Regardless, 'phenomena' means 'what appears', 'a fact or situation that is observed to exist or happen'. That is a matter of definition. The idea that phenomena constitute the totality of experience is commonplace, but mistaken. — Wayfarer

You're mistaken. I suggest you go to the
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and do a search on "phenomena". Here's a couple examples:

This IEP article on Laws of Nature:
"On the other account, the Necessitarian Theory, Laws of Nature are the “principles” which govern the natural phenomena of the world. "

IEP article in explanation:"Historically, explanation has been associated with causation: to explain an event or phenomenon is to identify its cause."

As explained in my post, intuitively, time is logically prior to space. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah....about that. I suppose you’re directing me to this....

This places the intuition of time as deeper than, and prior to, the intuition of space. It manifests as the most basic of mathematical principles, order. — Metaphysician Undercover

We do not intuit time or space; we intuit objects in time and space. To intuit is to follow from sensation, and the sensation proper of time or space is impossible, insofar as both are conceived as infinite and empty.

While I agree space and time have a mutual exclusivity with respect to functionality, I see no reason to grant one with priority over the other under empirical conditions. As a concession, on the other hand, I do grant that time has priority under none-empirical conditions, insofar as thoughts are never represented in space yet are always and only represented by successions in time.

Second, the most basic mathematical principles are subsumed under the schema of quantity, not relation, or, in your terms, order.
————-

But if we assume that our fundamental (base) intuitions are wrong, then we have nothing left to go on. We must dispose of the most basic principles of logic, such as identity, and non-contradiction, and we are left with zero, nothing as a starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough. But if it is the case we don’t function at all, in any way, shape or form, when we dismiss the basic principles of logic, then it is reasonable to suppose we couldn’t do that in the first place, insofar as we must use them in order to assume their dismissal. It follows that if we cannot assume to dismiss them, we are left with merely getting them as correct as we can.

Gotta be careful here, nonetheless, because to juxtaposition fundamental (base) intuitions to our basic principles of logic involves separate functions of human cognition. This is most apparent iff it is the case that intuition does not involve judgement, while basic logical principles is predicated on it exclusively.
————-

However, the nature of logic, and it's ground in intuition...., — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, but the nature of logic is in judgement, not intuition. Think of it this way: you know how when we perceive something, when we are affected by some imprint on the senses, we are never conscious of the information that flows along the nerves? We sense the beginning, we cognize what the beginning was, at the end, in the brain, but all that between, we know nothing about whatsoever. THAT is intuition, in the proper, albeit metaphysical, sense. And because we are never conscious of our intuitions, but we are certainly conscious of the judgements we make on our sensations from which the intuition is given, and logical determinations are the objects of judgements alone, it follows necessarily that intuition cannot stand in any relation to the nature of logic. It may be said intuition is the ground for the possibility of logical determinations, but that is not to say they determine the nature of logic.

Besides....there are those occasions when we employ logical principles even without an intuition, without an object making an impression on the senses. Case in point....the guy that invented the Slinky. Sure, springs and stuff falling are sensuous impressions, but you can’t get a Slinky as such, from those two intuitions. To connect those into an object that doesn’t yet exist requires more than the antecedent intuition of each. In just the same way, you cannot get to 12 if all you have is a 7 and a 5.

So sayeth the blue pill, and I got a whole bucketful of them little devils. Lucky for me, cuz I’ve grown accustomed.....ok, fine.....addicted.....to their intoxication.

Subjectivism — Wayfarer

.....in all its various and sundry and altogether private iterations.

But in the science of physics, this order has been reversed, such that space is prior to time — Metaphysician Undercover

Space and particles moving in it is time. The emergent thermodynamic time are real particles collectively moving in irreversible processes in an emergent space, the both of which inflated into existence from a TDtime- and macro-spaceless primordial state of virtual particles rotating reversibly in a primordial embryonic space (which can be interpreted as primordial time), embedded in a higher dimensional space with appropriate properties to make the inflation and later accelerated expansion happen.

↪Banno
It wouldn’t surprise me if she did. And yes the issue is a metaphysical one. It revolves around divesting the world of reason. No coincidence that Hume is also associated with the -is-ought problem’. This is not fortuious. — Wayfarer

While I don’t believe this will resolve much here, a possible metaphysical missing link in this thread is the relation between reason and causation. Reason consists of reasons. A reason can consist of a) a cause, b) a motive, or c) an explanation (with this latter including our epistemic understanding of causes and motives). Motives cause motions of psyche, i.e. cause cognitive behaviors. Explanations are commonly understood to be effects caused by psyches. Hence, the occurrence of any possible subcategory of “a reason” is at base dependent on the notion, if not the reality, of causation. Reasoning, the act of engaging in reason, is commonly understood to apply to at least human psyches. Were something like the Peircean idea of physicality as effete mind to take place, then reasoning - again, the activity of engaging in reason (which, again, can consist of causes, motives, or explanations) - would naturally be something which the physical world engages in; this in so far as the physical world engages in the activity of (physical) causation … which is a form of reasoning: i.e., the act of engaging in reason … here, in particular , of engaging in causes, hence causation. Of course, this interpretation harkens back to the Heraclitan and Stoic notion of logos, from which the notion of logic takes its form. And that’s a no-no for all materialist conceptualizations. (For which reasoning ipso facto can pertain only to certain psyches ... often enough, psyches that a fully controlled causally by a fully deterministic physical world ... hmm, something's amiss, me thinks.)

BTW, if it hasn’t yet been mentioned, Hume - despite his various imperfections (who is perfect?) - was a diehard compatibilist; he had no issue against the reality of causation as a metaphysical aspect of reality. His take was only that any particular cause we can identify to any particular effect will not, as a particular instantiation of causation, be logically necessitated by deductive reasoning. Instead, it will be so judged based on repeated like experiences inductively affirming the connection between particular causes and effects. E.g., that I cause the light to turn on when I turn the light switch - an instance of causation that most take for granted - is not a logical necessity … but only a belief habitually formed from repetitions of experience. I walk into a house, push a light switch, and the lights come on, making me believe I caused the lights to turn on … when, maybe, the light switch I pushed might have no wires attached and someone in an adjacent room not seen by me pushed the functional light switch to the light bulb I saw turned on at the same time I did. This only to illustrate the lack of logical necessity to my causing the lights to turn on in this one example. To any concrete instantiation of causation for that matter. But this observation in no way rationally justifies there being a lack of causation in the world. Again, there can be no variant of compatibilism absent the metaphysical reality of causation, and Hume, for starters, was a stanch compatibilist.

:up:

Reasons and causes are indeed closely connected. Reasons can be said teleological causes. Reasons provide clarity about personal causes.

Maybe reason and physical causation meet at the divide between the mental and physical world, at the epistemic cut, i.e., in our bodies.

Maybe reason and physical causation meet at the divide between the mental and physical world, at the epistemic cut, i.e., in our bodies. — Hillary

Here interpreting "reason" in the common modern sense, I rather like your take. So as to emphasize, to me both yet being aspects of the Stoic notion of universal logos.

Stoic notion of universal logos. — javra

I'm not too familiar with classical philosophy, so had to look it up. And indeed:

"Stoic philosophy began with Zeno of Citium c. 300 BC, in which the logos was the active reason pervading and animating the Universe. It was conceived as material and is usually identified with God or Nature."

Makes sense! Modern science could learn a lesson about that. Or be taught a lesson! The "hard problem" of consciousness would be "solved" in a couple of lessons!

Makes sense! Modern science could learn a lesson about that. Or be taught a lesson! The "hard problem" of consciousness would be "solved" in a couple of lessons! — Hillary

:grin: Yup. I agree. Like other things though, its something easier said than done. :razz:

Yup. I agree. Like other things though, its something easier said than done — javra

Yes, very true and frustrating. If only we had more power! :joke: The word (logos!) can be very powerful though! :smile:

:clap: :100:

I too noted the relevance of the Stoic 'logos' a little earlier. It seems rather like that other axial-age philosophical motif of the East, dharma. Agree with your remarks on Hume also.

The word (logos!) can be very powerful though! :smile: — Hillary

Will be erring on the side of caution here (I'm sure you'll correct me where needed):

The Word? Hmm. Causation isn't made up of words, never mind a word, no?

I'm all for Stoic notions of logos; but do not favor the Abrahamic re-invisioning of it. It's like laws of thought: they cause our abilities to think in the ways we can. Part and parcel of the logos. But to address them as the word of some deity is to run into the contradiction of a psyche that either is itself determined by the same laws of thought we are prior to ever creating them or, else, of some omni-this-and-that deity's mind that is beyond any law of thought and hence logically trivialistic and contradictory all the time and at no time in the same respect, including in the good/evil respect ... not my cup of tea this, to say the least.

Still, I was focusing in on the relation(s) between reason and causation.

The Word? Hmm. Causation isn't made up of words, never mind a word, no? — javra

I can see your concern for The Word. Not my cup of tea either! I was again referring to the modern version of the word, just the words of the language we speak, not realizing that Logos actually means the "Word of God" ( whatever he might have said). I'm a believer too, but my vision on heaven and gods stands a zillion miles away from the standard inhuman super omnimonster, with his roots in ancient Greece (at least, the western version), and theists probably like me even less than atheists!

So, I was talking about words. I read that Hitler used words like small doses of a lethal poison. Provide them one small dose at the time, and power is yours before noticed... (don't think I'm a fan of the guy!). Words can be powerful and maybe even change lives, though of course it takes more than them aline.

I too noted the relevance of the Stoic 'logos' a little earlier. It seems rather like that other axial-age philosophical motif of the East, dharma. — Wayfarer

Wanted to more properly back this up with a quote or two from my copy of Heraclitus’ translated fragments … can’t locate the book in my haphazard pile of books I like to call my bookshelves. From memory, to at least Heraclitus, logos is as much natural laws as it is the active causal processes the pervade the world – from which human judgments and speech commence, this while they remain intimately intertwined with the former. In this I find that there’s nothing notably different from Stoic interpretations. Though my knowledge in these fields is far more limited than yours, this to say that to me too it seems to be a different culture’s parallel formulation of the metaphysical principles applicable to dharma; I’d add of karma as well - this despite the divergences when one gets into the details and cultural applications.

It's simply the idea of there being a cosmic law or cosmic order. From the New Advent encyclopedia:

God, according to [the Stoics], "did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly.

Clearly a resemblance to the idea of 'dharma' in that context.

I agree with you that it was unfortunate (to say the least) the way Christian theology appopriated the conception of logos as 'the word of God' and then used it to underwrite the authority of the Church. In fact I think it's one of the reasons for the wholesale rejection of religion and such ideas of 'universal reason' in the Enlightenment.

Reasons provide clarity about personal causes. — Hillary

Or obscurity.

Ah, got it now.

Words can be powerful and maybe even change lives, though of course it takes more than them aline. — Hillary

Yea, there's the truism that the pen is mightier than than the sword to further back this up.

Funny thing though, when it comes to "logos" I always get frustrated that in English it translates into the plural of "logo". This missing the point of the term. As can also be said of the term interpreted in an Aristotelian sense. Still, I'm glad that the term "logos" in its Heraclitan and Stoic sense is of value to at least some of us. :up:

In fact I think it's one of the reasons for the wholesale rejection of religion and such ideas of 'universal reason' in the Enlightenment. — Wayfarer

Yea, and I have my hunches that it goes hand in hand with the turn to reject teleology as well. When teleology is only understood anthropomorphically, it then can only be interpreted as necessitating a globally governing psyche via which it manifests. So it gets rejected wholesale, baby out with the bathwater and all, and we end up with the meaninglessness of nihilism - which might ring just a bit truer if the very concept were to in fact be meaningless to people as well. :smile:

Reasons provide clarity about personal causes.
— Hillary

Or obscurity. — Janus

The strange thing is, I don't understand why I wrote that up and what I meant by it! I think I meant physical causes, as that's what the thread is about. Personal causes can indeed be quite obscure...

If nihilism is the idea that there is no purpose behind the manifestations of the cosmos, and teleologism is the idea that there is a cosmic purpose;and given that the very meaning of 'purpose' is something like " the aims or wishes of a conscious agent", how are we to avoid anthropomorphizing the notion of cosmic teleology? Surely the human imagination is bound to think god or gods in terms of the human writ large, or else the whole notion of cosmic purpose becomes too vague to be of any use, no?

The strange thing is, I don't understand why I wrote that up and what I meant by it! I think I meant physical causes, as that's what the thread is about. Personal causes can indeed be quite obscure... — Hillary

I agree, though I think that medicine shows that physiological causes can also be quite obscure.

That's why Nietszche foresaw the advent of nihilism as the defining character of modernity. And it is! Not necessarily a 'sturm und drang', dramatic kind of emotion, simply a shrug, a 'dunno', a 'whatever'.

(In Buddhist Studies, one of the texts I studied was called the Brahmajala Sutta, meaning the 'net of views'. It is a canonical list of all of the forms of mistaken beliefs that aspirants typically fall into. Half were 'eternalist' views - which I interpreted to mean belief in perpetual re-birth in accordance with favourable karma. The other half were nihilistic views - the belief that existence utterly ceases at death with no karmic consequences of actions. One of these kinds of view is the view that life arises purely fortuitously, as a matter of chance. Bhikkhu Bodhi, the translator, remarked in his preface that the majority of modern culture takes this as a scientifically-established fact.)

I agree, though I also think that medicine shows that physiological causes can also be quite obscure — Janus

What's obscure about them? The causes are raging through my brain, pushing and pulling ideas along or resonating with the outside, creating a colorful and noisy world with their mental load, while I between them, on the edge of reason and madness...

Yea, I maybe unthinkingly opened up this can of worms ... I'll work with it for the time being.

If nihilism is the idea that there is no purpose behind the manifestations of the cosmos, and teleologism is the idea that there is a cosmic purpose;and given that the very meaning of 'purpose' is something like " the aims or wishes of a conscious agent", how are we to avoid anthropomorphizing the notion of cosmic teleology? — Janus

Purpose is nowadays a fairly fuzzy term. In terms of teleology, though, it is the causal motions toward an end such that the given end propels the movements toward it. Causal agents have goals as various ends they pursue, yes. This signifies teleology/purpose for us, conscious agents. The envisioning of a cosmic teleology/purpose does not however necessitate a cosmic psyche that governs all via its own personal goals ... this, hence, toward who knows what ends that gives this deity purpose (a bit of a logical contradiction to me in relation to cosmic purpose, akin to the contradiction regarding laws of thought I previously mentioned, but this aside).

As to the alternative I at least have in mind, it's a mouthful, but here goes: Cosmic purpose/teleology could be self-consistently upheld - though not in any materialist conceptualization - in what has been termed "the One" or "the Good" as an ultimate state of reality, which is not itself a mind that thinks, wants, perceives, and judges but a non-dual (hence, lacking any dichotomy between self and otherness; hence, perfectly selfless; hence, in an important sense, a perfectly objective and non-quantitative) state of awareness (think of the eastern notion of Nirvana for one possible example: in short, not a mind), one which serves as an Aristotelian final cause as the unmoved mover of all that exists in states of duality/quantity (the "unmoved mover" read as: not a mind that has goals and hence wants, hence ends it itself pursues, but a state of pure and selfless awareness devoid of all otherness and wants ... on which all else is in either direct or indirect manners dependent but which is itself fully unconditioned, instead just being) ... which individual, naturally dualistic minds such as our own can either choose to approach (via earnest love of truth, or goodness, or impartiality, etc.) or to further ourselves from (via attempts at benefiting by means of deception, falsehoods, egotism, etc.).

If one happens to be theistic, the same can then be well argued of incorporeal gods (necessarily plural and non-monotheistic) and angels ... or whatever other faith one happens to theistically uphold: they too can either approach or distance themselves and their contexts from the ideal of the Good. All this without there being such a thing as a monotheistic deity, which would necessarily have will and hence wants, i.e. would necessarily be wanting by sheer fact of willing. Or, one can uphold the same state of "the Good" in a perfectly atheistic manner.

Yes, I get that its a strange conception to most nowadays. But this general notion of "the One" is nothing novel. Nor is the reinterpretation/misinterpretation of "the One" as a human-like psyche that determines and controls everything via its human-like will something novel. I argue that the latter postulation is and can only be bogus. The former, though contradicted by the position of materialism, is however not itself logically inconsistent.

This notion of "the One" then being that which defines what is correct, right, and good in existential, non-biased manners. Signifying an overarching moral objectivity that can yet manifest in context-relative manners. One that is un-created and unconditioned to which we are all willingly or unwillingly subjects of.

Yes, lots of justification would be required to make this position even close to bulletproof - and I think we both know a forum isn't amenable to such.

But as a shorter answer to the same question you ask: by not being egotistic about what is and can be, while yet remaining rational about what is and can be possible.

Surely the human imagination is bound to think god or gods in terms of the human writ large, or else the whole notion of cosmic purpose becomes too vague to be of any use, no? — Janus

I'll offer that "too vague to be of any use" would only apply to something that has little to no explanatory power. To the extent that value is important to us - inclusive of notions such as right/wrong and good/bad - teleology that is neither pivoted on the of ego-centrism of individual human minds nor on the imagined cosmic presence of such a human-like mind would be of considerable conceptual usefulness.

--------

While I'm defending my credence in a godless cosmic teleology, what defense for nihilism is there ... other than the knee-jerk rejection of some monotheistic deity that controls everything we think and do?

Cosmic purpose/teleology could be self-consistently upheld - though not in any materialist conceptualization - in what has been termed "the One" or "the Good" as an ultimate state of reality, which is not itself a mind that thinks, wants, perceives, and judges but a non-dual (hence, lacking any dichotomy between self and otherness; hence, perfectly selfless; hence, in an important sense, a perfectly objective and non-quantitative) state of awareness (think of the eastern notion of Nirvana for one possible example: in short, not a mind)..... — javra

:clap: well said.

Nagel’s starting point is not simply that he finds materialism partial or unconvincing, but that he himself has a metaphysical view or vision of reality that just cannot be accommodated within materialism. This vision is that the appearance of conscious beings in the universe is somehow what it is all for; that ‘Each of our lives is a part of the lengthy process of the universe gradually waking up and becoming aware of itself’. Nagel’s surrounding argument is something of a sketch, but is entirely compatible with a Buddhist vision of reality as naturalism, including the possibility of insight into reality (under the topic of reason or cognition) and the possibility of apprehension of objective good (under the topic of value). His naturalism does this while fully conceding the explanatory power of physics, Darwinian evolution and neuroscience. Most Buddhists are what one might describe as intuitive non-materialists, but they have no way to integrate their intuition into the predominantly materialistic scientific world view. I see the value of Nagel’s philosophy in Mind and Cosmos as sketching an imaginative vision of reality that integrates the scientific world view into a larger one that includes reason, value and purpose, and simultaneously casts philosophical doubt on the completeness of the predominant materialism of the age. — Western Buddhist Review of Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos

well said — Wayfarer

Thanks for that. Though I'm positive there's plenty about here that disagree.

Just saw the Western Buddhist Review quote. To confess, haven't yet read Nagel's Mind and Cosmos, though I've been itching to. This is a good reminder that I should sooner rather than later. Nice quote to read, btw.

Though I'm positive there's plenty about here that disagree. — javra

Most, I would think. :wink:

I like Nagel, and refer to him a lot, not because he's a hero figure, but because he has a very cool and detached analytical eye, but has discerned many issues that I think are of great significance in current cultural discourse. Mind and Cosmos, I read when it first came out, it's quite a brief book. I've read The Last Word and pinned a copy of one of the essays to my profile page. I've started on the View from Nowhere but couldn't find the motivation to finish it. But I think Mind and Cosmos is an important book - one of those books that many mainstream academics love to hate.

I was thinking about the causes of some health conditions. But even in regard to the idea we might have that neural activity causes thoughts, we still cannot connect particular thoughts with specific neural processes.

As to the alternative I at least have in mind, it's a mouthful, but here goes: Cosmic purpose/teleology could be self-consistently upheld - though not in any materialist conceptualization - in what has been termed "the One" or "the Good" as an ultimate state of reality, which is not itself a mind that thinks, wants, perceives, and judges but a non-dual (hence, lacking any dichotomy between self and otherness; hence, perfectly selfless; hence, in an important sense, a perfectly objective and non-quantitative) state of awareness (think of the eastern notion of Nirvana for one possible example: in short, not a mind), one which serves as an Aristotelian final cause as the unmoved mover of all that exists in states of duality/quantity (the "unmoved mover" read as: not a mind that has goals and hence wants, hence ends it itself pursues, but a state of pure and selfless awareness devoid of all otherness and wants ... on which all else is in either direct or indirect manners dependent but which is itself fully unconditioned, instead just being) ... which individual, naturally dualistic minds such as our own can either choose to approach (via earnest love of truth, or goodness, or impartiality, etc.) or to further ourselves from (via attempts at benefiting by means of deception, falsehoods, egotism, etc.). — javra

I'll offer that "too vague to be of any use" would only apply to something that has little to no explanatory power. To the extent that value is important to us - inclusive of notions such as right/wrong and good/bad - teleology that is neither pivoted on the of ego-centrism of individual human minds nor on the imagined cosmic presence of such a human-like mind would be of considerable conceptual usefulness. — javra

Firstly I can't see how the notion of purpose has any purchase without the accompanying idea of conscious planning, and I can't see how we can imagine conscious planning occurring in the absence of an at least sentient, if not sapient, agent.

As to the vague idea of a teleology that is neither that of an individual mind or a "cosmic' mind; I fail to see how it could have any explanatory power when it comes to human values, which I think are readily explained as being formed on account of the significance that things and entities of the world commonly have for us as embodied beings.

I'm very open to having it explained to me.

Not easy issues to explain in soundbite form, but I'll give it a go.

Firstly I can't see how the notion of purpose has any purchase without the accompanying idea of conscious planning, and I can't see how we can imagine conscious planning occurring in the absence of an at least sentient, if not sapient, agent. — Janus

As one example: Do you need to consciously plan on choosing that alternative which you deem optimally beneficial, hence good, relative to your principle, momentary conscious interests in order to so choose? Both purported saints and the vilest of villains will do this at all times regardless of their conscious planning. As will toddlers. I'll opine that, to the extent that lesser animals do in fact choose, the same will apply to lesser animals. Sentience cannot help but choose that which it deems to be optimally beneficial for itself, hence that which it momentarily feels to be optimally good for itself. This affirmation could be questioned (and can easily become complicated by issues such as that of short v. long term benefits), but supposing it's not here questioned: here, all our choices are partly manifested via the pull of the Good as a telos we all invariantly pursue at all times for ourselves - and this without any conscious planning to so pursue. It's instead a predetermined facet of our being we cannot escape: for in deeming it (consciously or unconsciously) good to escape it, we are nevertheless bound by it. Here, then, is telos (final cause) doing its work in the absence of conscious planning. This of course gets complicated, in part, by conscious planning ... but all such is yet existentially bound to the same telos of doing what is deemed best for you regardless of what is concretely planned.

But I grant that - even despite it's many potential points of contention - this example yet requires sentience which does the choosing.

There's also the example of biological evolution as having a telos. Momentarily suppose this to be true. This telos pulls towards itself. It does not push things this way and that - for such pushing would not be teleological. Were there to be a sentient agent (omni-God) in charge of evolution, it would push things this way and that; it would thus not be the telos addressed that teleologically moves evolution along toward itself as end... for ease of argumentation (nonsensical as this may technically be to those with biological knowledge), say for example toward a state of perfect fitness as end. Biological evolution is not sentient and has no conscious plans; in this example, it yet has a telos, hence purpose, that is independent of sentience and its conscious planning.

That offered, can you form an argument for the logical necessity of all final causes being themselves driven by, or else dependent on, sentient agency?

As to the vague idea of a teleology that is neither that of an individual mind or a "cosmic' mind; I fail to see how it could have any explanatory power when it comes to human values, which I think are readily explained as being formed on account of the significance that things and entities of the world commonly have for us as embodied beings. — Janus

Human values include ethics, metaethics, and aesthetics - none of which are to my knowledge satisfactorily explained in such simplistic terms. As to explaining teleology's explanatory power when addressing such values, they all address wants, which can be accounted for teleologically: see, for one example, the aforementioned drive to optimally approach that which is good for oneself.

To be clear, I argued for a teleology that neither pivots on individual minds nor on an omni-God of any sort. This, however, does not imply that such teleology does not apply to all coexistent minds, both sapient and non-sapient ... as I reckon it must if it is to hold. And again, I'm a lot closer to a Peircean objective idealism than I am to any materialism in my overall metaphysics.

As a reminder, I'm not here arguing about proofs, but only about the quite valid possibility that cosmic teleology can operate in the absence of a monotheistic deity. You've overlooked issues regarding the contradictions that unfold when considering such monotheistic deity the arbiter of purpose/telos.

You've also not offered a defense of nihilism.

I was thinking about the causes of some health conditions. But even in regard to the idea we might have that neural activity causes thoughts, we still cannot connect particular thoughts with specific neural processes. — Janus

We in fact can connect particular thoughts and feelings with particular processes. A thought is a collective, coherent, parallel, massive running around of spiked, localized bundles of sodium ions rushing in through small channels on the long neuron axons, wich, coupled to other neurons at the synapses by neurotransmitter releases which are gap width dependent, form an incredibly complex network. Considering that there are hundred billion of these damned neurons, and each can be connected to more than 10 000 other neurons, we shouldn't be surprised that every process in the physical universe can be simulated. A simple and fast back of the envelope calculation shows that about 10exp(10exp20) patterns can run on it. That'll do...