We don't have a choice valuing well being. — Nickolasgaspar

So your claim now is that people do not make choices? Is that really where you would go?

You shouldn't view my comments as black and white.
People do make choices...but they don't choose what choices they have.
i.e. we don't choose to have a strong urge to avoid pain or suffering.

"Wellbeing" is fine; like "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" it covers much of what we do want. And yes, we do usually choose wellbeing.

Partly that's because what we call wellbeing is what we do indeed choose. There is at leat the threat of circularity in the notion of choosing wellbeing.

Partly it's because "wellbeing" is close to a synonym for "the good". That is there is also the threat of a slide between "we choose what is good" and "we choose wellbeing".

But it is not the whole of ethics. So for instance fairness enters into ethics as well. Consider “The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas” or "Brave New World".

So it's not that Sam Harris is wrong. It's just that his account is incomplete.

That's not a criticism of his account alone; I think it a more general issue. No moral system can be complete. Morality, and human choice and action more generally, are not the sort of thing that can be systematised. This should not be surprising, since it is clear that as soon as a system is posited, our creativity will find issue with it.

Maths provides a close analogue. We know that any mathematical system complex enough to encompass addition will be incomplete; there will always be mathematical truths that are not provable from within that system. Why would we suppose that ethics would be any less perplexing?

Any system that limits itself to how things are can never encompass how things ought to be.

If one were to posit that part of what we ought do is to seek wellbeing, I'd have no objection. But it is not the whole.

That's not a criticism of his account alone; I think it a more general issue. No moral system can be complete. Morality, and human choice and action more generally, are not the sort of thing that can be systematised. This should not be surprising, since it is clear that as soon as a system is posited, our creativity will find issue with it. — Banno

I think this may be the most important point to bear in mind when one is trying to 'solve' a problem that has preoccupied some of our greatest thinkers.

I suspect Harris was propelled by that question so beloved of fundamentalists - 'How can atheists have a morality if you don't believe in God?' In his earnest pursuit to provide a foundational basis to secular morality, I think he may well have overcompensated.

Maybe there are better arguments for objective morality that avoid the above pitfall, but I am fairly new to the topic so have only just started reading about it. — PhilosophyRunner

I'm telling you that you are mis-attributing "objectivity" here.

Again as I told you many times,those biological metrics only verify to us that well being is an important principle for morality — Nickolasgaspar

How do they do that? If those metrics are not themselves 'well-being', then you've got to somehow relate them to the concept of well-being you're using. You've still not actually defined well-being.

We don't need to scan people in order to do a moral evaluation...lol
The only thing we need to do is study those metrics, understand why well being is linked to those metrics(why i.e. forcing the productions of glucocorticoids by putting people under stressful situations(immoral acts) is linked to documented pathodology) and use well being as principle for our moral judgments. — Nickolasgaspar

Here's a quick stripped down version of how one would design an experiment in any field of human sciences. I want to find out, for example, if being in the dark raises stress levels. I have to decide

1. How am I going to measure stress levels and what time period after the exposure to dark am I going to count as a response?
2. How am I going to control for other factors which might raise stress whilst the subject is in the dark, to be sure it wasn't those factors causing my results?
3. How am I going to ensure that any results I get aren't an artefact of my statistical analysis, rather than an effect of the exposure?
4. How do I avoid expectation bias - in this case stress levels being raised simply because the subjects expect to be exposed to something that raises stress.
5. How am I going to show that the factor I measured and the response I measured (both quantifiable terms) actually relate to the qualitative experiences I'm claiming to investigate?
6. How is anyone going to practically make use of what I've found out - how does it translate to the field of practice I'm aiming it at?

You want to claim we can do this with morality. That we can show immoral acts (the dark in my example) cause a drop in well-being (rise in stress in my example).

Yet you've missed virtually every step.

1. You've not said how well-being will be measured, nor at what timescale after the putative immoral act.
2. You've not said how you would work out that the act being tested would be isolated from all the other possible causes of a drop in well-being so as to show that this act (and not just a coincidence of confounding factors) caused the observed drop in well-being.
3. You've not provided any information at all on the statistical methods.
4. You've not said how to avoid the expectation bias in cultural ascriptions of acts as immoral and the accompanying expectation that they would affect well-being somehow
5. You've not related your measures to what we call 'well-being', nor what we call an 'act'. Nor have you taken into account any reinforcement feedback that might arise from those definitions
6. You've not answered@Banno's question about how you go from your results to any compulsion to act in the target audience (presumably those on the horns of a moral dilemma).

Answer issues 1-6 (although you can do as I do and just get a friendly statistician to do 3 for you!). Then we can see how your theory holds up.

How do they do that? If those metrics are not themselves 'well-being', then you've got to somehow relate them to the concept of well-being you're using. You've still not actually defined well-being. — Isaac

Well being is a state which encompasses many different elements like positive emotions, good physical health and social connections. We can list all the emotions and characteristics that promote such a state and trace them back to our basic drives and homeostatic configurations and see that we are biologically preconditioned to seek a state of well being.

Well I haven't missed any step because none of you have admitted yet that you value well being as the main reason why we are positive towards moral acts and negative towards immoral acts.
If you do then we can take examples of acts and answer all the steps you list.
Unfortunately in that list you are repeating things that I have pointed out as unnecessary.
Again we need those metrics to establish biological predisposition towards a state of well being. From the moment we do that we can accept well being as an objective criterion for moral judgments.
The acts that promote our well being are moral, those against are immoral.

IF we agree with that last thing, then we can proceed on the temporal framework of our judgments since every act can affect differently our wellbeing as individuals and as a society.
Again Banno's question (is/ought) is irrelevant since we have already pointed out that biological predisposition to a specific state is not a matter of choice. We are the descendants of individuals with a genetic predisposition to seek happiness, physical health and avoid suffering.

Partly that's because what we call wellbeing is what we do indeed choose. There is at leat the threat of circularity in the notion of choosing wellbeing. — Banno

Well our biological setup and markers dictate the preferable state and we reason afterwards. This is a fact that makes the concept of "free will" a bit shaky.

Partly it's because "wellbeing" is close to a synonym for "the good". That is there is also the threat of a slide between "we choose what is good" and "we choose wellbeing". — Banno

-Well being is a state while "choosing" what is good for our wellbeing is a different thing all together. This is where our role as agents is needed in order to evaluate what is good for our well being.
We need to understand whether an act is good for everyone so that it wont come back as a boomerang on our well being.
Our well being is contingent to our society's well being.
i.e. we can not promote our well being for ever by steal people's money. Our act is hurting other people's well being and they will act against us(put us in jail). So its important to understand how the well being of our society is linked to our moral evaluations.
Doing the good thing is what promotes our well being. We might have to choose what good thing to do but we don't choose the importance and connection of well being to our moral acts.

But it is not the whole of ethics. So for instance fairness enters into ethics as well. — Banno

Fairness is a value we see in moral acts. Fairness is a promoter of well being of a society.

So it's not that Sam Harris is wrong. It's just that his account is incomplete. — Banno

-How is incomplete?Fairness is not a competing principle. Its an evaluation of specific moral acts that can promote our well being!

No moral system can be complete. Morality, and human choice and action more generally, are not the sort of thing that can be systematised. This should not be surprising, since it is clear that as soon as a system is posited, our creativity will find issue with it. — Banno

I can not agree or disagree with an absolute statement without putting in to the test all known systems
and prove their incompleteness.
There are huge difficulties in their applicability but the point isn't to just prove their incompleteness but which one allow objective moral judgments.
The argument for systematicity but objectivity. We can arrive to objective moral judgements if we acknowledge an objective principle by which we can evaluate which acts are in favor or against it.
Will we find grey zones and inadequate data for many cases? Sure.
But we will be able to answer many of our moral questions and dilemmas .

Maths provides a close analogue. We know that any mathematical system complex enough to encompass addition will be incomplete; there will always be mathematical truths that are not provable from within that system. Why would we suppose that ethics would be any less perplexing? — Banno

-We need to remove absolute concepts from our reality. Absolute concepts are only there as beacons to help up strive toward a goal, but it would be irrational to think that we can finally arrive to an abstract or to abandon all efforts because we can't.
Identifying which acts affect the well being of a society and all its members is a good rule of thumb that we can build on.

Any system that limits itself to how things are can never encompass how things ought to be. — Banno

-And again you return back to this deepity that has nothing to do with how our biology forces specific "oughts". Its not our choice to decide which acts promote our well being, that is already decided by our biology. Our job is to decide whether we care about well being and whether we bother to act accordingly.

If one were to posit that part of what we ought do is to seek wellbeing, I'd have no objection. But it is not the whole. — Banno

The correct question is do we ought to seek morality? The question is simple. Since our biology forces us to value our well being ...THEN WE OUGHT TO SEEK MORALITY because our moral judgments essentially are the evaluation of acts that are either against or in favor our well being.

PhilosophyRunner, the brief answer to your question is, reality is objective, not subjective. In order for humans to survive and have a moral life, their philosophy must be based upon objective reality and it's demands. Or, to paraphrase a slogan, "science doesn't care how you feel about it".
Do your words and actions support survival, or impede it, that is the criterion.
The essay "Philosophy: Who Needs It?" by Ayn Rand states this better than I can.

PhilosophyRunner, you state, "...coming from a science background" about yourself.

This causes me to wonder about your education. I have no formal education, so no knowledge of how schools are designed. I was under the impression that a person with a major in the hard sciences was still required to take several courses in the humanities in order to graduate.

That raises the question: Which of the humanities do architects, physicists, engineers, programmers, chemists, etc. most require to live good lives, to have a complete education? Do schools at least require all freshman to take classes in logic, learn how to recognize and refute logical fallacies, regardless of their major?

I think that some of the persons involved in the Manhattan Project devoted all their brainpower yet never exercised their moral consciences until after that genie was out of the bottle. I expect plenty of contemporary scientists say what many former Nazis did after WW2. "I was only following orders".....or perhaps, "If I don't build it, I'll get fired and someone else will build it anyway"
I am not a Marxist, but I think that Marx referred to the worker under capitalism as being "alienated" from the product of his labor. Not just that his work doesn't give him a fulfilling life, but that it makes him callous and apathetic in general, with no moral conscience.

Of course, I'm not advocating a technocracy. Far too many "known scientific facts" have been overturned after years of blind adhesion and indoctrination in precedent for me to have any confidence in just scientists running government.

Well being is a state which encompasses many different elements like positive emotions, good physical health and social connections. We can list all the emotions and characteristics that promote such a state — Nickolasgaspar

Go on then...

we are biologically preconditioned to seek a state of well being. — Nickolasgaspar

Tautologous. If our well-being is constituted of those aspects which we are driven to maintain then it says nothing that we a biologically preconditions to seek them. You just defined them as those things we're biologically preconditioned to seek.

none of you have admitted yet that you value well being as the main reason why we are positive towards moral acts and negative towards immoral acts. — Nickolasgaspar

Because you've not defined 'well-being' yet, so we can hardly be expected to admit that we value it.

Unfortunately in that list you are repeating things that I have pointed out as unnecessary. — Nickolasgaspar

That would be because I disagree with your assessment that they're unnecessary.

we need those metrics to establish biological predisposition towards a state of well being. From the moment we do that we can accept well being as an objective criterion for moral judgments. — Nickolasgaspar

Doesn't follow at all. We establish that we are predisposed to a state of well-being. We can accept well-being as a criterion for moral judgements (though we need not - we could just as well accept hair colour as the criterion - nothing about being biologically predisposed toward a thing compels us to accept it as the goal of morality).

IF we agree with that last thing, then we can proceed on the temporal framework of our judgments since every act can affect differently our wellbeing as individuals and as a society. — Nickolasgaspar

Indeed. If we can accept 'air pressure', or 'tidal range', or 'fringe length' as an objective criterion for moral judgments then we can then go on judge the effect of acts on these criteria. The trouble is, we don't.

Again Banno's question (is/ought) is irrelevant since we have already pointed out that biological predisposition to a specific state is not a matter of choice. We are the descendants of individuals with a genetic predisposition to seek happiness, physical health and avoid suffering. — Nickolasgaspar

And @Banno has pointed out that it simply being one of our predispositions doesn't progress in any way toward the decision to choose it from others.

It's really simple. You have two scenarios

1. We will always choose the course of which maximises everyone's well-being

or

2. We will sometimes not choose the course of action which maximises everyone's well-being

In the case of (1) you have no moral dilemmas, no-one will ever act in any other way than the most moral anyway. In the case of (2) you have a choice and so you need to give reasons for choosing the course of action which maximises everyone's well-being over the alternative.

Tautologous. If our well-being is constituted of those aspects which we are driven to maintain then it says nothing that we a biologically preconditions to seek them. You just defined them as those things we're biologically preconditioned to seek — Isaac

-...for goodness sake!!! Do you even read what you write????
-"If our well-being is constituted of those aspects which we are driven to maintain then it says nothing that we a biologically preconditions to seek them. "
Why do you post a sentence that argues with itself?????
Our biology drives our acts to maintain our well being.
i.e. We are working under the sun during summer. We are dehydrated. DO we choose whether hydrating our organism is a good thing for our well being?No, Our biology drives our emotion of thirst, which we reason in to "I need to drink water". SO our organism VALUES our well being and drives our actions to maintain it. We can agree that if it didn't we wouldn't be talking about us being well...or being in the first place. We would be dry up dead.
Now if our action purposely prevents a dehydrated individual to have access to drinking water, we undermine his well being so we are committing an immoral act.

So I will stop here in order to let this sink in. Do you understand why this isn't a tautology but it describes what our biology "values" (drives serving our well being) and how that informs what we value.(moral judgements).

Do you understand why this isn't a tautology but it describes what our biology "values" (drives serving our well being) and how that informs what we value.(moral judgements). — Nickolasgaspar

"Our biology values that which our biology values" is a tautology. To avoid the tautology you'd have to define well-being in terms other than 'that which our biology values'. Something you've yet to do.

Before the questions of ethics can be accurately answered, before moral and political rules can be established, the questions of ontology and epistemology have to be answered.

If reality is objective, not subjective, and men are capable of perceiving it, the rest follows logically.
This is better expressed in the essay "Philosophy: Who Needs It?" by Rand.

The actual statement was we don't choose what our biology "values" or strives. Why is this so difficult for you?
Do you choose to enjoy a naked flame scorching your skin? Do you value the state you are after being burned?
Do you enjoy the emotions produced by an open wound, being starved, being humiliated etc etc etc etc etc etc.
Do you really feel you have a choice on deciding one day to enjoy all the above emotions?
So all those emotions help you avoid states that do not contribute to your well being (feeling comfortable, happy, free of pain, being valued by your peers, physically healthy etc).

Listen I have to repeat the same things to every single one of you who came with those nonsensical objections. I use a pretty common usage of the term "well being". From what I see in a quick google search there are not many common usages...there is just one. All refer to health,happiness and prosperity whether we are looking things from a Physical, emotional/psychological, social, intellectual or economical aspect.

I never defined well being 'that which our biology values'. I am allergic to the term "that which".
I only pointed out the fact that its not our choice to value well being or not . ITs what our biology dictates to us.

Your arguments appear like saying ' in order to talk about modern historical events we need to understand how our solar system was formed."
Whatever the ultimate nature of reality is ....its irrelevant to how we can arrive to objective moral judgments.
Whether humans can perceive the ultimate nature of reality is irrelevant to objective standards we need to or any moral evaluation.

We must follow the example of Methodological Naturalism and the reasonable Acknowledge that we have to work with what is available to us. Since we can verify Empirical Regularities we can establish frameworks that can describe phenomena within the limits of our observations.

I did not have to take any humanities modules for my degree (done in the UK, so not major and minor). We had a brief introduction to ethics at the very start, but given that it did not count towards our marks, not many paid attention. It is only recently that I have started to appreciate philosophy.

I haven't read "Philosophy: Who Needs It?" but just read a summary of it.

You say If reality is objective, men are capable of perceiving it. Yes, I have no problems with this. I can strive to objectively perceive the human species, I agree.

The problem is then saying that reality is wrong, and should be different. There is certainly no scientific method for saying the observed empirical is wrong, and the counter factual ought to happen, so science can't be the answer. I'm struggling to find a philosophical way to justify the same, perhaps you have some suggestions?

I certainly have a sense of morality, but is it subjective or objective? that is the question I am trying to answer.

I may well be using the term objectively loosely. I am cognisant that I may be using some philosophical terms loosely, which is why I have tried to state my positions verbosely rather than using label.

So here is the conundrum I'm trying to solve:

-I think X is morally correct.
-You think X is morally wrong

Is there a "fact of the matter" that we can strive to discover about this? Or is each correct for themselves?

Do you choose to enjoy a naked flame scorching your skin? Do you value the state you are after being burned? — Nickolasgaspar

I don't. Some people do.

Do you enjoy the emotions produced by an open wound, being starved, being humiliated etc etc etc etc etc etc. — Nickolasgaspar

Again, some do.

all those emotions help you avoid states that do not contribute to your well being (feeling comfortable, happy, free of pain, being valued by your peers, physically healthy etc). — Nickolasgaspar

You've yet to demonstrate that. Comfortable and free of pain I'll grant as being self-evident since such emotions are directly about comfort or pain, but where's your evidence that following such emotions leads to happiness, physical health and being valued by ones peers?

Sure there are...are they for a long time with us?

You've yet to demonstrate that. Comfortable and free of pain I'll grant as being self-evident since such emotions are directly about comfort or pain, but where's your evidence that following such emotions leads to happiness, physical health and being valued by ones peers? — Isaac

-what emotions????? Dude you also need to do your homework, its not my job to explain to you why the pain of an open wound informs you for a crisis your physical health is experiencing and how it is connected to you being "well" and being able to ...continue to be.
Your biology makes it best to force you to care as an agent for your well being.
No oughts or musts.....just ISes.

ITs a fact that our biology "cares" about its well being and forces us to take actions by interpreting urgent issues with intense emotions.
You are just here to deny everything just from pure ego. I am bored addressing stupid objections.....seriously!

its not my job to explain to you why the pain of an open wound informs you for a crisis your physical health is experiencing and how it is connected to you being "well" and being able to ...continue to be. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not asking you to explain it, I'm informing you that you're mistaken.

ITs a fact that our biology "cares" about its well being and forces us to take actions by interpreting urgent issues with intense emotions. — Nickolasgaspar

Yes this is true. And this biology that "cares" about its well being and forces us to take actions results in friendships and murder, among many other things.

How do you go from that to prescriptive morality? By which I mean telling a murderer what they did was wrong, and people in that situation should not commit murder in the future.

If you are sticking to science, then seeing a murder should result in you update your theory of human behaviour to include murder as part of biology that "cares about well being.". Is that what you do, or do you say "murder is wrong"?

Is there a "fact of the matter" that we can strive to discover about this? Or is each correct for themselves? — PhilosophyRunner

It isn't facts that you should be enforcing -- although it is part of everyone's argument: Fact: you killed my dog. But now comes the measure of the immorality of that act. And so on. We can now get to the issue of morality. Discuss it.

What you're supposed to be thinking of is to optimize the goodness (note I didn't say maximize). Optimize the goodness or the favorable outcome of moral acts.

What you're supposed to thinking of is to optimize the goodness (note I didn't say maximize). Optimize the goodness or the favorable outcome of moral acts. — L'éléphant

And what is goodness?

What is a favourable outcome?

And what are your justifications for saying we are supposed to think of optimising goodness? Why are we supposed to do anything in the first place?

And what is goodness?

What is a favourable outcome? — PhilosophyRunner

That's your job to figure out.

That's your job to figure out. — L'éléphant

And what if I come to a different conclusion to you, on what is good? My previous question could be re-written as

I think X optimises goodness
You think X does not optimise goodness

Are we both correct? Is one wrong and the other right?

Or even the following:

I think we should optimise happiness
You think we should optimise goodness

Are we both correct? Is one wrong and the other right?

There is no such thing as a greater good in a empirical sense, only a good that is greater than another good, in which case it is a greater good in a semi-logical sense. Good is moral-equality, any evil subtracts from this equality making it determinable on the moral-net.

There is no such thing as a greater evil, only solipsist. There is evil which is stupidity by good and solipsist which is stupidity by self as if all next moves would be evil.

Morality is always absolute, but in primal times there may be a mistake third party in a special episode of misunderstood goodlessness.

Yes this is true. And this biology that "cares" about its well being and forces us to take actions results in friendships and murder, among many other things.

How do you go from that to prescriptive morality? By which I mean telling a murderer what they did was wrong, and people in that situation should not commit murder in the future.

If you are sticking to science, then seeing a murder should result in you update your theory of human behaviour to include murder as part of biology that "cares about well being.". Is that what you do, or do you say "murder is wrong"? — PhilosophyRunner

"Murder" is a legal term. We use many terms to label the act of "killing" other humans and they depend on the situation. So your example already refers to an "immoral" act.
Murder is immoral.
Killing other people can be moral. (self defense, protecting your others or your country etc).
This is situational ethics.

I'm not asking you to explain it, I'm informing you that you're mistaken. — Isaac

If you have painkillers in your drawer...then you know that I am not mistaken....

Morality is absolutely ridiculous and silly. End of story :D

Imperfectly analogous, (for an ethical naturalist (à la Foot, Parfit, Nussbaum, Spinoza, Epicurus, et al) like myself) ethics is like linguistics and thereby moralities are like languages and correspondingly 'moral beliefs' (local customs) and like 'dialects' (idioms, clichés). We are an eusocial and metacognitive natural (ecology-situated) species and ethics, it seems to me, concerns individuals-in-groups flourishing by adaptive (coordinating) conduct and (cooperative) relationships despite our natural constraints (i.e. species defects). So not "absolute" – rules without exceptions, or unconditional norms – but objective, or more-than-intersubjective. — 180 Proof

:up:

We know what to do, but our nature gets in the way! Ethics is reason's struggle against, loosely speaking, unreason (not passion).