It would still be bishop....badly moved! The piece has a physical form that informs us of our obligations when moving it. But I get Yours and Searl's point.And they are deontic. Each implies an obligation. Someone might move the bishop along a row, but it would no longer be a Bishop. — Banno
I don't think we can identify something without distinguishing it from what it's not, and even then the same thing could be identified differently depending on the context of the thing. An O could be a letter in the alphabet or an O in tic tac toe, for example. — praxis
As soon as the game starts I am annoyed that they have broken their promise to use the bishop correctly. The question is, why do I believe that the other person is under a duty and obligation to follow my understanding of the game. I could argue that the majority agree with me that the bishop moves diagonally and therefore the other person must have a duty and obligation to follow the majority. — RussellA
I am sure that Searle is correct when he says that the test of a social institution is whether it has deontic power in establishing duties and obligations on others. These deontic powers can only come from its own members, whether an elite minority or a heterogeneous majority. One further question to ask is how does one set of members gain deontic power over others of differing opinions. A further question is once having gained such deontic powers, how do they keep them.
Duty and obligation may be admirable, but surely not at the expense of the tyranny of a small elite or a heterogeneous majority.
If the other person is using the same words as I do, but defining them in different ways, I may be mistaken in thinking that they have made me a promise, and should not be surprised if they break what I think are their obligations. — RussellA
Custom is a form of law. — Tobias
It may be that what must be added to the conversation are those status functions that we needs must accept in order that our conversation also acts upon the world and the body politic. So some parts of the conversation count as actions and implementations as we do things with words.Justice is not a conversation, otherwise we would at an impasse though, we just scream yes and no to each other. — Tobias
Institutional fact: you co-opt ideas from sources and then puke links to said sources onto a thread and pretend it's you taking a position on something you would have people believe is philosophy--that is, when you're not hopping on someone else's thread to puke ad hominems and abysmally misguided proclamations of "fact" (fiction).
Hey, thumbs up. — whollyrolling
I think this the wrong way around, but the point is moot. — Banno
It may be that what must be added to the conversation are those status functions that we needs must accept in order that our conversation also acts upon the world and the body politic. So some parts of the conversation count as actions and implementations as we do things with words. — Banno
The point is that what you - and Searle - would like to restrict to a class of facts holds for all facts, in fact all language use, and that the distinction between 'intuitional' and 'non-institutional' is arbitrary and unrigorous. — StreetlightX
the game of the US constitution cannot continue if a small group of folk storm the Capitol Building — Banno
You do not have to worry about the rules of the game of chess yourself. It has been codified for you — Tobias
[Searle's] distinction between institutional and non-institutional facts, and which things are institutional and non-institutional facts, is one that holds within the framework of an existing language with existing rules and existing meanings that he will accept is a human institution. — Michael
An object becoming a bishop or a combination of letters becoming a word are historical events — RussellA
In social cnstructivism this is known as the debate between radical and moderate social constructivism. To me the latter seems incoherent, because what is considered ' non institutional' is itself a product of social construction. Especially in the English tradition there have been distinctions between primary and secondary qualities between essential and non essential properties etc and now between institutional and non institutional facts of which I do not see the point. There might be good arguments for making the distinctions that we make, such as between wood and lead, but those ddistinctions rests on them being commonly accepted. In the end the inspiration for the distinction will probably be bodily. Wood is just easier for us to lift. Chess pieces made of lead weigh a ton. So we decided it was useful ot distinguish between the two materials on some ground, lately their chemical make up I guess. That does not make them any less socially constructed though. — Tobias
I feel like Daniel thrown into the lion's den. — RussellA
Unfortunately, I have to leave this game of philosophy, as we are about to get underway for Las Vegas to play a different kind of game. — RussellA
If I might interject, and @Michael may disagree, but it seems to me that this is where @StreetlightX's point comes into play; for us there can be no outside the framework. There's nothing can be said about wood or lead without using words, and so one is always already in the framework, so to speak.Does it hold outside of such a framework? Are there institutional facts outside of such a framework? — bongo fury
Is there in the modern day? Isn't the source of law not still based on custom and habit? Good habits, bad custom? Be it custom of conduct and behavior, or habit of thought? — Hillary
3) There are those obligatory games such as society where the person need make no promise to follow the rules are they are obliged to follow the rules and are committed to what they ought to do.
Unfortunately, I have to leave this game of philosophy, as we are about to get underway for Las Vegas to play a different kind of game — RussellA
No. It is also based on case law, codified law, treaties and some say legal principles, but that is debated. I know you mean something deeper with your question, but that to me, as the lawyer I am now in this discussion, is meaningles. the source thesis is also a technical aspect of and within law. — Tobias
I see an ambiguity here that seems odd. On the one hand you have that there is no point in distinguishing institutional from non-institutional facts; on the other that "Wood is just easier to lift!".
This should be a very minor point, on that we can agree. Yes, "...we decided it was useful to distinguish between the two materials on some ground", but e can only do this because they are different. — Banno
Perhaps it will be clear if I say that that difference is marked by, but not found in, those materials. That we can make the distinction shows that the distinction is there to be made — Banno
Or here: Someone who insists that lead is less dense than wood is mistaken, either in their perception of the world or in their use of words. — Banno
It is also based on case law, codified law, treaties and some say legal principles, but that is debated — Tobias
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