"Any fundamental particle in my body does what it does as a result of its interactions with the particles around it." — Pneumenon
It seems to me to be both ways. To say what something is, is to also say why it is. And why something is includes what it is.Good point! If I'm interested in why something is the way it is, then I'm not going to be satisfied with an explanation of what it is. — Pneumenon
You didn't answer "why" it was broken. You answered "what" broken is, which wasn't the question, which is why your answer is no good and has nothing to do with why the crowbar was broken.I show you a broken crowbar and tell you what it is: "This is a broken crowbar."
You ask, "Why is it broken?"
I say, "Because it's in two halves."
This is not a good answer on my part if you want to know how the crowbar ended up being broken. — Pneumenon
I'm still somewhat curious as to what you have to say about my question about the set of all fundamental particles being able to account for all causal changes. Not that I would advocate for such a view, but past it being pragmatically and perhaps inconceivably difficult to measure, what are the rebuttals? — Marty
If you want to support a model other than efficicient causation you will need to show that other models are intuitively comprehensible. — John
This venture seems a bit circular to me. At least, it does if a 'way of approaching causality' includes a definition. If it does then one cannot understand the goal ('enabling us to understand diverse varieties of "cause" ') until one has decided on a definition of 'cause'. But then one cannot use the goal to decide what definition to choose.what is a way of approaching causality that enables us to understand diverse varieties of cause in a unifying way? — Pneumenon
Yes we can all use the word. But one need only look at a litigation or an inquest to observe that we (all of us, not just philosophers) do not know what we mean by it.We all can use the word "cause." — Pneumenon
I'm fully in support of being Wittgensteinian in the approach to this. I don't think the later Witt would have seen any point in spending time trying to find a way to approach causality. — andrewk
It was a bit loose of me to say there's no point in it. I think there's no philosophical point in it. The point for me of such discussions is that they are enjoyable. Sometimes I learn something along the way - usually unrelated to the ostensible topic. But the enjoyment is the main thing.The later Wittgenstein wouldn't have seen any point in having this discussion. And yet, here we are. — Pneumenon
No, I'm afraid I don't agree about the keys.If you agree that touching the keys causes the letters to appear (and you do), then we have one case right here where we know what cause is. — Pneumenon
No, I'm afraid I don't agree about the keys. — andrewk
If it is clear to you what you mean by that statement about the keys, then why do you feel the need for an investigation into an approach to causality? — andrewk
No. Failure to assent to sentence S is not equivalent to assenting to its negation.Okay, so the following sentence is false: "The letter appears on this screen because I pushed a key."?
That you feel that is what most interests me here. What sort of benefit do you hope to obtain from an investigation into an approach to causality - beyond the sheer joy of human interaction in conversations like this?Because there's more to causality than pushing keys.
No. Failure to assent to sentence S is not equivalent to assenting to its negation. — andrewk
That you feel that is what most interests me here. What sort of benefit do you hope to obtain from an investigation into an approach to causality - beyond the sheer joy of human interaction in conversations like this? — andrewk
No, we don't.we both know this — Pneumenon
No, we don't.
What we may be able to agree on is that you thought to yourself that if you pushed the keys you would expect some letters to appear and, having thought that, you decided to push some keys, and then some letters appeared. If that's what you thought - whether explicitly or implicitly.
Injecting the word 'cause' into that quite clear scenario only confuses things. — andrewk
I like that way of putting it. I think in that case, probably no letters will appear on the screen. That's a prediction, which is based on a theory. Things fall into place so much more naturally when we talk in terms of predictions and theories, which are nice and concrete.Simple question: what do you think happens when Pneumenon doesn't press the keys? — TheWillowOfDarkness
This is the kind of thing that only pops up in a philosophical discussion. If I asked you why the letters appeared, youd reply, "Because you push the keys." It's not that hard. Outside of discussions like this, you know good and well why those letters appeared. — Pneumenon
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