Yes, two post-Kantian centuries after – out of the context of Berkeley's "to be is to be perceived" and so, while your analysis has merit, Tobias, it's besides the narrower point at issue here (for me at least).That is basic Heidegger actually — Tobias
That long sentence of which this was a part was meant as a joke. If you took that goblygook seriously, see your mental health professional :razz: — jgill
Scholars of the highest class, when they hear about the Tao, take it and practice it earnestly.
Scholars of the middle class, when they hear of it, take it half earnestly.
Scholars of the lowest class, when they hear of it, laugh at it. Without the laughter, there would be no Tao. — Tao Te Ching
This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.
A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active Being: as it perceives Ideas, it is called the Understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the Will.
Hence there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, being Passive and Inert, vide Sect. 25. they cannot represent unto us, by way of Image or Likeness, that which acts.
Idealism does not entail anti-realism. Berkeley thought rocks and chairs existed. They were just mental objects. Thus, idealism can work fine with science... — Count Timothy von Icarus
Ideas are objects of minds. They only exist as perception: — Count Timothy von Icarus
The forum is presently dominated by fools... — Banno
Ideas are objects of minds. They only exist as perception:
— Count Timothy von Icarus
So you are saying that you perceive your ideas? — Banno
Are you offering to mod? Not a job I want.
8h — Banno
But for the idealist, there is no such remove between the phenomenal and reality. So, when the rose colored glasses are worn, the idealist is committed to say that reality itself changes. When such a result is arrived at, it is time to discard the theory
It must be a comfort to be in such good company! — hypericin
I've been a member here a long time, but I post only very occasionally. My perception is that the level of discourse on this site has declined. I'm not sure if it's recent or if it's been happening for a while. Is this true? Or did my perspective change? If it's true, what can be done to improve it? — hypericin
You are conflating realism and idealism as the same things. — Count Timothy von Icarus
When you take off the rose colored glasses in Berkeley, the world doesn't change, you just don't have tinted glasses on — Count Timothy von Icarus
Huh? I am?
In philosophy, the term idealism identifies and describes metaphysical perspectives which assert that reality is indistinguishable and inseparable from human perception and understanding; that reality is a mental construct closely connected to ideas.[1] Idealist perspectives are in two categories: (i) Subjective idealism, which proposes that a material object exists only to the extent that a human being perceives the object; and (ii) Objective idealism, which proposes the existence of an objective consciousness that exists prior to and independently of human consciousness, thus the existence of the object is independent of human perception.
So, is reality rose tinted or no?
So, in objective idealism, ideas are still ontologically basic, but there is no question about them not being real when you aren't thinking about them. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Berkeley dedicates much time to illusions and hallucinations because these are the obvious objections to his system. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Helmholtz accepted this reasoning, and likewise argued that since the information about the external object is transformed beyond recognition on its way through the nervous system, what we end up perceiving is strictly speaking the internal effect rather than the external cause: — Joshs
It seems to me that Kantianish idealisms are parasitic upon the 'manifest image' of common sense. The notion of sense organs and a nervous system is part of this manifest image. When a thinker like Kant tries to throw space into the bucket of the manufactured or dream-like, he forgets that it's only our typical pre-critical experience of bodies in space with their sense organs that makes a 'processed sense-experience' vision of the world plausible in the first place. — jas0n
It seems that Berkeley has replaced the dualism between material and perception with a more ad hoc dualism between mortal perception and God's perceptions.
The connection between the logical and the actual is, on the one hand, unsurprising, evolution should have equipped us with a sense of "how things work," but on the other hand is one of the 'deeper' findings in the physical sciences from my perspective. — Count Timothy von Icarus
“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated. — Joshs
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