All of the above!

Fuck! Don't say things I agree with, it makes me doubt them.

I think that all the categories are applicable but moral decisions involve such a complex interplay of these. We live in social contexts in which the norms vary, but we also make moral decisions individually. There is a subjective aspect, but also objective measures, involving the use of reason.Moral choices can be extremely difficult sometimes involving balancing so many different, often conflicting variables.

Perhaps you should compose a list of things I might avoid saying!

I imagine you could guess them...

Going into a bit more detail:

1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity.
2. Morality is also relative insofar as much of it is also mediated by inherited socialisations which differ across time and space. Historically, those socialisations have been optimised to maximise our ability to apply our social hardware to daily living, which is why there is so much similarity between the cultures of immediate-return hunter-gatherer groups. More recently, those socialisations have evolved to counteract that innate behaviour (serfdom, slavery, individualism), and even more recently they're evolving to reassert that innate morality on a global scale (equality, diversity, tolerance).
3. Morality is subjective insofar as it is still us as individuals who inherit that biology and culture, and us ultimately that have to make moral decisions, gain experience based on those decisions and their outcomes, and grapple with moral problems specifically for us.

Make that two votes for all of the above.

It can be all at once. There can be morality out of our empathy, which could be considered an objective truth of the human condition. Then there can be morality that is subjective, invented differently by different cultures, religions, and so on. And therefore much of morality becomes relative.

The hypothetical true moral system has answers for all three. It makes a synthesis of all.

Absolutely objective as it is bound by the laws of reason and logic (for those in possession of such :smile: )

Morals are subjective in the sense that they're existentially mind-dependent.
Morals are objective in the sense that they're not random (ad hoc, arbitrary, discretionary, mere matter of opinion).
So I just voted subjective. Not convinced that subjective-versus-objective is all that relevant, though.

By and large, we (humans) have two legs. Exceptions are rare, and we might explain them in some way. Does that mean "two-legged-ness" itself exists wholly and independently of all else...? Not really, at least not in any discernible way, and it's not necessary anyway. Similarly, morals can be existentially mind-dependent and shared among such minds, without existing independently thereof.

Does it make sense to speak of morals for ...
• a person torturing a rock? No (bit creepy though)
• a rock torturing a person? No
• a rock torturing another rock? No
• a person torturing another person? Yes
Which suggests that morals are of and applicable to persons, to experiencing social minds.

Maybe not the best examples, but, anyway, ...

Fuck! Don't say things I agree with, it makes me doubt them. — Kenosha Kid

:-)

good example there, but...
if morals are not objective (same for all humans in regard to all living and the planet) then murder is okey sometimes? And if and when it is okey we will not be bothered by our conscience and we would not be bothered if someone did to us what we just did to them?

So intersubjetivo?

1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity. — Kenosha Kid

Morality is partly objective because it is inherent to religion, law, philosophy, politics, economics - and the ideological architecture of society, and so objective with respect to the individual. Historically, in a hunter gatherer state of nature, morality was intrinsic to the structural relations of the kinship tribe. Further, one can speculate that morality devolves ultimately to the causal relations between the organism and reality, likely via the pain/pleasure reward circuitry.

3. Morality is subjective insofar as it is still us as individuals who inherit that biology and culture, and us ultimately that have to make moral decisions, gain experience based on those decisions and their outcomes, and grapple with moral problems specifically for us. — Kenosha Kid

Morality is subjective insofar as the individual is imbued with a moral sense; like humour or aesthetics. The moral sense precedes human reason in evolutionary history - and such it is, we know right from wrong instinctively. The moral sense is related, but not identical to a capacity for moral reason, we find expressed as religion, law, philosophy, politics, economics; wherein, morality is objectivised.

2. Morality is also relative insofar as much of it is also mediated by inherited socialisations which differ across time and space. Historically, those socialisations have been optimised to maximise our ability to apply our social hardware to daily living, which is why there is so much similarity between the cultures of immediate-return hunter-gatherer groups. More recently, those socialisations have evolved to counteract that innate behaviour (serfdom, slavery, individualism), and even more recently they're evolving to reassert that innate morality on a global scale (equality, diversity, tolerance). — Kenosha Kid

I do not agree to the formulation of relativism suggesting that there is no right and wrong; most basically morality is a sense. We know right and wrong instinctively - and this moral sense precedes intellect in evolutionary history. The intellectual articulation of moral values - their expression by you and by me, makes them relative expressions of values. However, insofar as our expressions of values feed into things like religion, philosophy, law, politics, economics - that are means by which to establish objective values (and so allow for multi-tribal society and civilisation) relativism is resolved.

Absolutely objective as it is bound by the laws of reason and logic (for those in possession of such — Iris0

I suggest you think a little harder. The hazard in non-critical use of language is that a person can let language do his thinking for him, but language itself cannot distinguish sense from nonsense.

Objectively, not merely subjectively or relatively, all persons suffer. The first fact of life (Buddha, Epicurus). Thus, the consequences of a sufferer's actions either increase another person's / her own suffering or it does not (Hillel the Elder), and though each person suffers subjectively, unless deliberately isolated, persons do not suffer alone and are always surrounded by, in the company of, other suffering persons. Furthermore, each person knows that others suffer in the same ways as she does and she knows how to increase or not increase, even reduce, another's suffering as well as her own (P. Foot). Groups of suffering persons, therefore, depend on one another to act in ways that do not increase, and as often as possible reduce, suffering. This kind of grouping is eusocial: basically a truce or implicit promise each suffering person is committed to, by her mere presence and having once had been a suffering child dependent on suffering adults (Arendt), to not increase other suffering persons' suffering – and a promise, per John Searle, is an institutional fact that entails a manifest ought – and therefore is objective. Morality is objective because all suffering persons depend on one another to keep the implicit (eusocial) promise both to not harm one another and to help reduce each other's suffering whenever possible (Spinoza).

Are the laws of science objective or subjective?

Don't be shy gentlemen and ladies.

Are the laws of science objective or subjective ...

"Physical laws" are invariants in the structure of physical models which attempt to explain regularities experimentally observed in the physical world. To the degree such models themselves are objective, the "physical laws" derived from them are objective.

Physical laws" are invariants in the structure of physical models which attempt to explain regularities experimentally observed in the physical world. To the degree such models themselves are objective, the "physical laws" derived from them are objective. — 180 Proof

So that "sort of objectivity" is thus no applicable to the laws of moral? Like do not murder?

Objective-as-in-universal
as in not
subjective-as-in-relative

but also

subjective-as-in-phenomenal
as in not
objective-as-in-transcendent.

For morality just as for reality.

What? You tell me.

The regress of asking why things are bad eventually has to end with the honest answer "because I feel it is". For example: Q. why is undue violence a bad thing?, A. because it causes suffering, Q. why is suffering a bad thing, A. ??? - Even if that's not where the regress stops for you, it will eventually have to stop at "because I feel it is" (subjective)?

How is that any different from the infinite regress that comes with “is” questions? At some point you just say “it just looks like it’s that way!” Observation is subjective too.

You conclude what you've assumed, it seems to me. If one asks "why", then only a "subjective" answer (re: intentions) will suffice – thus, age old category mistakes like asking e.g. "why does the world exist"– but objectively the "subject" is the rider and not the elephant, so to speak. "Feeling" guides but does not ground, or explain, objective morality; only human suffering and eusociality factually ground moral agency ... just as our bodies systemically enable-constrain our "feelings" (affective cognition).

How is that any different from the infinite regress that comes with “is” questions? At some point you just say “it just looks like it’s that way!” Observation is subjective too. — Pfhorrest

I think there is objective foundation for non-moral beliefs. For example "X usually happens when I do Y, therefore now I am doing Y, X is likely to happen". That's an objective fact.

So you believe that:

It is the case that X

because

It is the case that Y
and
It is the case that if Y then X

Why do you believe those latter two things? (Infinite regress incoming...)

And how is this any different than if I believe that:

It ought to be the case that A

because

It ought to be the case that B
and
It ought to be the case that if B then A

?

"The apple is likely to drop to the ground when unrestricted as it has always dropped to the ground when unrestricted before". You are justified in predicting based upon a pattern you have observed.

This is objectively true, and I don't believe you need further reasoning for the belief.

Whereas

The only ultimate explanation for why "suffering is bad" is that we feel it is.

And the only ultimate explanation for why "observation is reality" is because it looks like it is. In both cases we're appealing to our experiences: experiences of things seeming true or false, or experiences of things seeming good or bad. The only differences is that you accept sense-experience as a valid reason to believe something or not, but you don't accept appetitive experience as a valid reason to intend something or not. What reason do you have to accept one over the other? If someone just refuses to accept that observation has any bearing on reality, what then? NB that I think there is a sound response to that kind of skepticism, but then that response also defeats moral skepticism in the same blow.

You conclude what you've assumed, it seems to me. If one asks "why", then only a "subjective" answer (re: intentions) will suffice – thus, age old category mistakes like asking e.g. "why does the world exist"– but objectively the "subject" is the rider and not the elephant, so to speak. "Feeling" guides but does not ground, or explain, objective morality; only human suffering and eusociality factually ground moral agency ... just as our bodies systemically enable-constrain our "feelings" (affective cognition). — 180 Proof

I think we still have the same problem if we remove the "why". If one asserts "suffering is a bad thing" they still have to have a basis for this belief.

You say "human suffering and eusociality" factually grounds moral agency. Is there a way to articulate this position to support your belief (I presume you hold) that "suffering is a bad thing"?

Is there a way to articulate this position to support your belief (I presume you hold) that "suffering is a bad thing"? — Down The Rabbit Hole

I can't speak for 180 Proof but many models of morality start with a supposition - e.g., that human flourishing should be the goal. This is not objective but objective standards can be built relative to this goal.

Is there a moral system that doesn't start with a supposition - whether it be religious or secular? Matter of fact if it is religious you then get into the subjective preferences of what moral behaviour you think a god wants. A muddle of subjective choices.

I can't speak for 180 Proof but many models of morality start with a supposition - e.g., that human flourishing should be the goal. This is not objective but objective standards can be built relative to this goal. — Tom Storm

Taking "human flourishing" as one's main goal is so ripe for exploitation. Dictators massacre thousands and do it in the name of human flourishing on a longer time control scale and who knows: they could be right about it! We'll never know because their visions were never "properly implemented."

Is there a moral system that doesn't start with a supposition - whether it be religious or secular? — Tom Storm

Nope, and if someone does then beware.