Sure, the mathematical models are themselves intelligible, but that is not relevant to what I have said: the point is that there is no intuitively intelligible non-deterministic picture of nature as a whole. Intuitively we know what it is for an event to have a cause; the idea is intelligible to us. The same cannot be said for a causeless event.

"Any fundamental particle in my body does what it does as a result of its interactions with the particles around it." — Pneumenon

Yes, but do we have any model of those interactions that are not understood in terms of efficient causation?

If you want to support a model other than efficicient causation you will need to show that other models are intuitively comprehensible.

Good point! If I'm interested in why something is the way it is, then I'm not going to be satisfied with an explanation of what it is.

I show you a broken crowbar and tell you what it is: "This is a broken crowbar."
You ask, "Why is it broken?"
I say, "Because it's in two halves."
This is not a good answer on my part if you want to know how the crowbar ended up being broken.

Good point! If I'm interested in why something is the way it is, then I'm not going to be satisfied with an explanation of what it is. — Pneumenon

It seems to me to be both ways. To say what something is, is to also say why it is. And why something is includes what it is.

I show you a broken crowbar and tell you what it is: "This is a broken crowbar."
You ask, "Why is it broken?"
I say, "Because it's in two halves."
This is not a good answer on my part if you want to know how the crowbar ended up being broken. — Pneumenon

You didn't answer "why" it was broken. You answered "what" broken is, which wasn't the question, which is why your answer is no good and has nothing to do with why the crowbar was broken.

When we ask, "What?", we are asking for the properties of some object or state-of-affairs as a "snap-shot" in time - the way it is now. But objects and processes exist in time. They have a history of interacting with the rest of the world. Asking, "Why?", something is is to ask about it's existence in time and about it's relationships with the rest of reality.

, I'm still somewhat curious as to what you have to say about my question about the set of all fundamental particles being able to account for all causal changes. Not that I would advocate for such a view, but past it being pragmatically and perhaps inconceivably difficult to measure, what are the rebuttals? I tried reading that Bunge book awhile back but the guy is fairly dense, as I recall, in formal language.

The Ontogeny of Information looks interesting, though. Would you recommend it?

I'm still somewhat curious as to what you have to say about my question about the set of all fundamental particles being able to account for all causal changes. Not that I would advocate for such a view, but past it being pragmatically and perhaps inconceivably difficult to measure, what are the rebuttals? — Marty

A few things, I guess: first, at the level of sheer instinctual/aesthetic response, I think it's an incredibly naive, even childish thesis (I mean this literally - as if the universe were one giant colorful ball pit). Second, what are the exact arguments in favor of it? It's the arguments which need to be evaluated and assessed, more so than the actual thesis itself. Third and most substantially, despite the apparent simplicity of the thesis, it's not even entirely clear what it would even mean to account for all causal changes in terms of 'the set of all fundamental particles'. In modeling a dynamic system, for instance, the fundamental parameters to take into account tend to be: (1) the set of attractors (roughly, the set of values toward or around which a system tends) and (2) the rates of change which define the dynamics of the system; (3) the 'tipping points' or critical thresholds which indicate when/where the system will undergo a phase transition (to become another 'kind' of system - the difference between a flourishing or dying ecosystem, for example). One can also add to this list rate-independent informational constraints for some systems, but that's another kettle of fish...

So the question becomes: what is the relation between these parameters and the 'set of all fundamental particles'? What here is doing the explanatory heavy-lifting, as it were? The parameters? The particles? Interactions between both? Including the environment in which these interactions take place? All of the above, depending on conditions? These are the kinds of questions that need to be asked and answered in order to assess whether it even makes sense to have "the set of all fundamental particles account for all causal changes." Personally, I'm not even convinced the thesis is coherent. Looking to something like processes of evolution (raised by the OP), for instance, I don't even know what it would mean to say that 'the set of all fundamental particles' explains evolutionary change - it wouldn't even be a 'wrong' thesis so much as a misuse of grammar.* So again, the important thing is not necessarily to 'rebut' the thesis, but to understand, at a minimum, weather it even in fact makes sense to begin with.

And I would totally recommend The Ontogeny of Information. It's one of those books I find myself going back to time and time again, and at a minimum, anyone interested in evolution ought to read.

Thanks, Streetlight. That makes sense to me.

One thing that I think has been overlooked in the paradigmatic billiard ball example (which almost every early modern uses) is the context of Hume's denial of causality. Hume says that we cannot get the idea of force, energy, or power from the "(1) impenetrability, (2) extension, or (3) motion" of the billiard balls. These three qualities name Descartes' res extensa, a model that defines substance by geometrical properties alone.

The critique of this position, made by Leibniz and Newton, is that the Cartesian qualities cannot account for the "equal and opposite reaction" of things. Leibniz explains this using active and passive forces; Newton by energy.

I think that the passage of history have made us overlook these two aspects of Hume's refutation: (1) we cannot know causality a priori and (2) that nothing visible can give us an idea of force, power, or energy. Hume spends the bulk of the text arguing for (2), but basically assumes (1).

I like to think about it is: who or what is doing the causing? Is it just "fundamental particles?"

Nothing in life is merely fundamental particles in action. Such particles are always part of something or interacting with other states which are more than just elementary particles. Causal relationships don't happen without this wider significance. It's the difference between the sun causing a temperature on Earth and someone opening their hand relating in an object falling.

"Just fundamental particles" is just a failed description, a reduction of everything in casualty to one idea, for use as an easy shorthand (usually to a political purpose). Another in a long line of human heuristics that mistake metaphysical significance for describing what's going on in the world-- "God (fundamental particles) did it."

I think the point is that causality understood in terms of mechanical interactions of "fundamental" particles is not useful at larger scales (for example in Biology or even geology).

On the other our intuitively understood models of interactions between fundamental particles seem to be analogues of our intuitive understanding of mechanical interactions between bodies at larger scales; i.e. at our 'lived' scale. I think this efficient kind of causality is really the only kind of causality that we intuitively 'get', except for formal and final causation involving what we understand to be intentional agents.

It seems to make understanding biological processes, for example, evolutionary selection, much more intuitive and less cumbersome if they are understood in terms of purposivity; even though they are generally thought to be, in principle, even if not in practice, reducible to mechanical (really energetic) microphysical processes. The so-called laws of nature themselves, though, are not necessarily thought to be reducible to being modeled in terms of fundamental forces; but their action or influence can only be understood as such, at least as far as I can tell. I could be wrong about this, though, and would be pleased to be further instructed by some clear alternative explanation. Also, I'm not suggesting that if this is the only way we can understand causality, it follows that this is 'the way things are' in any "ultimate" sense.

I think Hume did not account for the fact that it is not merely a matter of what we can see but is also a matter of what we can feel. We feel mechanical forces exerted by, and on, our bodies.

If idealism were the case, then that means that fundamental particles would be colors, shapes, sounds, smells, feelings, etc., I'd love to hear an idealist explain how those things interact to produce the combination of these things that we experience at once - like trees, cars, sunsets and dinner.

How did words get onto this screen if not for you thinking about moving your fingers in particular way to produce them? They didn't appear simply by thinking about them. Why would you have to think about moving your fingers to get text on a screen if not for causation?

Causality can be viewed as a special kind of logical relations between entities in the context of the arrow of time, where the consequences logically follow from the causes, and the causes are initial conditions and time-invariant structures known as the laws of physics.

If you want to support a model other than efficicient causation you will need to show that other models are intuitively comprehensible. — John

The only way to show that something is intuitive is to look at it and see if your intuition likes it. That's what "intuitive" means.

That being said, look into Aristotle's causality - there are some old, old, old folk-notions of cause that are intuitively plausible.

I agree completely. In fact, I argue this in a paper I am presenting at an upcoming conference.

Hume seems to dismiss this in a footnote because he lacks an account of intentionality, i.e. he can't distinguish between "our feeling" and "what we feel."

what is a way of approaching causality that enables us to understand diverse varieties of cause in a unifying way? — Pneumenon

This venture seems a bit circular to me. At least, it does if a 'way of approaching causality' includes a definition. If it does then one cannot understand the goal ('enabling us to understand diverse varieties of "cause" ') until one has decided on a definition of 'cause'. But then one cannot use the goal to decide what definition to choose.

It seems to me that discussions of causality usually are circular. Certainly I find Aristotle's notion of Efficient Cause circular.

What I wonder is what use the term 'cause' has. If we want to make something happen ('cause' it to happen) we can get by with the much simpler, non-circular notion of 'prediction'. Alternatively, if we want to understand 'why' something happened, we can address that by seeking an understanding of the prior environment. In neither case do we need a notion of 'cause'.

Even cones of causality, aka 'light cones', that are used in physics are able to be expressed - and IMHO are more clearly expressed - as cones of predictability. So what seems to be a case of the notion of 'cause' being inextricably embedded in core science is actually an illusion arising from etymological happenstance.

I think that definitions are overrated; as such, our way of approaching causality need not include one.

Formal definitions, that capture every single instance of a class, aren't what they're cracked up to be. For the most part, they're not even necessary. A cursory reading of Wittgenstein will show you that such definitions, in addition to being quixotic, are not even necessary. We all can use the word "cause." A philosophical investigation need not have a definition for it. Definitions are not what philosophy is about.

We all can use the word "cause." — Pneumenon

Yes we can all use the word. But one need only look at a litigation or an inquest to observe that we (all of us, not just philosophers) do not know what we mean by it.

My prescription is not to introduce a definition (although I do have 'one I made earlier' if anybody wants to see it (biscuit conditional alert)), but to avoid the use of the word 'cause' except where there is no possibility of disagreement over its use.

I'm fully in support of being Wittgensteinian in the approach to this. I don't think the later Witt would have seen any point in spending time trying to find a way to approach causality.

I'm fully in support of being Wittgensteinian in the approach to this. I don't think the later Witt would have seen any point in spending time trying to find a way to approach causality. — andrewk

The later Wittgenstein wouldn't have seen any point in having this discussion. And yet, here we are.

Anyway, we do know, in some cases, what we mean by cause. The cases where we DO know far outnumber the ones where we don't, all considered. I know that touching the keys on this keyboard cause the letters to appear on the screen. If you agree that touching the keys causes the letters to appear (and you do), then we have one case right here where we know what cause is.

The later Wittgenstein wouldn't have seen any point in having this discussion. And yet, here we are. — Pneumenon

It was a bit loose of me to say there's no point in it. I think there's no philosophical point in it. The point for me of such discussions is that they are enjoyable. Sometimes I learn something along the way - usually unrelated to the ostensible topic. But the enjoyment is the main thing.

If you agree that touching the keys causes the letters to appear (and you do), then we have one case right here where we know what cause is. — Pneumenon

No, I'm afraid I don't agree about the keys.

But that's by the by. If it is clear to you what you mean by that statement about the keys, then why do you feel the need for an investigation into an approach to causality? Is it simply for the sake of enjoyment as well? If so, I think it's a great idea.

No, I'm afraid I don't agree about the keys. — andrewk

Okay, so the following sentence is false: "The letter appears on this screen because I pushed a key."?

Come on, man. Even philosophical prevarication has limits.

If it is clear to you what you mean by that statement about the keys, then why do you feel the need for an investigation into an approach to causality? — andrewk

Because there's more to causality than pushing keys.

Okay, so the following sentence is false: "The letter appears on this screen because I pushed a key."?

No. Failure to assent to sentence S is not equivalent to assenting to its negation.

Because there's more to causality than pushing keys.

That you feel that is what most interests me here. What sort of benefit do you hope to obtain from an investigation into an approach to causality - beyond the sheer joy of human interaction in conversations like this?

No. Failure to assent to sentence S is not equivalent to assenting to its negation. — andrewk

Irrelevant. My pushing the keys causes the letters to appear, and we both know this. Even if you think this is all a silly game, you could at least humor me and pretend to be serious, or pretend a little more convincingly.

That you feel that is what most interests me here. What sort of benefit do you hope to obtain from an investigation into an approach to causality - beyond the sheer joy of human interaction in conversations like this? — andrewk

I want to investigate causality in order to investigate causality, because that's what I want to do.

we both know this — Pneumenon

No, we don't.

What we may be able to agree on is that you thought to yourself that if you pushed the keys you would expect some letters to appear and, having thought that, you decided to push some keys, and then some letters appeared. If that's what you thought - whether explicitly or implicitly.

Injecting the word 'cause' into that quite clear scenario only confuses things.

I don't think it's a silly game. I just think it's a confusion over words.

If you want to make progress, one avenue to try is to think of a sentence containing the word 'cause' that somebody might use in everyday life. 'My pushing the keys causes letters to appear' is not such a sentence - or not in my experience anyway.

My provisional contention is that, in real life sentences containing the word 'cause', they are either meaningless - as in most cases where a litigator claims that somebody 'caused' somebody else to incur an injury, or the sentence can be understood by considering it as a whole, in its context, without requiring a notion of 'cause'.

No, we don't.

What we may be able to agree on is that you thought to yourself that if you pushed the keys you would expect some letters to appear and, having thought that, you decided to push some keys, and then some letters appeared. If that's what you thought - whether explicitly or implicitly.

Injecting the word 'cause' into that quite clear scenario only confuses things. — andrewk

This is the kind of thing that only pops up in a philosophical discussion. If I asked you why the letters appeared, youd reply, "Because you push the keys." It's not that hard. Outside of discussions like this, you know good and well why those letters appeared.

In all sincerity, you seem to be assuming that I'm appealing to some metaphysical or formal definition of cause, because that's how you're used to responding to people when they talk about causation. But I am doing no such thing. We all know that some things result from other things. Saying that it's not about causation because the exact word, "cause," isn't used, is like saying that this post isn't addressed to you because I'm not calling you by your full name.

If we're going to discuss this issue, you have got to meet me halfway, not just launch into the Standard Wittgensteinian Script in response to someone doing philosophy.

You keep on telling me what I think and what I'd say. Yet every time you do that, you get it wrong. It might be time to stop making assumptions about what other people think.

I'm afraid I don't understand what your second paragraph is getting at.

I remain curious about what benefit you hope to gain from investigating an approach to causality. Last time you said something like 'I'm doing it because I want to'. I appreciate the wit of slipping the word 'because' into that answer but I'm still interested in an answer to the question I asked, which is 'what expected benefit?', not 'why?'

Simple question: what do you think happens when Pneumenon doesn't press the keys? Will letters still appear on the screen? The question of causality depends on this relationship. Does the world depend on Pneumenon pressing keys to have words appear on the screen?

Simple question: what do you think happens when Pneumenon doesn't press the keys? — TheWillowOfDarkness

I like that way of putting it. I think in that case, probably no letters will appear on the screen. That's a prediction, which is based on a theory. Things fall into place so much more naturally when we talk in terms of predictions and theories, which are nice and concrete.

I don't know about the 'depend' bit though. the notion of dependency seems very vague to me. Certainly I can imagine letters appearing on the screen without keys being pressed - eg if the dreaded Blue Screen of Death suddenly appeared.

.

This is the kind of thing that only pops up in a philosophical discussion. If I asked you why the letters appeared, youd reply, "Because you push the keys." It's not that hard. Outside of discussions like this, you know good and well why those letters appeared. — Pneumenon

“Let us not doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.” (C. S. Peirce)

he can't distinguish between "our feeling" and "what we feel." — Colin B

Or a representation and what is represented?