From that, you can see the Buddhist influence on his thinking even if he's not a Buddhist.

"The hard problem" is a pseudo-problem due to assuming an unwarranted confusion / conflation of an ontological duality with semantic duality compounded subsequently by observing that polar opposite terms "subjectivity" and "objectivity" cannot be described in terms of one another, which amounts to framing the "problem" based on a category mistake. There isn't an "hard problem" to begin with, schop. — 180 Proof

Why is that framing the problem based on a category mistake? There exists qualitative aspects to things. This exists in what we know (ourselves), more broadly (humans), and even more broadly (other sentient life forms). How is it that that phenomena fits into the structure of material processes?

Really, I see the hard problems as a direct critique at Materialism. Materialism proposes that everything is material or abstractions of material. There is no room for "inner aspects" because that itself is not material. The map becomes confused with the territory. Or perhaps, the territory has no room for the specific kind of territory and we are back to square one.

If you go and say "but material can be inner aspects" the question is "how". If you say "illusion" that has to be accounted for. If you say that physical is qualitative, then you become a sort of panpsychist or idealist and no longer a materialist. It's more tricky than you are letting on.

Are pure sets transcendent foundations in math, like platonic essences? — Joshs

Pure sets are collections built up from non-composite objects called empty sets. Collections can be concrete or general (Platonic), same difference as between concrete trees and a general (Platonic) tree. General tree is a property of concrete trees. Mathematical objects can be expressed by both concrete and general collections.

The statement that “all mathematical descriptions are reducible to pure sets” sounds very final and eternal, as if it must always be thus. — Joshs

Pure set theory is regarded as a foundation for mathematics because all known mathematical objects can be expressed as pure sets.

He [Chalmers] merely states that it is not hard to imagine creatures on another world living as we do today and doing what we do yet having no consciousness whatsoever... — I like sushi

Regarding Quote 01 above, do I correctly characterize it as a description of the behaviorism resultant of high-level, automatic, chemical-mechanical processes?

From there it is then a question of asking what is the difference between us and them. — I like sushi

Regarding Quote 02 above, I answer by declaring we humans, unlike the automatons, possess a self who, described functionally, maintains a personal POV of events as reported via the senses & the cogitating mind.

This leads me to my approach to The Hard Problem.

How does our scientific process, based mainly within objectivism, render an objective profile of subjectivity? In facing The Hard Problem, have we arrived at the limit of scientific objectivism?

Speaking traditionally, is not the academically objective rendering of subjective experience normally handled by denizens of the literary components of English Departments i.e. by the novelist?

The novel, however, does not normally delve into the how of rendering subjective experience objectively, or does it?

Disciplines such as structuralism & semiotics, derided by many as false scientification of the humanites, as I'm seeing them just now in context of this discussion, lean towards an objective assessment of subjectivity.

One of the pillars of the objective assessment of subjectivity is self-reference & self-referentiality.

If cognitive science has ascended to the level of analyzing the second-order feedback looping that substrates a self regarding first-order baseline feedback looping, then self-referentiality is now in the crosshairs of scientific objectivism.

What about the consciousness that comprises the inner, emotional life of the experiencing self?

Can that consciousness be objectified without it turning its observer-receiver into a clone of itself?

Must the individualized self soldier on through life in its unique & solitary bubble of selfhood?

Regarding Quote 02 above, I answer by declaring we humans, unlike the automatons, possess a self who, described functionally, maintains a personal POV of events as reported via the senses & the cogitating mind. — ucarr

That is the problem. Where is the physical evidence for consciousness? What does ‘consciousness’ do? This is in light of understanding that it is perfectly for a philosophical zombie to exist (without disrupting our understanding of nature).

This and what you say after leads directly to Husserl:

How does our scientific process, based mainly within objectivism, render an objective profile of subjectivity? In facing The Hard Problem, have we arrived at the limit of scientific objectivism? — ucarr

.

Generally there are attempts made by cognitive neuroscientists adopting phenomenological approaches (Husserl’s phenomenology). I believe Husserl was on the only rational track but it by no means extinguishes the Hard Problem just frames it in a different light that allows some form of possible approach to aspects within it or related to it.

My personal view is that it is more likely a problem of definitions and/or category errors. Subjectivity can not be ‘given’ to another as someone else cannot be someone different. Piecing together the intersubjectivity does allow us to shed some light but I think it is ridiculous to believe we can ‘know’ in any complete sense and so the Hard Problem is more or less an extension where epistemic questions can play around.

That is the problem. Where is the physical evidence for consciousness?
What does ‘consciousness’ do? This is in light of understanding that it is perfectly [sic] for a philosophical zombie to exist (without disrupting our understanding of nature). — I like sushi

I've already stated my response to your questions above. Here they are again.

One of the pillars of the objective assessment of subjectivity is self-reference & self-referentiality.

If cognitive science has ascended to the level of analyzing the second-order feedback looping that substrates a self regarding first-order baseline feedback looping, then self-referentiality is now in the crosshairs of scientific objectivism. — ucarr

Subjectivity can not be ‘given’ to another as someone else cannot be someone different. — I like sushi

We're on the same page here, as I've also said something similar,

What about the consciousness that comprises the inner, emotional life of the experiencing self?

Can that consciousness be objectified without it turning its observer-receiver into a clone of itself? — ucarr

Piecing together the intersubjectivity does allow us to shed some light — I like sushi

Our fellow member Joshs is pushing hard along this line of attack upon The Hard Problem.

My personal view is that it is more likely a problem of definitions and/or category errors. — I like sushi

Yes. The intersubjectivity of the subjective/objective divide sounds to me like a gnarly paradox. However, ascension to a 4D selfhood might enable the effecting of some type of Vulcan mind meld (don't laugh too loudly!)

So when presenting someone not familiar with the hard problem, or even has really grasped it (and is not of a mystical bent), they will quickly answer: "Because evolution has created it!" when asked, "Why is it we have sensations, thoughts, feelings associated with physical processes?".

How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? Can this be seen as answering it, — schopenhauer1

The point of the hard problem is to call attention to the fact that the subjective aspect of consciousness needs an explanation.

It may be that it's a result of evolution. We first need to understand how it works, though. After that we can work on how evolution is involved.

Really, I see the hard problems as a direct critique at Materialism. Materialism proposes that everything is material or abstractions of material. There is no room for "inner aspects" because that itself is not material. — schopenhauer1

It's not opposed to materialism. It's a call for an expansion of what counts as material.

It's not opposed to materialism. It's a call for an expansion of what counts as material. — Tate

What is that expansion?

Here's my conjecture,

One of the pillars of the objective assessment of subjectivity is self-reference & self-referentiality.

If cognitive science has ascended to the level of analyzing the second-order feedback looping that substrates a self regarding first-order baseline feedback looping, then self-referentiality is now in the crosshairs of scientific objectivism. — ucarr

If cognitive science has ascended to the level of analyzing the second-order feedback looping that substrates a self regarding first-order baseline feedback looping, then self-referentiality is now in the crosshairs of scientific objectivism. — ucarr

Afraid I did not understand that. Could you expand a little?

A feedback loop is a physical-material memory structure of the brain. At the first order level of feedback looping, you get the behaviorism that Chalmers uses as evidence that neuro-science hasn't created a material model for the self.

I'm theorizing that the self, by definition self-referential (please bear with the circularity here, as circularity lies at the heart of memory functions), doesn't appear in a materialist-objectivist model until the second order of feedback looping that, in a vertical structure, rides atop first order feedback looping. In short, the self is the reflection of the first order behaviorist automaton, and thus this automaton individualizes over time as it examines ever more thoroughly the reflections of its automaton self.

This tells us that philosophy, which promotes self-examination, culminates in the individual, the apotheosis of human identity, according to western-hemispheric culture.

A feedback loop is a physical-material memory structure of the brain. At the first order level of feedback looping, you get the behaviorism that Chalmers uses as evidence that neuro-science hasn't created a material model for the self.

I'm theorizing that the self, by definition self-referential (please bear with the circularity here, as circularity lies at the heart of memory functions), doesn't appear in a materialist-objectivist model until the second order of feedback looping that, in a vertical structure, rides atop first order feedback looping. In short, the self is the reflection of the first order behaviorist automaton, and thus this automaton individualizes over time as it examines ever more thoroughly the reflections of its automaton self.

This tells us that philosophy, which promotes self-examination, culminates in the individual, the apotheosis of human identity, according to western-hemispheric culture.

Nietzsche, in my opinion, has taken the worship of individuality to a madman's extreme. — ucarr

Thanks, that helps. I did not get the second part about the feedback loop and connection to individualism and Nietzsche.

Why is that framing the problem based on a category mistake? — schopenhauer1

As pointed out

... "subjectivity" and "objectivity" [ ... ] described in terms of one another ... — 180 Proof

How is it that that phenomena fits into the structure of material processes?

I don't understand the question.

Really, I see the hard problems as a direct critique at Materialism.

As a pseudo-problem it fails as a "critique".

Materialism proposes that everything is material or abstractions of material.

What do you understand "material" means in "materialism"?

There is no room for "inner aspects" because that itself is not material.

What does "inner aspects" refer to? Are you implying that these "inner aspects" do not affect the "material"? If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with respect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no?

If you go and say "but material can be inner aspects" the question is "how".

At most (if your terms are coherent), a scientific problem and not a philosophical question.

If you say "illusion" that has to be accounted for.

See previous reply.

If you say that physical  is qualitative, then you become a sort of panpsychist or idealist and no longer a materialist.

Incoherent muddle. "Physical" =/= "material" (i.e. event-patterns =/= events).

I'm theorizing that the self, by definition self-referential (please bear with the circularity here, as circularity lies at the heart of memory functions), doesn't appear in a materialist-objectivist model until the second order of feedback looping that, in a vertical structure, rides atop first order feedback looping. In short, the self is the reflection of the first order behaviorist automaton, and thus this automaton individualizes over time as it examines ever more thoroughly the reflections of its automaton self. — ucarr

:cool: This reminds me of Damasio's "core self" and Hofstadter's "strange loop".

If you want to explain the hard problem to John Doe, just ask him which animals and which plants feel something.

Obviously, it's not a bogus problem because it affects people's behavior, one is an animal rights activist, another is an animal abuser, the next doesn't care.

I suppose this is a textbook case of ignoratio elenchi (missing the point).

The hard problem of consciousness is, in question form, can science (ever) explain consciousness?

"Because evolution created it."

:roll:

If you want to explain the hard problem to John Doe, just ask him which animals and which plants feel something.

Obviously, it's not a bogus problem because it affects people's behavior, one is an animal rights activist, another is an animal abuser, the next doesn't care. — SolarWind

This puts a moral frame around it. That works.

What do understand by "material" means in "materialism"? — 180 Proof

Well yeah, obviously this is a main question and what I meant by:

The map becomes confused with the territory. Or perhaps, the territory has no room for the specific kind of territory and we are back to square one. — schopenhauer1

At most (if your terms are coherent), a scientific problem and not a philosophical question. — 180 Proof

If it is, then scientific methods have set up inquiries into why qualitative things like "seeing red" are one and the same with the physical substrates/processes whilst not ADDING IN the consequent in the premise. That is to say, not commit the homuncular fallacy

What does "inner aspects" refer to? Are you implying that these "inner aspects" do not affect the "material"? If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with tespect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no? — 180 Proof

I'm not implying that. I'm only saying there is an inner aspect and what is the nature of "inner aspect" as opposed to things that do not have an inner aspect. That is to say, does a plant have an inner aspect? Why not? Does a primitive animal have an inner aspect? Why? If it does, what about that phenomenon makes it have the nature "inner aspect" as opposed to other processes. If you read that correctly I am not saying what processes are indicative of the inner aspect (i.e. these features means consciousness is present) but rather why those features have inner aspect phenomenon while others do not.

Your question oddly presupposes panpsychism.. as you almost assuming that material MUST have inner aspect.

Incoherent muddle. "Physical" =/= "material" (i.e. event-patterns =/= events). — 180 Proof

Don't know how to read this other than you hold some view of events that is supposedly outside the scope of the hard problem, but probably is anyways.

It's not opposed to materialism. It's a call for an expansion of what counts as material. — Tate

True enough, but then we would come to conclusions like panpsychism which normally isn't considered materialism.

True enough, but then we would come to conclusions like panpsychism which normally isn't considered materialism. — schopenhauer1

The old materialism will fall by the way. A new one will take its place.

True enough, but then we would come to conclusions like panpsychism which normally isn't considered materialism. — schopenhauer1

Most panpsychists criticize physicalism.

I did not introduce the notion of "inner aspects" – whether or not entities have "inner aspects" – you did, schop1, and thereby the "oddly presupposed panpsychism" is your dilemma / inconsistency not mine. As for my shorthand, my apology for abbreviating what seems obvious in reply to your question. Restated it means: you use "physical" and "material" as synonyms and in this context their (technical) difference matters with respect to the level of analysis, namely that "material" corresponds to data and "physical" to structure (i.e. structured data). Your casual equivalence I find confusing.

NB: Apologies for the typos in my previous post; I've been sleep deprived lately.

I did not introduce the notion of "inner aspects" – whether or not entities have "inner aspects" – you did, schop1, and thereby the "oddly presupposed panpsychism" is your dilemma / inconsistency not mine. — 180 Proof

You said:

If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with respect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no? — 180 Proof

You are the one who seems to be saying "material" has "what it's like" (inner aspect) qualities. I am only working with what you are giving. My guess is anything else you might provide (illusion, map not the territory) has been addressed, but go tell me how I'm not getting something you are saying... Again, working with the responses you are giving me.

Most panpsychists criticize physicalism. — Jackson

Right, which is why I said it was odd he seemed to be providing this claim (that matter has inner aspects/conscious aspects). We know inner aspects exist NOT that material thus has inner/conscious aspects. That is jumping to the conclusion before explaining how. At least in @180 Proof debate with me here.

Nice try. "Inner aspects" is all you, schop1.

Nice try. "Inner aspects" is all you, schop1. — 180 Proof

So what would you say instead? We don't see red? We don't have emotions? Why would you deny that we have "inner aspects" of "what it's like to be..."?

I do not "deny" incoherent notions, I only question why you persist in woo-of-the-gaps nonsense (e.g. cartesian / kantian dualism, pan-woo-woo-ism, etc).

There exists qualitative aspects to things. — schopenhauer1

This is similar to saying that there is a relational aspect to things. Saying it like this closes the divide between physical and mental things. The hard problem is only a problem for dualists and physicalists, or those that believe the world is composed of a quantity of static objects independent of other things and then try to reconcile that with the qualitative aspect of the perception of quantities of static objects.

The hard problem is only a problem for dualists and physicalists, or those that believe the world is composed of a quantity of static objects independent of other things and then try to reconcile that with the qualitative aspect of the perception of quantities of static objects. — Harry Hindu

Things "relating" to one another does not entail qualitative aspects, unless from the start, that is your metaphysics.. aka panpsychists. That is fine, but that is basically what it is. If all relations have a qualitative aspect, then ok, that's your position. If only some relations have a qualitative aspect, then it is that which still has to be explained. You cannot get around this. Whether "process", "event" or "object" or combination thereof.. the problem remains as none of that entails qualitative aspects. It is not WOO either. I already mentioned the problem earlier and you are not refuting it:

The map becomes confused with the territory. Or perhaps, the territory has no room for the specific kind of territory and we are back to square one.

If you go and say "but material can be inner aspects" the question is "how". If you say "illusion" that has to be accounted for. If you say that physical is qualitative, then you become a sort of panpsychist or idealist and no longer a materialist. It's more tricky than you are letting on. — schopenhauer1

What do you mean by "qualitative aspects"? :roll: