That is already contained in Peircean semiotics. — apokrisis
When it was structuralist, it was dyadic Saussurean semiosis it went for and not Peircean triadic semiosis. — apokrisis
But then a closer examination of Saussure says he was actually so much a Saussurean either. He suffered the usual over simplification. — apokrisis
you didn't answer my question which is what's the difference between contexts and language games? — Agent Smith
The term ‘language-game’ is used to refer to:
Fictional examples of language use that are simpler than our own everyday language. (e.g. PI 2)
Simple uses of language with which children are first taught language (training in language).
Specific regions of our language with their own grammars and relations to other language-games.
All of a natural language seen as comprising a family of language-games.
over simplification — apokrisis
It’s been a long while since I read any Derrida. And for me, I didn’t feel I was learning anything new at the time. The points were already familiar from social constructionism and Vygotskian psychology. — apokrisis
As for metaphors, I have nothing against their use - it makes for interesting reading, adds zest to what otherwise would be a dull and boring interaction among ourselves to say nothing of how it makes certain subjects/topics more relatable, oui? — Agent Smith
think you underestimate their force and prevalence. Lakoff, Hofstadter, Wittgenstein. Folks have been trying to tell us that we think in pictures, often without realizing it. See what I mean? (With your inner eye.) Do you grasp what I'm saying? (With your intellectual hand?).
How can abstract thoughts get themselves established in the first place? — jas0n
Minus the metaphors would you even grasp the basics (of any subject)? — Agent Smith
It's hard to say how much of culture is mistaken for nature: — Agent Smith
We think in pictures? Perhaps, but still in the dark about how. — Agent Smith
Once rationality or to be precise, logic, enters the picture, semantics is no longer part of the game. Logic has its own syntax and that's all that matters. Validity, as you'll recall, is all about form, the content is of zero significance. When I think logically, it's all syntax and no semantics. — Agent Smith
Ergo, I feel justified to say, Wittgenstein is irrelevant to philosophy as it's wholly a logical exercise. — Agent Smith
The Real itself is what organises itself and makes itself concrete so as to become a determinate “species,” capable of being revealed by a general notion"; the Real itself reveals itself through articulate knowledge and thereby becomes a known object that has the knowing subject as its necessary complement, so that "empirical existence” is divided into beings that speak and beings that are spoken of. For real Being existing as Nature is what produces Man who reveals that Nature (and himself) by speaking of it. Real Being thus transforms itself into “truth” or into reality revealed by speech, and becomes a “higher” and “higher” truth as its discursive revelation becomes ever more adequate and complete.
...
The concrete Real (of which we speak) is both Real revealed by a discourse, and Discourse revealing a real. And the Hegelian experience is related neither to the Real nor to Discourse taken separately, but to their indissoluble unity. And since it is itself a revealing Discourse, it is itself an aspect of the concrete Real which it describes. It therefore brings in nothing from outside, and the thought or the discourse which is born from it is not a reflection on the Real: the Real itself is what reflects itself or is reflected in the discourse or as thought.
Do you mean to recommend that we abandon this figurative language? — Agent Smith
1. If God exists then God intervenes (in human affairs)
2. God exists
Ergo,
3. God intervenes — Agent Smith
make sure you're consistent in usage of words and it's smooth sailing. — Agent Smith
In other words, Wittgenstein, whose philosophy is semantics-oriented, is taken out of the equation as it were. :grin: — Agent Smith
No. That's like a fish giving up water. We think metaphorically, maybe only metaphorically. The point is to not be trapped unwittingly in a metaphor — jas0n
Philosophers (and regular folks) still don't agree what 'God' means, what 'exist' means, what 'intervene' means (at least in this context), and of course what 'mean' 'means.' Meaning is social and therefore ambiguous. We mostly ignore this, because we mostly stick to practical talk. Start talking religion and politics and things get ugly. Somehow the other fellow just doesn't 'see' it (the folly of his ways, his bad logic, etc.) — jas0n
Indeed, differences in definition is a cause of many quarrels, but then to oversimplify it as being only a definitional issue is not, in my humble opinion, a very sensible thing to do. — Agent Smith
I have my concepts, my own logic, and I can understand them within the constraints and freedom therein present. You can't tell me I'm confused and nor can I say the same thing about you, oui? — Agent Smith
That's what happens to all philosophers in the end. They tend to exit one cage only to walk into another. My personal point of view; could be way off the mark. The question is am I? — Agent Smith
In living, our bodies generate, imply, and enact language and culture; but with and after those, our bodies imply (project, experience, sense, practice, demand . . .) more. What they imply is inherently interactional and social, but it is more precise and implies what has never as yet formed and happened.”
— Joshs
Plausible but vague and hard to do anything with. Something is gestured at. A Romantic poet might talk of the chains of rigid conceptuality scraping the incomputable flesh of a most elusive goddess. — jas0n
I think we both need to be careful to distinguish between body and 'symbolic' ego. At times I've preferred an 'external' view, watching bodies learn to emit the token 'I' appropriately. A body is trained to emit tokens interpreted as a self-description internal realm. A body is trained that such a narrative features a single protagonist. This perspective, admittedly one among others, takes 'culture'-coordinated bodies navigating a shared world as primary — jas0n
The body's interaction is always more intricate than language. It is after and with language, always again freshly ongoing and constellating this situation in the present.”
— Joshs
This may be so, and one can also go in the direction of 'art mysticism' and insist that concept is wrong way to grasp 'Reality' in the first place. On the other hand, it's a move away from a critical and exoteric inquiry/articulation and back into the darkness of intuition and the ineffable. I'm not immune to the charms of the aesthetic or even the mystical. As Nietzsche might say, it may be only those who are secretly sustained by 'dark forces' who can indulge in reckless and thorough criticism — jas0n
Heidegger, too. Heidegger describes the proposition ‘S is P’ as ‘seeing something as something’. He calls this the ‘as’ structure and it is the fundamental basis of perception, cognition , affectivity and theoretical knowledge. — Joshs
“...in interpretatively addressing something as something, one addresses the thing encountered against the background of a more or less explicit acquaintance with it: as a tool as suitable for this or that, etc.
The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act.” — Joshs
How does a body know what is emitted ‘appropriately’? Via social reinforcement , shaping, conditioning? — Joshs
How is it that each of us emit what is socially ‘appropriate’ in unique ways , with unique senses that doesn’t simply correspond to the ‘ norm’ but contributes its own variation on the ‘norm’? — Joshs
The world as a whole is entrained to the dynamics of the laws of thermodynamics. We exist both by and for our evolved ability to break down barriers to entropy production. So to understand the human situation, we must be able to place ourselves correctly in nature. We must start with the core or fundamental imperative that drives us, and thus shapes our sociocultural mindset, our generalised and collective view of the world. — apokrisis
…. it is quite possible to step back from the human condition and see the whole story laid out. — apokrisis
….It is only when you get down to this level of science-informed modelling that you can clearly diagnose where things have gone wrong for us.
The fourth level of modelling - the one based on numbers that wants to treat nature as a machine - isn't doing so well. Or it has over-performed on the entropy production, under-performed on the material recycling.
So for the scientist who understands the reality of organismic being, the inadequacies of the machine model, all this as plain as the nose on your face. — apokrisis
if philosophy was up to date, it would be presenting fine arguments about what it really means to be an organism - at the noosphere scale.
Instead, we have this stale nonsense - this warmed over Romanticism - about the human individual and the pluralistic struggle against totalising discourse. — apokrisis
Isn’t a social ‘norm’, ‘convention’, ‘shared practice’ merely an abstraction derived from what is in fact always ways of sense-making unique to individuals who particulate in those ‘shared’ spaces? — Joshs
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