And isn't that the hallmark of something of philosophically interesting? — Pantagruel

Metaphysics is a popular specialty for philosophers at universities.

:smile: It's a good feeling. As long as it lasts. :smile:

↪universeness
Well I for one was trying to unburden it of what I thought were questionable associations with Chinese philosophy, to return it to its Platonist-Aristotelian roots. — Wayfarer

When I engage in a discussion on "metaphysics" on this forum, I begin by trying to "unburden" that venerable term from it's Catholic Scholastic baggage. Aristotle didn't categorize the theme of the second volume of his book on Nature (phusis) as "super-natural". Instead, its topics were merely philosophical (general & universal, instead of specific & local) ideas & opinions about the natural world -- including its human spectators & commentators.

Ironically, the medieval Greek Renaissance spawned both Science and Scholasticism. And it was the biblical Scholastics, who inextricably linked the mundane Greek term "Meta-physics" with Christian concepts of an unseen parallel realm above the manifest natural world. Hence, for most western thinkers, "meta" doesn't mean simply "after" or "subsequent", but implies "above" and "superior". Which offends those who believe that scientific Reality is purely Material & Physical, hence uncontaminated with Mental or Spiritual impurities. Just the opposite of the Christian belief system, which views Matter as the pollution of spiritual souls.

Apparently, Eastern philosophies are not as well known by posters on TPF. In my experience, the most common negative associations of "metaphysics" is with European/Christian doctrine, not Buddhism or Taoism. Although the Body/Spirit or Brain/Mind distinction is also found in Eastern worldviews, that dueling Dualism seems to be most egregious in the West --- perhaps due to the Religion vs Science upheavals following the Enlightenment/Renaissance reformation, during which people were burned at the stake for doctrinal disputes. On the other hand, Eastern religions didn't place their emphasis on Belief, but on Behavior.

Anyway, I have tried with little success to return the descriptive term "meta-physics" to its original Aristotelian meaning. For him, Physics was the objective study of Physical Nature, and Meta-Physics was a subjective investigation of Human Nature. Not just what we know, but how we know (Epistemology). Not just what we are, but what "Being" is (Ontology). In other words, The Physics was observations of the Environment, and The Metaphysics was inwardly focused on the Observer. For example, there are no objective Laws in nature, because universal Principles are in the mind of the beholder.

Aristotle seemed to include Human Nature under the general topic of Nature. But modern pragmatic Science has come to dominate the study of our physical surroundings, even down to its barely physical substructure. So modern Philosophy got stuck holding the bag of meta-physical leftovers. Yet, Quantum Physics has begun to cross-over into the impractical unrealistic philosophical domain of spooky Non-classical-physics. And that neither-here-nor-there terrain is where toes get stepped-on and beliefs get tripped-up. :nerd:

ARISTOTLE'S NATURE INCLUDED BOTH SIDES OF PLATO'S IDEAL/REAL DICHOTOMY

Anyway, I have tried with little success to return the descriptive term "meta-physics" to its original Aristotelian meaning. For him, Physics was the objective study of Physical Nature, and Meta-Physics was a subjective investigation of Human Nature. — Gnomon

No. Aristotle's Metaphysics (a word he never uses) is about first principles of philosophy--not "Human Nature."

No. Aristotle's Metaphysics (a word he never uses) is about first principles of philosophy--not "Human Nature." — Jackson

Yes. I'm aware that Aristotle's purpose in writing the second volume of his encyclopedia on Nature, has been interpreted in various ways at various times. The Scholastics, for religious reasons, focused on the spiritual implications of his work. In fact, Ari himself referred to the theme of his book as "Theology", but from a (pre-christian, yet "virtuous", Pagan) perspective. Some modern academics have even portrayed Aristotle as an Atheistic Realist Scientist, and emphasized his differences from Mystical Idealistic Plato.

Nevertheless, having no academic training in Philosophy, I approached the book as a look at the rational Observers of Nature. And I tend to interpret the work in terms of my Information-theoretic worldview, which is not yet mainstream in academia. Hence, IMHO, it's an early treatise on Human Nature -- among other things -- and more like modern Psychology than Plato's more spiritual approach. But, he still referred to the human Soul, as the embodiment of Reason. His books cataloged the Categories that we still use millennia later in our Religion, Science, Cosmology, and Philosophy. :smile:

Aristotle’s Metaphysics :
Metaphysics, for Aristotle, was the study of nature and ourselves. In this sense he brings metaphysics to this world of sense experience–where we live, learn, know, think, and speak. Metaphysics is the study of being qua being, which is, first, the study of the different ways the word “be” can be used.
https://open.library.okstate.edu/introphilosophy/chapter/__unknown__/

Topical Metaphysics :
Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_metaphysics

Metaphysics of Theology :
Metaphysics (Greek: τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, "things after the ones about the natural world"; Latin: Metaphysica) is one of the principal works of Aristotle, in which he develops the doctrine that he refers to sometimes as Wisdom, sometimes as First Philosophy, and sometimes as Theology.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle)
Note -- Ari made it clear that he thought that contemporary Greek Religion was based on false premises, and fostered base motives for popularity, instead of promoting a rational search for worldly wisdom.

Philosophical Theology :
"For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotelian_theology

Nevertheless, having no academic training in Philosophy — Gnomon

Indeed.

I'm aware that Aristotle's purpose in writing the second volume of his encyclopedia on Nature, — Gnomon

Sorry, I do not understand what you're saying here.

I'm aware that Aristotle's purpose in writing the second volume of his encyclopedia on Nature, — Gnomon
Sorry, I do not understand what you're saying here. — Jackson

If it was unclear, what I was implying was that your "First Principles" interpretation is one of many. So, I submitted some alternative versions of Aristotle's "purpose" for separating Physics from Metaphysics. The first volume was Scientific & Materialistic, looking at the environment. The second volume was Philosophical & Psychological, looking at the observer. Admittedly, that is not a traditional academic interpretation. But, it serves my 21st century information-theoretic purposes. And the links are intended to show that I am not alone in seeing the focus on the mind of the Observer, as Quantum Physics has forced scientists to do. :nerd:

PS__I'm not saying that Aristotle was a Quantum Scientist. Merely that his insight was prescient.

"I'm aware that Aristotle's purpose in writing the second volume of his encyclopedia on Nature, has been interpreted in various ways at various times."

Intentional Observer Effects on Quantum Randomness :
Observer effects are thus described as entanglement correlations between the intentional observer and the observed system
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00379/full

This whole subject is a massive can of worms, but I'll say a few words.

Regarding Aristotle and the subject of objectivity - I think the whole concept, or rather orientation, of objectivity, is part and parcel of the modern period. The word itself only came into regular usage in the early modern period. And I think the deep reason for that is that pre-moderns, even very sophisticated pre-moderns such as the Greeks, experienced the world differently - not as an ensemble of objects, but as an intentional creation, and so had different kind of relationship with it - an 'I-Thou' relationship, not subject and object. But that's a whole thesis topic, right there. (I think it's articulated by Owen Barfield in his books.)

As regards scholasticism - my very scanty knowledge of that started with a book called God, Zen and the Intuition of Being (from the Adyar Bookshop, naturally) which was cross-cultural meditation on spiritual awareness in Zen Buddhism and Thomas Aquinas (mediated by Jacques Maritain). It's not at all dry scholasticism, but about an acuity of insight into the nature of being. Why it appealed to me, is that it depicts Aquinas in terms of his spiritual realisation. (It can be found here.)

There was another book, The Theological Origins of Modernity, by Michael Allen Gillespie. Read that in 2010 when first posting on forums. It's an essay in the history of ideas, showing how the roots of today's scientific materialism lie in medieval nominalism. It documents a series of interchanges between some of the key figures - Descartes and Hobbes, and Erasmus and Luther, for example. The point about nominalism was that it dissolved the intricate Aristotelian rationalism that underlay the scholastic worldview and moved Christianity nearer to something like Islam, where God is an unknowable and completely capricious sovereign. It ends up belittling reason (for which, see Max Horkheimer The Eclipse of Reason. Review of Gillespie here. You see it especially in the fideism of Protestant Fundamentalism.)

The basic drift of all this is that the advent of modernity, whilst conferring immense power and comfort, is also deeply irrational. Man pictures himself, as Bertrand Russell put it, as the outcome of the accidental collocation of atoms, 'chemical scum', in Stephen Hawkings words, on a minute speck of dust in an infinite universe. That's the setting in which metaphysics is ridiculed, mainly because the culture has forgotten what it means. And that goes back to the medieval period, the conflict between nominalism and (scholastic) realism, as Gillespie says. History, as they say, is written by the victors, and now we can't even remember what the conflict was about.

A genuine (scholastic) realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.

In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom — Joshua Hochschild, What's Wrong with Ockham?Reassessing the Role of Nominalism in the Dissolution of the West

The basic drift of all this is that the advent of modernity, whilst conferring immense power and comfort, is also deeply irrational. Man pictures himself, as Bertrand Russell put it, as the outcome of the accidental collocation of atoms, 'chemical scum', in Stephen Hawkings words, on a minute speck of dust in an infinite universe. That's the setting in which metaphysics is ridiculed, mainly because the culture has forgotten what it means — Wayfarer

Russell and Hawking may have ridiculed what they understood to be metaphysics, but this hardly means their own view of the world was lacking a metaphysical basis. Post-Einsteinian physics fits Kant's definition of empirical idealism: “Idealism is the opinion that we immediately experience only our own existence, but can only infer that of outer things (which inference from effect to cause is in fact uncertain)” (Kant 2005: 294).

Russell and Hawking may have ridiculed what they understood to be metaphysics, but this hardly means their own view of the world was lacking a metaphysical basis. — Joshs

Of course. The point is, their kind of naturalism is a worldview that doesn't realise that it's a worldview - it takes itself to be the way things truly are, once the world has been stripped of what they see as superstitious accretions.

The point is, their kind of naturalism is a worldview that doesn't realise that it's a worldview - it takes itself to be the way things truly are, once the world has been stripped of what they see as superstitious accretions. — Wayfarer

I have to say that every philosophical position I’ve ever read believes that it has reached the irreducible basis of things and has stripped thought of superstitious accretions. One can only recognize their position as just one more worldview once they have transcended it.

One can only recognize their position as just one more worldview once they have transcended it. — Joshs

At that point I think we start to take philosophy less seriously. It's still healthy brain food and good for clearing away the clouds. But has little effect on, for example, blood pressure.

What do you mean by "worldview" in contrast to (a) metaphysics?

I have to say that every philosophical position I’ve ever read believes that it has reached the irreducible basis of things and has stripped thought of superstitious accretions. One can only recognize their position as just one more worldview once they have transcended it. — Joshs

Sounds like you haven't read very much philosophy.

One can only recognize their position as just one more worldview once they have transcended it. — Joshs

Fair enough, for which the awareness of there being something to be transcended would be a pre-requisite.

At that point I think we start to take philosophy less seriously. It's still healthy brain food and good for clearing away the clouds. But has little effect on, for example, blood pressure. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You think the sciences are any different? How could they be when every significant scientific development in history requires a change in philosophical underpinnings?

How could they be when every significant scientific development in history requires a change in philosophical underpinnings? — Joshs

Could you explain what that means?

One can only recognize their position as just one more worldview once they have transcended it.
— Joshs

Fair enough, for which the awareness of there being something to be transcended would be a pre-requisite. — Wayfarer

The awareness comes from within the sciences themselves. Heidegger argued that for the most parts the sciences dont think, they construct their own regional ontology and remain constrained within it.

Philosopher of science Joseph Rouse disagrees with this limited view of science:

“Science as such could not uncover its “essence,” the metaphysics of the world as picture which made the transformation of science into a research enterprise seem appropriate and inevitable. Only philosophical reflection could hold open the possibility of an alternative understanding. This claim depended upon a contentious distinction between science and philosophy, however. In lectures contemporaneous with “Age of the World-Picture,” Heidegger acknowledged that Galileo and Newton, or Heisenberg and Bohr, were doing philosophy rather than “mere” science. The need for such gerrymandering suggests difficulties with Heidegger's claim that science inevitably closed off a more fundamental ontological understanding: the most important and influential scientific work had to count as philosophy instead, precisely because it was unquestionably insightful.”

I have to say that every philosophical position I’ve ever read believes that it has reached the irreducible basis of things and has stripped thought of superstitious accretions. One can only recognize their position as just one more worldview once they have transcended it. — Joshs

Sounds like you haven't read very much philosophy — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you like to elaborate?

↪Wayfarer ↪Joshs What do you mean by "worldview" in contrast to (a) metaphysics? — 180 Proof

I tend to use them interchangeably.

I was extolling a transcendence of worldview X, Y or Z. Worldview XX, YY or ZZ provide the clearest vista on worldview X, Y or Z.

Hence the perpetual need for self-transcendence.

Not sure how to receive your response.

How could they be when every significant scientific development in history requires a change in philosophical underpinnings?
— Joshs

Could you explain what that means? — Jackson

I’m a fan of Thomas Kuhn. His paradigm shifts are philosophical transformations.

I’m a fan of Thomas Kuhn. His paradigm shifts are philosophical transformations. — Joshs

Oh.

Would you like to elaborate? — Joshs

I don't think I've read any philosopher who believed oneself to have "reached the irreducible basis of things and has stripped thought of superstitious accretions". If I knew that this was the case, before reading it though, I'd reject it as bad philosophy, and not bother reading it. Perhaps Wittgenstein thought that way when he wrote the Tractatus, which was bad philosophy, but then he later realized that he was wrong to think that way, and produced some better material.

I don't think I've read any philosopher who believed oneself to have "reached the irreducible basis of things and has stripped thought of superstitious accretions". If I knew that this was the case, before reading it though, I'd reject it as bad philosophy, and not bother reading it. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about Descartes( certainty of the cogito) , Kant(irreducibility of the categories) , Hegel( Absolute subjectivity) , Husserl ( apodictic certainty) and Heidegger( Being as fundamental ontology). I could add Spinoza, Leibnitz and many others to the list.

Fair enough, for which the awareness of there being something to be transcended would be a pre-requisite. — Wayfarer

It's conceivable that some X becomes visible only when transcended.

It's conceivable that some X becomes visible only when transcended. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which is why historical movements are only identified in hindsight.

:up:

At that point I think we start to take philosophy less seriously — ZzzoneiroCosm

You mean there are those who do take it seriously? :snicker: