I do not see how that is a meaningful concept. — Jackson

What do you find unmeaningful about it?

What do you find unmeaningful about it? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I have explained this. We just don't agree.

Gotcha.

People with blind-sight don't behave like normal humans. Neither would a p-zombie. — Harry Hindu

P-zombies are specifically stipulated as appearing to be normal people.

P-zombies are specifically stipulated as appearing to be normal people. — Tate

Which is Chalmer's point. He wants to say there is a difference between a zombie and a human with self -consciousness.

He wants to say there is a difference between a zombie and a human with self -consciousness. — Jackson

Of course there is. Everyone knows there is.

Of course there is. Everyone knows there is. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Ok, close down the philosophy departments!

Before responding, what is it like reading my post?
— Harry Hindu

I do not see how that is a meaningful concept. — Jackson

I put it several ways but you're cherry-picking.

Before you responded you had to read my post. It took conscious effort and time to do so. How would you describe this state-of-affairs - of you reading my post? If you wanted to describe to someone this state-of-affairs how would you do it? How would the description from someone else observing you reading my posts differ from your account of the same state-of-affairs?

P-zombies are specifically stipulated as appearing to be normal people. — Tate

P-Zombies are make-believe concepts that have no basis in reality. P-zombies are stipulated as having no experiences of color, shapes, sounds, feelings, etc. and being identical to humans in behavior. All one has to do is point to blind-sight patients as evidence that p-zombies could not behave like humans. In this sense, the concept of p-zombies are like the concept of god. They are proposed to be possible realities when one simply needs to look at reality to see that such things are not possible as stipulated.

I put it several ways but you're cherry-picking. — Harry Hindu

Which is what philosophy is. One choses a specific thing to discuss.

Banno? Is that you?

Banno? Is that you? — Harry Hindu

I think we ran out.

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. — Nagel

Choose:

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism sees some aspects of its environment and not others.

or

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism sees some kinds of picture in its Cartesian theatre and not others.

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism sees some aspects of its environment and not others.

I would agree with that. Consciousness just means the way we interact with the environment.

I haven't read all the comments and it's a long time since I have read Nagel's paper that refers. I take "like" to mean just that a system has feelings about its operation, where "feelings" can be taken to refer to (as Mark Solms would say it) homeostatic deviations from preferred states. That is (and following Solms), I would say that feelings are abstractions about relational properties that convey information regarding deviations from preferred states in unpredicted contexts.

Further, Solms says, "if the organism is going to make plausible choices in novel contexts it must do so via some type of here-and-now assessment of the relative value attaching to the alternatives".

I suggest that in Nagel's terms, it is to be like something if the subject is able to attach value character to contexts and adapt behaviours accordingly.

Choose:

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism sees some aspects of its environment and not others.

or

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism sees some kinds of picture in its Cartesian theatre and not others. — bongo fury

What do you mean by "sees"? Can an organism see it's own mind?

I think that "information" is more useful here. Just as every computer that comes off the production line and is purchased by a variety of users - over time the information in these computers will diverge in that each computer will possess different information depending on the inputs of different users.

Organisms possess information as well. The information they possess will be unique because each organism occupies a different location in space-time and possess different wants, needs and values. They're accumulation of unique input over their lives is part of the subjectivity in the information we possess.

So your options should look more like:
the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism possesses a perspective of some aspects of its environment and not others.

or

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism possesses a perspective of some kinds of picture in its Cartesian theatre and not others.

Each organism possesses a perspective and a perspective is a structure of information about the relationship between the organism and it's environment. The environment appears located relative to the eyes but the environment is not located relative to the eyes. The experience is subjective because the information is about the environment relative to our self, and not any one else.

As information, we turn the information back on itself, forming a loop - like that seen when you point a camera at the monitor it is connected to. This creates a feedback loop where the information on the screen is about itself being about its self, being about its self, etc. In this sense we are not really "seeing" our minds. We are simply looping the information of our mind the same way the camera-monitor system does.