Goodbye. — Jackson

Should I find the tiny violin player or will you?

I imagine you sounding like this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2Z2CklSxM0

Should I find the tiny violin player or will you? — igjugarjuk

I won't be reading your posts.

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I am a philosopher and discussing ideas. I suggest you stop making personal attacks. — Jackson

I don't think you can do philosophy without some risk of your claims or expressions being challenged, and I am not defending pointless hostility by saying so. But I'm sorry if I caused more discomfort than I intended.

I hear you, but I don't think we think can or should just jettison that very distinctions that make such exciting claims possible in the first place.

Let's imagine a set of concepts such that, starting from any privileged subset, we can use that subset to rhetorically hobble all the rest.

Along these lines, see how your latest claim above depends on the concepts of singularity, polarity, and eventhood. Which, according to your own claim, must be metaphorical usages. As I grok the white mythology (and I expect you'll agree), it's no good to simply point out the metaphorical origin or residue of master concepts. The most obvious objection is that metaphor is itself a metaphor being applied metaphysically in such a context. This is a problem in general with centers of structures/systems, both inside and outside problematically. — igjugarjuk

It wouldnt be a question of jettisoning distinctions , but of making any singularity equivocal and indeterminable(which is not the same thing as indefinable). Singularity for Derrida , as the gramme, the mark, differance, is not a univocal concept, it is a bipolar hinge, a differentiation. an in-between. To be a singularity is to borrow from what it is not, and this is the essence of metaphor, or what Derrida calls the metaphoricity of metaphor.

. Because language is a system of differences and a form without substance, it makes no sense to privilege the voice. — igjugarjuk

This would not be Derrida’s view. For him there is no form without substance. Form and content are equivocal in every meaning. Saussure’s system of language is a structuralism, because it is oriented around a systematic center. For Derrida the ‘system’ of language remakes itself one singular to the next, without reference to a pre-existing totality.

This would not be Derrida’s view. For him there is no form without substance. — Joshs

That would also be my view of Derrida's view. Correctly or not, and speaking metaphorically, I understand him to insist on the total incarnation of the divine. Shit being mixed up is primary. Afterword we use signs to create purity and presence and eternity and the sign itself, etc.

Saussure’s system of language is a structuralism, — Joshs

Jesus, brother, I hope so. It's a or even the prototypical example.

For Derrida the ‘system’ of language remakes itself one singular to the next, without reference to a pre-existing totality. — Joshs

Maybe he made that claim. It's grandiose enough. If so, maybe it can be justified. Still, I don't think a tamer version of that claim is anything Saussure would object to. Synchronic study is an abstraction. We take language, living evolving thing, at an ideal moment. Every tiny piece of parole will theoretically reverberate through the structure, changing it. But is this more than a footnote? The magnitude of that reverberation matters. Is it news?

Of Grammatology also has a great introduction, and lots of copies were printed, so one can get used copies pretty cheap from Amazon, etc. — igjugarjuk

I'm curious about the 'gramatology' label. Saussure called his topic 'linguistique générale".

It wouldnt be a question of jettisoning distinctions , but of making any singularity equivocal and indeterminable(which is not the same thing as indefinable). — Joshs

Maybe you can tame what you are getting at. I like Derrida enough to have actually read a decent chunk of his work in my free time. And this is without having friends also into this difficult and now largely forgotten stuff. But I didn't like him because he could be annoyingly obscure. I tolerated it for the good stuff. I like continental depth, but I appreciate analytic clarity and directness.

I'm curious about the 'gramatology' label. Saussure called his topic 'linguistique générale". — Olivier5

As I understand it, it's a slicker version of Writingology. Basically there's a deep structure in sign systems that's more like writing than (an idealized vision of) speech, and 'writing' is repurposed to refer to this deeper structure. As you know, Saussure glimpsed a semiology broader than linguistics, and Derrida (sort of) takes it over.

It wouldnt be a question of jettisoning distinctions , but of making any singularity equivocal and indeterminable(which is not the same thing as indefinable).
— Joshs

Maybe you can tame what you are getting at. — igjugarjuk

I should have said the issue for Derrida was the undecidability vs the indetermination of the poles of distinctions.

“I do not believe I have ever spoken of "indeterminacy," whether in regard to "meaning" or anything else. Undecidability is something else again. While referring to what I have said above and elsewhere, I want to recall that undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for example, discursive-syntactical or rhetorical-but also political, ethical, etc. ). They are pragmatically determined.The analyses that I have devoted to undecidability concern just these determinations and these definitions, not at all some vague "indeterminacy. " I say "undecidability" rather than "indeterminacy" because I am interested more in relations of force, in differences of force, in everything that allows, precisely, determinations in given situations to be stabilized through a decision of writing (in the broad sense I give to this word, which also includes political action and experience in general). There would be no indecision or double bind were it not between determined (semantic, ethical, political) poles, which are upon occasion terribly necessary and always irreplaceably Singular. Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics, but also of ethics and politics, "deconstruction" should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism.(Limited, Inc, p.148)

Amen man. :clap:

Still, I don't think a tamer version of that claim is anything Saussure would object to. Synchronic study is an abstraction. We take language, living evolving thing, at an ideal moment. Every tiny piece of parole will theoretically reverberate through the structure, changing it. But is this more than a footnote? The magnitude of that reverberation matters. Is it news? — igjugarjuk

A tamer version of that claim which presupposes the dialectical transformation of centered structures(reverberation through a structure) is a form of structuralism.

What is problematic here is the justification of a center, an ‘all of these together’. Deleuze showed how one can conceptualization a system with no center , a rhizomatic assemblage of differential singularities whose sense changes from one singular element to the next.
The Saussurian model is widely seen these days in the form of a dynamical reciprocal causality within patterned
structures.

As I understand it, it's a slicker version of Writingology. Basically there's a deep structure in sign systems that's more like writing than (an idealized vision of) speech, and 'writing' is repurposed to refer to this deeper structure. — igjugarjuk

Writing was historically derived from counting stuff. Oil, grain, sheep, cattle were counted for trade, and there was a need for some records for inventories and transactions; specifically in Sumer, where writing derived from accounting, and only applied secondarily to speech. Another source, in Egypt, was painting. The Egyptians progressively widened the use of standardized paintings of gods, humans and animals to 'word painting', apparently as an afterthought.

And then it took 2000 years to move from ideograms to the first alphabet. (Chinese never made the move)

So on these historical grounds I would disagree with idealising writing as some sort of Ur-language.

where writing derives from accounting, and not directly from speech. — Olivier5

Derrida is interested in this kind of thing. Our math these days depends on symbols that are only very awkwardly translated into English. We learn to think with these non-phonetic symbols. We are also cyborgs in the sense that higher mathematics would not be possible without the memory aids of books. Our minds are not hermetically sealed spirit chambers. They are continuous with our bodies and environments. Or that's an idea I read into Derrida.

Our math these days depends on symbols that are only very awkwardly translated into English. We learn to think with these non-phonetic symbols. — igjugarjuk

Aka ideograms. Yes, modern math has rediscovered the power of ideograms. They are much more intuitive and shorter (essential almost) than alphabetic code can ever be.

Many alphabetic letters derive from ideograms originally. 'A' is an inverted cow head with horns.

Our minds are not hermetically sealed spirit chambers. They are continuous with our bodies and environments. Or that's an idea I read into Derrida. — igjugarjuk

That’s certainly quite compatible with embodied , enactive , embedded approaches in cognitive science. Gallagher’s primary corporeal intersubjectivity, which borrows from the phenomenological
work of Merleau-Ponty, is one example. The relation of embodied phenomenology to Derrida, however , is quite complex, and has to run through Heidegger’s and Derrida’s critiques of the subjectivist underpinnings of Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment model.

Aka ideograms. Yes, modern math has rediscovered the power of ideograms. They are much more intuitive and shorter (essential almost) than alphabetic code can ever be. — Olivier5

Since you know some math, perhaps you know of structuralism in the philosophy of math? I think that's adjacent to Derrida too. The meaning or content of '1' (for instance) is 'only' its place in a system. Each number 'is' its relationship to the others. No Platonic realm needed, though one can argue that the norms for using numbers 'properly' have a kind of social existence (a pattern in our doings, which is somewhat accountable to patterns in extra-human nature, given the origin and application of math.)

So on these historical grounds I would disagree with idealising writing as some sort of Ur-language. — Olivier5

I feel compelled to emphasize here that Derrida does not take writing (as commonly understood) to be the ur-language but rather sketches/develops the concept of this ur-language (or deep structure) and gives it, for complicated rhetorical reasons, the confusing name 'writing' (and lots of other names.) It's a bit like a fairy tale, where the anti-hero is given a name that emphasizes questionable origins, to grow to be the origin of origins.

Since you know some math, perhaps you know of structuralism in the philosophy of math? I think that's adjacent to Derrida too. The meaning or content of '1' (for instance) is 'only' its place in a system. — igjugarjuk

Deleuze is useful here. There is a lot of Derrida in his position on mathematics. He argues that quantification is inherently qualitative. That is , every repetition of a numeric counting (a counting of degree) is simultaneously a qualitative change. Every difference in degree is a difference in kind.

“ “ A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions
that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). … An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root.

The number is no longer a universal concept measuring elements according to their emplacement in a given dimension, but has itself become a multiplicity that varies according to the dimensions considered (the primacy of the domain over a complex of numbers attached to that domain). We do not have units (unites) of measure, only multiplicities or varieties of measurement.”( A Thousand Plateaus)

Deleuze is useful here. He argues that quantification is inherently qualitative. That is , every repetition of a numeric counting (a counting of degree) is simultaneously a qualitative change. Every difference in degree is a difference in kind. — Joshs

That seems true to me, but we ignore such differences for practical reasons. As Nietzsche saw, cognition makes unequal things equal. Such 'lies' are life-preserving. Differences that make no (practical) difference are ignored. We are automatically and compulsively pragmatists in this sense. Note that we don't treat such things as lies. Instead Deleuze's claim would be suspect, an abuse of 'grammar' (proprieties of use), until it was made clear he was a philosopher.

Then we can consider that self which bears responsibility and suffers praise and blame as a piece of necessary 'fiction,' as a kind of successful meme or habit. 'Fiction' is not an ideal metaphor here, and 'convention' neglects that it's received like language, like the law. I use Shakespeare as an image out of respect for what Bloom, probably correctly, projects on the bard. All the world's a stage. A key aspect of the human situation is our awareness of ourselves as characters for others...and for ourselves, not one without the other. Hegel, who saw that Shakespeare invented self-overhearing characters, went on to emphasize the importance of mutual recognition in any epistemological context.

I am curious how we can contextualize Derrida and his reading of Western metaphysics. As a non-philosopher I'm interested to enhance my understanding of what Derrida believed he was primarily working towards. (I get that this is a blunt and perhaps reductive question) Was he essentially trying to reevaluate traditional Western values, build a new ethical process?

Curious too:
What did Derrida's approach say about nihilism?
What was Derrida's conceptualization of Platonic idealism?

A tamer version of that claim which presupposes the dialectical transformation of centered structures(reverberation through a structure) is a form of structuralism. — Joshs

Small point maybe, but what do you imagine to be the center of a system of differences without positive elements? I don't see a center for language itself, but only a central cluster perhaps in certain language games (such as in philosophy there are few master concepts entangled with all the others.)

Small point maybe, but what do you imagine to be the center of a system of differences without positive elements? I don't see a center for language itself, but only a central cluster perhaps in certain language games (such as in philosophy there are few master concepts entangled with all the others.) — igjugarjuk

Hmm. A system of differences without positive elements. The question is how that system comes into play in contextual word use. As a normative , grammatical or rule-forming criterion, is the relation between this system and actual word use referential( the rule is accessed and applied to the current situation) or does the system only actually exist as it is being redefined by the present context of word use? Witty thought of such systems in terms of family resemblance wherein the particular context establishes the rule, (from the particular to the general) , rather than the pre-existing structure determining the contextual sense of the world ( from general to particular)

Thank you for your input.

To all,

I have copypasted here a passage from J. Hillis Miller as to what exactly the deconstruction is. Please read and if you have any doubts as to the strength of this explanation by Miller, please look him up. Also look up Julian Wolfreys.

Deconstruction as a mode of interpretation works by a careful and circumspect entering of each textual labyrinth. The [deconstruction] critic feels his way from figure to figure, from concept to concept, from mythical motif to mythical motif, in a repetition which is in no sense a parody. It employs nevertheless, the subversive power present in even the most exact and ironical doubling. The deconstructive critic seeks to find, by this process of retracing, the element in the system studied which is alogical, the thread in the text in question which will unravel it all, or the loose stone which will pull down the whole building.

The deconstruction, rather, annihilates the ground on which the building stands by showing that the text has already annihilated that ground, knowingly and unknowingly. Deconstruction is not a dismantling of the structure of the text but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself. Its apparently solid ground is no rock but thin air.

The uncanny moment in Derrida’s criticism, the vacant place around which all his work is organized, is the formulation of this non-existence of the ground out of which the whole textual structure seems to rise…

(J. Hillis Miller, Theory Now and Then, 1991, 126.)
Credits to Julian Wolfreys, Deconstruction – Derrida, 1997

The uncanny moment in Derrida’s criticism, the vacant place around which all his work is organized, is the formulation of this non-existence of the ground out of which the whole textual structure seems to rise…

I'm not sure if this is meant as a compliment or a snipe.

I'm not sure if this is meant as a compliment or a snipe. — Tom Storm

Derrida, too, must acknowledge that the ground upon which his criticism is organized is on non-existent ground. Miller is pointing out the irony, or the parallel, if you will.

Thanks. Isn't this one of several performative self-refutations aimed at D?

I'm interested to enhance my understanding of what Derrida believed he was primarily working towards. (I get that this is a blunt and perhaps reductive question) Was he essentially trying to reevaluate traditional Western values, build a new ethical process? — Tom Storm

For context, I'm a person who become fascinated with Derrida and put a substantial but still non-expert amount of time into some of his texts, primarily the early ones, because I was most interested in the issue of meaning (as in to what degree do/can we know what we are talking about.)

While he has grandiose moments like Nietzsche, his are hopeful and without the shrill negativity, and vaguely envision new ways of thinking rather than new values. His actual thoughts are detailed critiques of thinkers like Saussure, Husserl, and Rousseau. Their thrust is largely anti-Romantic. The truth is not nakedly there in some brutal intuition. Nothing is as simple and pure as folks might want it to be. Not even mother. So I'd say no. The early relatively apolitical Derrida is 'guilty' primarily of not being a joiner or of a certain vanity that exaggerated the significance or extent or originality of his version of the revolution (same old Western rationality purifying itself of its dream of purity, etc.), not so uncommon perhaps in '67.