Is the charge pre-assigned to the electron as a property? Or is the charge created by the interaction? — Joshs
Is the charge pre-assigned to the electron as a property? Or is the charge created by the interaction — Joshs
But when we realize that the equations describe composition relations between stuffs then it becomes clear that the existence of stuffs is not only natural but also necessary for the existence of any relations. — litewave
There are no such things as stuffs , either in the form of subjective qualia or objective matter. Stuff is a derivative abstraction that has convenient uses in the sciences. — Joshs
How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1
And when linked to the idea of p-zombies, it may not be a necessity to have "what it's like" aspects to processes.. It is conceivable that animal processes (like nervous systems) can do the exact same things we can measure now, but WITHOUT the attendant "what it's like" inner aspect to it. Of course that is debatable. If it IS a necessity, then we must understand WHY they are intrinsically linked. THAT is the question at hand. — schopenhauer1
I think the 'what is it like' concept is either incoherent or meaningless. From Nagel's paper, the concept he tried to explain does not really make sense. — Jackson
P-zombies would be like relations without stuffs, which seems inconceivable to me. Relations alone would be relations between what? Between nothings? Granted, there are relations between relations but if they are not ultimately grounded in stuffs (non-relations), they seem undefined, meaningless. — litewave
Why do you think that is the case? — schopenhauer1
It's all saying the same thing.. which is basically..
X (object process) from the "inside" is experiential and outside is "objectified" thing. — schopenhauer1
Nagel asks, What is it like to be a bat?
What is it like to be me? I am the things I do and think about. What's the mystery?
Nagel thinks bats are so different from humans that we cannot understand bats. But do we know what is like to be a human; to be what one is? No, not any better than what it is like to be a bat. — Jackson
I don't think that was his main point that we can't know what it's like to be a bat. Rather it is the idea that there IS a "what it's like to be a bat", EVEN if we don't know exactly what that means. — schopenhauer1
Yes, from the "inside" it is the stuff it is, and from the "outside" it has relations to other stuffs. — litewave
there IS an inner aspect. What is THAT inner aspect? That is the thing to be explained in consciousness. — schopenhauer1
That is what I am disagreeing with. I don't know what it's like to be the person standing in front of me at the bank, either. — Jackson
THAT there is an inner aspect is the problem at hand, — schopenhauer1
My point is that "inner aspect" is vague or incoherent. — Jackson
It's the most immediate thing.. Unless you ARE a zombie.. you DO have "what it feels like" aspects (tastes, colors, thoughts, emotions, motives, goals, imagination etc.). — schopenhauer1
I see red. I don't feel myself seeing red. — Jackson
"I" see red. That's all you need in my book to confirm an inner aspect (other than me actually getting inside your head). — schopenhauer1
This is, again, confusing the how with the why question by those who answer the question that way. They're answering the how thinking they're providing the why answer. Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc.So when presenting someone not familiar with the hard problem, or even has really grasped it (and is not of a mystical bent), they will quickly answer: "Because evolution has created it!" when asked, "Why is it we have sensations, thoughts, feelings associated with physical processes?".
How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1
Sorry, I don't follow. The designations of inner and outer do not seem correct. — Jackson
This is, again, confusing the how with the why question by those who answer the question that way. They're answering the how thinking they're providing the why answer. Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc. — L'éléphant
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