Efficient cause can't explain anything all on its lonely ownsome. A holism which can provide the context is always going to be the other half of the story that completes the causal picture. — apokrisis

I see efficient cause as being both a necessary and sufficient (given the presence of the other necessary conditions) condition for any event. The three other kinds being necessary conditions.

...in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move?
— Philosophim

Well, thank you for the example, and the opportunity it offers. You see, Newton's laws do not make mention of cause. That's the point made by Russell, and subsequently by myself. Phrasing them in terms of cause is removing them from their usual playing field and putting them into the language of our everyday interactions. — Banno

I notice you didn't answer the question. If I asked a scientist that question, would they be unable to answer? They would answer it without hesitation.

I'm going to post this part again, as you didn't address it.

So what causes a body to cease remaining at rest? A force acting upon it. Words describe concepts, and concept of causality is very much alive in science. Now causality can be considered a large word, more generic such as "good" or "tree". Science might try to use words that are more specific parts within the concept of causality, but that is not a negation of the word, or its usefulness in day to day communication. — Philosophim

Words represent concepts Banno. There are also synonyms. I don't care if you tallied a word count of all scientific articles and speeches around the world and found the percentage use of "cause" was lower than the rest of the population. They do use the word cause, and if they don't that specific word in a sentence, they use often use synonyms or more specific subsets of the concept of causality.

There are some ways to debate causality, but "Scientists don't use the word" is just silly. When you have to go to absurd lengths to avoid answering a simple and obvious question, its time to question whether your argument is absurd as well.

I notice you didn't answer the question. — Philosophim

Well, yes, I did. But it was not an answer to your liking.

The scientist can use causal language just as you and I can. But does not use it in setting out Newton's laws.

Have a look a the SEP article Causation in Physics. At the least it might help you to see that the notion of cause in physics is not as simple as you suggest. What I have argued here is pretty much the "vagueness" challenge mentioned in that article. If causation palya a central part in physics, you should have little trouble setting out what causation is.

Have to it, then.

But you say you understand causality to only mean efficient cause. And that to apply only in classical physics.

That is bonkers as far as I am concerned. — apokrisis

This makes sense to me based on things you've written about biosemiotics and DNA as a kind of formal cause. I see you as walking a path between nuts and bolds reductionism and Thomas Merton and his hippie noosphere cohort. I find it really interesting.

My problem is that my understanding of formal cause includes a need for intention. Formal cause doesn't make any sense unless the form is intended to achieve the final cause - purpose. Purpose requires intention. That gets too close to the noosphere for my taste.

I'm trying to decide if the difference between your understanding and mine is just one of language. You certainly have put a lot more thought into it than I have.

And yet induction is logical invalid, — Banno

I've never understood that. It seems like a throwback to Descartes and universal doubt. Induction works...imperfectly. There isn't any other option. We do the best we can. We're still here. Bridges generally don't fall down. Aircraft don't generally fall from the sky. Ergo induction works.

in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move? — Philosophim

It all depends on where you place the frame and what you set as the scale. The object you're describing is travelling with the Earth's rotation at about 1,000 miles an hour. It's also travelling around along with the Earth as it revolves around the sun and as the sun travels around the galactic center. I guess it's also moving along with the expansion of the universe. It's status as at rest in relation to the Earth's surface is the result of the forces of gravity and friction. If you start it moving, you'll also have to deal with air drag and impacts with whatever it bumps into.

If you look more closely, unless you apply a body force such as gravity to the object, the force you apply will be distributed from the point of application to the rest of the object by elastic deformations which are the result of intermolecular forces. The frame you've chosen is based on your particular point of view which results from the fact that you are a human and live at human scale.

This is a deep question for me.

Causality, Hume clearly demonstrated, has no deductive necessity to it. There really is no deducitve argument that shows that, for example, when a ball hits another, the other ball should move with a specific velocity (speed + direction).

This observation, in tandem with the problem of induction, prove the case for empiricism against rationalism, the latter being the position that all knowledge can be acquired deductively, a priori.

It's odd then, oui, that causality is a topic in metaphysics, metaphysics also being deduction unless the aim is to refute empiricism in this particular case by demonstrating causality can be given a deductive foundation.

Yeah... and I keep thinking to myself, if cause is this fuckin' elusive, why even get to god?

Yeah... and I keep thinking to myself, if cause is this fuckin' elusive, why even get to god? — Tom Storm

Indeed, let's first tackle the small fries before we go for the big guy! If I can't get through the door, I sure as hell won't fit through the window. I used to follow this strategy on my exams: first the easy, then the hard! :grin:

My problem is that my understanding of formal cause includes a need for intention. Formal cause doesn't make any sense unless the form is intended to achieve the final cause - purpose. Purpose requires intention. That gets too close to the noosphere for my taste. — T Clark

Yes. Final cause and formal cause combine like that in the pansemiotic view. But at the level of physics, this is no more than saying the second law of thermodynamics imposes a thermal direction on nature. The finality is the need to maximise entropy production and reach equilibrium.

So that is both sort of “mindful”. But also the least mindful notion of teleology we can imagine.

Then humans can sit at the other end of the scale in terms of being full of all sorts of cunning schemes and bright ideas.

So you can either see causality as being about two different realms - res cogitans and res extensa - each with their own non-overlapping logic. Or you can seek for a unified theory of causality, as Aristotle and a Peirce did.

I see efficient cause as being both a necessary and sufficient (given the presence of the othe necessary conditions) condition for any event. The three other kinds being necessary conditions. — Janus

Yep. There is the set-up. Then there is the pulling of the trigger. That way of thinking also leads to the dichotomy of proximate and distal causes.

Everyone is feeling the same elephant.

In physics-speak, I would also talk about constraints and degrees of freedom.

Yes. Final cause and formal cause combine like that in the pansemiotic view. But at the level of physics, this is no more than saying the second law of thermodynamics imposes a thermal direction on nature. The finality is the need to maximise entropy production and reach equilibrium.

So that is both sort of “mindful”. But also the least mindful notion of teleology we can imagine. — apokrisis

I can understand that approach, although it's a stretch for me to think about it that way. I keep wanting to keep it simple. Simpler.

So you can either see causality as being about two different realms - res cogitans and res extensa - each with their own non-overlapping logic. — apokrisis

This is more like how I see it, without much interest in the cogitans, at least in this thread.

Logical, no conjunction of observations leads to the truth of a general rule; no finite sequence f(a) & f(b) & f(c) implies U(x)f(x)... That's clear enough isn't it?

I keep wanting to keep it simple. Simpler. — T Clark

But why when that approach can only make causality incomprehensible?

What is efficient cause all its own with no context?

And how could you explain why the radioactive atom decayed at some particular moment? If a triggering event is ruled out by physical theory, what then?

If you are serious about causality in a physical context, you are going to need to arm yourself with more resources.

Final cause and formal cause — apokrisis

Hi, may I ask you something?

Since we're in Aristotelian cause territory, which one of the follwing

1. Material cause
2. Formal cause
3. Efficient cause
4. Final cause

entails a conscious being? In my humble opinion, it should be 4. Final cause which I interpret as teleological in essence and if there's a purpose, it kinda makes someone, as opposed to something, an inevitability (design argument).

Seems to me that one merely needs to look at processes of one's own mind for evidence of causation. Thinking is a causal process. Logic is the process of identifying and eliminating premises that do not causally support one's conclusion, such as pleading to authority and popularity as not being the cause of one's conclusion being true. What makes one's conclusion true is if it is the case.

Thinking itself is an IF-THEN-ELSE statement, ie. (IF) I think, therefore I am (ELSE I am not).

It also seems that causation is an integral part of any realist world-view in that your experience is a product of the interaction of your body and the world (ELSE solipsism is the case).

Reading a sentence is another causal process as it takes time to read a sentence. It has a beginning and an ending and the beginning causes the context to emerge for the rest of the sentence and the rest of the paragraph.

Symbols symbolizing would be another causal process.

in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move?
— Philosophim

It all depends on where you place the frame and what you set as the scale. — T Clark

Of course that's the answer. We've known this for a long time. We can see that in Newton's own laws. When you "act upon" something, you are placing the frame of reference on "something that is being acted upon" and "something that is doing the acting". The result of the acted upon's response to the "actor" is the response, while the "actor" is the cause.

Needing to apply scale does not make anything special or questionable. Its completely normal. Take a look at your keyboard right now. What is it composed of? Of course, I'm not asking you to give me the atomic composition right? We scale it to what's reasonable. If I wanted to dig down at a deep enough scale, the keyboard would disappear entirely. Does that mean there's no keyboard or identity? Of course not, that's absurd.

Take the words that you're using and realize you scale those as well. You scale them to your audience. You have implicit emotions and intentions behind them that your audience may never glean. And yet I can say, "I understand what you're saying T Clark". Even though if I go to a small enough scale, like reading what is exactly going on in your mind right now, I would not.

Scaling down something to the point of uselessness and incomprehensibility is not clever, though it appears a trapping for many. Anyone can do it by simply crossing their eyeballs. "Look, my view of the world is completely distorted now! Maybe I don't really see anything at all?!" My answer is to that person is, "Uncross your eyes you silly goose." Words are signs we use to convey conceptual intention, and the challenge is not to make them pointless, but to make them useful as we need to convey those underlying concepts.

If I would guess at the real underlying criticism of the word "causality", its that it has sub-concepts that are not easily conveyed through the context of a conversation. I'm not saying Aristotle's break down is correct, but you could construct a sentence with "causality" which could mean any one of the sub-types. Again, this does not mean "causality" does not exist or is useful. What is really being asked is. "Which sub-type are you intending through your context?" When conversation requires the accuracy of those sub-types be conveyed cleanly without possible ambiguity, then we should use a sub-type of causality.

Well, yes, I did. But it was not an answer to your liking. — Banno

It was not that it was to my liking, it is that I interpreted your intentions incorrectly. Your link to the article made your intention more clear. Above should include my response to that.

Logical, no conjunction of observations leads to the truth of a general rule; no finite sequence f(a) & f(b) & f(c) implies U(x)f(x)... That's clear enough isn't it? — Banno

Logic schmogic. Induction works. Pragmatic logic:

• If it works it's true
• Induction works
• Induction is true

But why when that approach can only make causality incomprehensible? — apokrisis

That's a good point. I think that's the right place to start because that's where everyone else starts. That's what people mean when they "cause" in a physics context. I know that needs to be broadened in order to get anywhere, but I think I need to figure out what the standard meaning of the word is.

That being said, I've been really happy with the way this thread has developed. As usual, it's helped me get my hands around the subject, which is a good start.

And how could you explain why the radioactive atom decayed at some particular moment? If a triggering event is ruled out by physical theory, what then? — apokrisis

Isn't that an argument for my position rather than yours?

If you are serious about causality in a physical context, you are going to need to arm yourself with more resources. — apokrisis

Working on it.

Needing to apply scale does not make anything special or questionable. Its completely normal. — Philosophim

Agreed.

We scale it to what's reasonable. — Philosophim

We scale it to what is relevant to us as humans. I'm not disagreeing with you.

If I would guess at the real underlying criticism of the word "causality", its that it has sub-concepts that are not easily conveyed through the context of a conversation. I'm not saying Aristotle's break down is correct, but you could construct a sentence with "causality" which could mean any one of the sub-types. Again, this does not mean "causality" does not exist or is useful. What is really being asked is. "Which sub-type are you intending through your context?" When conversation requires the accuracy of those sub-types be conveyed cleanly without possible ambiguity, then we should use a sub-type of causality. — Philosophim

Reading Aristotle, it struck me that, generally, when he is talking about cause, he is talking about it in a human context. The formal cause is the planning, design, that goes into an event, human activities. The final cause is the human purpose to which it will be put. The efficient cause is the guy who does the work or the skill and understanding that allows him to do so. It is my understanding that Aristotle also acknowledges that some non-human entities may cause things, e.g. fire (heat) causes things to rise.

R.G. Collingwood wrote that cause is a process that started out referring to human action and only later took on meaning as a non-human physical process. He saw the term cause as it is used by philosophers to describe physical action as a metaphorical usage from that original meaning.

R.G. Collingwood wrote that cause is a process that started out referring to human action and only later took on meaning as a non-human physical process. He saw the term cause as it is used by philosophers to describe physical action as a metaphorical usage from that original meaning. — T Clark

I don't doubt it. Word use continually evolves over the centuries. I find that philosophy is often about amending and inventing words to fit logical concepts. Science tries to take those words and use them effectively. Good philosophy eventually becomes science.

The notion that something can act upon another is a genie out of the bottle now. Of course, this is not to be confused with intention, or the personification of objects. But I think its a fairly straight forward notion in science that we look for a cause to explain why a state exists as it does. Its our job as philosophers to find the nugets of the concept that are valuable, and refine out the rest.

I think its a fairly straight forward notion in science that we look for a cause to explain why a state exists as it does. — Philosophim

I think it is common, but that doesn't necessarily mean it is straight forward. And I don't think it is.

Isn't that an argument for my position rather than yours? — T Clark

What, that some events seem to need a push - an impressed force - like the billiard ball, while other things, like the decay, the quantum fluctuation, have only a global probability, the certainty of a statistical half-life, that bounds them?

Some situations conform to one end of the spectrum - where cause and effect seems to rule in strict counterfactual fashion. But others are somehow locally unprompted and yet exactly constrained by some probability curve or wavefunction.

Doesn’t this show that causality must be a bigger picture?

The scientist can use causal language just as you and I can. But does not use it in setting out Newton's laws. — Banno

Shome mishtake shurely?

“Impressed force is the action exerted on a body to change its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward.”

“You sometimes speak of gravity as essential & inherent to matter: pray do not ascribe that notion to me, for ye cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know, & therefore would take more time to consider of it.” — Isaac Newton

So Newton was both pleased to be able to give a precise reason in terms of one body striking another body, and also honest about another law that appeared to speak uncomfortably to action at a distance.

Seems that Newton was pretty engaged in the issue of causation, and its larger complexities.

The Humean issue is only about the certainty that can be ascribed to some causal belief, not that causation is somehow "metaphysical". The pragmatist then tidies that up nicely by replying that causal beliefs can be judged by their inductive evidence.

If Newton's laws predict the future with reasonable accuracy using a reasonable argument, then what is there not to believe?

There are some ways to debate causality, but "Scientists don't use the word" is just silly. When you have to go to absurd lengths to avoid answering a simple and obvious question, its time to question whether your argument is absurd as well. — Philosophim

:up:

Final cause which I interpret as teleological in essence and if there's a purpose, it kinda makes someone, as opposed to something, an inevitability (design argument). — Agent Smith

But if you frame your notion of final cause so that it only applies to humans, or even organisms, then you rob it of that kind of causal status as it is not a necessary part of nature as a whole. It becomes just a local accident of evolutionary history.

So if you want to argue for intelligent design - big daddy in the sky - you still have to try all the usual rhetorical tricks to make it seem you are making a solid causation-based argument.

Note that the whole "everything needs a cause" creating God is yet further evidence that a narrow "cause and effect", or efficient cause, model of causality is too limited. A larger model of causality is required.

Note that the whole "everything needs a cause" creating God is yet further evidence that a narrow "cause and effect", or efficient cause, model of causality is too limited. A larger model of causality is required. — apokrisis

I would argue that's just an unexamined look at the nature of causality to its ends. I think its pretty obvious to anyone who's been in philosophy for even a short time that the next question becomes, "Well what caused God then?" Yes, theists often invent special circumstances for God, but its all made up, and they can never quite explain those special instances can only apply to God, and not well, anything else.

Regardless, reasoning about causality as a serious argument should not involve God. If a person avoids causality because they think a conclusion leads to God, that's not square thinking. Same as if a person holds onto a view of causality because they think a conclusion leads to God. An argument should never be agreed or disagreed with based on where it might lead, it should be considered on its logical merits of its immediate claims and deduced conclusions.

I think its pretty obvious to anyone who's been in philosophy for even a short time that the next question becomes, "Well what caused God then? — Philosophim

Or any child.

If a person avoids causality because they think a conclusion leads to God, that's not square thinking. — Philosophim

That wasn't anything that I was advocating. I was saying it is yet further evidence that the metaphysics of causality are far more complex and interesting.

What this thread demonstrates is just what a baked in conception of causality folk have. They believe that the laws of mechanics, logic and computation all point to the same small narrow device of the "cause and effect" connection of temporal chains of efficient causes.

It is even baked into the grammar of language. Every sentence is formally composed of a verb connecting a subject to an object - a tale of who did what to whom.

So no wonder folk are confounded by the idea that causality might demand a much larger "four causes" model, or that it might have a triadic "irreducible complexity".

In everyday life, they have probably never come across a challenge to the way they have been taught to think about the way everything works at its most general possible level.

If your case is that Newton expressed his laws in explicitly casual terms, the example you quote does not support your case.

What, that some events seem to need a push - an impressed force - like the billiard ball, while other things, like the decay, the quantum fluctuation, have only a global probability, the certainty of a statistical half-life, that bounds them? — apokrisis

I meant that radioactive decay seems like an instance when the idea of cause doesn't fit.

Some situations conform to one end of the spectrum - where cause and effect seems to rule in strict counterfactual fashion. But others are somehow locally unprompted and yet exactly constrained by some probability curve or wavefunction.

Doesn’t this show that causality must be a bigger picture? — apokrisis

Or, alternatively, that there is a bigger picture, but it doesn't make sense to call it "causality" anymore. I have no doubt that the universe is an historic entity. Events in the past are connected to those happening now.