That's because the idea challenges you. That's ok. — Tom Storm

Well, I wanted an argument from you refuting my claim.

1) dying is often done with family and friends and is often the first time people have felt connected to others in many years. — Tom Storm

Thank you for explaining. You were referring to death, not other kinds of suffering.

Well, I wanted an argument from you refuting my claim. — Agent Smith

Best I can do is above already. You just have to trust my experience of this and what I have seen. I don't mind at all if you don't believe me.

And other suffering. By the way, not everyone in palliative care dies. Mainly it is about managing pain.

Misery loves company - the loneliness of suffering is obvious/evident, oui? — Agent Smith

Except in depression, which is epitomized by a sense of isolation from others. Physical pain and grief can also isolate.

Matthew Ratcliffe has written extensively about experiences of depression:

“Even more troubling is the loss of emotional connectedness to other people that features in almost every account. The loneliness that sufferers describe is not a contingent form of isolation that might be remedied by a change in social circumstances; one feels irrevocably estranged from the rest of humanity. Elizabeth Wurtzel describes herself as “a stranger in town and on earth” (1996, p.142), and Tracy Thompson writes, “I wanted a connection I couldn't have. [. . . .] The blankness might not even be obvious to others. But on our side of that severed connection, it was hell, a life lived behind glass” (1995, pp.199–200). Absolutely central to depression is the need for a kind of interpersonal relatedness that at the same time presents itself as impossible.”

Except in depression, which is epitomized by a sense of isolation from others. Physical pain and grief can also isolate. — Joshs

Best I can do is above already. You just have to trust my experience of this and what I have seen. I don't mind at all if you don't believe me. — Tom Storm

There are two ways to dismiss Chalmer’s hard problem. — Joshs

That's a gross oversimplification; as if the only choice were between Dennett and Heidegger.

If Chalmer’s hard problem of consciousness does not exist, then there is no difference between a living human body suffering and a computer built to imitate all happenings and behaviours of suffering. — Angelo Cannata

Why?

This is too fast a step. It is not obvious that the notion of "what it is like" consciousness is coherent, nor that it is impossible for a sufficiently complex artificial organism of some sort to suffer; and to claim that we have "no evidence that somebody is suffering inside a body showing alarm signs of suffering" is reprehensible - of course you can see when someone is suffering.

Physical pain and grief can also isolate. — Joshs

I never said it can't also do this. :smile: Note Joshs' words 'can also' not 'always'. This is not a black and white world (no matter what some Republicans imagine). :razz:

"We suffer, therefore I am." (A Levinasian moment.)

When suffering we feel most alone and being so isolated, one naturally drifts towards metacognition. — Agent Smith

This is inconsistent with my understanding and life experience, Smith. Suffering entails solicitude; self-awareness – "metacognition" – emerges, I think, in early childhood from the perceived interval – wait – between suffering and amelioration, between need (cry) and relief (care). Natal-dependence/vulnerability undeniably, it seems to me, reinforces both 'eusociality' – reciprocal empathy – and, in certain higher mammals, a 'theory of mind' :point: .

Happiness, on the other hand, tends to be a group affair and one's sense of self is lost in the joyous crowd so to speak.

"Happiness" like this is the exception to the exception. Suffering is the rule of our species and other mammals and any lucid existentialist, whinging antinatalist or devout Xtian "sinner" will tell you so, mi amigo. Besides, what can be more self-centered – ego-fetishistic-aggrandizing – than the orgiastic? :yum:

Well, there's a whole lot of things science cannot prove, nor even sensibly talk about, which we take for granted:

Literature, the arts, issues pertaining to the will and much else.

We may find some very general and not very interesting suggestions in art by arguing that we like certain symmetries in objects. That doesn't say too much.

Science doesn't really say why Shakespeare or [insert favorite author here] was a genius. Nevertheless, we need not abandon rationality when talking about this and go to mysticism.

There very much are "edge-cases" such as the issue of the self, free will and object constancy that can be somewhat studied, or denied, marginalized or ignored. We have no choice but to deal with them in real life however.

Included in all this is suffering in general: it's very hard to measure. No one doubts it exists.

Included in all this is suffering in general: it's very hard to measure. No one doubts it exists. — Manuel

Would you agree that most living philosophers accept the hard problem in some form? Maybe the conflict is over whether it is solvable at all?

As fsr as I know, most physicalist philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists take the position that there is not – never has been – a "hard problem", just a hard confusion (category mistakes, etc).

I haven't seen a poll of professional philosophers in relation to this question, so I can't vouch that "most living philosophers" accept the hard problem as stated.

I'd very slightly change the formulation and instead say that the so called "hard problem", has generated of a lot of literature in contemporary philosophy.

You ask 10 different philosophers, and you'll get 10 different replies. Some take it to be solvable, others don't.

Personally, I side with those who think that it is not solvable in a manner in which we would like the answer to be, namely, to explain how matter produces experience.

Much more importantly, in my view, is that it is only one of many "hard problems". We've gotten so used to accepting these problems, that they don't bother us anymore: gravity was hard problem for Newton, motion was a problem for Locke and Hume and many others, the identity of objects is a hard problem going back to Heraclitus, and so on.

Personally, I side with those who think that it is not solvable in a manner in which we would like the answer to be, namely, to explain how matter produces experience. — Manuel

What makes you pessimistic?

It's too long to explain here again (I've discussed this too much here), there is a thread I started in which I shared an essay by Chomsky that explains the reasons why.

Besides Chomsky: Locke, Hume, Reid, Kant and up to Russell, share similar intuitions. In a nutshell, we have quite a rigid nature that allows us to pose some questions to nature, but not others. We can ask all kinds of questions, some which may be well posed, of which we have no inkling of an answer.

No one doubts all biological creatures have rigid natures: dogs, dolphins, birds, etc. Why would we be the exception to this rule? Sure, we are vastly more intelligent and unique than any other animal, by a lot, but we don't have an advanced alien civilization to which we could compare ourselves.

I think it's a matter of human cognitive limitation and being epistemologically realistic, not pessimistic.

I've been immersed in Bloch's philosophy of hope lately, so I come at it from a different direction. I think the realistic attitude is say that we don't know if we can figure it out or not, but we can certainly imagine succeeding. Science fiction frequently depicts technology that allows one to know what another being has experienced. So maybe. :grin:

I think that even though for him a conscious self is just an artifact , a convenient function, he would still argue that humans operate on the basis of complex motivational systems that computers currently lack, but that eventually we will be able to construct machines with such systems , and those machines es will indeed be capable of ‘suffering’. — Joshs

I think that is a good way to illustrate the problem. Imagine a checklist of all the characteristics that pain has. What if you went down that list, one trait at a time, and programmed all those traits into an artificial being? Conventional wisdom would say "it doesn't matter, because that isn't real suffering". But to the one experiencing the suffering, it's not important how they arrived at this state of pain. If you trick something into believing it is experiencing pain, that is still pain as we know it.

Personally, I side with those who think that it is not solvable in a manner in which we would like the answer to be, namely, to explain how matter produces experience. — Manuel

Well, that's the wrong question, right? And a scientific (explanatory) problem, in fact, not a philosophical (descriptive, interpretive) question? :chin:

This is inconsistent with my understanding and life experience, Smith. Suffering entails solicitude; self-awareness – "metacognition" – emerges, I think, in early childhood from the perceived interval – wait – between suffering and amelioration, between need (cry) and relief (care). Natal-dependence/vulnerability undeniably, it seems to me, reinforces both 'eusociality' – reciprocal empathy – and, in certain higher mammals, a 'theory of mind' :point: ↪180 Proof.

Happiness, on the other hand, tends to be a group affair and one's sense of self is lost in the joyous crowd so to speak.

"Happiness" like this is the exception to the exception. Suffering is the rule of our species and other mammals and any lucid existentialist, whinging antinatalist or devout Xtian "sinner" will tell you so, mi amigo. Besides, what can be more self-centered – ego-fetishistic-aggrandizing – than the orgiastic? :yum: — 180 Proof

Yep, that's the complete picture in my humble opinion. Self-awareness has something to do with hedonism, not just suffering but the whole enchilada (sorrow and joy).

However, again with some reservations, I feel that suffering is a more effective method of inducing metacognition than happiness; it usually is the case that the stick is better at making you think about your own welfare than the carrot.

Danke, Herr 180 Proof.

I never said it can't also do this. :smile: Note Joshs' words 'can also' not 'always'. This is not a black and white world (no matter what some Republicans imagine). :razz: — Tom Storm

We need some statistics: Isolation cells are not all that popular among inmates I hear.

De nada, señor. :wink:

Well, that's the wrong question, right? And scientific (explanatory), not philosophical (descriptive, interpretive)? — 180 Proof

That's the hard problem.

I suppose it depends who you ask.

One could explain it in terms of which areas in the brain are directly responsible for consciousness (frontal lobe, etc., etc.). Maybe we'll find which areas are strictly necessary for this.

How to interpret this, would be difficult. But the distinction between science and philosophy on this topic is more slippery than in other areas, I think.



Sure. No one knowns what the future may hold. We have different intuitions on this and it's not possible to say who will end up being correct.

I think "life" is the subject the action (to suffer, and many other things). A living thing "lives", while a robot doesn't.

As I'm not a scientist, I can't speak from science's standpoint, only from a living being's standpoint. It's a sentiment, a living being's sympathy, universal enough that it has become a norm, an agreement. "I realize I would suffer in a certain situation, so I consider another in such a situation is suffering, too. I want to live, so I consider another wants the same, too. Since we are all 'alive', that is." Many I's would become we. Enough we's, it'd be everyone. It would become a truth.

"Why should we protect humans from violence, if nobody is suffering inside a suffering body?" First, here we must understand what "nobody" - or "somebody" - is. The life inside the body? The "soul"? Or a "consciousness"? To me, knowing inside that body is a life just like mine, I would think that life wants the same thing I want, to not suffer. Then, the question, "why should we protect humans from violence?" is quite hard to answer. Why shouldn't we? Who are we, every human being on earth? How do we protect, with laws, force, all means? Reality has shown that different people would act differently in such a situation. Some would rush to help another, some would just let another suffer. Each has their own reason, so there won't be one answer to this question that will apply to everyone.

In well ordered habitats, all suffering is rewarding, especially to apt minds; meaningless suffering, on the other hand, is super-effectively not rewarding and demoralizing- there are limits to how much one ought to suffer.

Death must exist to entertain killing in some video games, whether or not it must exist in material form is a different matter, but the fact death is material, is beneficent, again, to apt minds- who find homage in a closer sense of death.

Suffering in particular areas(such as vision) is good. The morbid downside of life is not suffering but how inconcise the universe is.

If Chalmer’s hard problem of consciousness does not exist, then there is no difference between a living human body suffering and a computer built to imitate all happenings and behaviours of suffering. — Angelo Cannata

It's not really about suffering, but our awareness of suffering. In what ways are we aware of suffering and how does that differ from actual suffering? What form does the awareness of suffering take as opposed to actual suffering? It seems that there can be one without the other. For instance, I can be aware of your suffering but not suffering myself. As a matter of fact, some people can take pleasure in others' suffering.

The observation of others' suffering takes a different form than my own suffering. From my perspective, others' suffering is a "physical" state (ie they cry, moan, pout, etc,). For myself, it's a mental state. I don't need to be aware of the "physical" state of my body to know that I am suffering. I can close my eyes and still be aware of my own suffering. This is not the case for others' suffering and this is essentially the hard problem - which is more about awareness of states-of-affairs and what form that awareness takes, and why it is different to be aware of others' suffering as opposed to our own suffering.

So, you think that suffering can exist without awareness of it? I don’t think so. I think that suffering is possible exclusively in proportion to awareness: if awareness is 100, suffering is 100, if 50, 50, if awareness is 0, suffering is 0. The medical practice of anaestesia is scientific evidence of it. So, there is absolutely no difference between “actual suffering” and “awareness of suffering”. Suffering without awareness can produce body reactions, but these body reactions are not suffering: when only the body is suffering, nobody is suffering: when doctors are operating your body and you are totally under anaestesia, nobody is suffering. We can see that animals have degree of awareness as well and it is possible to practice anaestesia on animals as well. This seems to me scientific evidence hard to deny.

However, this realization, speaking only for myself, doesn't diminish the suffering I have to bear. I don't feel better about someone belittling me in public just because I happen to know that I am in illusion, an accident of circumstances, having no real essence and so on. In short, there is no self, doesn't necessarily imply there is no suffering. — Agent Smith

I think the fact that you chose a social suffering is good because it raises a nice (for me) side issue. You say you know that you are an illusion. I would argue that if you knew (in the binary sense of know that I think is implicit here) that you were an illusion you would not suffer. But it's not binary, this knowing. You partially know. Or perhaps part of your brain/mind believes, but other parts do not know. And we do have examples of people who have trained themselves to 'get' this, being an illusion, in a more complete way and who do not suffer that kind of social pain.

I think the fact that you chose a social suffering is good because it raises a nice (for me) side issue. You say you know that you are an illusion. I would argue that if you knew (in the binary sense of know that I think is implicit here) that you were an illusion you would not suffer. But it's not binary, this knowing. You partially know. Or perhaps part of your brain/mind believes, but other parts do not know. And we do have examples of people who have trained themselves to 'get' this, being an illusion, in a more complete way and who do not suffer that kind of social pain. — Bylaw

You psychoanalyzed me señor! I'm most obliged.