Surprising, but I'll take your word for it. It suggests nothing of the sort to me. American vs English usage perhaps? — Isaac

They don’t say things like “I believe God exists” in Limey town?

Outside of that, there's no 'it' to be 'really' anything. — Isaac

So the mind constructs ‘it’.

Fact checking is a way to support personal beliefs. — universeness

If we’re not sure about something why would we need to hold it to be true?

If we’re not sure about something why would we need to hold it to be true? — praxis

I am 99.9% sure gods don’t exist and I hold there nonexistence to be true but It would be highly unlikely that I would kill other humans over the issue.
It would depend on what the theists were threatening me with and those I consider innocents, with.
I would kill theists who threaten to kill others in the name of their theism.
I would also kill those who I believed were 99.9% fascist and were engaged in killing others as happened In WW2.
In general I would probably try to kill someone who was trying to kill me or those I care about.
But I would not have much belief in a concept such as ‘the only good German is a dead German,’ A little fact checking would soon provide strong evidence that there are many good Germans, even during WW2.
So we need to believe certain things are true if we are willing to kill based on it being true.

So we need to believe certain things are true if we are willing to kill based on it being true. — universeness

In a court of law, reasonable doubt gets an acquittal and reasonable conviction… gets a conviction. In this area there seems to be a moral imperative to ‘hold a conviction to be true’. It also helps to avoid the trouble of having to retry the case indefinitely, which would be impractical.

But this has nothing to do with rationality, but with the power hierarchy between the people involved, and the implications of this hierarchy. Neither those above oneself nor those beneath oneself are open to being convinced by the arguments one gives.
— baker

Well, that still leaves those of one's own class, surely? — Isaac

Within the same socioeconomic class, there is still a power hierarchy, depending on socioeconomic context. Would, for example, your boss be persuaded by rational arguments provided by you? Perhaps your colleagues would, as long as you and they are not competing for the same opportunities at work.

My point being that there are relatively few situations in life where the argument from power isn't the strongest one.

No. I have in mind Kenny's "Faith, then, resembles knowledge in being irrevocable, but differs from it in being a commitment in the absence of adequate evidence" Faith is unwarranted belief.

Knowledge, Belief, and Faith. — Banno

"Unwarranted" on whose terms?
"Belief despite evidence" according to whose idea of evidence?

This is what happens when you throw out all notions of subjectivity and set yourself up as the one objective arbiter of reality.

You don't care about other people's knowledge, insights, concerns. Other people don't really exist for you. You are the one who decides what is real and what isn't, what exists and what doesn't, what is adequate evidence and what isn't. You treat your own standards as if they were the objective standards that everyone is bound to. (IOW, you're doing the exact same thing as many religious people do.)

* * *

Faith is not belief in the face of evidence to the contrary. No one has ever used the word that way as far as I know. — Tate

Some atheists do, for example.

Some atheists believe there is a lot of evidence that shows or at least indicates that god doesn't exist. They also believe that they have the only truthful take on the matter. So from the perspective of those atheists, theists in fact believe in god contrary to evidence.

Similarly, some theists claim that atheists refuse to believe in god despite ample evidence that god exists.

You can find examples of this in the theism-atheism discussions pretty much anywhere where this is discussed.

The two camps have vastly different ideas about what in particular constitutes "evidence of god", but often, they refuse to acknowledge this.

They don’t say things like “I believe God exists” in Limey town? — praxis

Well, yes. It's just that it doesn't carry the connotations of certainty you read from it. "I believe God exists" could equally mean one is a fervent evangelist or a casual churchgoer.

So the mind constructs ‘it’. — praxis

Yes. I don't think that can be in doubt. We cannot see anything without minds.

there are relatively few situations in life where the argument from power isn't the strongest one. — baker

Probably, but it sounds simply tautological. Power is powerful. You could drop the 'argument' bit entirely. People are controlled in some way or another by those more powerful than them. If they weren't then it would be incorrect to have identified them as more powerful.

Whether they are actually convinced by that argument is not given by power relationships. Loads of people are more powerful than me. I rarely believe anything they say.

American vs English usage perhaps? — Isaac

Could be. My casual observations:
-- Americans use "belief" more frequently in ideological contexts,
-- "belief" is an extremely loaded term,
-- middle class people use it more often than elites,
-- in British English, "I believe" seems to often be used with the meaning 'I guess; I think so, but I'm not sure'.

Well, yes. It's just that it doesn't carry the connotations of certainty you read from it. "I believe God exists" could equally mean one is a fervent evangelist or a casual churchgoer. — Isaac

Us Yanks, well, one at least, see a difference between the the following statements.

"I think God exists"

"I believe God exists"

The former suggests consideration or thinking and the latter suggests more conviction or faith in the sense of accepting another's word as true. If someone had actually met God I think they would be inclined to say something like, "I know God."

Do you really see the statements as perfectly synonymous?

Loads of people are more powerful than me. I rarely believe anything they say. — Isaac

Like I said earlier: Neither those above oneself nor those beneath oneself are open to being convinced by the arguments one gives.

I think the existence of a power differential between people makes rational argumentation (and being convinced by rational arguments) difficult or even impossible.

Whether they are actually convinced by that argument is not given by power relationships.

It's the power relationship that prevails.

Personally, it feels awkward to me to agree with an argument given by someone more powerful than myself. Am I agreeing with their reasoning, or submitting to their power?

Do you really see the statements as perfectly synonymous? — praxis

Virtually, yes. As @baker has said above...

in British English, "I believe" seems to often be used with the meaning 'I guess; I think so, but I'm not sure'. — baker

We might even say something like "I do believe it's going to rain" meaning nothing more than thinking it slightly more likely than not.

So almost but not perfectly. A shade of meaning.

Personally, it feels awkward to me to agree with an argument given by someone more powerful than myself. Am I agreeing with their reasoning, or submitting to their power? — baker

Yeah, interesting. I suppose that's more true than it might at first seem if one considers social as well as economic power relationships. I do think it's surmountable though, but I agree the temptation makes it difficult to be sure.

I think, one difficulty here is that there's two aspects to these types of discussion that people are interested in. The 'beliefs' we find most interesting are those like god, socialism, transgenders, etc... But these are a tiny minority of beliefs. We all believe, for example, that larger objects cannot fit inside smaller ones.

The former type of beliefs I think are held almost entirely for reasons of social relationships. The latter type more for pragmatic or biological reasons. The forces which act on each type will be different.

About a propensity to act, why are we calling that a belief rather than, say, a conditioned response?

About a propensity to act, why are we calling that a belief rather than, say, a conditioned response? — praxis

I'm not sure how to answer a question like "why" am j using some word or other. It's like asking why I use the word 'cup' to refer to the thing holding my tea.

Nonetheless, I think your dichotomy there is excessively distinct. It's not "propensity to act" it's "propensity to act as if...". 'Conditioned response' wouldn't cover that.

So if I'm walking down a flight of stairs and I have a propensity to act as if the next step is the same dimentions as the previous steps but I trip because it's not, did I have a mistaken belief or a prediction error?

Yes, lots of things. Next. — Banno

OK, so regarding the distinction between feeling certain and being certain; we can be certain of some things, so they are the things we know. Of the things we cannot be certain, we can either feel certain or uncertain.

The former state I call believing; we believe something is the case even though we cannot be certain that it is so. meaning that we feel certain, even thought we cannot be certain. My point all along is that it is possible to act without believing; so I don't see the definition of belief as a tendency to act a certain way as being a very useful one.

To anticipate an objection; I am not claiming that someone who believes something necessarily feels certain about what they believe all the time; they may vacillate between belief and doubt. The point is that belief consists in feeling certain, so at times when doubt may creep in they are no longer believing.

I’m not against holding something to be true but I am advocating for some rigorous background checking to make sure YOUR conviction or belief it’s true isjustified to YOU and you can cite your sources and also cite why your sources are reliable and rational. Fact checking is a way to support personal beliefs. — universeness

What you're describing is epistemic egoism. It's the ideal of epistemic autonomy.
Given that we're not living in a vacuum, epistemic autonomy is not possible.

I think the existence of a power differential between people makes rational argumentation (and being convinced by rational arguments) difficult or even impossible. — baker

Yeah, but you only think that because the power elites make you...

:roll:

No, it's a description.

so regarding the distinction between feeling certain and being certain; we can be certain of some things, so they are the things we know. — Janus

You are equating being certainty with knowing. That's not right. Knowing requiters having a justification. Certainty does not.

My point all along is that it is possible to act without believing; — Janus

The point is that belief consists in feeling certain — Janus

If you wish to use the word "belief" in this idiosyncratic way, be my guest. It doesn't fit withthe standard use of my community, nor with the standard use in philosophy. Take a look at the Stanford article:

Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. — Belief

See especially the section on Degree of Belief, which quite explicitly sets out how not all beliefs are certain.

Your distinction between \being and feeling certain still appears incoherent. I don't see any point in continuing this discussion, since it seems that you are the only [person who holds to your view, and it does not help with the problem in the OP.

Cheers.

No, it's a description. — baker

Ah, so we are free to "think" that such-and-such is true, free of the yoke of authority?

You are equating being certainty with knowing. That's not right. Knowing requiters having a justification. Certainty does not. — Banno

We disagree right there; feeling certain does not require a justification (at least not an inter-subjective one), but being certain does.

If you wish to use the word "belief" in this idiosyncratic way, be my guest. It doesn't fit withthe standard use of my community, nor with the standard use in philosophy. Take a look at the Stanford article:

Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. — Banno

Taking something to be the case or regarding it as true is the same as feeling certain it is the case or that it is true.

See especially the section on Degree of Belief, which quite explicitly sets out how not all beliefs are certain. — Banno

I'll take a look; but I can say right off that I agree that not all beliefs are certain. In fact I don't think any beliefs are certain; if they were they would be better thought of as bits of knowledge, not beliefs. On the other hand all acts of believing are acts of feeling certain; and that is precisely the distinction you keep missing.

How it relates to the OP goes back to what I said in the beginning; that I can accept and entertain something as seeming to be the case, and act accordingly, without believing it is the case. The author of the OP seems to have agreed with what I've said and to have thought it to be germane to his thoughts, so I'm puzzled as to why you seem to be resisting what seems so obvious.

You are equating being certainty with knowing. That's not right. Knowing requiters having a justification. Certainty does not.
— Banno

We disagree right there; feeling certain does not require a justification (at least not an inter-subjective one), but being certain does. — Janus

See, this is where there is a miscommunication. What I said above does not imply that feeling certain does not require a justification. Knowing requires justification. And again, one can know something without feeling certain.

Belief; if someone believes
Beliefs; if someone believes in things

Technically speaking, belief isn't pluralized in that context, only in the context of multiple parties.

Metaphorically the spring of belief is constant and is a singularity, where any fragmentation divides a singular, reducing belief and not multiplying it.

I have belief, I can also have belief in- the problem, is that beliefs means multiple belief when it assesses belief in. I believe in is different from I believe; both make sense but when regarded technically are different.

I believe I have made myself clear, it's among my beliefs.

We disagree right there; feeling certain does not require a justification (at least not an inter-subjective one), but being certain does. — Janus


See, this is where there is a miscommunication. What I said above does not imply that feeling certain does not require a justification. Knowing requires justification. And again, one can know something without feeling certain. — Banno

It's me, though, saying that feeling certain does not require a justification; insofar as justification is an inter-subjective requirement.That said, I also doubt that people generally feel certain about anything without thinking they have justification for their feeling of certainty.

I agree that knowing requires justification, in that knowing, in order to count as such, must be warranted by either observation, experience or logic. One can know things without knowing that they know, I guess, which would mean that one does not have to feel certain about it. But in order to know (reflectively) that you know, you must be certain that you know, and you can't be wrong about that or else you only think you know.

My words,contrasting the two entirely different phrases : one, saying: "beleive" and the other saying: "beleive IN" have been accepted by many in this forum as having different meanings but also have not been accepted by many who use them interchangeably.

My initial words --"I believe nothing." were incorrect. I do, indeed believe things but rarely do I believe WORDS that are said to me.

But I have been wildly correct in saying that the these words are very tricky and self contradictory. The evidence for that is this extended forum itself.

So if I'm walking down a flight of stairs and I have a propensity to act as if the next step is the same dimentions as the previous steps but I trip because it's not, did I have a mistaken belief or a prediction error? — praxis

Both are the same thing.

In this area there seems to be a moral imperative to ‘hold a conviction to be true’. — praxis

I agree, I see ‘hold a conviction to be true,’ and believing a proposal to be true to be almost synonymous.