That's how you shoot yourself in the foot, and why so many here don't take you seriously.
Such a self-deprecating remark as you make above is either a sample of false humility (which is offputting), or just a plain declaration of incompetence (which is also offputting). — baker
Amen! — 180 Proof
Kazantzakis — Wayfarer
Too far afield here and really a massive strawman. — Hanover
I'm arguing moral realism, asserting an actual right and wrong beyond the opinion of humans. — Hanover
We're not just flittering randomly over time regarding what is good and evil, but are getting closer to the truth. — Hanover
... assured by naturalism that the Universe has no inherent meaning, that the idea that life has a reason for existing is an anachronistic throwback to an ignorant age.
— Wayfarer
This a true of nihilism and – once again ↪180 Proof – not (moral) "naturalism". :roll: — 180 Proof
So, assuming moral truths are relative to society, the times, the culture, one's idiosyncratic upbringing and experiences, tell me why the rapist ought be judged wrong despite his view it is right? — Hanover
https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/404866/mod_resource/content/0/Hubert_L._Dreyfus_Being-in-the-World_A_Commentary_on_Heideggers_Being_and_Time%2C_Division_I.__1995.pdfFor both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, then, the source of the intelligibility of the world is the average public practices through which alone there can be any understanding at all. What is shared is not a conceptual scheme, i.e., not a belief system that can be made explicit and justified. Not that we share a belief system that is always implicit and arbitrary. That is just the Sartrean version of the same mistake. What we share is simply our average comportment. Once a practice has been explained by appealing to what one does, no more basic explanation is possible. As Wittgenstein puts it in On Certainty: "Giving grounds [must] come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.
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This view is entirely antithetical to the philosophical ideal of total clarity and ultimate intelligibility. Philosophers seek an ultimate ground. When they discover there is none, even modern philosophers like Sartre and Derrida seem to think that they have fallen into an abyss -- that the lack of an ultimate ground has catastrophic consequences for human activity.
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There is, however, something that average everyday intelligibility obscures, viz., that it is merely average everyday intelligibility. It takes for granted that the everyday for-the-sake-of-whichs and the equipment that serves them are based upon God's goodness, human nature, or at least solid good sense. This is what Heidegger called "the perhaps necessary appearance of foundation." One cannot help thinking that the right (healthy, civilized, rational, natural, etc.) way to sit, for example, is on chairs, at tables, etc., not on the floor. Our way seems to make intrinsic sense -- a sense not captured in saying, "This is what we in the West happen to do." What gets covered up in everyday understanding is not some deep intelligibility as the tradition has always held; it is that the ultimate "ground" of intelligibility is simply shared practices. There is no right interpretation. Average intelligibility is not inferior intelligibility; it simply obscures its own groundlessness. This is the last stage of the hermeneutics of suspicion. The only deep interpretation left is that there is no deep interpretation.
And if the truth is that some - many - terms are not definable in the way you suppose, you would pretend otherwise in order to retain your mythology? — Banno
People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts.Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. — Richard Polt, Anything but Human
That is, today's understanding of morality is superior to 500 years ago. We're not just flittering randomly over time regarding what is good and evil, but are getting closer to the truth. — Hanover
The contradiction is that we assured by naturalism that the Universe has no inherent meaning, that the idea that life has a reason for existing is an anachronistic throwback to an ignorant age. Whereas it was assumed by pre-modern philosophy that things exist for a reason and that the rational faculty is what enables us to grasp it. — Wayfarer
Nikos Kazantzakis (Greek: Νίκος Καζαντζάκης [ˈnikos kazanˈd͡zacis]; 2 March (OS 18 February) 1883[2] – 26 October 1957) was a Greek writer. Widely considered a giant of modern Greek literature, he was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature nine times.[3]
Kazantzakis' novels included Zorba the Greek (published 1946 as Life and Times of Alexis Zorbas), Christ Recrucified (1948), Captain Michalis (1950, translated Freedom or Death), and The Last Temptation of Christ (1955). He also wrote plays, travel books, memoirs and philosophical essays such as The Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises. His fame spread in the English-speaking world due to cinematic adaptations of Zorba the Greek (1964) and The Last Temptation of Christ (1988).
He translated also a number of notable works into Modern Greek, such as the Divine Comedy, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On the Origin of Species, the Iliad and the Odyssey.
While never claiming to be an atheist, his public questioning and critique of the most fundamental Christian values put him at odds with some in the Greek Orthodox church, and many of his critics.[16] Scholars theorize that Kazantzakis' difficult relationship with many members of the clergy, and the more religiously conservative literary critics, came from his questioning.
And since there are non-religious rituals, and religions that don't have specific rituals, ritual is not the essence of religion.
It shouldn't be surprising that after 5000 years of drastic change in world views, the word "religion" is hard to define. — frank
What does it mean to be a "Jew" if not performing some ritual?I describe myself as a non-ritualstic Jew. That doesn't mean my family won't gather for Passover Seder, but that has nothing to do with me thinking God will bless me for the event anymore than when your family might gather for your birthday. In truth, along with our matzoh, we color eggs on Passover, which isn't exact textbook haggadah. Is that ritual? — Hanover
... cognitive dissonance ...just a subjective preference just means we've arrived at an interesting coping mechanism in order to navigate this godless world. — Hanover
Well, (1) is wrong, for starters... — Banno
But it is probably too big a piece of work to productively argue about here. — Wayfarer
This? — Banno
It's a form of life — Banno
What does it mean to be a "Jew" if not performing some ritual — Harry Hindu
but I don't do it to celebrate the birth of some man that claimed to be the son of a god — Harry Hindu
Jesus never claims to be the son of God in the gospels. It's said of him (in Matthew, I think). — frank
He may not think he's god, but he definitely thinks he's god's gift. — ZzzoneiroCosm
He actually was pretty cool. — frank
Does the term "religion" refer to nothing? — Banno
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