"The hard problem" is a pseudo-problem due to assuming an unwarranted confusion / conflation of an ontological duality with semantic duality compounded subsequently by observing that polar opposite terms "subjectivity" and "objectivity" cannot be described in terms of one another, which amounts to framing the "problem" based on a category mistake. There isn't an "hard problem" to begin with, schop. — 180 Proof
Are pure sets transcendent foundations in math, like platonic essences? — Joshs
The statement that “all mathematical descriptions are reducible to pure sets” sounds very final and eternal, as if it must always be thus. — Joshs
He [Chalmers] merely states that it is not hard to imagine creatures on another world living as we do today and doing what we do yet having no consciousness whatsoever... — I like sushi
From there it is then a question of asking what is the difference between us and them. — I like sushi
Regarding Quote 02 above, I answer by declaring we humans, unlike the automatons, possess a self who, described functionally, maintains a personal POV of events as reported via the senses & the cogitating mind. — ucarr
.How does our scientific process, based mainly within objectivism, render an objective profile of subjectivity? In facing The Hard Problem, have we arrived at the limit of scientific objectivism? — ucarr
That is the problem. Where is the physical evidence for consciousness?
What does ‘consciousness’ do? This is in light of understanding that it is perfectly [sic] for a philosophical zombie to exist (without disrupting our understanding of nature). — I like sushi
One of the pillars of the objective assessment of subjectivity is self-reference & self-referentiality.
If cognitive science has ascended to the level of analyzing the second-order feedback looping that substrates a self regarding first-order baseline feedback looping, then self-referentiality is now in the crosshairs of scientific objectivism. — ucarr
Subjectivity can not be ‘given’ to another as someone else cannot be someone different. — I like sushi
What about the consciousness that comprises the inner, emotional life of the experiencing self?
Can that consciousness be objectified without it turning its observer-receiver into a clone of itself? — ucarr
Piecing together the intersubjectivity does allow us to shed some light — I like sushi
My personal view is that it is more likely a problem of definitions and/or category errors. — I like sushi
So when presenting someone not familiar with the hard problem, or even has really grasped it (and is not of a mystical bent), they will quickly answer: "Because evolution has created it!" when asked, "Why is it we have sensations, thoughts, feelings associated with physical processes?".
How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? Can this be seen as answering it, — schopenhauer1
Really, I see the hard problems as a direct critique at Materialism. Materialism proposes that everything is material or abstractions of material. There is no room for "inner aspects" because that itself is not material. — schopenhauer1
One of the pillars of the objective assessment of subjectivity is self-reference & self-referentiality.
If cognitive science has ascended to the level of analyzing the second-order feedback looping that substrates a self regarding first-order baseline feedback looping, then self-referentiality is now in the crosshairs of scientific objectivism. — ucarr
If cognitive science has ascended to the level of analyzing the second-order feedback looping that substrates a self regarding first-order baseline feedback looping, then self-referentiality is now in the crosshairs of scientific objectivism. — ucarr
A feedback loop is a physical-material memory structure of the brain. At the first order level of feedback looping, you get the behaviorism that Chalmers uses as evidence that neuro-science hasn't created a material model for the self.
I'm theorizing that the self, by definition self-referential (please bear with the circularity here, as circularity lies at the heart of memory functions), doesn't appear in a materialist-objectivist model until the second order of feedback looping that, in a vertical structure, rides atop first order feedback looping. In short, the self is the reflection of the first order behaviorist automaton, and thus this automaton individualizes over time as it examines ever more thoroughly the reflections of its automaton self.
This tells us that philosophy, which promotes self-examination, culminates in the individual, the apotheosis of human identity, according to western-hemispheric culture.
Nietzsche, in my opinion, has taken the worship of individuality to a madman's extreme. — ucarr
As pointed outWhy is that framing the problem based on a category mistake? — schopenhauer1
... "subjectivity" and "objectivity" [ ... ] described in terms of one another ... — 180 Proof
I don't understand the question.How is it that that phenomena fits into the structure of material processes?
As a pseudo-problem it fails as a "critique".Really, I see the hard problems as a direct critique at Materialism.
What do you understand "material" means in "materialism"?Materialism proposes that everything is material or abstractions of material.
What does "inner aspects" refer to? Are you implying that these "inner aspects" do not affect the "material"? If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with respect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no?There is no room for "inner aspects" because that itself is not material.
At most (if your terms are coherent), a scientific problem and not a philosophical question.If you go and say "but material can be inner aspects" the question is "how".
See previous reply.If you say "illusion" that has to be accounted for.
Incoherent muddle. "Physical" =/= "material" (i.e. event-patterns =/= events).If you say that physical is qualitative, then you become a sort of panpsychist or idealist and no longer a materialist.
:cool: This reminds me of Damasio's "core self" and Hofstadter's "strange loop".I'm theorizing that the self, by definition self-referential (please bear with the circularity here, as circularity lies at the heart of memory functions), doesn't appear in a materialist-objectivist model until the second order of feedback looping that, in a vertical structure, rides atop first order feedback looping. In short, the self is the reflection of the first order behaviorist automaton, and thus this automaton individualizes over time as it examines ever more thoroughly the reflections of its automaton self. — ucarr
If you want to explain the hard problem to John Doe, just ask him which animals and which plants feel something.
Obviously, it's not a bogus problem because it affects people's behavior, one is an animal rights activist, another is an animal abuser, the next doesn't care. — SolarWind
What do understand by "material" means in "materialism"? — 180 Proof
The map becomes confused with the territory. Or perhaps, the territory has no room for the specific kind of territory and we are back to square one. — schopenhauer1
At most (if your terms are coherent), a scientific problem and not a philosophical question. — 180 Proof
What does "inner aspects" refer to? Are you implying that these "inner aspects" do not affect the "material"? If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with tespect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no? — 180 Proof
Incoherent muddle. "Physical" =/= "material" (i.e. event-patterns =/= events). — 180 Proof
It's not opposed to materialism. It's a call for an expansion of what counts as material. — Tate
True enough, but then we would come to conclusions like panpsychism which normally isn't considered materialism. — schopenhauer1
True enough, but then we would come to conclusions like panpsychism which normally isn't considered materialism. — schopenhauer1
I did not introduce the notion of "inner aspects" – whether or not entities have "inner aspects" – you did, schop1, and thereby the "oddly presupposed panpsychism" is your dilemma / inconsistency not mine. — 180 Proof
If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with respect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no? — 180 Proof
Most panpsychists criticize physicalism. — Jackson
Nice try. "Inner aspects" is all you, schop1. — 180 Proof
This is similar to saying that there is a relational aspect to things. Saying it like this closes the divide between physical and mental things. The hard problem is only a problem for dualists and physicalists, or those that believe the world is composed of a quantity of static objects independent of other things and then try to reconcile that with the qualitative aspect of the perception of quantities of static objects.There exists qualitative aspects to things. — schopenhauer1
The hard problem is only a problem for dualists and physicalists, or those that believe the world is composed of a quantity of static objects independent of other things and then try to reconcile that with the qualitative aspect of the perception of quantities of static objects. — Harry Hindu
The map becomes confused with the territory. Or perhaps, the territory has no room for the specific kind of territory and we are back to square one.
If you go and say "but material can be inner aspects" the question is "how". If you say "illusion" that has to be accounted for. If you say that physical is qualitative, then you become a sort of panpsychist or idealist and no longer a materialist. It's more tricky than you are letting on. — schopenhauer1
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