The funny thing is that people think they have made some agreement with society. They have not. They are simply thrown in. — Tobias

Yes!

They are different only because we decided that this difference merrited a distinction. — Tobias

They are different because we decide the difference merits the distinction. Ipso facto there is a difference for which we might make that distinction.

Some distinctions work; others do not. And to"work" here is to fit in with our form of life. Hence the dual direction of fit of a declarative utterance. We make the words fit the world, and we also make the world fit the words. We know what wood is by cutting, carving, burning and talking about, wood. We know what lead is by melting, folding, feeling, and talking about lead. We cannot melt, fold, or feel wood. That we decided there was a distinction of merit is because there was indeed a distinction of merit.

.

Well, I asked if modern day law is not based on habit and custom just as well. You replied it's based on case law, codyfied law, treatise, and legal principles. So law is based on codified law? Isn't that circular? — Hillary

No, because the word law in English is used in a dual connotation. It denotes the whole body of law, the legal institution, but it also denotes a certain codified piece of text, a certain law. In Dutch and German the distinction is much clearer. They make a difference between 'Gesetz' (Gr) or 'wet' (NL) and 'Recht' (NL GR), the latter denotes the legal institution, the former a particular written text with binding legal force.

Texts issued according to the proper legal procedures count as a source of law because they creates binding rights and duties an aspire to legitimacy, that is, they are meant for legal professionals and the populace to adhere to, often under threat of some penalty.

I think what you mean is whether ultimately the sources of law depend on custom and habit. I would say partly. They also depend on power. Not all law is an articulation of a prior habit. Some laws (texts) also mandate a certain behaviour to create such a habit. For instance the obligation to wear seat belts, or to drive on the right hand or left hand lane.

They are different because we decide the difference merits the distinction. Ipso facto there is a difference for which we might make that distinction. — Banno

For me that whole question is so odd to comprehend. Ipso facto there will be a difference between the bread you eat in the morning and that I do, even if it would so happen that we eat the same kind of bread, Yet yours will have slightly different ingredients than mine, more sugar, more grain, baked harder or what have you. Still we would say, "hey, what a coincidence, we eat the same kind of bread". The reason is we do not notice any difference, which might, ipso facto still be there. That would mean all our distinctions are not dependent on the matter in re, but on our finding some sort of importance in articulating it. Whether the bread is really really different or the same is a question of metaphysics that I think is pointless.

We make the words fit the world, and we also make the world fit the words. We know what wood is by cutting, carving, burning and talking about, wood. We know what lead is by melting, folding, feeling, and talking about lead. We cannot melt, fold, or feel wood. — Banno

Indeed, but that is the problem here no? The distinctions come to the fore in our practices. They are therefore institutionalized facts, not very different from say law. We also 'find law' by artculating it, drafting it, codifying it and applying it.

Yes, I can taste the sweet candy you offer here, but I have experienced a lot of times that the musings of de rechter are based on custom and pre-established norms of conduct. De rechter kan behoorlijk krom zijn! Ook al zegt zuj rechter te zijn dan recht (supposing you are Dutch).

Does it hold outside of such a framework? Are there institutional facts outside of such a framework? — bongo fury

There is a weaker and a stronger version of my claim. The weaker is that in order to have institutional facts at all, a society must have at least a primitive form of language, that in this sense the institution of language is logically prior to other institutions. On this view language is the basic social institution in the sense that all others presuppose language, but language does not presuppose the others; you can have language without money and marriage, but not the converse. The stronger claim is that each institution requires linguistic elements of the facts within that very institution. I believe both claims are true, and I will be arguing for the stronger claim. The stronger claim implies the weaker. — The Construction of Social Reality, Chapter 3, Language and Social Reality

Then the result is a meaningles statement: "matter is less dense than matter". — Tobias

Or the meaningful "this is less dense than that."

But the meaningfulness of the statement is irrelevant to the distinction. As he says:

Brute facts require the institution of language in order that we can state the facts, but the brute facts themselves exist quite independently of language or of any other institution. Thus the statement that the sun is ninety-three million miles from the earth requires an institution of language and an institution of measuring distances in miles, but the fact stated, the fact that there is a certain distance between the earth and the sun, exists independently of any institution.

Regardless of what numbers or words we decide to use, whether it be "93 million miles" or "150 million kilometres" or "1 astronomical unit", the space between the earth and the sun is a brute fact. We can't make it further from or closer to us just by deciding that it is.

So, no? Ok.

Are there brute facts outside of such a framework?

Are there brute facts outside of such a framework? — bongo fury

Yes. See above.

Yes. See above. — Michael

That passage addresses only institutional facts?

This.

Ah. Ok.

Are there brute facts that exist only inside such a framework?

No, brute facts are defined as facts that don’t depend on human institutions like language.

So, they are the facts that aren't fiction?

Institutional facts aren’t fiction.

Institutional facts aren’t fiction. — Michael

Oh. Are they hallucinations?

How aren't they fiction? Weren't you stressing their lack of correspondence with actual states of affairs?

Brute facts can be shown and said. Here, hold this piece of lead in one hand, and this piece of wood in the other. See how they feel different? We call this difference weight, and further, the difference in weight of objects of the same size we call density. Things like this show how our words "lock onto" the world around us. — Banno

I think the trouble I’m having is that I don’t think that words lock onto the world around us (objective idealism?) but lock onto our mental representations or model of the world.

Status function:
Lead and wood count as matter in reality.

But is reality “the world around us” or is it only our model of reality?

Yes, I can taste the sweet candy you offer here, but I have experienced a lot of times that the musings of de rechter are based on custom and pre-established norms of conduct. De rechter kan behoorlijk krom zijn! Ook al zegt zuj rechter te zijn dan recht (supposing you are Dutch). — Hillary

I am Dutch... but I do not understand what you mean. You man that somehow judges judge wrongly because of custom? Every practice of course has its 'habitus' as Bourdieu would put it. I do not see so much legal wrongheadedness. Usually, if there is a judicial error it depends on faulty fact finding, but not faulty legal deliberation.

I had to pay 580 euro. Which I didn't in time. The incasso raised the amount to 1300. I took it to the judge because I didn't agree. But, nonewithstanding my financial situation, the law is such and such. That's the way the money system works. If you don't pay in time, you have to pay almost 1000 euro extra. Dus, de rechter is niet recht maar krom. Ze is een krommer, geen rechter.

I had to pay 580 euro. Which I didn't in time. The incasso raised the amount to 1300. I took it to the judge because I didn't agree. But, nonewithstanding my financial situation, the law is such and such. That's the way the money system works. If you don't pay in time, you have to pay almost 1000 euro extra. Dus, de rechter is niet recht maar krom. Ze is een krommer, geen rechter. — Hillary

Just to translate your last line, which actually doesn't translate well in English, but you state the judge is crooked not straight. (Using a pun on the word straight in Dutch which in dutch also means judge). Why do you think that? You did not agree with the fine, because you had a rough financial situation. The judge found for the state because the law is the way it is... I do not see something crooked there. The judiciary does not have the power to say, 'ohh, no matter what the law is, I find such and such fair and therefore the outcome is such and such!' If that was possible the juddges would de facto rule the country. They do not. The legislature does. Content wise I might be on your side, the judge might also be, but that is the point of procedure I dealt with above. If such outcomes are considered unfair, the law should be changed. The judge does not have the power to do so as she lacks democratic legitimacy. Materially the outcome might feel wrong for you, but legally the outcome does not seem wrong per se. That does not imply law is built on custom, it means law is a binding, authoritative rule.

The legislature does — Tobias

And who made the law? Mainly the possessing class. Als de rechter linkser was (of linker) had ze aan mijn kant kunnen komen staan!

And who made the law? Mainly the possessing class. Als de rechter linkser was (of linker) had ze aan mijn kant kunnen komen staat! — Hillary

I would like to ask to ask you to write in English, though I applaud your comment of Dutch. You are mistaken though. Also a left wing judge would rule against you. She is a judge not a political activist. She might agree with you in terms of content, but the role of the judge is not to be a political activist and misuse her power to force through social change. That is simply not her role in the legal system. Even if she would have found for you, the juddgment would be overturned by a higher court and with reason because it would be against the law. There are extreme cases of course and sometimes a judge has to go contra-legem, but that is very rare and only in case of overt violation of other legal principles. That is not the case here as far as I can see.

And who made the law? Mainly the possessing class. — Hillary

I am not so sure Hilary. Most people in the Netherlands, including the least well off, voted for right wing political parties with a law and order agenda. I would not be against fines that are dependent on the income of the person fined. In some countries such a system exists. However, in NL we do not have it. There is also no movement for it, no one asking for it and like I said, most people vote right...

Even if she would have found for you, the juddgment would be overturned by a higher court and with reason because it would be against the law. — Tobias

Yes. The incasso woman might have taken it a level higher. And the verdict would be that the judge operated against the law. But suppose, just suppose, the highest level judges (why is it called "rechter: in Dutch?) spoke the verdict I didn't have to pay because I couldn't pay the 580 euro? True, I didn't reacted to repeated pressure of the insurance company. But suppose they said, 1000 euro extra, for doing nothing (except sending a woman to court). What then?

True, I didn't reacted to repeated pressure of the insurance company. But suppose they said, 1000 euro extra, for doing nothing (except sending a woman to court). What then? — Hillary

Then you would not have to pay. However they will not do so because they will have to give their reasons for such a verdict and these reasons have to have their base in the law (including principles of law). If they do not, because legally it cannot be defended, we would have a constitutional crisis on our hands. People would legitmately ask: are we ruled by the chosen legislator, or by the supreme court? We have a legal principle in the Netherlands arguing for judiicial restraint because the judge does not have democratic legitimacy.

People would legitmately ask: are we ruled by the chosen legislator, or by the supreme court? — Tobias

And I could ask: am I ruled by some stupid rule if law allowing incasso to raise my debt by almost 1000 euro?

I think the trouble I’m having is that I don’t think that words lock onto the world around us (objective idealism?) but lock onto our mental representations or model of the world. — praxis

That seemed to be @Isaac's problem, too. In his case it has to do with the notion of modelling used in neuroscience. And @Tobias is caught in a form of conceptual relativism perhaps resulting from a diet of legal mumbo.

Realism here is simply that not just any account of how things are will do.

The alternative conceptual relativism presents a muddled picture. I am astonished that otherwise erudite folk find it appealing. It seems to be a metal picture that has folk inthralled.

Our words do not "lock on to our metal representations" because if this were granted, then there could be no such thing as our representations; there could only be your representations and my representations. There could be no agreement, no correction of those mental models because there would be nothing else but those models.

Even a neural network corrects itself against its inputs, and therefore has inputs that are independent of the neural net. A neural net with no inputs is just as inept as the ubiquitous example of an engine in neutral or a car with its wheels spinning in the air. But of course the "model" used in talking about neural networks is non-representational, and so is a very different thing from a conceptual model. This fact gets lost int he discussion, such that folk treat neural networks and conceptual models as equivalent.

Realism is nothing less than the truely alarming contention that there is a world within which our representations take place, within which we are embedded and against which our words my be tested.

And of course none of you will deny this; and yet you pretend to conceptual relativism of one sort or another. Despite your protestations, you cannot walk through walls.

And I could ask: am I ruled by some stupid rule if law allowing incasso to raise my debt by almost 1000 euro? — Hillary

Yes of course you could. The fact that a law is applied and even upheld in court, does not mean it is a good law. So by all means, campaign against the rule, mobilize citizens, make sure it appears on the political agenda. However a court of law is not a political arena. Granted, it does become more and more of a political arena, but there are severe problems associated with that. I rather ddo not see the politicization of the courts.

That seemed to be Isaac's problem, too. In his case it has to do with the notion of modelling used in neuroscience. And @Tobias is caught in a form of conceptual relativism perhaps resulting from a diet of legal mumbo. — Banno

I do not think I am a conceptual relativist. Some concepts work better than others. There might be better arguments for some distinctions than for others. I do think that the dstinction between brute facts an institutional facts is not easy to maintain. Every fact depends on some form of institutionalization to be aaccepted as such. The distinctions we accept as meaningful depends on the way we interact with the world.

Realism here is simply that not just any account of how things are will do.

The alternative conceptual relativism presents a muddled picture. — Banno

Searle accepts both realism and conceptual relativism.

A third mistake, also common, is to suppose that realism is committed to the theory that there is one best vocabulary for describing reality, that reality itself must determine how it should be described. But once again, ER [external realism] as defined above has no such implication. The view that the world exists independently of our representations of it does not imply that there is a privileged vocabulary for describing it. It is consistent with ER to claim the thesis of conceptual relativity (proposition 4), that different and even incommensurable vocabularies can be constructed for describing different aspects of reality for our various different purposes.

...

The fact that alternative conceptual schemes allow for different descriptions of the same reality, and that there are no descriptions of reality outside all conceptual schemes, has no bearing whatever on the truth of realism.

Although perhaps the issue is that Searle's account of realism differs from yours? He defines external realism as the view that "the world (or alternatively, reality or the universe) exists independently of our representations of it" which he says "is not a theory of truth, [is] not a theory of knowledge, and [is] not a theory of language."

@Isaac @Streetlight

Regarding my repeated accusations of a use-mention error, it appears Searle has something to say about it to:

If we try to take these arguments against ER, we commit a massive use-mention fallacy: From the fact that a description can only be made relative to a set of linguistic categories, it does not follow that the facts/objects/states of affairs,/etc., described can only exist relative to a set of categories. Conceptual relativism, properly understood, is an account of how we fix the application of our terms: What counts as a correct application of the term "cat" or "kilogram" or "canyon" (or "klurg") is up to us to decide and is to that extent arbitrary. But once we have fixed the meaning of such terms in our vocabulary by arbitrary definitions, it is no longer a matter of any kind of relativism or arbitrariness whether representation-independent features of the world satisfy those definitions, because the features of the world that satisfy or fail to satisfy the definitions exist independently of those or any other definitions. We arbitrarily define the word "cat" in such and such a way; and only relative to such and such definitions can we say, "That's a cat." But once we have made the definitions and once we have applied the concepts relative to the system of definitions, whether or not something satisfies our definition is no longer arbitrary or relative. That we use the word "cat" the way we do is up to us; that there is an object that exists independently of that use, and satisfies that use, is a plain matter of (absolute, intrinsic, mind-independent) fact.