It depends on how you define "ideas." I will stick with my answer as written for now.

If you say it is real apart from those appearances, then you have to be able to see it apart from any experience of it, as it is 'in itself'. That is what is at issue. — Wayfarer

This is incorrect. We don't say of things only what we can "see". We infer that objects are real apart from their appearances, because it is necessary for them to be so in order for us to be able to see and refer to the same things, form one person and one minute to the next.

As far as we know there is no causal connection between your seeing of an object and any one else's seeing of an object. I might die, for example, but all the particular objects in the kitchen will still be there just the same for my family. Or, as our everyday experience make it seem obvious, if the whole family moves away and leaves the house with all its contents behind; anyone coming into the house will see just that unique set of contents and no other.

Or, for another example, say you lost your mobile phone in the bush. If anyone finds years later they will be able to identify it as an iPhone, or whether brand and model it is. They will be able to read its serial number and that number will not have changed. Do you believe that? If that is so then how could the stability of its identity and serial number remained invariant absent its being seen by anyone if they were dependent on human perception?

We cannot even begin to imagine how perceptual and cognitive faculties could determine the content of experience. That it is reasonable to infer that they do determine the form of experience is not at issue. I think this is the distinction you are not seeing, or at least failing to deal with. Kant saw that his arguments in the CPR did offer any explanation for the content of experience, and that is why he later ( according to Beth Lord) changed his mind and became a transcendental realist.

Or what? What is the penalty of their not being 'transcendentally real'? What if they are 'consistent appearances'? — Wayfarer

If they are "consistent appearances" they would still qualify as being transcendentally real, because the consistency of their appearance is obviously, it certainly seems, not dependent on anyone's perception or experience.

If they are "consistent appearances" they would still qualify as being transcendentally real, because the consistency of their appearance is obviously, it certainly seems, not dependent on anyone's perception or experience. — John

All appearance depend on perception.

I can see where our disagreement is. You're simply saying, look, I close my eyes, or die, or whatever, and the whole universe doesn't simply vanish.

Basically it is the same objection as Samuel Johnson's to Berkeley:

After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, 'I refute it thus.

Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson

All appearance depend on perception. — Wayfarer

You are conflating two ideas: the correct (by definition) idea that all appearances are correlated with perceptions, with the incorrect idea that the consistency of appearances depends (entirely) on perception. There also seems to be a conflation of acts of perception with the 'machinery' of perception.

Attempting to dismiss my arguments by equating them with Johnson's unargued 'refutation' is too cheap.

If you think the consistency of appearances can be exhaustively explained in terms of human perception, then please present an explanation.

Interestingly, Berkeley recognized this problem and the lynchpin of his position that "esse est percipi" is that the consistency of appearances is due to their objects being held in God's mind. This is equivalent to objects being created by God, and if this were the case then the objects would still be transcendentally real insofar as they would be independent of human perception.

You do indeed have a very valid point. But time was out of the question. — DebateTheBait

I think time is very relevant. The reason why one side of the tree is a different perspective from the other side of the tree, as stated in the op, is that the observer cannot be at both sides of the tree, at the same time. That's what defines it as a different perspective. So when the op is referring to different perspectives, what is being referred to is different places, which is determined as where the same observer cannot be at the same time.

So I think my point remains as relevant. If an observer could be at both sides of the tree, at the same time, this individual could confirm that it is the same tree being observed, knowing that no time has passed between the observation at point A, and the observation at point B, observing from both perspectives at the very same moment. Therefore no changes could possibly have occurred to the tree between the observation at point A and the observation at point B, and it is confirmed as the same tree.

Attempting to dismiss my arguments by equating them with Johnson's unargued 'refutation' is too cheap. — John

No, it isn't. It is exactly what you've been arguing. It's not a pejorative comparison. I would say the vast majority of people agree with Johnson.

Berkeley recognized this problem and the lynchpin of his position that "esse est percipi" is that the consistency of appearances is due to their objects being held in God's mind. This is equivalent to objects being created by God, and if this were the case then the objects would still be transcendentally real insofar as they would be independent of human perception. — John

'Being perceived by God', I would have thought it better expressed. In any case, that is one of the facets of Berkeley's philosophy that I don't think I understand, or at any rate don't agree with.

You are conflating two ideas: the correct (by definition) idea that all appearances are correlated with perceptions, with the incorrect idea that the consistency of appearances depends (entirely) on perception. — John

My argument is always that what we take to be real has an irreducibly subjective element, i.e. there are no objects that exist 'sui generis', in their own right, independently of cognition. Per Kant, I think space and time themselves are in some real sense subjectively constructed.

No, it isn't. It is exactly what you've been arguing. It's not a pejorative comparison. I would say the vast majority of people agree with Johnson. — Wayfarer

Again, Johnson's "refutation" is not an argument. The opinion that the vast majority of people agree with Johnston is not relevant to the argument and is not an argument for or against, either. If anything, if it is true, it might support an argument that people think that objects simply persist because it is in accordance with all of their experience, and it is the simplest explanation for the consistency of appearances. You have no way of knowing that objects do not simply persist independently of human perception (whatever the metaphysical explanation for that might be). So, if you want to reject it you need to come up with a more convincing alternative.

'Being perceived by God', I would have thought it better expressed. In any case, that is one of the facets of Berkeley's philosophy that I don't think I understand, or at any rate don't agree with. — Wayfarer

If you don't agree with that "facet" then you don't agree with Berkeley's philosophy, period. As I said, it is the lynchpin and without it his philosophy loses all force of explanation and persuasion. A metaphysics needs to explain our everyday common experience, not deny it.

My argument is always that what we take to be real has an irreducibly subjective element, i.e. there are no objects that exist 'sui generis', in their own right, independently of cognition. Per Kant, I think space and time themselves are in some real sense subjectively constructed. — Wayfarer

But, can't you see that this is just an opinion, and not an argument at all?

To be honest, I am losing interest since you seem to be unable, or at least unwilling, to present anything but reiterated assertions.

I am losing interest since you seem to be unable, or at least unwilling, to present anything but reiterated assertions. — John

The fact that 'what we take to be real has an irreducibly subjective element' is not mere assertion, it builds on the argument in this thread.

In any case, and yet again, I am arguing against the implicit assumption of the 'mind-independent' nature of reality, that the Universe exists, in the way that we understand it, absent our observation of it. This doesn't mean that, absent our observation, there is no universe, but that the kind of existence, if any, that it has, absent the organising capabilities provided by the mind, is completely unknowable and incoherent. It's part of a coherent argument, which you continue to call 'irrelevant' or 'a strawman', or regard as a personal slight. So you accuse me of 'distorting' what you say, whilst persistently misrepresenting what I say. Maybe it is time to quit!

If you don't agree with that "facet" then you don't agree with Berkeley's philosophy, period. As I said, it is the lynchpin and without it his philosophy loses all force of explanation and persuasion — John

There are aspects of Berkeley's philosophy I accept, and aspects that I don’t. I suppose I should read his account of what ‘perceived by God’ means again, but I solve the problem another way altogether. This is that human consciousness – what we know of the world – is collective. We agree inter-subjectively on all of those aspects of experience which are proven to be regular - which is what scientific laws and numerical analyses describe. All of those aspects of experience can serve as the basis for scientific prediction, without thereby agreeing that the objects of scientific analysis are ‘mind-independent’ or ‘self-existent’.

There’s a physicist by the name of Richard Conn Henry who reached a very Berkeleyian view of science purely and simply through physics itself. He put a cat amongst the pidgeons by publishing an opinion piece in Nature – Nature! - called ‘This Mental Universe’. It’s well worth reading in this context, as it is, as I say, very like Berkeley, sans reference to God.

The fact that 'what we take to be real has an irreducibly subjective element' is not mere assertion, it builds on the entire thread. — Wayfarer

Our taking something to be real has an irreducibly subjective element. But that which we take to be real does not necessarily have any element of human subjectivity in it. For example, we take the existence of the Dinosaurs to have been real, and since humans did not yet exist, there could have been no human subjective element in that purported reality.

In any case, and yet again, I am arguing against the implicit assumption of the 'mind-independent' nature of reality, that the Universe exists, in the way that we understand it, absent our observation of it. This doesn't mean that, absent our observation, there is no universe, but that the kind of existence, if any, that it has, absent the organising capabilities provided by the mind, is completely unknowable and incoherent. It's part of a coherent argument, which you continue to call 'irrelevant' or 'a strawman', or as a personal slight. So you accuse me of 'distorting' what you say, whilst persistently misrepresenting what I say. Maybe it is time to quit!

I agree with you that the kind of existence the Universe has in itself is indeterminate, but that does not mean it is not real. If it has any existence at all, whether as aggregations of energy, or thoughts in God's mind, or in a collective 'world soul' or whatever, then that existence must be real, otherwise it would not be an existence at all, but a fiction. Also it seems that the order we find in the world is not merely the product of our minds (although it is also that) but the product of something transcendental to our minds. Our minds themselves must be products of something transcendental to them; otherwise they would be totally transparent to us.

And nothing I have said is intended as a "personal slight"; I argue against and attempt to refute and reject ideas, not people.

I'll take a look at the paper you recommended when I get some time and tell you what I think of it, but I will say this in anticipation; I doubt the paper will argue that the universe is a product of human mentality; but rather that consciousness or mind or thought or experience is somehow inherent in reality; and I have no issue with this idea at all.

But it seems it must be a problem for you, though. I suppose when you go home at night you greet a different companion each time. I wonder how it is that you are able to recognize your wife, since she is never the same person from one day, or even one minute, to the next.

But it seems it must be a problem for you, though. I suppose when you go home at night you greet a different companion each time. — John

It's no problem for me. I accept change as real. I expect that all my acquaintances will be different each time I meet them. This helps me in my efforts to remain stoic. Without this expectation, some of these differences might upset me.

I wonder how it is that you are able to recognize your wife, since she is never the same person from one day, or even one minute, to the next. — John

As I said earlier, in response to wayfarer's quote from Kant, there is an assumed continuity which allows us to say that a person remains the same person. I derive this idea continuity directly from my experience of self-consciousness, as Kant described in that quote. The problem which I described is that this idea of continuity is derived only from my living experiences, such as memory, so I cannot justify assigning continuity to non-living, inanimate matter. I can project this continuity towards other human beings, and living creatures, assume that they continue to be "the same" being through experiences like memories, because they're alive just like me, but to extend this to inanimate matter is unjustified. That's the point I made, the continuity of existence of matter is an assumption which is unjustified.

It depends on how you define "ideas." I will stick with my answer as written for now. — aletheist

You said "reasonable inferences." I'm not trying to advance a thesis here. I'm asking. Do you picture reasonable inferences as something other than a sort of processing or manipulation of ideas?

Apologies if I seem evasive, but I am not in the right frame of mind to delve into this any deeper at the moment. Perhaps another time.

Cool.

As I said earlier, in response to wayfarer's quote from Kant, there is an assumed continuity which allows us to say that a person remains the same person. — Metaphysician Undercover

What allows you to say the tree in your backyard is the same tree? Or, if you count the tree as a "living creature", then what allows you to say the mountain you can see out of your kitchen window every morning as you eat you breakfast is the same mountain, as opposed to any other mountain, each time you see it as it was all the other times you have seen it?