When does metaphysical border on mystical? Eliminating metaphysics (which I consider impossible without severely crippling philosophy) would remove all the entertaining babble about quantum entanglement, for example. — jgill

What does the discipline of metphysics have to do with quantum entanglement?

My understanding is that mysticism is not necessarily the same in philosophy, but that the term metaphysics was used in a specific way by some who considered themselves to be mystics. I am thinking of the metaphysical poets, such as John Donne.

However, the relationship between metaphysics and mysticism may be more complex. Even in thinking of the approach of language being a limitation, it is possible to see Wittgenstein as a mystic, but it is probably a very different kind of mysticism, if it is called that, than those who come from a religious or spiritual approach to mysticism.

Even in thinking of the approach of language being a limitation, it is possible to see Wittgenstein as a mystic, — Jack Cummins

How is Wittgenstein a mystic?

What does the discipline of metphysics have to do with quantum entanglement? — Jackson

Calling metaphysics a "discipline" is quite a stretch. Here, on TPF, several philosophers have tried to interpret QE without a clue about the math that seems to support the phenomenon. That's an example of metaphysics as I see it.

Calling metaphysics a "discipline" is quite a stretch. — jgill

It is a branch of philosophy like epistemology or ethics.

I think that Murdoch is speaking of a tendency to move away from metaphysics. She is speaking of what is happening, rather than saying what should happen. It is about the is/ ought dichotomy and she remains in the is category. If anything, I think she is critical of the tendency, or, at least, raising rhetorical questioning of it.

It is a branch of philosophy like epistemology or ethics — Jackson

Then it should discipline itself by agreeing upon a definition.

Then it should discipline itself by agreeing upon a definition. — jgill

You could say that of logic, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, or politics.

Metaphysics is foundational to ethics [causality + identity/change + necessity/possibilty (ought implies can) = moral responsibility]. If you delete the metaphysics file, you'll lose ethics along with it.

Metaphysics is the bedrock of science (causality + spacetime). Discard metaphysics, science loses its moorings.

Metaphysics is life-critical (ontology/existence). To throw metaphysics out the window is life denying itself.

:snicker:

You could say that of logic — Jackson

Logic is the study of correct reasoning or good arguments. It is often defined in a more narrow sense as the science of deductively valid inferences or of logical truths. In this sense, it is equivalent to formal logic and constitutes a formal science investigating how conclusions follow from premises in a topic-neutral way or which propositions are true only in virtue of the logical vocabulary they contain

Wiki

I never read posts about wiki. Later

I never read posts about wiki — Jackson

I understand. Don't read this one.

I do agree that metaphysics is the basis for all understanding, especially ethics. The way reality is, or works, is essential to the questions about how one should live. It may be that metaphysical perspectives have to be altered on the basis of empirical investigations but that is another matter.

Those who see metaphysics as being nonsensical may just be making metaphysical assumptions invisible. It does not mean that they have really gone beyond it. If anything, the idea that metaphysics can be eliminated may be a form of concrete thinking, as if there is one way of seeing reality rather than the plurality of possibilities.

If anything, the idea that metaphysics can be eliminated may be a form of concrete thinking, as if there is one way of seeing reality rather than the plurality of possibilities. — Jack Cummins

Good point.

In the twentieth first century, I am wondering how much further is philosophy going in the elimination of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins

First, I think that metaphysics, despite the extremely intricate forest of definitions and positions, can be defined as any system of ideas that you try to use to interpret how things are. So, when you say “I think that certain things can be thought as they were this and this, this way and this way”, you are making metaphysics. This coincides to what in science is called hypothesis: “let’s imagine that things are this way”; “let’s imagine that that planet changed its direction because there is another planet whose existence we don’t know yet”: this is metaphysics.

Now, we need to make a distinction between metaphysics and its usage: I think this is a confusion frequently present in most philosophers. The difference I am talking about is between considering an hypothesis as just an hypothesis or, rather, as something that actually is certain, more certain than proved scientific achievements.
If you say “let’s imagine that being is and not being is not”, since you premised “let’s imagine”, in this case you have made some metaphysics, but you are considering that metaphysics as just an hypothesis. Parmenides didn’t add this premise. He just said “being is, not being is not”. This is metaphysics considered not as just an hypothesis, but as something already obtained as conclusive, certain.

Now, we should also not confuse metaphysics with definitions that we can find in dictionaries. This is another thing that creates a lot of confusion. If a dictionary says that “an orange is a kind of fruit”, the expression looks very similar to a metaphysical hypothesis, but we need to realize that the dictionary is not trying to define what an orange is in reality. The dictionary defines the word, not the reality meant by the word. The dictionary is not saying “that thing that you are seeing out there is an orange”, nor “the thing that you are seeing out there is that kind of fruit with this and that characteristics”. Rather, the dictionary means “if you think that that fruit is so and so, then you can call it orange”, or “in order to call that fruit “orange”, you must check if it is so and so”. So, again, dictionaries are about words, not about the reality meant by words. According to this, we can notice that dictionaries can even contain definitions of things considered, at least by some people, not existing: for example, a dictionary can have a definition of the word “god”, but gods do not exist according to atheists. So, dictionaries are not about how things are, but about what we decided to agree about what certain words mean, independently from their connection with reality. According to atheists, the word “god” has no relationship with reality, but this is not a problem for dictionaries.
Now, going back to Parmenides, personally I consider his procedure an error, because he decided to consider his metaphysics not an hypothesis, but a description of reality that must be considered true, certain, real, objective. His statement has hypnotized a lot of philosophers because it seems fantastically obvious, able to have in itself all the ground, all the basis to make it true, without needing any further research.
I think that Parmenides’ statement is so hypnotizing because it is tremendously similar to a dictionary definition. By using a dictionary (dictionaries contain also some grammar notes) you can achieve the same conclusion of Parmenides without being a philosopher: in a dictionary (or in a grammar book) you can find that “being” is the present continuous of the verb “to be”, whose present simple form, third singular person, is “is”. Since “being” and “is” are different forms of the verb “to be”, then, if something “is being an orange”, then, at least “now, in this moment” it is an orange. We don’t need any philosophy to say this: grammars say this. E voilà, we have found the magic power of grammars, that was exploited by Parmenides: this way grammars and dictionaries can master not only descriptions of words, but descriptions of reality as well.
This is the big trick, I mean the big illusion made by Parmenides.
Now we can deconstruct this and realize that, as a statement about words and verbs, Parmenides’ statement can be easily adopted because, as such, it is a social agreement: societies create words and verbs and agree about their meaning.
But, as a statement about reality, about how thing actually are, how objectivity works, it should have been considered just an hypothesis; we can call it metaphysics if we agree that metaphysics is just an hypothesis.

At this point I would say that metaphysics, if it is considered not hypothesis, but a conclusive and definitive achievement about how reality is, how things are, how things really work, then metaphysics can and should be eliminated from philosophy. Considering something as a definitive and certain achievement should belong to the realm of religion, faith, belief. That’s good, because intelligent believers belonging to religions know that, since their belief is belief, their faith is faith, then it is a free choice, it is not based on any proven ground; if its essential basis has a proven ground, then it is not religion, nor belief, nor faith, it is science.

So, in synthesis, the mistake made by Parmenides, because of confusion between grammars and reality, made him and his followers think that metaphysics is able to be not just hypothesis, but conclusive achievement about understanding how reality is and works. This kind of achievement should actually belong to science, but science is limited to evidence, which, in turn, falls into all the difficulties raised by epistemology. Philosophers like Parmenides think that metaphysics is not based on scientific evidence, but on the power of reason, which is infinitely more powerful than evidence; since reason is free from objections coming from epistemology, it has the magic power of dictionaries and grammars.

In conclusion, I think that metaphysics, considered as a conclusive achievement about how reality is and works, can and should be 100% eliminated from philosophy, because it changes philsophy into religion dressed up as rationality. Metaphysics as just hypothesis is fundamental to work on everything, on science, philosophy, whatever, so it should remain in philosophy and should be well used.

imagination — Jack Cummins

possibilities — Jack Cummins

:fire:

When we don't know, we imagine!

Thanks for your lengthy reply. It is interesting to think about metaphysics in connection with religion because many of the thinkers of the past did see metaphysics in connection with religious perspectives. In particular, the ideas of good and evil were bound up in Christian thought with the idea of God.

The gradual movement towards science as opposed to religious thinking within rationalism and humanism may be connected to less metaphysical speculation. It may be related to the move away from ideas about the supernatural, or ideas about hidden aspects of reality. I am not suggesting that it is worth fabricating complex otherworldly suggestions of how reality works. That seems more like fiction, or myth, but, at the same time, I am not certain that it possible to eliminate or eradicate metaphysics because even with scientific knowledge there is a lot which is unknown.

Humanity has moved from a perception of a flat earth, but philosophy may go too far in flat thinking. Life is embedded in stories. Perhaps, the difference may be about seeing stories for what they are and disentangling the mythical aspects of life from the causal explanations offered through science.

I am actually wondering if we are not seeing a new metaphysical turn. One indeed based around 'Quantum entanglement'. At least I discussed a book today that almost started from the proposition that 'existence is entangled'. It referred to 'the ontological turn' in philosophy. I do not know enough about it, I am curious but I am also skeptical. This new metaphysics seems to forego any phenomenological analysis of actual existence and offers a third person account of matter in motion. I believe it misses something, but I really need to delve deeper into it. I am not in favor of eliminating metaphysics, however I do get to see the possibility that ethics precedes metaphysics, in that one's ethical commitment seem now to determine one's metaphysics. They were of course always... entangled.

I agree. Therefore, I do not think metaphysics can be eliminated.

One aspect of what the positivists did, and latter Wittgenstein (in opposition to his earlier, I think deeper, work) was to try to frame "traditional metaphysical" questions is such a manner that apparent difficulties could be dissolved.

And while this is one way to approach the problem, with some good results, it's far from the only one. And yet despite the critique of it, many metaphysical problems are still with is. It's up to each person to decide whether such questions are worthy of pursuit or a waste of time.

I think that, despite not being capable of arriving at definite conclusions, the journey is very much its own reward. Of course, your miles will vary.

I think that, despite not being capable of arriving at definite conclusions, the journey is very much its own reward. Of course, your miles will vary. — Manuel

Metaphysics is no different from every other branch of philosophy.

Those who see metaphysics as being nonsensical may just be making metaphysical assumptions invisible. — Jack Cummins

Yes. I think this is correct.

If anything, the idea that metaphysics can be eliminated may be a form of concrete thinking, as if there is one way of seeing reality rather than the plurality of possibilities. — Jack Cummins

I think most people think there is only one correct way of seeing reality. It certainly seems that way here on the forum.

I am actually wondering if we are not seeing a new metaphysical turn. One indeed based around 'Quantum entanglement'. — Tobias

Entanglement itself is a physical, not a metaphysical, phenomenon. Metaphysics is how we look at things, not what we see. I have thought about what changes in metaphysics are required in order to deal with quantum mechanical phenomena. I don't know the answer.

That's probably true.

It is however, fiendishly hard to pin-point what it actually is, outside of saying that it's about the nature of the world.

Epistemology, ethics, etc., in this respect are much more straightforward to define, imo.

It is however, fiendishly hard to pin-point what it actually is, outside of saying that it's about the nature of the world. — Manuel

Lots of philosophy articles being published in metaphysics. I do not see the problem.

They sure are. It's not clear to me however, that many of these questions pertain to metaphysics exclusively, that is, that we're going to find some kind of answers to questions about the self, free will, and say, materialism, from looking at the world.

These questions I think need to be re-integrated into epistemology. In this respect I think Descartes
"launch" of modern philosophy is quite correct.

My point being, that if you ask anyone here, what metaphysics is, you'll get many different answers. And with contemporary philosophers, it's not much better.

Then again, if it's clear to you, then that's a massive plus to you. I still puzzle over it, after having spent considerable time on it.

I still puzzle over it, after having spent considerable time on it. — Manuel

Check out https://philpapers.org/ . There is a list of categories of published papers by philosophers. Metaphysics has over 50,000.

Rorty used to say that philosophy is what philosophers do. Sounds trite, but he had a point.

It is however, fiendishly hard to pin-point what it actually is, outside of saying that it's about the nature of the world. — Manuel

I don't think it's hard to pin-point, it's just hard for people to agree on.

I'm not sure I'm understanding what you mean by showing this link. I agree metaphysics is a branch of philosophy, and that work is done in the field.

I still maintain that what one person calls "metaphysics" another says isn't or is bad philosophy, etc. I think metaphysics now is more obscure than it was during Descartes time, because the topics are much more technical, and we know less that the classical figures hoped we could know.



Perhaps that's more accurate than what I said.

It causes considerable contention, as you well know.

I still maintain that what one person calls "metaphysics" another says isn't or is bad philosophy, etc. I think metaphysics now is more obscure than it was during Descartes time, because the topics are much more technical, and we know less that the classical figures hoped we could know. — Manuel

I am afraid I do not understand the problem.

What do you take metaphysics to be?

And who does good metaphysics in your opinion?