I agree. And that is also true of the other 4 points I outlined. We give them the benefit of the doubt.The grammar of sensation and pain is a bit special. In general, we do not question or doubt such statements. One 'cannot be wrong' about 'appearance' or 'what things seem like.' This grammatical habit is too readily taken as some great logical principle or discovery. — lll
Yes, this happens but under a different circumstance that what I'm trying to say in the introduction. Of course there would be liars.We should note exceptions though. How many doctors have doubted claims of 'back pain' from claimants who clearly want opiates? — lll
Might. But in general, we do not have strict requirements for reports of dreams.If you tell me that you dreamed vividly of 'round squares' but refused to draw one for me, I might doubt you. — lll
Fortunately, in a philosophical argument, we don't distinguish between life and death situation when requiring proof to back up our claims. I mean, just search for Descartes's cogito and see how much time and space was devoted to it just so we talk about existence and the self. In epistemology, we don't put hierarchy on topics.Our culture doesn't make much of dreams, so we don't care enough to challenge them. The God issue is connected to bloody wars and issues like abortion and assisted suicide. As one might expect, claims that 'God told me X' are held to far more scrutiny. — lll
And now we are venturing into the legality of it, which again fortunately for the purpose of this topic, is not a requirement. I just really meant philosophical proof.If I try to sell a cancer-curing concoction without making a case for its effectiveness, I might get a visit from the government. — lll
I just really meant philosophical proof. — L'éléphant
What I meant was, proof that we accept as epistemologicaly sound-- so it could be empirical proof (which includes scientific proof) or logical proof. Heck, even induction is acceptable as philosophical argument. — L'éléphant
The grammar of sensation and pain is a bit special. In general, we do not question or doubt such statements. — lll
Okay we can also include those. But, again, my point is, we don't require proof for certain things we claim to be true or we accept from accounts of other people.These are important, but what about intermediate theories which remain blurry and plausible? — lll
Yes. And I don't disagree with W.Wittgenstein said (paraphrasing) "When you're in pain, you know you're in pain; uou don't justify/require proof that you are in pain." — Agent Smith
Yes. And I don't disagree with W. — L'éléphant
Please see above. I am agreeing with W as far as being content with our self-reporting habit of pain -- no proof required except our own account of it. — L'éléphant
I haven't changed my tune since I've written the OP. I can explain again. I said that there are things that we accept without requiring proof. I gave an example of pain. Then you quoted W for same idea that our experience is enough to claim its truth. I said okay, I agree with him. And we should really give the benefit of the doubt to the pain reporter, barring some wayward silly individuals who fake pain to get high on drugs.Are you changing your tune or is it that I misunderstood you? That was quick. — Agent Smith
And the ending of my intro is that, we do accept certain things without proof. But belief in god seems to have not benefited from this leniency. — L'éléphant
Excellent point.1. What if god is a sensation, like pain is? God's relationship with suffering is well-documented (heaven/hell) (vide religious experience)
2. Is "I am in pain" = "God exists"? The former is private but the latter is not. My pain vs. Our God. Both are propositions in their own right. — Agent Smith
Belief in god could be both viewed as private or public (later about this) -- private like pain, as you said. In which case, nothing else is required except for the self-reported sensation of divination or other holy experience. But if we consider it as a public knowledge, such as what lll touched on -- since belief in god had led to some grave consequences such as persecution, then should it be held at a higher standard than other private sensation such as dreams and pains? Should we require proof of god? — L'éléphant
And here the issue of belief in god becomes muddled when organized religions are involved. And to me, this is when the practice of religion is more at issue here than belief in god.
Nonetheless, I gave an example of the big bang, which is comparable to the existence of god in magnitude? Or not. But I guess I'm trying to find a comparison big enough to make it balanced. — L'éléphant
then should it be held at a higher standard than other private sensation such as dreams and pains? — L'éléphant
Organized religion makes no sense in Wittgenstein's philosophy if god is a religious experience (private). There may be 2 billion Christians on earth but each one of them could be using "Yahweh" to mean totally different things. — Agent Smith
So, you think since the god topic is an all important life situation that we must require proof, whereas, other things in life could pass as not requiring proof. — L'éléphant
Wittgenstein seems to be/is using experience (can't find a better/right term), pain to be precise, in the same ways as Descartes uses thinking (cogito ergo sum). Both become the foundation of knowledge i.e. they can be employed to exorcize philosophy of skepticism. — Agent Smith
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
I'm sure there are other existent things that we readily accept without proof. I will post more if I could think of other examples. But my point is, so much for requiring proof for beliefs. We don't always require proof. — L'éléphant
Dreams – Almost everyone, if not all, claims that they dream. We accept this claim without requiring proof. We use our own experience of dreaming to validate the other person’s claim of dream. — L'éléphant
For me the question sometimes might be: what is it we have reason to doubt? Not so much what is it we don't have proof for. — Tom Storm
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