly of this type. You are ignoring them for the convenience of your power worship. What you are interested in here is not moral responsibility nor goodness/badness, but rather expressions of power and authority. The extent of your analysis goes merely to getting to a point of being able to shout out how terrible someone is and call for their punishment.

I'm not confusing them at all, Sapientia. I'm distinguishing them for the reasons stated. You haven't responded to that but I'll give you one more chance:

Whether a life is worth living is not empirical. It always means is my life worth living to me. Thus it is an existential question, which can only be determined by me examining my life. Thus if my life is not examined by me, it is not worth living. — Landru Guide Us

Well, you're confusing the relationship between them, at least. There is no logical dependency of one on the other. (Unless your argument is an argument by definition, in which case, I reject your definition). And I have responded. It's up to you whether or not you wilfully ignore it. In short: nope. Your assertion 'P' doesn't warrant any more than a dismissal or an assertion '~P'. Or are you trying to shift the burden of proof? But additionally, as others have also noted, there are counterexamples to your claim, and your position fails to acknowledge them. That is good enough reason to reject it.

Indeed. Which is what makes your argument that the worthy life necessary involves self-examination so egregious. Your "third person" pontifications about how only examined lives are worth living don't define the life of anyone. They may have an "unexamined" life in which they are both comfortable and good. Some people don't need the critical reflection of philosophy to have a life which is worth living for them.

Personally I feel very strongly that one of those people is morally superior to the other - one was willing to sacrifice himself to protect others, while the other was willing to sacrifice others to protect himself. — Agustino

I can empathise with such a feeling. I think that it has been ingrained in many of us. But I can also empathise with the feeling that the former should not have sacrificed something so valuable, namely his own life, for the sake of others; and that the latter's actions, though most will judge them to be far from admirable, are acceptable given the circumstances.

I disagree that goodness has to be in my self-interest to be goodness. — Agustino

But I didn't make that claim. It doesn't have to be, but it can be, and in some cases, is.

I identify many things which aren't in my self interest, which are in fact damaging to my self-interest, as good. — Agustino

I'm not ruling that out. It's just that there are some such things which I might not identify in the same way as you.

So your theory seems to me to be, prima facie, false. — Agustino

But what seems to you to be my theory is actually a misunderstanding on your part.

It would be better to identify what the correct moral values are if that is the case. — Agustino

I think you're right. Although, I don't interpret "correct moral values" in the same way as, say, "correct answers to mathematical questions". If I did, maybe I'd be an Error Theorist.

Oh man, now you cast yourself as arbiter of the value of the lives of others! What's next in your litany of arrogation?

By using science!

Indeed. Which is what makes your argument that the worthy life necessary involves self-examination so egregious. Your "third person" pontifications about how only examined lives are worth living don't define the life of anyone. They may have an "unexamined" life in which they are both comfortable and good. Some people don't need the critical reflection of philosophy to have a life which is worth living for them. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Sure it does Willow. It describes Dasein's life. And Dasein is always my Dasein. That's true for you too. But if you don't think it is, then don't examine your life and don't determine whether it's worth living. It's OK with me.

Well, you're confusing the relationship between them, at least. There is no logical dependency of one on the other. (Unless your argument is an argument by definition, in which case, I reject your definition). And I have responded. It's up to you whether or not you wilfully ignore it. In short: nope. Your assertion 'P' doesn't warrant any more than a dismissal or an assertion '~P'. Or are you trying to shift the burden of proof? But additionally, as others have also noted, there are counterexamples to your claim, and your position fails to acknowledge them. That is good enough reason to reject it. — Sapientia

The relationship between them is the difference between the ontic and the ontological. Whether that's logical or not hardly matters. My position would be that logic arises out of the difference.

Is morality anything more than being good, with being good defined in a manner which doesn't necessarily include self-interest? — Agustino

I would think moral philosophy is the inquiry into what is right or wrong (not good) from the perspective we find ourselves in at the time. Defining that as "being good" is the type of thing at issue in the inquiry, and a bit old fashioned and Platonic. But again, I'm not claiming that putting the self-interests of others ahead of one's own is necessarily moral. I'm saying that it's a better way to live. I don't think the distinction is that hard to grasp. Indeed, it would have been - and was - considered immoral in Roman antiquity, not to mention stupid. The Roman authorities generally thought that Christians were immoral for helping the poor and weak (not to mention a threat to the state, not to mention stupid).

There is no particular relationship between living an examined meaningful life, and living a moral one. Though I could of course define the former as the latter. Still, I'll resist that. It seems to me that morality is historically contingent and not on the same level as existential structures.

The relationship between them is the difference between the ontic and the ontological. — Landru Guide Us

I'll look up what that means later, after work.

Whether that's logical or not hardly matters. — Landru Guide Us

It does matter. You have implied that whether a life is worth living is dependent on whether one knows whether one's life is worth living. That is about logical necessity. It implies that it cannot logically be otherwise, i.e. that the contrary is logically impossible.

But not only is it possible, there are, and have been, actual cases in which one's life is worth living despite lacking that knowledge.

The one way that I see that you can legitimately make that claim is if you include the knowledge of whether one's life is worth living as part of what it means for a life to be worth living; but that's begging the question, and, as I said, I'd reject that definition.

My position would be that logic arises out of the difference. — Landru Guide Us

You'll have to elaborate for me to better understand, but at first glance, that seems wrong and absurd.