My pleasure, and thanks for the positive feedback. You make an excellent point about the two layers in Derrida's deconstructions. One has to try and keep the distinction clear. In the case of Saussure, it's as if Derrida is siding with Saussure's radical tendency against his obliviously still-phonocentric tendency. He uses a crowbar provided by Saussure in the first place to set his work ajar.

Surely we should have read some Derrida before pondering this — Moliere

This point really can't be emphasized enough. Along with "don't trust others, credentialed or not, to do your reading for you." I understand that an outsider might be deciding whether further investigation is warranted, since life and short and there are lots of books out there.

You've just got to see an example, if you really want to know. One my favorites is Derrida's reading of Saussure (in Of Grammatology). — igjugarjuk

I'm familiar with Saussure so that'd be a good introduction i guess

Another aspect of Derrida that stays with me is his investigation of metaphor in philosophy (and therefore in the rational investigation of rationality itself.)

By definition, there is therefore no properly philosophical category to qualify a certain number of tropes which have conditioned the structuring of those philosophical oppositions which are called "fundamental," "structuring," "originating": being just so many "metaphors" which would be the basis of such a "tropology," the terms "twist" or "trope" or "metaphor" are themselves governed by this rule. We could only allow ourselves to ignore this sleep of philosophy by supposing that the meaning aimed at through these figures is an essence rigorously independent of that which carries it over, which is already a philosophical thesis, one might even say the sole thesis of philosophy, the thesis which constitutes the concept of metaphor, the opposition between what is proper and what is not, between essence and accident, between intuition and discourse, between thought and language, between the intelligible and the sensible, and so forth.
... — Derrida

I understand this 'sleep' in terms of ignoring the pictorial source of concepts/metaphors that always function synchronically/systematically. The etymological fallacy is legit. Usage can change, become abstract or metaphorical. Meaning inhering in a system of differences seems especially important as this happens. What 'matter' is, it isn't mind. And maybe that's 'all' matter is. One bit of information, a system of two categories (imagine a device that returns one bit of information about its environment.)

Every case in which a plurality of meanings is irreducible, in which there is not even a promise of unity of sense, is a case in which we are beyond language. And consequently beyond humanity. It is proper to man, no doubt, to be able to create metaphors, but that in order to express something, some one thing. In this sense, the philosopher, who always has just one thing to say, of all men is indeed a man. He who does not subject the equivocal to this law is already something less than a man: a sophist, who in the end says nothing that can be brought down to a sense.

This seems relevant to the cartoon version of Derrida. But perhaps what was most offensive about him was his laughter or inappropriate playfulness. He goofed off in a way that embarrassed his peers. He violated an essential norm. Philosophy is a serious business. Rigorous thinking is a solemn affair.

The appeal to criteria of clarity and obscurity would be enough to establish the point made above: that this whole philosophical delimitation of metaphor is already constructed and worked upon by "metaphors." How could a piece of knowledge or a language be clear or obscure properly speaking? Now all the concepts which have played a part in the definition of metaphor always have an origin and a force which are themselves "metaphorical," to use on this occasion a word which can no longer strictly be applicable in designating tropes whichare as much defining as defined. If we were to take each term of the definition suggested in the Poetics, we should detect in it the mark of a figure of speech (metaphora and epiphora also designate transferin space; eidos is also a visible figure, an outline and a form-the space of an aspect or a species; genos is also a line of consanguinity, the stock of a birth, an origin, a family, and so on). One sees everything thatt hese tropes maintain and sediment in the tangle of their roots. But our task is not to trace back the function of a concept along a line to the etymology of the word. Indeed it was to avoid this etymologism that we concerned ourselves with the inner, systematic, and synchronic articulation of Aristotelian concepts. 

Metaphor is therefore classified by philosophy as provisional loss of meaning, a form of economy that does no irreparable damage to what is proper, an inevitable detour, no doubt, but the account is in view, and within the horizon of a circular reappropriation of the proper sense. This is why the philosophical evaluation of metaphor has always been ambiguous: metaphor is menacing and foreign to the eyes ofintuition (vision or contact), of the concept (the grasping or proper presence of what is signified), of consciousness (the proximity of presence to itself); but it is an accomplice of that which it threatens, being necessary to the extent to which a de-tour is a return tour guided bythe function of resemblance (mimesis and homoiosis) under the law of sameness. At this point, the contrasts between intuition, concept, and consciousness become irrelevant. They are three meanings belonging to the order of sense and its movement. And so does metaphor. From this point, the whole teleology of sense, which constructs the philosophical concept of metaphor, directs it to the manifestation of truth as an unveiled presence, to the regaining of language in its fullness without syntax, to a pure calling by name: there would be no syntactic differentiation, or at least no properly unnamable articulation which could not be reduced to semantic "sublation" or dialectical interiorization.

I connect the concern with metaphor to the critique of of phonocentrism. The 'superstition' or rhetorical target is that some mind thing is perfectly present to itself as a fount of crystal clear vehicle-independent meaning. Ololon, perhaps, virgin in a snow-white dress untainted by 'writing,' symbol of all pollution by history and its stink of ambiguity and irony. The metaphor is only acceptable as a completely separate packaging, that can be harmlessly peeled-off the divine nectar of eternal insight. All of this seems highly related to the notion of the body as the prison of the soul. The basic fantasy is of some kind of stuff that's unstained by time and chance. It's almost too easy to mock such a desire, often in terms that rely on something sufficiently timeless for the critique to have purchase. It's hard to get exciting about 'knowledge' with a questionable shelf-life. As others have mentioned, Derrida is a quasi-Kantian philosopher who can't help chasing the timeless and the pure himself. I suspect that he obsessed over presence because he fucking wanted it and yet couldn't lie to himself about having it.

↪Jackson Last I checked I was talking about what you said, not you. But perhaps as with Derrida, we can settle this the good old way: provide a quote which demonstrates Kant's commitment to skepticism. — Streetlight

Perhaps Jackson should have said that , despite the fact that Kant’s idealism was intended to avoid Humean skepticism , Kant’s split between our representations of the world and the thing in itself leads inevitably to its own form of skepticism. The veil that remains in place between subject and world is deconstructed by Derrida.

Perhaps Jackson should have said that , despite the fact that Kant’s idealism was intended to avoid Humean skepticism , Kant’s split between our representations of the world and the thing in itself leads inevitably to its own form of skepticism. The veil that remains in place between subject and world is deconstructed by Derrida. — Joshs

Already done by Hume, who I said, was not a skeptic in the contemporary sense.

A little more, without comment, and a link to the source: https://tfreeman.net/resources/Phil-480/derrida-white-mythology.pdf

If, for example, we tried to ascertain the diagram for the (supposedly) proper metaphorics of Descartes, even if we allow ourselves to suppose what is far from given, that we could rigorously delimit the metaphorical corpus belonging to his signature alone, we should have to bring to light, beneath the layer of metaphors which are apparently didactic (those reviewed in the psychological and empirical analysis of Spoerri: the ivy and the tree, the road, the house, the town, the machine, the foundation or chain), another less but equally systematic stratum which would not only beneath the first but also interwoven with it. There we should come upon the wax and the pen, dress and nakedness, the boat, the clock,t he seeds and the lodestone, the book, the stick, and so on. To reconstruct the grammar of these metaphors would be to relate its logic to what is taken to be nonmetaphorical writing, in this case to what is called the philosophical system, the meaning of concepts and the order of reasons; but also to relate it to longer sequences, to patterns of permanence and continuity, the "same" metaphor being able to function differently in one place and another. But if we put above all else our respect for the philosophical specificity of this syntax, we thereby also recognize its subordination to sense or meaning, to the truth of the philosophical concept, to what is signified in philosophy. And it is to that main item signified in onto-theology that the tenor of the dominant metaphor will always return: the circle of the heliotrope. Certainly, the metaphors of light and of the circle, so important in Descartes, are not organized as they are in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, or Husserl. But if we turn to the most critical and most properly Cartesian point of the critical process, to the point of hyperbolic doubt, of the hypothesis of the Evil Genius, to the point at which doubt attacks not only ideas of sensible origin, but "clear and distinct" ideas, and the self-evident truths of mathematics, this point we know very well that what allows the work to start off again and to continue, its last resort, is designated as lumen naturale. The natural light, and all the axioms which it enables us to see, are never subjected to the most radical doubt. Indeed, that doubt is practised in that light. "For I cannot doubt that which the natural light causes me to believe to be true, as, for example, it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt"(Third Meditation). Among the axioms which the natural light causes me to believe to be true, there is, on each occasion, and with each step, what allows emergence from doubt, and progress in the order of reasons; in particular, what allows the proof of the existence of a God who is not a deceiver. ("Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect . . . so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of reason. . . . From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect," etc.) Prior to any determinate presence or any representative idea, natural light constitutes a kind of ether of thought and of the discourse proper to it. As something natural, it has its source in God, in the God whose existence has been put in doubt and then demonstrated thanks to it. "I have certainly no cause to complain that God has not given me an intelligence which is more powerful, or a natural light which is stronger than that which I have received from Him . . ." (Fourth Meditation). Precisely in breaking out of the logical circle which has so much preoccupied him, Descartes inscribes the chain of reasons in the circle of natural light which proceeds from and returns to God.This metaphorics no doubt has its own specific syntax; but as a metaphorics it belongs to a more general syntax, a more extensive system whose constraints are equally operative in Platonism; and everything becomes clear in this sun, sun of absence and presence, blinding and luminous, dazzling. This is the end of the Third Meditation, where the existence of God has just been proved for the first time thanks to the natural light which he himself has bestowed on us, in the pretence of disappearing and allowing us to seek the blinding source of its clarity: "It seems to me right to pause for a while in order to contemplate God Himself, to ponder at leisure His marvellous attributes, to consider, and admire, and adore, the beauty of this light so resplendent, at least as far as the strength of my mind, which is in some measure dazzled by the sight, will allow me to do so." Of course, the adoration here is that of a philosopher, and since the natural light is natural, Descartes does not take what he says to belike what a theologian would say:- for a theologian would be content with metaphor. And metaphor must be left to the theologian: "The author could give a satisfactory explanation, according to his philosophy, of the creation of the world, as described in Genesis ....The account of creation there is perhaps metaphorical; it must therefore be left to the theologians. . . . Why is it said, in fact, that darkness preceded light? . . . And as for the fountains of the great deep, there too is a metaphor, but this metaphor escapes us" .A presence disappearing in its own radiance, a hidden source of light, of truth and of meaning, an obliteration of the face of being-such would be the insistent return of that which subjects metaphysics to metaphor. To metaphors, we should say: for the word can only be in the plural. If there were only one possible metaphor (a dream at the basis of philosophy), if the play of metaphors could be reduced to a family circle or group of metaphors, that is, to a "central," "fundamental," or "principal" metaphor, there would no longer be any true metaphor: there would only be the guarantee of reading the proper sense in a metaphor that was true. Now it is because the metaphorical comes into play in the plural that it does not escape syntax; and that it gives rise, in philosophy too, to a text which is not exhausted by an account of its sense (a concept signified, or a metaphorical tenor: a thesis), nor by the visible or invisible presence of its theme (the meaning and truth of being). But it is because the metaphorical does not reduce syntax, but sets out in syntax its deviations, that it carries itself away, can only be what it is by obliterating itself, endlessly constructs its own destruction. — Derrida

. I suspect that he obsessed over presence because he fucking wanted it and yet couldn't lie to himself about having it. — igjugarjuk

He does indeed place desire for pure presence at the heart of all desire. But pure presence for Derrida is death, so desire must always be thwarted or interrupted in order to continue to be.

I'm familiar with Saussure so that'd be a good introduction i guess — Olivier5

Of Grammatology also has a great introduction, and lots of copies were printed, so one can get used copies pretty cheap from Amazon, etc.

He does indeed place desire for pure presence at the heart of all desire. But pure presence for Derrida is death, so desire must always be thwarted or interrupted in order to continue to be. — Joshs

Like the face of God. There's maybe some German Romanticism in Derrida. And/or a certain slant of light, winter afternoons,...

Bennington turned me on the idea that Derrida was obsessed with what he criticized. To be rational about rationality is a complicated project. One criticizes the very condition of possibility of that criticism. But this is also just Nuerath's boat. We were always already doing it.

Usage can change, become abstract or metaphorical. Meaning inhering in a system of differences seems especially important as this happens. What 'matter' is, it isn't mind. And maybe that's 'all' matter is. One bit of information, a system of two categories (imagine a device that returns one bit of information about its environment.) — igjugarjuk

I might add that usage doesn’t only become metaphorical. For Derrida there is no non-metaphorical usage. Also, one would not be able to separate ‘mind’ from ‘matter’ , form from content , the transcendental from the empirical, presence from absence except as poles of a singular event.

I might add that usage doesn’t only become metaphorical. For Derrida there is no non-metaphorical usage. Also, one would not be able to separate ‘mind’ from ‘matter’ , form from content , the transcendental from the empirical, presence from absence except as poles of a singular event. — Joshs

Sounds right.

I might add that usage doesn’t only become metaphorical. For Derrida there is no non-metaphorical usage. Also, one would not be able to separate ‘mind’ from ‘matter’ , form from content , the transcendental from the empirical, presence from absence except as poles of a singular event. — Joshs

I hear you, but I don't think we think can or should just jettison that very distinctions that make such exciting claims possible in the first place.

Let's imagine a set of concepts such that, starting from any privileged subset, we can use that subset to rhetorically hobble all the rest.

Along these lines, see how your latest claim above depends on the concepts of singularity, polarity, and eventhood. Which, according to your own claim, must be metaphorical usages. As I grok the white mythology (and I expect you'll agree), it's no good to simply point out the metaphorical origin or residue of master concepts. The most obvious objection is that metaphor is itself a metaphor being applied metaphysically in such a context. This is a problem in general with centers of structures/systems, both inside and outside problematically.

Sounds right. — Jackson

Anatole France's criticism strikes me as important, but its limitations (Derrida's contribution) seem just as important. 'Philosophy' is just the white European man's disavowed myth system. That's the accusation. All his master concepts are spooks, figments, fairy tales with the images rubbed off. It's a basically anti-intellectual belief that philosophers just worship fairy tales like everyone else without admitting it to themselves...that genuine rationality is impossible, so go have fun with your preferred meta-narrative.

To me it's noteworthy that the move often used against cartoon versions of Derrida is basically the move that Derrida himself uses against Anatole France's fictional anti-metaphysician of the The Garden of Epicurus. Cartoon pomo is understood (correctly) to contradict itself. Or, at least, to reduce itself to a mere hunch or preference that has no binding force.

Derrida, in his concern with 'the proper,' is surprisingly adjacent to Brandom, however different their styles and influences. — igjugarjuk

How is it similar to Brandom?

How is it similar to Brandom? — Jackson

I'm new to Brandom, so buyer beware, but rationality is all about norms. Forget (or move to the background) all the ontological chatter about minds and matter. Think about practical human beings in the world holding one another accountable for propositions. There are proper ways to justify claims, proper ways to use a concept. Much of this propriety is tacit, down on the level of blind skill. But philosophers especially have made such skill explicit with their metacognitive vocabulary. We were always rational, but we could not always make claims about our claim making in general, etc.

Anyway, phonocentrism privileges speech over writing. Speech is (or was said to be) the proper example of a sign system, or the proper way to communicate sacred insights, just as reproductive sex has been understood as proper sex while homosexuality or just contraception in a heterosexual context was understood as secondary if not outright perverse.

I also mentioned tonal propriety in a post above. I think Derrida offends some with his playfulness. His 'Sarl' joke and many others in Limited Inc are not 'professional.' Is a seriousness of presentation essential to rationality? I don't think so. But the guy with the mohawk or face tattoo has more of a hill to climb. And so does the joker around solemn purveyors of science.

Phonocentrism privileges speech over writing. Speech is (or was said to be) the proper example of a sign system — igjugarjuk

That is not true. One of the weaker claims by Derrida.

That is not true. One of the weaker claims by Derrida. — Jackson

Well...I've read Saussure, and Saussure privileges speech.

But I am very open to the idea that Derrida whipped up a boogeyman or sniffed out a conspiracy, that he projected his private concerns on the tradition. Some great ideas, but he's not my guru, so hack away. If you've read his bios (maybe you have), you know he made some awkward moves (as do we all.)

But I am very open to the idea that Derrida whipped up a boogeyman or sniffed out a conspiracy. That he projected his private concerns on the tradition. — igjugarjuk

Derrida's idea that "presence" is the prevailing idea in Western philosophy is false. It barely makes sense.

And, Socrates says speech is superior to the written word...but it is Plato the writer giving Socrates these words.

Derrida's idea that "presence" is the prevailing idea in Western philosophy is false. It barely makes sense. — Jackson

Personally I agree that presence in general is a tricky thing to gripe about. Hence the hint toward German Romanticism. Sartre also comes to mind...the desire of consciousness/nothingness to finally be something...

On the other hand, it makes excellent sense in the limited Saussurian context. A system of differences without positive elements. (Systematic) form not substance. This is why I try to speak only about the Derrida I've studied most and makes most sense to me.

On the other hand, it makes excellent sense in the limited Saussurian context. A — igjugarjuk

I don't think Saussure was referring only to spoken language.

I don't think Saussure was referring only to spoken language. — Jackson

Of course he wasn't. He didn't only write of speech. But speech was the ideal and the focus. Yet Saussure can't help relying on the written 'face' of language to make sense of the clearly 'official' or 'proper' voice (this also occurs with other critics of writing who nevertheless resort to metaphors of writing at the crucial moment.) As mentioned above, Derrida reads the radical aspect of Saussure against still-phonocentric biases that are also in the text. Because language is a system of differences and a form without substance, it makes no sense to privilege the voice. Why should the ear have better access to pure, differential form?

I won't go to too much trouble to make the case for Saussure's phonocentrism, because it's not exactly hidden away in footnotes, but I'll do this much.

The subject matter of linguistics comprises all manifestations of human speech, whether that of savages or civilized nations, or of archaic, classical or decadent periods. In each period the linguist must consider not only correct speech and flowery language, but all other forms of expression as well. And that is not all: since he is often unable to observe speech directly, he must consider written texts, for only through them can he reach idioms that are remote in time or space. — Saussure

Written language is different from spoken language. I don't see anything interesting about Derrida's observation.

Written language is different from spoken language. I don't see anything interesting about Derrida's observation. — Jackson

Should I find a journalist or will you?

Point being that you don't care about Derrida and I do a little and pretty much no one cares about those first two situations, not even a little.

Should I find a journalist or will you? — igjugarjuk

I have no idea what that meant.

You offered a mere report of your feelings. So I razzed you for it.

You offered a mere report of your feelings. So I razzed you for it. — igjugarjuk

Goodbye.

And, Socrates says speech is superior to the written word...but it is Plato the writer giving Socrates these words. — Jackson

A Derridean point, by the way. But Plato may feel that writing is a lesser evil than oblivion.

Point being that you don't care about Derrida and I do a little and pretty much no one cares about those first two situations, not even a little. — igjugarjuk

I am a philosopher and discussing ideas. I suggest you stop making personal attacks.

A Derridean point, by the way — igjugarjuk

An obvious point, to anyone who read Plato.