The question is this:
What kind of pre-schemarized understanding of the world must be already in place in order for propositional logic to work as a description of empirical reality?

Indeed. There are folk who suppose that there can be an answer to this question, as if we could step outside of logic in order to examine it logically.

It's trite to say that the attempt results in nonsense. But then, folk quote stuff like

“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated. — Joshs

...and I don't know what to say.

Indeed, saying nothing might be the correct response, the way forward.

Think I got that from the Tractates.

There are folk who suppose that there can be an answer to this question, as if we could step outside of logic in order to examine it logically.

It's trite to say that the attempt results in nonsense. Indeed, saying nothing might be the correct response, the way forward.

Think I got that from the Tractates. — Banno

You’ll have better luck with Philosophical Investigations.
Here’s you’ll find Witt reiterating Heidegger’s point that logic, as a grammatical construction, is a frame of sense, and the sense of language is in its contextual use.


114. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This is how things are."——That is the kind of propo­sition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is
merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.
115. A. picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”

That quote reminds me of Mach's view to some degree, which features a monistic 'plane' of 'elements' that include what are traditionally called thoughts, body parts, and worldly objects. The scientist can then search this plane for functional relationships.

What role does 'extra-mental' play in the second sentence? Is some kind of transcendental subject (however disembodied and transhuman) still playing an essential role? Given the parasitism mentioned above, it's not clear that a monism is plausible or useful.

A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. — Joshs

I imagine a prisoner in a cell. One of the walls is a paper-thin painting of a brick wall.

You’ll have better luck with Philosophical Investigations. — Joshs

This aspect of Wittgenstein's thought, found in the Tractatus, hence predating Heidegger, does continue in the Investigations. The Tractatus concerns itself with setting out the relation between logic and language, and is quite explicit in separating what can be stated from what cannot, without denigration. Hence,

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

This aspect of Wittgenstein's thought, found in the Tractatus, hence predating Heidegger, does continue in the Investigations. The Tractatus concerns itself with setting out the relation between logic and language, and is quite explicit in separating what can be stated from what cannot, without denigration. Hence,

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. — Banno

But the relation between logic and language is rethought between Tractatus and P.I.

As Ray Monk says “ In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein had said that philosophical problems arise because the logic of our language is misunderstood. His attempted solution was to produce a correct account of the logic of our language. But when this collapsed, he began to see things completely differently, to question whether there is something that could be called the logic of our language. Indeed, he now takes his own earlier work as a perfect example of how philosophers are misled. For notice that what he says above about 'the craving for general- ity' applies to the author of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as much as to any other philosopher. When, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had attempted to analyse 'the general form of the proposition', he had fallen victim to the 'tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term', thinking that there must be a single form that was common to all propositions.”

“Some Remarks on Logical Form' is interesting as a record of how and why the logical edifice of the Tractatus came tumbling down and with it the whole notion of logical form.”

There's a fair bit of nuance in Monk's comments, and some disagreement as to accuracy. But regardless, the point I made remains. A better source on this for you might be Kenny's book, in which the similarities and differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations are set out explicitly. One of the constants is the view that there are important things which cannot be said. That some German philosophers ignore this is neither here nor there.

Much of what is in the Tractatus remains fundamental to logic; the suggestion that the "logical edifice of the Tractatus came tumbling down" is... unsound. Logic proceeds apace, to the greater clarity of language.

A better source on this for you might be Kenny's book, in which the similarities and differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations are set out explicitly. Much of what is in the Tractatus remains fundamental to logic; the suggestion that the "logical edifice of the Tractatus came tumbling down" is... unsound. Logic proceeds apace, to the greater clarity of language. — Banno

We each get to choose our own Wittgenstein. My Wittgenstein is the Wittgenstein of Cavell , Diamond, Conant and the later Baker(and Anthony Nickles too) , who are hostile to readings of him by Kenny, Peter Hacker, P.F.Strawson, Pears and Hans-Johann Glock and who do indeed believe that the ‘logical edifice of the Tractatus came tumbling down’.

Well, then, mine is the Wittgenstein of Anscombe, Kenny, Malcom, the folk who studied and worked with him.

Berkeley's focus on perception gave rise to the notion of "essence precedes existence". Through our perception we may learn to understand goals that pertain to life. In-turn our goals may help to shape our perception. This could be used as a method to develop a more useful intellect.

He was required to spend much of his time using persuasive communication (due to the mental limits of his peers) but it is possible that his ultimate goal was to create a method for cognitive fine-tuning. The end goal of perception has not been achieved, and we will need to use an even higher order of perception to pass the horizon.