Things That We Accept Without Proof

L'éléphant

This topic is about things/entities that we claim to exist without requiring actual proof. This is an off-shoot from the Atheism thread – I decided to create a new thread so as not to derail that other thread.

1. Dreams – Almost everyone, if not all, claims that they dream. We accept this claim without requiring proof. We use our own experience of dreaming to validate the other person’s claim of dream.

2. Pain – We do not have proof of pain except our own complaint and expression of pain. Doctors have to ask where it hurts because there isn’t a proof that they could point to.

3. Fear –It’s a very subjective feeling that has side effects such as sweating, fast heart-beat, sweaty palms, but fear cannot be proven by pointing to these outward signs because these signs can also be present for reasons other than fear.

4. Floaters—these are what you see in front of you when you experience “floaters” small dark shapes that float across your vision. There is no proof of their existence except for what you report to other people.

I'm sure there are other existent things that we readily accept without proof. I will post more if I could think of other examples. But my point is, so much for requiring proof for beliefs. We don't always require proof.

lll

↪L'éléphant

The grammar of sensation and pain is a bit special. In general, we do not question or doubt such statements. One 'cannot be wrong' about 'appearance' or 'what things seem like.' This grammatical habit is too readily taken as some great logical principle or discovery.

We should note exceptions though. How many doctors have doubted claims of 'back pain' from claimants who clearly want opiates? If you tell me that you dreamed vividly of 'round squares' but refused to draw one for me, I might doubt you.

L'éléphant

The grammar of sensation and pain is a bit special. In general, we do not question or doubt such statements. One 'cannot be wrong' about 'appearance' or 'what things seem like.' This grammatical habit is too readily taken as some great logical principle or discovery. — lll

I agree. And that is also true of the other 4 points I outlined. We give them the benefit of the doubt.

We should note exceptions though. How many doctors have doubted claims of 'back pain' from claimants who clearly want opiates? — lll

Yes, this happens but under a different circumstance that what I'm trying to say in the introduction. Of course there would be liars.

If you tell me that you dreamed vividly of 'round squares' but refused to draw one for me, I might doubt you. — lll

Might. But in general, we do not have strict requirements for reports of dreams.

lll

↪L'éléphant

I suspect we go easy on some stuff for practical reasons. Our culture doesn't make much of dreams, so we don't care enough to challenge them. The God issue is connected to bloody wars and issues like abortion and assisted suicide. As one might expect, claims that 'God told me X' are held to far more scrutiny. It's not just the supernatural though. If I try to sell a cancer-curing concoction without making a case for its effectiveness, I might get a visit from the government.

A bit of tangent, but I think metaphysics is such a jungle of disagreement because the rubber never meets the road (or only very indirectly and inconclusively). We can have wild disagreements about metaphysical entities and both drive safely and not punch strangers on the contrary cut of their jibs.

L'éléphant

Our culture doesn't make much of dreams, so we don't care enough to challenge them. The God issue is connected to bloody wars and issues like abortion and assisted suicide. As one might expect, claims that 'God told me X' are held to far more scrutiny. — lll

Fortunately, in a philosophical argument, we don't distinguish between life and death situation when requiring proof to back up our claims. I mean, just search for Descartes's cogito and see how much time and space was devoted to it just so we talk about existence and the self. In epistemology, we don't put hierarchy on topics.

If I try to sell a cancer-curing concoction without making a case for its effectiveness, I might get a visit from the government. — lll

And now we are venturing into the legality of it, which again fortunately for the purpose of this topic, is not a requirement. I just really meant philosophical proof.

lll

.

I just really meant philosophical proof. — L'éléphant

We might look at the written and unwritten 'rules' or 'heroic self-image' of philosophy. How is a philosopher different from a prophet or a mystic or a physicist? Philosophers themselves continue to evolve this image, but generally making a case for claims and responding to criticisms seems central. As I see it, it's an essentially social endeavor. As a philosopher, I try to figure out what's true not just for me but for the whole tribe. Many philosophical claims are too abstract or foundational to be falsified (pre-scientific or super-scientific, if you like), so their are evaluated for consistency, coherence, practicality, decency, etc. The norms for such evaluation are themselves up for debate. This 'self-eating' of philosophy reminds me of an infinite hall of mirrors.

L'éléphant

↪lll

Okay, I misspoke when I said "philosophical proof". That needs explaining. What I meant was, proof that we accept as epistemologicaly sound-- so it could be empirical proof (which includes scientific proof) or logical proof. Heck, even induction is acceptable as philosophical argument.

lll

What I meant was, proof that we accept as epistemologicaly sound-- so it could be empirical proof (which includes scientific proof) or logical proof. Heck, even induction is acceptable as philosophical argument. — L'éléphant

These are important, but what about intermediate theories which remain blurry and plausible? The 'crisp' thesis is an ideal we strive toward perhaps, but largely (seems to me) we work within hazy metaphorical frameworks. For instance, the Cartesian ego can be elaborated endlessly. What exactly was he talking about? Did he even know? The words pour out of us as we turn the crank on ye old smoke machine. Our sloppy gang of noises and marks has evolved perhaps with just enough resolution or specificity to keep us feeding and breeding. Ask us what we mean and we'll offer yet more words, trying to assure ourselves and others of our mastery of some infinitely proximate Content.

Agent Smith

The grammar of sensation and pain is a bit special. In general, we do not question or doubt such statements. — lll

:up:

Wittgenstein said (paraphrasing) "When you're in pain, you know you're in pain; you don't justify/require proof that you are in pain."

The way I understood his statement: Some things are not proven, they're experienced directly.

Even so, take a look at the following argument.

Imagine you prick your finger with a needle.

1. This sensation in my finger is called pain.
Ergo,
2. I'm experiencing pain.

L'éléphant

These are important, but what about intermediate theories which remain blurry and plausible? — lll

Okay we can also include those. But, again, my point is, we don't require proof for certain things we claim to be true or we accept from accounts of other people.

Wittgenstein said (paraphrasing) "When you're in pain, you know you're in pain; uou don't justify/require proof that you are in pain." — Agent Smith

Yes. And I don't disagree with W.

Agent Smith

Yes. And I don't disagree with W. — L'éléphant

Well, yeah, Wittgenstein seems to be/is using experience (can't find a better/right term), pain to be precise, in the same ways as Descartes uses thinking (cogito ergo sum). Both become the foundation of knowledge i.e. they can be employed to exorcize philosophy of skepticism.

L'éléphant

↪lll

Going back to the issue you touched on earlier -- life and death situation as against other topics that others might simply dismissed as philosophical inquiry. So, you think since the god topic is an all important life situation that we must require proof, whereas, other things in life could pass as not requiring proof.

And as I countered, in philosophically sound argument, we do not put importance on life and death situation. So I guess my question to you is, should we? Should we put hierarchy on issues when we're doing philosophy?

↪Agent Smith

Please see above. I am agreeing with W as far as being content with our self-reporting habit of pain -- no proof required except our own account of it.

L'éléphant

And if we want to expand our search for accepted truths without proof -- how about the big bang theory? Here they really don't have a proof, per se. But what they claim is, it is testable, mainly by the presence of 3 things, among them CMB, cosmic microwave background, which they call evidence.

So what's the difference between a proof and presence of evidence? A proof is the actual explosion that we witnessed or captured through some device. That's the proof. That's never gonna happen. Evidence is the background support for the plausibility of the big bang happening, evidence such as expansion of the universe, presence of CMB, and abundance of elements.

Agent Smith

Please see above. I am agreeing with W as far as being content with our self-reporting habit of pain -- no proof required except our own account of it. — L'éléphant

Are you changing your tune or is it that I misunderstood you? That was quick.

Anyway, as far as I can tell this: One can't deny what one is experiencing in the immediate sense. If I'm going through pain, yes I am. That's about it.

L'éléphant

Are you changing your tune or is it that I misunderstood you? That was quick. — Agent Smith

I haven't changed my tune since I've written the OP. I can explain again. I said that there are things that we accept without requiring proof. I gave an example of pain. Then you quoted W for same idea that our experience is enough to claim its truth. I said okay, I agree with him. And we should really give the benefit of the doubt to the pain reporter, barring some wayward silly individuals who fake pain to get high on drugs.

And the ending of my intro is that, we do accept certain things without proof. But belief in god seems to have not benefited from this leniency.

Agent Smith

And the ending of my intro is that, we do accept certain things without proof. But belief in god seems to have not benefited from this leniency. — L'éléphant

Great! I'm now fascinated by where you're going with this.

1. What if god is a sensation, like pain is? God's relationship with suffering is well-documented (heaven/hell) (vide religious experience)

2. Is "I am in pain" = "God exists"? The former is private but the latter is not. My pain vs. Our God. Both are propositions in their own right.

3. Wittgenstein means to convey that experience itself can't be doubted (to be false), but he makes it a point to clarify that it remains possible that we could be talking past each other (beetle-in-the-box).

L'éléphant

1. What if god is a sensation, like pain is? God's relationship with suffering is well-documented (heaven/hell) (vide religious experience)

2. Is "I am in pain" = "God exists"? The former is private but the latter is not. My pain vs. Our God. Both are propositions in their own right. — Agent Smith

Excellent point.

Belief in god could be both viewed as private or public (later about this) -- private like pain, as you said. In which case, nothing else is required except for the self-reported sensation of divination or other holy experience. But if we consider it as a public knowledge, such as what @lll touched on -- since belief in god had led to some grave consequences such as persecution, then should it be held at a higher standard than other private sensation such as dreams and pains? Should we require proof of god?

And here the issue of belief in god becomes muddled when organized religions are involved. And to me, this is when the practice of religion is more at issue here than belief in god.

Nonetheless, I gave an example of the big bang, which is comparable to the existence of god in magnitude? Or not. But I guess I'm trying to find a comparison big enough to make it balanced.

Agent Smith

Belief in god could be both viewed as private or public (later about this) -- private like pain, as you said. In which case, nothing else is required except for the self-reported sensation of divination or other holy experience. But if we consider it as a public knowledge, such as what lll touched on -- since belief in god had led to some grave consequences such as persecution, then should it be held at a higher standard than other private sensation such as dreams and pains? Should we require proof of god? — L'éléphant

What I wanted to say but didn't now becomes relevant. A person has a religious experience and tells himself he had a one-to-one with God. The religious experience itself can't be denied, it is true and there's no need for proof.

We have to prove that some things need no proof. The reality of a sensation/experience doesn't need an argument, it needs no justification. How do we do that? Looks like the JTB theory of knowledge needs an overhaul. I have no idea how to do that.

Anyway, what I want to get across has to do with the beetle-in-the-box analogy. Is my religious experience (a private affair) the same as or identical to yours?

And here the issue of belief in god becomes muddled when organized religions are involved. And to me, this is when the practice of religion is more at issue here than belief in god.

Nonetheless, I gave an example of the big bang, which is comparable to the existence of god in magnitude? Or not. But I guess I'm trying to find a comparison big enough to make it balanced. — L'éléphant

Organized religion makes no sense in Wittgenstein's philosophy if god is a religious experience (private). There may be 2 billion Christians on earth but each one of them could be using "Yahweh" to mean totally different things.

Please excuse any remarks you feel are tangential to the main point.

lll

then should it be held at a higher standard than other private sensation such as dreams and pains? — L'éléphant

Another problem with qualia or sensation as a channel for God is the strong arguments that Wittgenstein has made against the possibility of giving a meaning to terms by attaching them to some kind of meaning-making 'primal stuff' (such as sensation or 'direct' intuition.) Basically it doesn't matter if your red is my red as long as we call the same things red.

lll

Organized religion makes no sense in Wittgenstein's philosophy if god is a religious experience (private). There may be 2 billion Christians on earth but each one of them could be using "Yahweh" to mean totally different things. — Agent Smith

Good point. I take Wittgenstein to show that the meaning of the 'Yahweh' is not inside each of its users but rather in the outside in the way the mark 'Yahweh' functions along with other worldly objects. If you want the 'meaning' of 'Yahweh,' look for it as you might look for the 'meaning' of money. See what people do with the little pieces of paper, how they fit in with other things people do.

lll

So, you think since the god topic is an all important life situation that we must require proof, whereas, other things in life could pass as not requiring proof. — L'éléphant

That depends on how a particular society treats religion. The modern way is to treat it as a kind of choose your own therapy. Kierkegaard writes about Abraham being told to sacrifice his son and then going on to almost do it. Note that this son was a miracle gift from God in the first place, since his wife gave birth as a very old lady. A suicide bomber manifests the same conspicuously irrationality. But most religion is sitting around in a building, eating some crackers, not eating this or that, perhaps protesting in front of clinic or passing out brochures. As soon as religion goes against the dominant meta-religion of liberalism, it's shoved back in its place as a kind of lifestyle choice (which I don't object to, really.)

lll

Wittgenstein seems to be/is using experience (can't find a better/right term), pain to be precise, in the same ways as Descartes uses thinking (cogito ergo sum). Both become the foundation of knowledge i.e. they can be employed to exorcize philosophy of skepticism. — Agent Smith

Not to be contrary, but I think Wittgenstein's beetle analogy shows the semantic uselessness of sensation. 'Pain' gets its meaning from the public corona of the supposed 'raw feel.' The pain itself (the quale) is like the hole in a donut. That hole 'seems' or is habitually understood to be the source or ground of the meaning of the token 'pain,' but it turns out that such a theory falls apart. It's the non-hole dough that 'informs' the token.

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

Now of course 'pain' does have a use in our language. A dentist asks about your 'pain' and your answer helps her drill the right tooth. Or your mom gives you aspirin, or you accept your wife's 'headache' and entertain yourself otherwise. The big idea here is that the 'meaning' of pain is its relationship to other tokens (words) and practical activities, all of them public. 'Nothing is hidden.' (One does not have to deny qualia to show their epistemological and semantic uselessness. Once this realization clicks, it seems amazing how easy we are all taken in by an absurdity, a philosophical earworm. )

Tom Storm

I'm sure there are other existent things that we readily accept without proof. I will post more if I could think of other examples. But my point is, so much for requiring proof for beliefs. We don't always require proof. — L'éléphant

Well, I guess an idealist would argue that everything we see, we take for granted as real when it is actually a product of mind. Does that count?

When we see people walking down the road, we take it for granted that they are real. What if only 50% of them are real and the rest spectres?

For me the question sometimes might be: what is it we have reason to doubt? Not so much what is it we don't have proof for.

There are many things we accept for which we have no firm proof and some are much more quotidian. 'My husband says he loves me'. Is it true? 'My wife says this is our daughter' But is it? My brith certificate says I was born in Denmark in 1923. Is this true? If I jump off the roof of my 20 story apartment building I will fall to the ground and probably die. But what if I can fly? None of these sorts of things are generally established through proof but I guess we can have reasonable confidence about most of them based on some key indicators and inferences.

EugeneW

Dreams – Almost everyone, if not all, claims that they dream. We accept this claim without requiring proof. We use our own experience of dreaming to validate the other person’s claim of dream. — L'éléphant

If you hear people talking in their sleep you have proof of the dreaming. Likewise for animals. You might even put me under a brain-scanning machine. Then you could see if I dream when asleep. What proof do you need more? Are you a solipsist?

EugeneW

' The pain itself (the quale) is like the hole in a donut. — lll

I think pain is the donut tasting like shit. The hole is just empty space.

EugeneW

Well, I guess an idealist would argue that everything we see, we take for granted as real when it is actually a product of mind. — Tom Storm

That sounds like the solipsist attitude (I have to be careful with words here though; is it an attitude?). L'éléphant appears to be one.

Luke

One does not have to deny qualia to show their epistemological and semantic uselessness. — lll

:up:

Tom Storm

↪EugeneW

Well, it's not quite solipsistic because it is not saying 'only I exist'. It is saying we all share the same illusion of consciousness manifesting as ostensible material reality.

EugeneW

For me the question sometimes might be: what is it we have reason to doubt? Not so much what is it we don't have proof for. — Tom Storm

Then why you are an atheist? I think it's the kind of gods you doubt. The omnibus gods. What is it you have reason to doubt, apart from the moral aspect?

Tom Storm

↪EugeneW

I'm not saying I am an idealist am trying to describe the argument properly Often when I contribute I am not defending my own position, I am trying to interrogate and steel man other arguments to see if I might have missed something.

EugeneW

Well;, it's not quite solipsistic because it is not saying 'only I exist'. It is saying we all share the same illusion — Tom Storm

But then you make everyone a solipsist. If I'm a product of your mind, you assume someone behind that product?

Things That We Accept Without Proof

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