:ok: :roll: :sweat:

Maybe I didn't clarify that enough. As I said, all the folk expressions (as the churchland's call them) will eventually be just empty descriptors. Like saying "he's got some balls" as a descriptor of a man's bravery, not the simple physical fact.

Great discussion. Lot of strong minds on here - some not so much but as a visitor I'll remain polite. I'm a "medium" strength mind ha.

Thanks for your responses. Whoever said "many philosophers will disagree" with Dennett, The Churchlands I think Patricia Churchland would agree wholeheartedly. She, and myself as well, started in philosophy but started leaning towards neuroscience. I think that might stick in the craw of many philosophers. I have a long list of philosophers who value science highly - but there's probably a longer list of those that are skeptics,

So if consciousness and the material brain are not literally the same thing, how do we avoid dualism?

makes me think minds don't emerge from matter. — RogueAI

From what else? But not purely from the brain's matter. In the brain, the intrinsic nature of matter is connected to the body which walks around in the physical world seen on the outside, projecting itself continuously into the brain by the senses, which makes the intrinsic nature of matter resonate and a conscious simulation of the physical world appear. An appearance shaped by our modes of thinking, worldview, expectations, feelings, a priori or inborn reactions, culture, etc. In principle, a complete material rendering of this process of a body with a brain walking in the world can be given, but such rendering will never be able to explain the intrinsic matter features which can only be felt on the inside.



quote="Wayfarer;697465"]Rational inference depends wholly and solely on the relations of ideas - ‘is’, ‘is not’, ‘is greater than’, ‘is the same as’, and so on. Judgements based on those simple elements are intrinsic to any rational claim about anything whatever, including the claim that thought can be explained in terms.[/quote]l9l

I don't think that these judgements are inherent to the claim that thought can be explained in physical terms. Why should it? That claim is just a claim about the nature of reality.

Ya - I haven't mentioned Dennett because I don't feel comfortable with all his views. But if you read the ps in my final msg from yesterday, I actually DO think we may have to "to find some quite radical or revolutionary alternative science?" to explain consciousness, as opposed to your Dennett quote..

Is that a stretch? Well...isn't there something called "quantum mechanics" that requires a different approach to particle physics? (not to mention reality itself)

? Well...isn't there something called "quantum mechanics" that requires a different approach to particle physics? (not to mention reality itself) — GLEN willows

As has been observed in popular literature, there's a meme that 'hey, consciousness is mysterious, and quantum mechanics is mysterious, so maybe there's a connection! :yikes: '

But seriously - the problem with the Churchlands and Daniel Dennett is actually simple. It's just a matter of perspective. The point of David Chalmer's famous paper Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, is the impossibility of accounting for the first-person reality of experience in third-person, objective terms.

Science generally deals with what is objectively the case, right? What can be measured and predicted according to mathematically-structured hypotheses. So, ask yourself, why is this approach also called 'physicalism'? Isn't it because physics provides the ideal paradigm, in that the objects of physics can be described wholly in terms of measurable, physical quantities, such as velocity, mass, vector, and so on. This is why many of the other areas of science are said to have 'physics envy' - they want to be able to deal with things that are perfectly predictable, like those of physics.

If that breaks down at the quantum level, it's relevance to this argument might only be that physics itself doesn't go 'all the way down'. But the main point is actually a lot more simple than that - it is that humans are subjects of experience, not simply objects of scientific analysis. They're out of scope for objective sciences for that reason. But for some reason, that is just unacceptable to some people - if it can't be made an object of scientific analysis, then it can't be considered real. And that is the exact reason they're called 'eliminativists'.

In principle, a complete material rendering of this process of a body with a brain walking in the world can be given, but such rendering will never be able to explain the intrinsic matter features which can only be felt on the inside. — Hillary

:up: (Although your 'in principle' assumes that science can perfectly reproduce a living being de novo, which so far is not even close to happening.)

will eventually be just empty descriptors. Like saying "he's got some balls" as a descriptor of a man's bravery, not the simple physical fact. — GLEN willows

folk descriptions have specific meanings for people just as the technical terms
used by eliminativists like the Churchlands . And their empirical jargon may be found pragmatically useful in ways that the folk speech they disparage is not, but to imply , as the term ‘folk’ usually does when used by cognitive scientists, that the neural concepts the eliminativists employ are more scientifically ‘correct’, is part of the problem I see with their brand of psychological
modeling. The Churchland’s concepts are just as contestable as the folk concepts they want to replace, and in my opinion have already been replaced by what I consider to be more satisfying accounts by enactivist cognitive theorists. It’s not just subjective mystical ‘woo’ the eliminativists eliminate, it’s the appreciation that reducing cognitive processes to internal computational bits misses the interactive web tying together mind, body and world.

I believe that we will eventually build robots with consciousness. Do you really think that's impossible? — GLEN willows

I do. It's not because consciousness is something that lies outside purely mechanical processes, but rather it's because consciousness is a muddled notion to begin with, Boolean logic consists of all true statements, inanimate objects have no emotion, emotion is part of thought and belief, and consciousness includes an ability to suspend one's judgment as well as change one's mind about things previously held true. That's just skimming the top of the problems involved with any claims of artificial 'intelligence'(scarequotes intentional).

It's not because consciousness is something that lies outside purely mechanical processes, but rather it's because consciousness is a muddled notion to begin with, Boolean logic consists of all true statements, inanimate objects have no emotion, emotion is part of thought and belief, and consciousness includes an ability to suspend one's judgment as well as change one's mind about things previously held true. That's just skimming the top of the problems involved with any claims of artificial 'intelligence'(scarequotes intentional). — creativesoul

Some think intelligence is a function of human biology. So, there is natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. But artificial intelligence does not merely mimic human intelligence or consciousness.
Turing's paper, COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE, shows that the question is what is intelligence regardless of it being natural or artificial.

...if consciousness and the material brain are not literally the same thing, how do we avoid dualism? — GLEN willows

Mind/body dualism? Internal/external dualism? Material/immaterial dualism? Mental/physical dualism? Another, perhaps?

Which dualism?

For the record...

I'm quite fond of Dennett's paper "Quining Qualia". Quite indeed!

But seriously - the problem with the Churchlands and Daniel Dennett is actually simple. It's just a matter of perspective. The point of David Chalmer's famous paper Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, is the impossibility of accounting for the first-person reality of experience in third-person, objective terms. — Wayfarer

There are two points here I think are worth noting; first, Chalmers doesn't claim that science cannot possibly explain consciousness (otherwise he would name it Impossible Problem rather than Hard Problem); he says that a new kind of way of doing science will likely be needed; whatever we might think he has in mind with that.

And second, accounting for first person experience in third person terms does not equate to giving a first person account of experience in third person terms; which is an obvious contradiction. It may be possible to come up with a coherent physical theory that explains why we have first person experience, but that account will not be a first person account of experience, in other words, and just in case you missed the distinction.

Some think intelligence is a function of human biology — Jackson

If the term means anything at all, it must include biological machinery. Our intelligence is most certainly a result of our biological machinery including our physiological nervous system, of which the brain is just one part.

If the term means anything at all, it must include biological machinery. — creativesoul

Why? There are lots of things in the universe. Why privilege the human biological mechanism?

It's our intelligence that forms the basis of our understanding. We must get it right prior to attempting to attribute it or something like it to something else. Wouldn't you say?

It's our intelligence that forms the basis of our understanding. We must get it right prior to attempting to attribute it or something like it to something else. Wouldn't you say? — creativesoul

No. I never really understood what Aristotle meant by "art imitates nature." But he considers nature to be a process so art imitates that process. So, nature exhibits intelligence. The modern preoccupation with subjectivity obscures this idea.

:up:

[A]ccounting for first person experience in third person terms does not equate to giving a first person account of experience in third person terms; which is an obvious contradiction. It may be possible to come up with a coherent physical theory that explains why we have first person experience, but that account will not be a first person account of experience, in other words, and just in case you missed the distinction. — Janus

:fire:

The point of David Chalmer's famous paper Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, is the impossibility of accounting for the first-person reality of experience in third-person, objective terms. — Wayfarer

:roll:

Before I could post my own reply ...

Chalmers doesn't claim that science cannot possibly explain consciousness (otherwise he would name it Impossible Problem rather than Hard Problem) — Janus

he says that a new kind of way of doing science will likely be needed; whatever we might think he has in mind with that. — Janus

He calls it a first person science, which Dennett dismisses as a fantasy. But it must be something very like phenomenology.

nature exhibits intelligence — Jackson

We are part of nature, aren't we?

We are part of nature, aren't we? — creativesoul

Exactly. So, "artificial" intelligence is just an extension of natural intelligence.

Hey my man! Hope all is good is peach country. Get rid of that effin lunatic Taylor Greene... Phew!

Surely Chalmers would be aware that we already have a first person science: phenomenology. Do you have a quote from Chalmers which actually says that?

:smirk:

We are part of nature, aren't we?
— creativesoul

Exactly. So, "artificial" intelligence is just an extension of natural intelligence. — Jackson

Artificial intelligence is not even close to being the same sort of thing that human intelligence is. Not even close. The point here is that it is a misnomer that renders the term intelligence meaningless.

Artificial intelligence is not even close to being the same sort of thing that human intelligence is. Not even close. The point here is that it is a misnomer that renders the term intelligence meaningless. — creativesoul

How is AI different from human intelligence?

I believe that we will eventually build robots with consciousness. Do you really think that's impossible?
— GLEN willows

I do. It's not because consciousness is something that lies outside purely mechanical processes, but rather it's because consciousness is a muddled notion to begin with, Boolean logic consists of all true statements, inanimate objects have no emotion, emotion is part of thought and belief, and consciousness includes an ability to suspend one's judgment as well as change one's mind about things previously held true. That's just skimming the top of the problems involved with any claims of artificial 'intelligence'(scarequotes intentional). — creativesoul

Surely Chalmers would be aware that we already have a first person science: phenomenology. — Janus

He doesn't mention it in the essay we're talking about. 'Phenomenology' only appears in the references. The salient passage is this

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.

Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. A nonreductive theory of experience will add new principles to the furniture of the basic laws of nature. These basic principles will ultimately carry the explanatory burden in a theory of consciousness. Just as we explain familiar high-level phenomena involving mass in terms of more basic principles involving mass and other entities, we might explain familiar phenomena involving experience in terms of more basic principles involving experience and other entities.

In particular, a nonreductive theory of experience will specify basic principles telling us how experience depends on physical features of the world. These psychophysical principles will not interfere with physical laws, as it seems that physical laws already form a closed system. Rather, they will be a supplement to a physical theory. A physical theory gives a theory of physical processes, and a psychophysical theory tells us how those processes give rise to experience. We know that experience depends on physical processes, but we also know that this dependence cannot be derived from physical laws alone. The new basic principles postulated by a nonreductive theory give us the extra ingredient that we need to build an explanatory bridge.

Of course, by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place. But this is the same for any fundamental theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not count this against theories of matter. Certain features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory. A theory of matter can still explain all sorts of facts about matter, by showing how they are consequences of the basic laws. The same goes for a theory of experience.

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism.

Although the question this flags for me is, if these fundamental laws need to capture intentionality, then already they're significantly different from the kinds of laws we're familiar with from post-Galilean science.

And also, as you're presumably familiar with Husserl's criticism of naturalism, I think he would call into question the sense in which such a description could be 'entirely naturalistic'. But I suppose, in the Anglosphere in particular, if you stray from the 'entirely naturalistic', then you're already going out of bounds.

I sometimes think consciousness is like the old theory of ether. Consciousness is the ether through which thought takes place. Of course there is no ether.

OK, thanks for posting the passage from Chalmers. As you say there is no mention of phenomenology there, and also no mention of a 'first person science".

From the passage:

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental.

I think this goes without saying. Dennett and the Churchlands don't deny that we experience, and it seems obvious that any theory of consciousness must explain how consciousness (experience) is possible.

And this is an important point:

Of course, by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place.

Yes, a physical theory of consciousness would give an account of how experience is possible, as I said earlier, and not why we have experiences, or how those experiences seem (the latter being the province of phenomenology).

I sometimes think consciousness is like the old theory of ether. Consciousness is the ether through which thought takes place. Of course there is no ether. — Jackson

So, you seem to be saying there is no first person experience. In any case I think it is a poor analogy; there seems to be every reason to believe that consciousness is not a substance or substantive medium, but that it is a process.

So, you seem to be saying there is no first person experience. — Janus

No. I don't know how you inferred that.

there seems to be every reason to believe that consciousness is not a substance or substantive medium, but that it is a process. — Janus

Yes, that is what I am saying.