Yep. I think this has been said by a few folk here when Nagel's stuff comes up. Personally I have no idea what it means to be 'like' me.

seems his whole idea of "like" is vague or inchoherent. — Jackson

Nothing is more clear to me than what it is like to eat an apple while I'm eating an apple.

A bubble exists where things are similar and same. I and the fly are similar, but also dissimilar; sometimes we are the same, but at other times we are not.

I and the fly are

like — Nagel

another at times where we are similar and same- which, is all the time within the bubble from a bubbled perspective.

We are both life- but let's not assume we know what life is, let's give it definition...

An analogy: a creator looks at all his creation as his creation, all individuals of his creation are thus, like, but from their perspective, it is how they are similar and same in a bubble(simple, really).

There are things we aren't like(are there?)- at all. They are not part of this universe.

:up:

I've always found Nagel's intuition pump (Dennett) "what is it like to be a bat" to be incoherent. The problematic "like to be" presupposes a comparison, but to what? No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point: an individual human being, like an individual bat, does not "know" what it is like to be other than what s/he, or it, is, so there's no comparison, or differentiation, from the inside-out, so to speak. — 180 Proof

Yes, I agree that 'what it is like-ness' is a very awkward and indirect expression. I think a much more succinct word for what he is trying to describe is simply 'being'. That comes out especially clearly in David Chalmer's related essay, Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, which is mainly about the problem of describing the subjective nature of experience, that experiences are always 'had' by a subject. But the subject is never something amenable to objective description or analysis, for the very good reason that it's not an object.

No, my friend, for the reason that "subjective experiences" are not objective; to require that subjectivity be described objectively is a category mistake, which is why (most contemporary philosophers (of mind) and almost all cognitive neuroscientists) consider Chalmer's "Hard Problem" a pseudo-problem.

Nothing is more clear to me than what it is like to eat an apple while I'm eating an apple. — Hanover

It's like other times you have eaten an apple, which is like other times you have eaten fruit, which is like eating sausages, which is like drinking, which is like other things you do with your mouth, which is like other things you do with your hands...

"What it is like to..." is usually a relation, but in Nagel it tries to become an individual, and hence a 'qual"; the result is a confusion. That's part of the criticism in Quining Qualia

But the subject is never something amenable to objective description or analysis, for the very good reason that it's not an object. — Wayfarer

The concept of the subject is a modern notion. Aristotle uses the word "subject" only in the context of grammar.

But the subject is never something amenable to objective description or analysis, for the very good reason that it's not an object. — Wayfarer

Isn't this so indicative of the conceptual confusion around subject and object; when the subject is the object?

As it stands, I'm immediately turned off any post mentioning "subject", "subjectivity", or "objectivity". Too much baggage. Too much garbage.

Personally I have no idea what it means to be 'like' me. — Tom Storm

The experience of being you holisticaly is to have the various individual experiences of being you. Whatever your holistic phenomenal state is right now could be imagined subtracting out any particular experience. That is, I could imagine what it'd be like to not be playing on my phone and therefore not being me as I currently am.

The concept of likeness isn't complicated, awkward, or elusive. I can know what things are like and not like, even though I'm just one perceiver.

To be like something for which I have no reference, though, is impossible, like being a bat. I do know what it'd be like though not to be me insofar as I've experienced other states I'm currently not experiencing. But, to jettison the concept of likeness as incoherent because all you've ever been is you simply isn't correct.

But, to jettison the concept of likeness as incoherent because all you've ever been is you simply isn't correct. — Hanover

When I read his article my reaction was, why am I supposed to know what it is like to be me?
Familiarity is not knowledge.

It's like other times you have eaten an apple, — Banno

It's actually like eating a pear, which would be a good cross reference to use to describe to you my experience if you lacked it and needed it

I'm immediately turned off any post mentioning "subject", "subjectivity", or "objectivity". Too much baggage. — Banno

Accordingly I’ll do you the courtesy of not answering your question.

Aristotle uses the word "subject" only in the context of grammar. — Jackson

He also says that one of the major themes of the metaphysics is the analysis of the different meanings of the verb ‘to be’.

He also says that one of the major themes of the metaphysics is the analysis of the different meanings of the verb ‘to be’. — Wayfarer

Yes, but not as a function of subjectivity.

Accodiringly I’ll do you the courtesy of not answering your question. — Wayfarer

Rein forcing my conviction that subjective and objective mark a lack of conceptual clarity.

The experience of being you holisticaly is to have the various individual experiences of being you. — Hanover

That, as explanations go, is not the best. Made me laugh, though.

To be like something for which I have no reference, though, is impossible, like being a bat. — Hanover

But one can easily imagine what it would be like to fly at night using sound to "see". So that does not seem right.

Bat
At evening, sitting on this terrace,
When the sun from the west, beyond Pisa, beyond the mountains of Carrara
Departs, and the world is taken by surprise ...

When the tired flower of Florence is in gloom beneath the glowing
Brown hills surrounding ...

When under the arches of the Ponte Vecchio
A green light enters against stream, flush from the west,
Against the current of obscure Arno ...

Look up, and you see things flying
Between the day and the night;
Swallows with spools of dark thread sewing the shadows together.

A circle swoop, and a quick parabola under the bridge arches
Where light pushes through;
A sudden turning upon itself of a thing in the air.
A dip to the water.

And you think:
"The swallows are flying so late!"

Swallows?

Dark air-life looping
Yet missing the pure loop ...
A twitch, a twitter, an elastic shudder in flight
And serrated wings against the sky,
Like a glove, a black glove thrown up at the light,
And falling back.

Never swallows!
Bats!
The swallows are gone.

At a wavering instant the swallows gave way to bats
By the Ponte Vecchio ...
Changing guard.

Bats, and an uneasy creeping in one's scalp
As the bats swoop overhead!
Flying madly.

Pipistrello!
Black piper on an infinitesimal pipe.
Little lumps that fly in air and have voices indefinite, wildly vindictive;

Wings like bits of umbrella.

Bats!

Creatures that hang themselves up like an old rag, to sleep;
And disgustingly upside down.

Hanging upside down like rows of disgusting old rags
And grinning in their sleep.
Bats!

In China the bat is symbol for happiness.

Not for me! — D. H Lawrence

Some people know how to use the word 'quale' and find it apt - if awkward and mootable. Some people don't know how to use the word 'quale' and find it absurd.

It remains true that the word 'quale' can be used.

It has a use - it can be used - so what's the big deal?

It remains true that the word 'quale' can be used. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why mention my name? I said nothing about quale.

No, my friend, for the reason that "subjective experiences" are not objective; to require that subjectivity be described objectively is a category mistake, which is why (many philosophers and almost all cognitive neuroscientists consider) Chalmer's "Hard Problem" a pseudo-problem — 180 Proof

I take this as distinct from what @Banno us saying. He seems to deny the subjective/objective distinction, arguing (in other threads) that reference to the experience of the cup and the cup are not to be divided into separate entities.

Here, you intentionally or not, admit to a dualism, claiming two categories, each with their distinct vocabulary. That is there are (1) cups and (2) experiences of cups, just the latter are not to be described in the language of the former.

That, as explanations go, is not the best. Made me laugh, though. — Banno

That the whole is comprised of its parts is a pretty basic explanation.

But one can easily imagine what it would be like to fly at night using sound to "see". So that does not seem right. — Banno

Thanks for the poem, but I think there's quite a distance between that and what the reality would be.

I'm referring to other people's (e.g. Chalmer's, Nagel's, McGinn's) dualism. @Banno is spot on; the subjective-objective distinction and the subsequent "problem" of describing one in terms of – reduced to – the other is incoherent (i.e. category mistake).

It has a use - it can be used - so what's the big deal? — ZzzoneiroCosm

The big deal is that folk are mislead by misused language.

In this case, how exactly is "experiencing a red qual" different from "seeing red"? I'm not asking for an answer, since there is a plethora of posts and indeed treads on the topic. But what is germane is the common use of "like" in "What it is like to be a bat" and "What it is like to see red".

There is nothing "it is like" to see red or to be a bat; there is just seeing red, and being a bat.

There is nothing "it is like" to see red or to be a bat; there is just seeing red, and being a bat. — Banno

Yes, agree with that.

The big deal is that folk are mislead by misused language. — Banno

You just don't know how or don't want to play their game.

Yes. Because it is associated with an idealist or anti-realist metaphysics that I reject. That's the point.

Because it is associated with an idealist or anti-realist metaphysics that I reject. That's the point. — Banno

If Wittgenstein put an end to metaphysics, why are you still playing the realism game?

Seems like a waste of your time and talents.

But the game can be played.

If you reject the game of chess, you just stop playing it. You don't get on a soapbox about it - unless you're a very odd sort of fanatic. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What is this "game?"

I thought you thought Wittgenstein ended metaphysics. No?

What is this "game?" — Jackson

Language games a la Wittgenstein. Banno is the forum expert on it. It's just a sideshow to me.

Language games a la Wittgenstein. Banno is the forum expert on it. It's just a sideshow to me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Ok, thanks for clarifying.

Sure. But the game can be played. If you reject the game of chess you just stop playing it. You don't get on a soapbox about it - unless you're a very odd sort of fanatic.