Is the charge pre-assigned to the electron as a property? Or is the charge created by the interaction? — Joshs

In pure set theory (a foundational theory of mathematics) every stuff is structurally a set whose identity is completely defined by its composition, that is by other sets (members) that compose the set. So two electrons are two sets and any relations between them are established by the properties of the compositions of the two sets. Electric charge would be one of the properties of the composition of the electron and electric force would be a (causal) relation between two electrons. Note however that electric force cannot be just a relation between two electrons but also between other sets that compose the structure of a set called spacetime.

Is the charge pre-assigned to the electron as a property? Or is the charge created by the interaction — Joshs

The charge is assigned. It's an inherent property. It's the mental load, so to speak. And this charge couples to "virtual" (they're not really virtual) particles (electric charge couples to "virtual" or real (which are just time extended virtual photon) photons).

So the mindcharge reaches out to other mindcharge. Which looks like two material particles interacting.

In QFT, charge is the generator of the A field. Which is kind of misleading as photons sre not generated by charge. Charge couples to already existing virtual photons, which is wrongly pictured as a photon being emitted.

Electric charge would be one of the properties of the composition of the electron and electric force would be a (causal) relation between two electrons. — litewave

This is the wrong way round.

But when we realize that the equations describe composition relations between stuffs then it becomes clear that the existence of stuffs is not only natural but also necessary for the existence of any relations. — litewave

This sounds like it’s leading toward a kind of panpsychism in the vein of Chalmers: all matter is composed of stuffs just as the psyche is composed of felt stuffs. But this elevating of stuffs to the position of fundamental basis of matter reifies rather than dissolves the hard problem.
There are no such things as stuffs , either in the form of subjective qualia or objective matter. Stuff is a derivative abstraction that has convenient uses in the sciences.

This is the wrong way round. — Hillary

Why? It actually seems consistent with what you wrote here:

There are no such things as stuffs , either in the form of subjective qualia or objective matter. Stuff is a derivative abstraction that has convenient uses in the sciences. — Joshs

By "stuff" I mean something that is not a relation. Are you saying that only relations exist? Or what exists?

Yes! You're right. I thought you see the interaction as a first, from which charge is derived. But they are a simultaneity, a contemporary.

How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1

As something different from the answers already provided, that biological evolution has taken place in no way specifies what does, and does not, have consciousness. First off, we know we have consciousness because we experientially know we are conscious (and not because biological evolution tells us so). Secondly, we infer that we acquired the specific forms of our consciousness via evolution. To which I say of course. But how can evolution explain if nematodes (which have a nervous system) have, or don’t have, consciousness? The same question can be asked of any other non-human lifeform, ameba included. Note: all I mean by “consciousness” here is “firsthand experience”.

The occurrence of evolution no more explains the occurrence of consciousness than does the occurrence of change: as in, consciousness occurs because change occurs. Which is to say, it holds no satisfactory explanations regarding the matter. Because it does not explain what does, and does not, have consciousness, it does not explain why consciousness is nor how consciousness comes to be wherever it does.

In general, I see stuffs (non-relations) and relations between them as inconceivable without each other, complementary to each other, and neither one as existentially prior to the other. Relations are expressions of properties of stuffs, and properties of stuffs are expressions of relations between stuffs, simultaneously and eternally. Even in spacetime, which is an eternal (timeless) stuff like any other as time is just a special kind of space (as described in theory of relativity).

@litewave, @javra @Hillary @Joshs @Paine
And when linked to the idea of p-zombies, it may not be a necessity to have "what it's like" aspects to processes.. It is conceivable that animal processes (like nervous systems) can do the exact same things we can measure now, but WITHOUT the attendant "what it's like" inner aspect to it. Of course that is debatable. If it IS a necessity, then we must understand WHY they are intrinsically linked. THAT is the question at hand.

And when linked to the idea of p-zombies, it may not be a necessity to have "what it's like" aspects to processes.. It is conceivable that animal processes (like nervous systems) can do the exact same things we can measure now, but WITHOUT the attendant "what it's like" inner aspect to it. Of course that is debatable. If it IS a necessity, then we must understand WHY they are intrinsically linked. THAT is the question at hand. — schopenhauer1

I think the 'what is it like' concept is either incoherent or meaningless. From Nagel's paper, the concept he tried to explain does not really make sense.

P-zombies would be like relations without stuffs, which seems inconceivable to me. Relations alone would be relations between what? Between nothings? Granted, there are relations between relations but if they are not ultimately grounded in stuffs (non-relations), they seem undefined, meaningless.

I think the 'what is it like' concept is either incoherent or meaningless. From Nagel's paper, the concept he tried to explain does not really make sense. — Jackson

Why do you think that is the case?

P-zombies would be like relations without stuffs, which seems inconceivable to me. Relations alone would be relations between what? Between nothings? Granted, there are relations between relations but if they are not ultimately grounded in stuffs (non-relations), they seem undefined, meaningless. — litewave

It's all saying the same thing.. which is basically..
X (object process) from the "inside"/metaphysical is experiential and outside is "objectified"/viewed/measured/epistemological thing.

Why do you think that is the case? — schopenhauer1

Nagel asks, What is it like to be a bat?

What is it like to be me? I am the things I do and think about. What's the mystery?
Nagel thinks bats are so different from humans that we cannot understand bats. But do we know what is like to be a human; to be what one is? No, not any better than what it is like to be a bat.

It's all saying the same thing.. which is basically..
X (object process) from the "inside" is experiential and outside is "objectified" thing. — schopenhauer1

Yes, from the "inside" it is the stuff it is, and from the "outside" it has relations to other stuffs. (some of the other stuffs can be regarded as "correlates of consciousness")

Nagel asks, What is it like to be a bat?

What is it like to be me? I am the things I do and think about. What's the mystery?
Nagel thinks bats are so different from humans that we cannot understand bats. But do we know what is like to be a human; to be what one is? No, not any better than what it is like to be a bat. — Jackson

I don't think that was his main point that we can't know what it's like to be a bat. Rather it is the idea that there IS a "what it's like to be a bat", EVEN if we don't know exactly what that means. We can sort of speculate (sonar-based, etc.) just like dogs are more smell-based, etc. We can speculate they don't have conceptual thinking etc. but there IS an inner aspect. What is THAT inner aspect? That is the thing to be explained in consciousness.

I don't think that was his main point that we can't know what it's like to be a bat. Rather it is the idea that there IS a "what it's like to be a bat", EVEN if we don't know exactly what that means. — schopenhauer1

That is what I am disagreeing with. I don't know what it's like to be the person standing in front of me at the bank, either.

Yes, from the "inside" it is the stuff it is, and from the "outside" it has relations to other stuffs. — litewave

But of course, this doesn't explain much either. It just posits that the "inner aspect" is spread around to everything. It is a position.. an Idealist or Panpsychist one.. but as far as we know, only nervous systems would seem to be correlated with an "inner aspect". Doesn't mean it's true but it does seem odd to say that this dirt or that plant has inner aspects to it. But anything is possible I guess when discussing metaphysics.

there IS an inner aspect. What is THAT inner aspect? That is the thing to be explained in consciousness. — schopenhauer1

Yes, exactly what I am disputing.

That is what I am disagreeing with. I don't know what it's like to be the person standing in front of me at the bank, either. — Jackson

Ok, but that isn't his main point.. THAT there is an inner aspect is the problem at hand, not "How is this inner aspect different than mine". The difference of inner aspect doesn't discount that there is an inner aspect.

THAT there is an inner aspect is the problem at hand, — schopenhauer1

Again, do not agree. My point is that "inner aspect" is vague or incoherent.

Nagel's point is that a human can know what is like to be a human but not a bat. I do not agree.

My point is that "inner aspect" is vague or incoherent. — Jackson

It's the most immediate thing.. Unless you ARE a zombie.. you DO have "what it feels like" aspects (tastes, colors, thoughts, emotions, motives, goals, imagination etc.).

It's the most immediate thing.. Unless you ARE a zombie.. you DO have "what it feels like" aspects (tastes, colors, thoughts, emotions, motives, goals, imagination etc.). — schopenhauer1

I see red. I don't feel myself seeing red.

I see red. I don't feel myself seeing red. — Jackson

"I" see red. That's all you need in my book to confirm an inner aspect (other than me actually getting inside your head).

Assuming that a dolphin has firsthand experience of its species-specific senses, what is it like for the dolphin to perceive its surroundings via echolocation? Or for the homing pigeon to perceive the skies via magnetoception? And so forth. It converges the experience of sense-dependent phenomena we ourselves do not experience with the experience of understanding these phenomena in manners that allow the organism to function. This as occurs in firsthand experience.

That’s my understanding of the phrase.

For instance, assuming that a homing pigeon has firsthand experiences of the world, I have no idea what a homing pigeon's awareness of the Earth's magnetic field is like. But I know it wouldn't be visual in the way that I visually perceive the world - for I don't have perceptual awareness of the Earth's magnetic field, be it visually or in any other manner.

"I" see red. That's all you need in my book to confirm an inner aspect (other than me actually getting inside your head). — schopenhauer1

Sorry, I don't follow. The designations of inner and outer do not seem correct.

So when presenting someone not familiar with the hard problem, or even has really grasped it (and is not of a mystical bent), they will quickly answer: "Because evolution has created it!" when asked, "Why is it we have sensations, thoughts, feelings associated with physical processes?".

How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1

This is, again, confusing the how with the why question by those who answer the question that way. They're answering the how thinking they're providing the why answer. Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc.

Sorry, I don't follow. The designations of inner and outer do not seem correct. — Jackson

Then this is foolish. The fact that you "see" a color is the question. Why is there "seeing of color", and not just neurons firing and wavelengths of light being filtered etc.? The processes have a "feels like" or "inner aspect". You can say THAT "seeing red" IS the process but then the question is why is THAT process one that has a "sees red" aspect and not other physical processes?

This is, again, confusing the how with the why question by those who answer the question that way. They're answering the how thinking they're providing the why answer. Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc. — L'éléphant

Yep, I agree.