Yes, you're wrong. Here's how:

I am certain the sun will rise in the morning. But I could be wrong. — ZzzoneiroCosm

This does show Banno's lack of distinction between being certain and feeling certain; so yes, he is wrong on those terms. I would say, however, that we cannot be certain that the sun will rise in the morning, but that of course we can feel certain of it; which presents no contradiction or inconsistency with the possibility of being wrong.

So....

I can be certain 2+2=4.
I can feel certain the sun will rise in the morning.


Is that what you had in mind?

If they have an abortion does that mean that they never actually believed in the pro-life movement? It would appear so.
— praxis

They changed their mind. — Banno

How exactly did they change it?

I was thinking of what Isaac said in relation to the location of lost keys and how one could have an equal propensity to act in multiple ways. In the keys scenario, I figured that long term memory would be a key factor. If long term memory indicated that the keys were equally likely to be in two different locations there would be a moment of indecision. Otherwise, one would readily check the most likely location first. Therefore, one way to manipulate ourselves or others would be to alter our long term memories.

Is that how you’re suggesting the pro-lifer can change their mind? To somehow make themselves forget that they are a pro-lifer?

Yes, that's pretty much it.

No. They were a pro-lifer and now they are not. A change of mind.

I am certain the sun will rise in the morning. But I could be wrong. — ZzzoneiroCosm

If you could be wrong, then you are not certain.

Perhaps you are using "I am certain..." somewhat irregularly to indicate that the degree of doubt can be ignored. The group of words hereabouts can be used with various and in many cases interchangeable sense. But for our purposes we need something tighter.

I can be certain 2+2=4.
I can feel certain the sun will rise in the morning. — ZzzoneiroCosm

but:

• I can feel certain 2+2=4.
• I can be certain the sun will rise in the morning

That doesn't seem to help @Janus' case.


Thanks for actually engaging in the discussion with an argument. We could proceed to reconstruct Austin's Kindergarten... the research program he commenced that examined the relations between words. Putting the anal back into analytic.

If you could be wrong, then you are not certain. — Banno

This definition or rule is fine - it's the beginning and end of your argument.

@Janus's view is fine too.

I can feel certain 2+2=4.
I can be certain the sun will rise in the morning — Banno

You're ignoring Janus's view in favor of your own. Only natural.

But both are fine.

Not really interested in continuing this. Just passing through.

You're ignoring Janus's definition in favor of your own. Only natural. — ZzzoneiroCosm

This?

I can be certain 2+2=4.
I can feel certain the sun will rise in the morning. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I admit to not having been able to make sense of it. He hasn't made a case for what the difference consists in. Hence my counterexample:

I can feel certain 2+2=4.
I can be certain the sun will rise in the morning — Banno

Seems to make no difference.

I'll leave that to Janus. I can see an a-priori-a-posteriori-esque tack surfacing. Or a (likely idiosyncratic) codification of degrees of certainty. All of it seems fine to me, but not my cup of tea. We'll continue to believe and to be and/or feel certain, regardless.



Headed back to the coliseum roar.

Feelings are narratives? That doesn't seem right. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Have you read Lisa Feldman-Barrett's work?

If you could be wrong, then you are not certain. — Banno


This definition or rule is fine - it's the beginning and end of your argument. — ZzzoneiroCosm

This is also in accordance with my view. Of course, if you could be wrong then you can't be certain, but you could feel certain (but only if you didn't think you could be wrong).

I can be certain 2+2=4.
I can feel certain the sun will rise in the morning. — ZzzoneiroCosm


I admit to not having been able to make sense of it. He hasn't made a case for what the difference consists in. Hence my counterexample:

I can feel certain 2+2=4.
I can be certain the sun will rise in the morning — Banno


Seems to make no difference. — Banno

The difference is obvious: by your own argument at the top of this post you cannot be certain the sun will rise in the morning, because you could be wrong. But you can be certain that 2+2=4, because you cannot be wrong about that. Of course you can also feel certain about either example.

I'll leave that to Janus. I can see an a-priori-a-posteriori-esque tact surfacing. Or a (likely idiosyncratic) codification of degrees of certainty. All of it seems fine to me, but not my cup of tea. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I agree there can be more or less certainty, and I would say that to the degree you feel certain of something, to that degree you more or less believe it.

This analytic stuff is not really my cup of philosophy either, it's mostly pedantry and trivia; I just comment when I think there is some degree of confusion, and I don't like to be misrepresented. But I should learn not to waste time and energy where it will be ill-spent. Casting pearls before swine and all that...

No. Is it her view that "feelings are narratives"? That doesn't have the ring of precision to me, no matter how you parse it.

But I should learn not to waste time and energy where it will be ill-spent. Casting pearls before swine and all that... — Janus

It's good exercise but not a lot of meat on those bones.

Others find it filling.

It appears that the mind and heart have different criteria for belief. The mind uses justification as the gold standard (is/cope). The heart, on the other hand, relies on something else (ought/hope).

See @Banno's example here . It gets closer to what I'm saying.

A belief is not simply a mental state alone - mental states on their own are just snapshots of a constantly changing pattern of bloodflow,or action potential, depending on what you're measuring. To say a mental state is a belief requires that it is interpreted as some statement or other in our language. Banno and I disagree (I think) about the extent of non-verbal beliefs, but the crux of the matter is pretty indisputable I think - a belief is a belief that... So, in my terms, a propensity to act as if some state of affairs were the case requires me to define that state of affairs - in language. The brain, however, does not require such states of affairs to be rendered in language on order to be in some state or other.

So our 'pro-lifer' can hold the belief that all life is sacred and also hold the belief that some life is not sacred which he will express (and possibly even rationalise, post hoc) in different ways if and when called upon to do so. If I were to look into his brain (this can't be done yet, of course) and see the tendencies wired into his neural networks, I might render his beliefs as "he believes that all life is sacred, and he believes that all life is not sacred". He would likely not render them that way (seeing how odd it sounds) but the way he renders his beliefs is just a front - a post hoc process designed to make them meet that standard required of rational discussion.

Philosophers sometimes forget that appeals to rationality are themselves normative. That we are sometimes irrational means we can ask if we ought be rational. — Banno

Exactly. That we can say "you're being irrational about this!" entails that it is possible not to be rational. How would one render irrational beliefs into a conversation if it were impossible to even hold them in the first place?

Ah. So all this is just to day that sometimes folk say "I feel certain..." as equivalent to "I believe...", and this is distinct from "I am certain...".

Why didn't you say?

Is it her view that "feelings are narratives"? That doesn't have the ring of precision to me, no matter how you parse it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Well. I strongly recommend her work.

This is a good introduction https://www.affective-science.org/pubs/2017/barrett-tce-scan-2017.pdf

The usual story in philosophy since Socrates is that if it is pointed out to someone that they are being irrational, they will modify their behaviour or belief in order to achieve rationality.

It irks philosophers that this is not so.

Banno and I disagree (I think) about the extent of non-verbal beliefs... — Isaac

Well, I'm not sure of the extent of our disagreement either, but further if we do disagree then you are probably right. I've a vague notion of how belief or some correlate might function in neural networks roughly in terms of Bayesian analysis, but it's not as clear as it should be. It seems that a belief can be represented as a non-symbolic pattern in a neural net, and arguably that is a non-linguistic belief, but I would add that one could still put that belief into symbolic form - into words - and hence in that sense all belief is of the form "A believes that p". I'm not sure that any disagreement we might have here would not be about the terms used rather than the nature of belief.

It irks philosophers that this is not so. — Banno

Ha! Yes, the abject (and worsening) failure of the project to get people to think more rationally by using rational argument. Was it Mark Twain who said "you cannot use rational argument to disabuse a man of a notion that was never arrived at rationally in the first place".

I'm not sure that any disagreement we might have here would not be about the terms used rather than the nature of belief. — Banno

Ah, yes. I remember now, we did resolve that. How satisfying. I am, of course, seconding the word 'belief' for a purpose it was not originally intended to cover, but now we have discovered these networks which are (in all likelihood) responsible for our tendency to say things like "I believe the pub is at the end of this road", then it seems appropriate to borrow the word 'belief' to apply to them. The limits of our language remain the limits of our world.

The interesting thing that a neural analysis opens is the possibility of two or more renderings of the same neural network. I might say "I believe life is sacred" and you might (looking at my horrendous anti-abortion bombing spree) say "No you don't believe that". What we'd be arguing about is the best rendering into language of exactly the same neural network, where 'best' might be defined by the rules of rational thinking, or ethics, or just social function.

Mark Twain who said "you cannot use rational argument to disabuse a man of a notion that was never arrived at rationally in the first place". — Isaac

Swift.

It is useless to attempt to reason a man out of a thing he was never reasoned into.


From memory so check it. :smile:


Reasoning will never make a Man correct an ill Opinion, which by Reasoning he never acquired.

No. They were a pro-lifer and now they are not. A change of mind. — Banno

Or perhaps they never had a tendency to act according to their "beliefs".

... a belief is a belief that... So, in my terms, a propensity to act as if some state of affairs were the case ... — Isaac

I afraid this doesn't pan out, simply because we can 'hold something to be true' despite evidence, despite reason, and despite our own propensity to act as though it were true.

So our 'pro-lifer' can hold the belief that all life is sacred and also hold the belief that some life is not sacred — Isaac

Rather, they can 'hold something to be true' (life is sacrid) and fail to act as though it were true.

The curious thing is that you appear perfectly willing to count emotions as social constructs but not something like beliefs.

To abandon belief is to abandon the influence of a social construct and essentially an effort to abandon tribalism. Belief died with God, in other words.

They were a pro-lifer and now they are not. A change of mind. — Banno

Sometimes, that's the case. Other times, denial, rationalization, compartmentalization are at work.

Christian women are, officially, pro-life, but many, if not most, also routinely use contraceptives and have abortions, just like non-Christian women.
As far as I know Christians, context determines a lot. There are things they proclaim in official situations, but in some informal situation, they might claim the opposite. The whole discrepancy seems so strategic, so systematic that it's hard to believe there is some mistake or unconscious denial going on.

A similar pattern can be observed with with many other people. For example, a white American supremacist nationalist will show contempt for blacks if the topic of the discussion is US internal matters, but will prefer a black American to a white Russian or a white German if the topic of discussion are matters external to the US.

Swift — ZzzoneiroCosm

Ah, yes. I was using the tried and tested policy - if in doubt attribute it to Mark Twain.

we can 'hold something to be true'... despite our own propensity to act as though it were true. — praxis

How would you know?

The curious thing is that you appear perfectly willing to count emotions as social constructs but not something like beliefs. — praxis

Odd that you should think that. My main field of research was the social construction of beliefs. What have I said that makes you think I've dismissed it?

I've never heard of "I believe" being equated with "I'm certain", it seemed out of the blue. — Isaac

It seems to me that this is how (philosophically uneducated) people usually mean it.

Yes, the abject (and worsening) failure of the project to get people to think more rationally by using rational argument. — Isaac

But this has nothing to do with rationality, but with the power hierarchy between the people involved, and the implications of this hierarchy. Neither those above oneself nor those beneath oneself are open to being convinced by the arguments one gives.

So our 'pro-lifer' can hold the belief that all life is sacred and also hold the belief that some life is not sacred which he will express (and possibly even rationalise, post hoc) in different ways if and when called upon to do so. If I were to look into his brain (this can't be done yet, of course) and see the tendencies wired into his neural networks, I might render his beliefs as "he believes that all life is sacred, and he believes that all life is not sacred". He would likely not render them that way (seeing how odd it sounds) but the way he renders his beliefs is just a front - a post hoc process designed to make them meet that standard required of rational discussion. — Isaac

_He_, the pro-lifer. Oh, the irony.

But this has nothing to do with rationality, but with the power hierarchy between the people involved, and the implications of this hierarchy. Neither those above oneself nor those beneath oneself are open to being convinced by the arguments one gives. — baker

Well, that still leaves those of one's own class, surely?