Have you ever considered the possibility that there is no such thing as "matter"? . . .
The whole field of "process philosophy", which allows the substance of physical reality to be rendered as mathematical equations, instead of as matter, in a fundamental platonic realism, is derived from the annihilation of "matter". — Metaphysician Undercover

For pragmatic l purposes -- such as walking on solid ground -- I take matter for granted. But for philosophical speculations, I have followed the findings of Quantum & Information sciences, to the conclusion that ultimate reality is in-substantial & immaterial. So, it seems possible that our massy world is constructed of weightless-but-meaningful relationships, such as mathematics & logic. Of course, that possibility is not amenable to empirical investigation. So, like Einstein riding on a light-beam, we must use the telescope of imagination to explore the unseen & intangible foundations of Reality.

Your reference to Process Philosophy is interesting. I've read A.N. Whitehead's book on the topic, but much of it was above my philosophical pay-grade. Can you direct me to a more accessible source of information on the "annihilation of matter" concept? :smile:

Mathematical structure :
In mathematics, a structure is a set endowed with some additional features on the set (e.g. an operation, relation, metric, or topology). Often, the additional features are attached or related to the set, so as to provide it with some additional meaning or significance.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_structure

reductive Reason — Gnomon
You mean bone-headed, dismissive reason. — L'éléphant

No. I mean scientific reasoning, as used effectively for the dissection of material objects. But when reductive methods are used on Holistic systems it misses the immaterial bonds that hold it together. So, those who insist on "empirical evidence" for philosophical concepts, such as "axioms". "principles", "categories", "substance", "essence", or "systems", may be applying "bone-headed, dismissive reason" to non-empirical problems. :smile:

Note -- the mental image of a real thing has a similar structure, in the sense of analogy or metaphor, but is not identical with the neurons that evoke that mental pattern. — Gnomon

In my view, it'd be easier to make your point by emphasizing the difference between sentences and neocortexes. . . .
So skeptical cynics are the true enemies of scientific progress? One funeral at a time, right? — lll

No. I'm not talking about conventional grammatical syntax or physical structure. My "point" was referring to "mathematical structure" & "mental meaning". Which are not constructed of matter or social conventions, but of cognitive relationships. (see definition of "Mathematical Structure" in reply to — Metaphysician Undercover above)

Cynics are obstacles to progress for whatever process they deny. But I'm not talking about "scientific progress", such as in Neurology. Instead, I'm referring to "philosophical progress", as in the "hard question" of Consciousness. How does matter become conscious of its environment and of itself? :smile:

Which are not constructed of matter or social conventions, but of cognitive relationships. — Gnomon

I believe you'll find it hard to make sense of 'cognitive relationships' without dragging in the so-called 'physical' and various semantic conventions. For instance, qualia are ghosts who only exist in terms of the sheets we wrap them in. The 'mental' is like the hole in the donut of that which is public. Toothaches are tokens.

How does matter become conscious of its environment and of itself? :smile: — Gnomon

That's a bag biggy question, friend. 'Conscious' and 'matter' are 'draping what' (dropping went, drooping wait) with ambiguity. In social animals like ourselves we have conventions assigning a unique ghost or soul to each body. We inherit this way of talking about ourselves, presumably because it's an efficient way to coordinate those semantically-networked bodies. Most philosophers just take for granted the existence of a singular subject and an attendant droolism dualism.

Still, I'll speculate an answer. The nervous systems of animals encode/enact useful maps of their territory. In humans this mapping is largely an orgy of analogy (note that 'map' is itself a metaphor, as is 'metaphor,' albeit undead these daze.)

Mind must be taken for granted, if you're going to do any philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

It could be that taking 'mind' for granted is the end of philosophy and not its beginning. If you make this or that concept sacred, you're just scribbling a creed for a cult.

This is why logic must be given priority over the sense information derived from empirical observation, because we know that the senses can mislead us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps 'logic' is largely a ghost story. I don't deny that our reasoning has a structure. I also do not imply that anything goes. I just mean that 'logic' can play the role of the magic word that's supposed to point to some immaterial Faculty. Often enough it suffices to look at grammar as a set of loose conventions, many of which are made as rigid as possible by philosophers and taken as eternal laws of thought and not just the way we tend to do things for the moment or the century.

I wonder if that's what we should be doing. — Agent Smith

If you stare at the world and recognize an interesting pattern, you'll be map making? I think we gather here to make maps, meta-maps ,meta-meta-maps,...

Bravo! — Agent Smith

Thanks, but that meta-map is more treasure from the chunk yard, so I can't claim it.

Only where there are compelling grounds am I "skeptical". — 180 Proof

I see you take the unreasonable approach 180. The rational human being says "only where there are compelling grounds am I certain". In other words, compelling grounds are what removes skepticism, not what induces it.

For pragmatic l purposes -- such as walking on solid ground -- I take matter for granted. — Gnomon

But the point is that you do not need to take matter for granted to be walking on solid ground. You just need to walk, and not think about what the ground is made of. And, it could turn out that the substance of the ground is something completely different from what is described by the concept "matter", just like it turned out that the earth orbits the sun instead of the ancient idea that the sun was going around the earth.

But for philosophical speculations, I have followed the findings of Quantum & Information sciences, to the conclusion that ultimate reality is in-substantial & immaterial. So, it seems possible that our massy world is constructed of weightless-but-meaningful relationships, such as mathematics & logic. — Gnomon

The problem with this is that you are lacking substance here. Meaningful relations between weightless things does not magically create a "massy world". Substance is what gives mass its inertia, its resistance to change, the ability to support you when you walk. So for example, if the ground was composed of meaningful relations of weightless things, we need to know why these relations are resistant to change. It is this resistance to change which produces the appearance of weight, and the massy world. But telling me that this is the result of meaningful relations doesn't tell me anything, unless you can say why some relations are more resistant to change than others. Does this mean that some are more meaningful than others? Why are some relations more meaningful than others?

Can you direct me to a more accessible source of information on the "annihilation of matter" concept? :smile: — Gnomon

Have you seen Berkeley's "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous"?

It could be that taking 'mind' for granted is the end of philosophy and not its beginning. If you make this or that concept sacred, you're just scribbling a creed for a cult. — lll

It's not a matter of making any particular concept sacred, it's just a matter of recognizing that any philosophizing you are doing is done through your mind. You might call it something other than "mind" if you like, but it's still the same thing by a different name.

Perhaps 'logic' is largely a ghost story. — lll

That's always a possibility, but logic has already proven itself, so it's very unlikely. That's why the example of the demise of geocentric cosmology is so powerful. It demonstrates the power of logic to overthrow the assumed reality given to us through sensation. Empirical observation will mislead us immensely until we use proper logic to overturn the faulty empirical principles.

I see you take the unreasonable approach 180. The rational human being says "only where there are compelling grounds am I certain". In other words, compelling grounds are what removes skepticism, not what induces it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see you are ignorant of Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, Hume, Peirce, Dewey & Wittgenstein ... Have a good one, MU. :smirk:

It's not a matter of making any particular concept sacred, it's just a matter of recognizing that any philosophizing you are doing is done through your mind. You might call it something other than "mind" if you like, but it's still the same thing by a different name. — Metaphysician Undercover

It matters tho if one switches from 'mind' to 'language,' especially if one is supposed to be engaged upon a super-seance of that aforesaid mind. Nothing blinds as reliably and effectively as the so-called obvious.

It matters tho if one switches from 'mind' to 'language,' especially if one is supposed to be engaged upon a super-seance of that aforesaid mind. Nothing blinds as reliably and effectively as the so-called obvious. — lll

Mind is logically prior to language. So such a "switch" is a move in the wrong direction. and will only mislead you, as 180 Proof is obviously mislead into thinking that certainty is prior to skepticism. Language is a product of minds, just like certainty is a product of skepticism, and any attempt to reverse this logical order, is a mistake. This is why semiosis, which reduces fundamental biological processes to a form of language, results in panpsychism.

I believe you'll find it hard to make sense of 'cognitive relationships' without dragging in the so-called 'physical' and various semantic conventions. — lll

Yes. I know that all too well. Human languages are derived from commonsense (sensory) experience. That's why we talk about private-subjective-Mental-concepts in terms of analogies to public-objective-Material-things, Much of the ranting on this forum is a result of mistaken terminology, That's also why I spend (waste?) so much verbiage on defining terms, and defining definitions, and linking to other's definitions.

Ironically, even spooky counter-intuitive (not common sense) Quantum Physics is expressed in material metaphors. For example, a Quantum "Field" is an intangible mathematical concept, but scientists describe it in metaphorical as-if language. Note, in the definitions below, that the term "Field" in physics is defined in terms of another material thing : a "Region". Likewise, my Information-based terminology is misconstrued by the "Trolls" (as I teasingly call them) as-if I'm making a scientific claim about a physical Substance*1, instead of a Philosophical hypothesis about the imaginary Realm (or Field, or Region) we call "Consciousness" or "Mind".

That inherent materiality of language makes discussion of immaterial topics confusing. "Mind" is defined below in terms of an indivisible material substance (like a Democratean atom). But another way to define the "subjective Mind" is as a holistic-system-of-brain-&-its-functions, that when divided into parts, no longer functions mentally. Chop off a piece of brain, and it may still have some neuronal activity, but its cognitive mental functions don't work in the absence of the rest of the system. A mind without a body/brain is metaphorically*2 known as a Ghost. We can imagine such a thing, but mustn't take as real.

The early 20th century Quantum scientists had the same difficulty in describing the atoms they were dissecting in the lab. They likened it to "plum pudding", and to "solar system", and to a "cloud". But all "likens" are metaphors compared to something detectable by the physical senses. Yet Mind & Consciousness are detectable only via rational inference. Hence, the "other minds" problem.

Like those pioneers of Quantum Theory, the attempts of paradigm-busting Information Theorists -- to discuss their Holistic Systems theory of fundamental Information -- are often victims of the misinterpretation of misplaced concreteness, due to the materialistic bias of our common language. :nerd:


*1. Aristotle analyses substance in terms of form and matter. The form is what kind of thing the object is, and the matter is what it is made of.
Note -- "Form" is the immaterial essence, or defining principle of a thing, while "Matter" is the clay from which it is constructed. In-Form-ation is a meaningful (or metaphorical) projection in the theatre-of-the-mind that represents a real (or metaphorical) object in the world outside the body/brain.

*2. A metaphor is a mental representation of a thing or concept. It's an abstract symbol. It may be stated as-if a Fact, but is not to be taken literally. Semiology is the science of abstractions that exist only in Minds. So, it too is plagued with misconceptions, due to the limitations of language.

Is information the only thing that exists? :
Physics suggests information is more fundamental than matter, energy, space and time
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23431191-500-inside-knowledge-is-information-the-only-thing-that-exists/

But language too is material! :
Language is infused with materiality and should therefore not be considered as an abstract system that is isolated from socio-material reality.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-017-9540-0

Field :
1. an expanse of open or cleared ground, especially a piece of land suitable or used for pasture or tillage.
2. field, in physics, a region in which each point has a physical quantity associated with it

Region :
1. an area or division, especially part of a country or the world having definable characteristics but not always fixed boundaries.

MInd :
1. the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought.

Element :
1. An element is a substance that cannot be separated into simpler substances through chemistry.

What Is an Atom Like? :
Since the atom was discovered, many theories tried to depict what an atom is like. They have likened it to a plum pudding, a small ball, and even a tiny solar system. Perhaps, it is also imagined as a core with a cloud of small and light particles surrounding it.
https://www.thegreatcoursesdaily.com/what-is-an-atom-like/

A Democratean Metaphor :
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4181641

MIND IS A METAPHOR FOR BRAIN FUNCTION

That inherent materiality of language makes discussion of immaterial topics confusing. "Mind" is defined below in terms of an indivisible material substance (like a Democratean atom). — Gnomon

This is the 'substance abuse' of mutterphysics I mentioned previously (we are too easily imprisoned by our own grammar.) Why indivisible and how material? Why do human beings have only one mind each ? Have we fished out mindnuggets from their abandoned snailskulls and do we always find exactly one?

But another way to define the "subjective Mind" is as a holistic-system-of-brain-&-its-functions, that when divided into parts, no longer functions mentally. Chop off a piece of brain, and it may still have some neuronal activity, but its cognitive mental functions don't work in the absence of the rest of the system. A mind without a body/brain is metaphorically*2 known as a Ghost. We can imagine such a thing, but mustn't take as real. — Gnomon

We start to agree at this point, but we need even more context, for we must include language. For this we need a tribe that coordinates struggle in the real world through semantic conventions. I suggest that mentalistic language developed as part of this system of conventions (along with physicalistic language.) We use 'fictional' or conventional entities like 'thoughts' and 'feelings' and 'qualia' to predict and control that part of our environment which consists of us. We distribute goods and duties, affix praise and blame, mete out justice, and wage war with their help. In short, we can think of the 'mental / physical' distinction as a convention and acknowledge that we never have known and probably never can know exactly what we are talking about when coughing up these magic words.

180 Proof is obviously mislead into thinking that certainty is prior to skepticism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I'm in good company with other thinkers such as the author of On Certainty. :fire:

I have followed the findings of Quantum & Information sciences, to the conclusion that ultimate reality is in-substantial & immaterial. — Gnomon

I'll follow you down this path. It's maps all the way down. 'No finite thing has genuine being,' because the bubbles of our pragmatic babble are systematically interdependent. One notices that every stab at something 'behind' appearance depends on still-actually-mentalistic items (for instance, electrons are calculus scribbles on black boards). So matter is really just mutter which is obviously Mind, right?

So, it seems possible that our massy world is constructed of weightless-but-meaningful relationships, such as mathematics & logic. Of course, that possibility is not amenable to empirical investigation. So, like Einstein riding on a light-beam, we must use the telescope of imagination to explore the unseen & intangible foundations of Reality. — Gnomon

But (consider thou the beetle in the box) the same realization is available in this direction, where all the talk of secret interior recesses is shown dependent on that which is 'public' or social. The ghost is a hole in the donut. The life of signs is enmeshed in the worldly. No matter, never mind. Our maps are as 'material' as they are 'mental.' We have equivalence classes of strings of tokens whose differences do not make a (practical) difference in this or that context. From this we should not infer an informagical kernel and an 'immaterial' ghost or faculty that grazes upon it. Or, if we insist on such speculation, we can remember that it's an invention and not a discovery.

Yes, Wittgenstein can be very misleading. He ought to be discussed in the thread on sophistry.

Read the thread on hinge propositions. There I argued that Wittgenstein is fundamentally wrong on this issue. That he is wrong on this issue ought not surprise anyone, given his attitude toward metaphysics. Those who are not inclined toward making the effort to understand metaphysics tend to try and dismiss metaphysics with faulty principles.

How do you think that the present situation of human beings with knowledge, evolved from the prior situation of beings without knowledge, if uncertainty is not prior to certainty?

Those who are not inclined toward making the effort to understand metaphysics tend to try and dismiss metaphysics with faulty principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

That kind of comment, like Gloria's famous knife, cuts both ways.

Those who are not inclined toward making the effort to understand criticisms of traditional metaphysics tend to try and dismiss criticisms of traditional metaphysics with faulty principles.

What makes a subject difficult to understand — if it is significant, important — is not that some special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. Rather it is the contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people want to see. Because of this the very things that are most obvious can become the most difficult to understand. What has to be overcome is not difficulty of the intellect but of the will.
...
Work on philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) — Witt

due to the materialistic bias of our common language. — Gnomon

Let's not forget the intense mentalistic bias of forum philosophers who won't/can't ingest any criticisms thereof, attached for the usual reasons to go stories.

This "priority" formulation is a red herring. My point is only that doubt requires grounds just as belief and disbelief do. To clarify, epistemic attitudes contrary to the status quo – positing new doubts, new dis/beliefs – require grounds and lacking those grounds the status quo remains (i.e. certainty). So idle "paper" doubts (Peirce) such as Descartes' are unreasonable – vacuous – since there are no grounds for "doubting everything that can be doubted" and therefore one can be certain of background, or status quo, beliefs until one encounters some difficulty or uncertainty. One doesn't begin uncertain and then becomes certain or begin certain and become uncertain; one is always both but in different respects and striving to discern which is which or when it's the case and when it's not the case. Epistemic attitudes or perspectives are much more fluid and nonlinear than you seem to assume, MU. No wonder you don't understand Witty et al.

Those who are not inclined toward making the effort to understand criticisms of traditional metaphysics tend to try and dismiss criticisms of traditional metaphysics with faulty principles. — lll

This is actually untrue. Those who are well educated in traditional metaphysics have very little, if any problem understanding such criticisms, and tend to address them adequately, with sound metaphysical principles. But those not educated in traditional metaphysics, being unwilling to make the effort, do not have such an understanding, and tend to dismiss traditional metaphysics with faulty principles. Therefore the knife really just cuts one way. What is the case generally, is that what makes a subject difficult to understand is that special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. This is no different from mathematics, physics, chemistry, or biology for example.

My point is only that doubt requires grounds just as belief and disbelief do. — 180 Proof

And my point is that this is manifestly untrue. "Doubt" is an uncertainty, and as such it is fundamentally different from belief, which is a form of certainty. The mental state of being uncertain does not require grounds, and it especially does not require "compelling grounds" as you stated earlier. Compelling grounds is what produces certainty, and certainty is fundamentally distinct from uncertainty.

To clarity, epistemic attitudes contrary to the status quo – positing new doubts, new dis/beliefs – require grounds and lacking those grounds the status quo remains (i.e. certainty). — 180 Proof

Again, this is fundamentally incorrect. There is no need to posit alternatives in order to be uncertain of the status quo. In reality, the "status quo" needs to be justified. It is fundamentally illogical to accept "the status quo" simply on the basis of authority. This is why so many people reject religion, because we are often asked to accept the principles on faith without being offered any justification of those principles.

there are no grounds for "doubting everything that can be doubted" — 180 Proof

And this is also incorrect. There is very good grounds to doubt everything which can be doubted. Any principle which has not been adequately justified may prove to be unacceptable if doubted. And, since we cannot know prior to doubting them, which ones are unacceptable, we must doubt everything which can be doubted, in order to determine which ones are unacceptable. Even if it turns out to be only a sparse few principles, out of a vast lot, we cannot know which ones until we doubt them all.

One doesn't begin uncertain and then becomes certain or begin certain and become uncertain; one is always both but in different respects and striving to discern which is which or when it's the case and when it's not the case. Epistemic attitudes or perspectives are much for fluid and nonlinear than you seem to assume, MU. No wonder you don't understand Witty et al. — 180 Proof

Finally, I think that this is obviously false as well. We do begin uncertain, as little babies. Schooling teaches us how to become certain. It is true though that a grown adult is usually certain in some respects and uncertain in others. Retaining an open mind (uncertainty) in the face of an education system which attempts to rid us of this, is something which requires significant philosophical training. But the fact that most adults are certain in some respects and uncertain in others, does not negate the fact that we begin as uncertain.

What is the case generally, is that what makes a subject difficult to understand is that special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. This is no different from mathematics, physics, chemistry, or biology for example. — Metaphysician Undercover

So traditional metaphysics is comparable with physics, biology, and mathematics ? Why not mention astrology, phrenology, and numerology ? Why not theology, an especially obvious choice? Could not the theologian insist on the same point? 'There is a proof of God, but people don't have the patience to grok it. I swear! '

The problem with this is that you are lacking substance here. Meaningful relations between weightless things does not magically create a "massy world". Substance is what gives mass its inertia, its resistance to change, the ability to support you when you walk. So for example, if the ground was composed of meaningful relations of weightless things, we need to know why these relations are resistant to change. It is this resistance to change which produces the appearance of weight, and the massy world. But telling me that this is the result of meaningful relations doesn't tell me anything, unless you can say why some relations are more resistant to change than others. Does this mean that some are more meaningful than others? Why are some relations more meaningful than others? — Metaphysician Undercover

Good questions! But difficult to answer, due to the material bias of language. So, we resort to debatable analogies between metaphysical Concepts & physical Objects.

Aristotle made a distinction between two kinds of "substance". : 1. Primary Substance -- Being qua Being, or 2. Secondary Substances -- species & genera (i.e. specific instances of Being). As I interpret those categories, Primary Substance is Essence (massless potential), but Secondary Substance is Matter (massy existence). The earthy "ground" I take for granted is Secondary & sensory, hence no mystery. But, the "substance" that "miraculously" gives mass to matter is Primary & abstract. Actually, Mass is merely a different form of Energy : energy transforms into mass, which is the property of matter that is mysteriously attracted to other masses via gravity (L. heaviness).

In my thesis terminology, Primary Substance is the Power to Enform, to give form to the formless. In Einstein's equation, that mysterious ability to create Mass from the massless is "magical" Energy. And according to current Information theories, Energy (potential) is merely one form of generic Information -- the same non-stuff that creates Meaning in a brain. So, shape-shifting Information does seem to be magical -- but it's also material, and that's what brings massless ideas back down to earth.

Relations that are "resistant to change" are eternal & infinite, like Primary Substance : the essence of Being. Meaningful Relations are mental analogies. Physical Relations are thermodynamic ratios.

"More meaningful" in this context can be understood as higher Valence. In a thermodynamic ratio, the relative valences are expressed in higher & lower abstract numbers representing degrees of energy content (hot/cold). But, in mental evaluations, numerator & denominator are evaluated in terms of significance to Self (good/bad).

Any more questions? :smile:


Ratio :the quantitative relation between two amounts showing the number of times one value contains or is contained within the other.

Valence : the combining power of an element ; a value that adds-up

The mass-energy-information equivalence principle :
https://aip.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/1.5123794

Is information equivalent to energy? :
The bit of information is equivalent to a quantum of minimum energy
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1401/1401.6052.pdf

So traditional metaphysics is comparable with physics, biology, and mathematics ? Why not mention astrology, phrenology, and numerology ? Why not theology, an especially obvious choice? Could not the theologian insist on the same point? — lll

Yes, sure why not? These are all fields of study along with physics, mathematics, biology and metaphysics, requiring effort and learning of principles. And, I would expect the ones who made the effort to study them to have a better understanding, and be more capable of discussing those principles. Do you have difficulty with this?

Any more questions? :smile: — Gnomon

I understand primary and secondary substance in a way slightly different from you. Maybe I'll get to that tomorrow.

And, I would expect the ones who made the effort to study them to have a better understanding, and be more capable of discussing those principles. Do you have difficulty with this? — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't pretend to take astrology or numerology seriously, yet I have no doubt there are those who are stuffed with knowledge of these things. Others may have memorized the Book of Mormon or the later scribbles of L. Ron Hubbard about Xemu.

I enter philosophical conversations with the prejudice that the human tendency toward self-flattering delusions is well known. The philosophical project is (so runs my dream) climbing out of such muck as much as possible.

And my point is that this is manifestly untrue.

Again, this is fundamentally incorrect.

And this is also incorrect. 

Finally, I think that this is obviously false as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Apparently, MU, I'm just not as 'smart' or 'full of gnosis' as you. :sparkle: :yawn:

Apparently, MU, I'm not as 'smart' or 'full of gnosis' as you — 180 Proof

And:

I'm in good company — 180 Proof

While I'm at it, I'll add this:

the human tendency toward self-flattering delusions is well known. — lll

Aristotle made a distinction between two kinds of "substance". : 1. Primary Substance -- Being qua Being, or 2. Secondary Substances -- species & genera (i.e. specific instances of Being). As I interpret those categories, Primary Substance is Essence (massless potential), but Secondary Substance is Matter (massy existence). The earthy "ground" I take for granted is Secondary & sensory, hence no mystery. But, the "substance" that "miraculously" gives mass to matter is Primary & abstract. Actually, Mass is merely a different form of Energy : energy transforms into mass, which is the property of matter that is mysteriously attracted to other masses via gravity (L. heaviness). — Gnomon

Primary substance, as defined by Aristotle is the individual, the particular, such as the individual man, or individual horse. Secondary substance is the species such as "man" or "horse". Since the category of "primary substance" consists of particular items, we cannot say that these are massless potentials. Each object has a form unique to itself, as well as its matter. This is the basis for Aristotle's law of identity, and his hylomorphism. What provides the "substance" to the particular, has been debated. Some would argue that it is the matter of the object, some would argue that it is the form, which constitutes the substance. I would argue that "primary substance" requires both. But if "form" is argued as prior, and responsible for the identity of the particular, this leaves matter as unnecessary (demonstrated by Berkeley), which is consistent with the true to the definition of matter, as potential, and this means that primary substance, as particular individuals, is not necessary, particulars are contingent.

So I think that you conflate the categories here. Matter is defined as potential, and matter is what is said commonly, to have mass. However, when we assign a property to "matter", we are assigning a form to it, properties are formal. So this is the first mistake which a physicist, (Newton for example) might make, to assign mass directly to matter as a necessary property. This negates the true definition of matter as pure potential by restricting that potential to the characteristics of mass, saying that all matter must have this specific formal attribute, mass.

If we say that all individual particulars have matter, and all matter has mass, then we lose the capacity to speak of massless potential in the form of primary substance. Primary substance is necessarily a combination of matter and form, so when we say that matter necessarily has mass, we lose the capacity to speak of massless matter, and therefore we lose the capacity to speak of massless primary substance as well because primary substance must have matter. And since matter represents the potential of primary substance, we can have no primary substance in the case of massless potential. Massless potential cannot have matter and therefore cannot be primary substance

So physicists fall back on secondary substance, a specified form, to speak of massless individuals, particles. However, then these particles escape Aristotle's law of identity, not being identified as matter and form (having no matter, because the true potential of matter has been lost by assigning matter the property of mass); consequently these particles can only be understood as generic forms (secondary substance), and cannot be given the status of true identifiable individuals (primary substance).

In my thesis terminology, Primary Substance is the Power to Enform, to give form to the formless. In Einstein's equation, that mysterious ability to create Mass from the massless is "magical" Energy. And according to current Information theories, Energy (potential) is merely one form of generic Information -- the same non-stuff that creates Meaning in a brain. So, shape-shifting Information does seem to be magical -- but it's also material, and that's what brings massless ideas back down to earth. — Gnomon

I don't think this is really consistent with Aristotle's "primary substance", because under Aristotle's definitions, primary substance is an individual object, and an object is a unity of matter and form. However, if we assign the identity of the particular, to the formal aspect, as I described above, then the form of the particular is necessarily prior to its material existence, as what determines the particular's existence as the unique individual which it is. This enables the concept of independent Forms. But the union between matter and form must remain a mystery because "matter", by definition refers to the aspect of the particular which is unintelligible to us. If we assign a property to matter, like "mass", in the attempt to bring matter into the realm of intelligibility, then we defeat the purpose of the concept, to refer to the unintelligible aspect of reality, and we delude ourselves by thinking that the unintelligible has become intelligible.

Relations that are "resistant to change" are eternal & infinite, like Primary Substance : — Gnomon

This is not realistic. As we know, an object is resistant to change only until the necessary force required to change it, is applied to it. So we cannot represent "resistant to change" as eternal and infinite, that would be a mistake. Each object has its own temporal duration, as a property of its own internal resistance to change, and external forces applied to it, and never do we find an eternal and infinite object. This is what is meant when we talk about objects as being contingent, they are generated and corrupted.

due to the materialistic bias of our common language. — Gnomon
Let's not forget the intense mentalistic bias of forum philosophers who won't/can't ingest any criticisms thereof, attached for the usual reasons to go stories. — lll

Your perception is accurate, even though your aim is off. This forum does have two strategic factions : mental emphasis vs physical emphasis. The pro-Metaphysics posters are talking about human Culture, while the anti-Metaphysics posters are focused on non-human Nature. The "pros" typically have no problem with Natural Science, but as appropriate on a Philosophy forum, they are more interested in Cultural phenomena (e.g. beliefs & practices). So, they necessarily have a "mentalistic bias". Culture is the specifically human aspect of the natural world.

Human culture is difficult to study by means of the reductive scientific method. That's why Psychology and Sociology essentially gave-up on trying to emulate Hard Science, and remain mostly philosophical & holistic in their methods (i.e. induction & argument ; systems instead of parts), and standards of evidence (e.g. logical coherence instead of physical replication). Philosophical theories are also non-falsifiable in that there are no mental "Black Swans" to refute a hypothesis. Testing of Philosophical theories is logical instead of physical. Unfortunately, you can lead a person to Truth, but you can't make him believe it.

Therefore, Philosophy can be characterized as "non-science", but not as "pseudo-science". Because it does not pretend to be producing empirical evidence for physical theories. It's merely trying to produce reasonable models of intangible human concepts. So, the standards of evidence for Philosophy are different from those of Science. That's why your "criticisms thereof" are not "ingested". They may be food-for-physical-belly, but not nourishment-for-metaphysical-thought. Your error is what Popper called the "Demarcation Problem". Hence, you are shooting at pseudo-science, and hitting thin air. :cool:


What Is the Difference Between Hard and Soft Science? :
In general, the soft sciences deal with intangibles and relate to the study of human and animal behaviors, interactions, thoughts, and feelings.
https://www.thoughtco.com/hard-vs-soft-science-3975989

Human Culture vs Nature :
Culture can be defined as all the ways of life including arts, beliefs and institutions of a population that are passed down from generation to generation. Culture has been called "the way of life for an entire society." As such, it includes codes of manners, dress, language, religion, rituals, art.
https://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/mph-modules/PH/CulturalAwareness/CulturalAwareness2.html

Popper's Falsifiability Theory :
* Karl Popper believed that scientific knowledge is provisional – the best we can do at the moment.
* Popper is known for his attempt to refute the classical positivist account of the scientific method, by replacing induction with the falsification principle.
* The Falsification Principle, proposed by Karl Popper, is a way of demarcating science from non-science. It suggests that for a theory to be considered scientific it must be able to be tested and conceivably proven false.
* For example, the hypothesis that "all swans are white," can be falsified by observing a black swan.

Demarcation Problem :
For Popper the central problem in the philosophy of science is that of demarcation, i.e., of distinguishing between science and what he terms “non-science” (e.g., logic, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and Adler's individual psychology).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/

Induction vs Deduction :
Induction is a specific form of reasoning in which the premises of an argument support a conclusion, but do not ensure it. . . .
Deduction is a form of reasoning whereby the premises of the argument guarantee the conclusion.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Induction_(philosophy)

Note -- Philosophy does not speak of physical Reality, but of mental Ideality.