The classic statement of deconstruction - what it is and does - and how it relates to philosophy remains Rodolphe Gasché, from his The Tain of the Mirror:

Deconstruction starts with an interrogation of a variety of contradictions and aporias in the discourse of philosophy. These are not contradictions and aporias proper, however, since the discourse of philosophy accommodates them without difficulty. In addition to these contradictions and aporias, which pertain to the formation of concepts and to the development of philosophical arguments, deconstruction addresses many other discursive and conceptual inequalities that have never before been questioned by philosophy. All these aporias, differences of levels, inequalities of developments, and disparities characteristic of the discourse of philosophy, yet which do not seem to disturb the logic of philosophy, also contribute to the establishment of that logic. All the gestures of philosophy - reflection and transcendentalization, all the themes of philosophy, but primarily those of subjectivity, transcendentality, freedom, origin, truth, presence, and the proper - are impossible without the differences and discrepancies that permeate philosophical texts. Yet these same disparities also limit the scope of these gestures and of the purity and coherence of the philosophical concepts or themes.

Deconstruction is an attempt to account for these various and essentially heterogenous aporias and discursive inequalities with what I have called infrastructures. These minimal structures are both the grounds of possibilities of the canonical philosophical gestures and themes and their ungrounds, that is, that which makes them impossible. These structures limit what they make possible by rendering its rigor and purity impossible. The infrastructures are the internal limit from which classical philosophical concepts and themes take their force and necessity. Deconstruction does not merely destroy metaphysical concepts; it shows how these concepts and themes draw their possibility from that which ultimately makes them impossible. The infrastructures achieve this double task.

Extending the requirement of philosophy that a ground must be different from what it grounds, deconstruction exhibits such an absolute other ground as “constitutive” of the canonical philosophical problems. As a solution of sorts to traditional philosophical problems, such as, for instance, the problem of how something absolute can possibly have a generating, engendering, or constituting function, deconstruction both conserves he immanence of philosophical argumentation and concept formation while simultaneously opening it up to that which structurally disorganizes it.... Deconstruction traces the inner limits of the project of a philosophy of philosophy. Yet without in the least trying to do away with philosophy, its style of argumentation, with the rigor of classical logic and without ever dreaming the empiricist - that is, the symmetrical - dream of a final impossibility of accounting and founding, deconstruction pursues the formulation of problems that, although apparently more easily accommodated by the discourse of literature and critical stylistics, are nonetheless not of that order. Deconstruction opens philosophy to its Others.

Thank you. That was neither clear nor informative.

Really? I actually found it helpful.

There are people for whom philosophy is not appropriate. That's OK.

In what way?

Rodolphe Gasché, from his The Tain of the Mirror — Streetlight

Aka "The Shit on the Bed" ...

Which part?

If deconstruction is such a great idea, why isn't it a favorite in a philosopher's toolkit?

There are people for whom philosophy is not appropriate. That's OK. — Streetlight

Don't be so hard on yourself.

In the most general sense, for understanding deconstruction! :D But also clearing grime off old memories.

One of the questions I'm coming to right now is this notion the thread started with -- of deconstruction deconstructing itself -- and trying to draw out a communicable distinction between refutation and deconstruction. Because if Derrida had wanted to refute Husserl or Saussure, then I don't think he'd have to develop deconstruction -- it would be straightforward, right?

In Streetlight's quote the beginnings of an answer:

Deconstruction starts with an interrogation of a variety of contradictions and aporias in the discourse of philosophy. These are not contradictions and aporias proper, however, since the discourse of philosophy accommodates them without difficulty

Somehow the problems Derrida are interested -- or the question driving his writing -- will easily be swept away in this old style.

But reflecting back onto deconstruction -- it would mean that refutation isn't the goal of deconstruction. And that perhaps deconstruction deconstructing itself would actually be an affirmation?

After all, that's just good old self-consistency, yes?

What interests me, personally and professionally, is the analysis and teasing out of hidden assumptions. I found out that Collingwood had usefully formalized this process. If Derrida does too, I could be interested.

Heh, I, for one, never think there's anything useful in philosophy -- so asking me, well... I'm the wrong source. :)

But there is something beautiful in it, at times. And seeing that beauty requires me to put aside my own projects and try to understand why someone would go on the way they did.

, I, for one, never think there's anything useful in philosophy -- — Moliere

I beg to disagree. :-)

Thank you. That was neither clear nor informative. — Olivier5

It was pretty accurate, from my limited POV. It's just difficult stuff. And you need to see examples for that summary to have definite and significant content. Otherwise it's just vague grandiose claims. As Hegel saw, one really can't summarize philosophy. Or, better, such summaries are only for those who've already walked the path. To learn about Derrida requires (surprise!) jumping in the passenger seat for one of his readings of Saussure or Husserl or Austin or ....

Because if Derrida had wanted to refute Husserl or Saussure, then I don't think he'd have to develop deconstruction -- it would be straightforward, right? — Moliere

This is a pre-Hegelian vision of truth, that one simply refutes a strong thinker...from the 'outside.'

What Derrida does with Saussure is read his radical side against his obliviously still-phonocentric side. The points he makes against Saussure are made possible by Saussure in the first place. Metaphorically, it is immanent critique. One steps 'in' to the perspective criticized thinker and discovers where and how that thinker disappointments his or her own principles. Interpersonally, that'd be like me showing you how you have failed in terms of your own criteria and not mine. Saussure and Husserl are worth critiquing this way precisely because they are worthy. Their standards and insights are powerful, so that one would like 'fix' their system, unclogging it...but at the cost of shifting the original goal perhaps. For instance, Saussure insights really apply to more than just speech. They implicitly uncover the structure of any signifying code. For rhetorical/historical reasons, Derrida calls this new semiology a grammatology, but writing is something like the best introductory metaphor.

Thank you. That was neither clear nor informative.
— Olivier5

It was pretty accurate, from my limited POV. — igjugarjuk

Well, I guess it could be both unclear, uninformative and yet accurate.

Perhaps I was wrong to assumes that deconstruction has a clear objective and follows some sort of standard process. Maybe it's more fluid, creative, intuitive. Which is fine too.

I've not determined whether philosophy is useful (to me). I think it's good Streetlight put this quote here. He's clearly familiar with the discourse which is something I cannot claim. I am unable to make any sense of the three paragraphs posted, or even understand the comments about them. Pretty sure this is on me for not taking much interest in philosophy in the first place. This is content that requires time/commitment and aptitude.

Well, I guess it could be both unclear, uninformative and yet accurate. — Olivier5

There's quite an industry of gentle introductions to famous and famously difficult thinkers.

Gasché is writing for insiders. But here's a decent expositor.

Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written ...can be cited, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring. This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is not an accident or anomaly, but is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could no longer even have a so-called “normal” functioning. What would a mark be that one could not cite? And whose origin could not be lost on the way?” — Derrida

What are the consequences of this simple fact, that the concept of the sign implies an unbounded possibility of recontextualization? Especially given that philosopher's purported eternal truths live in this medium? What if anything anchors the meaning of signs ? Already in Saussure we get insights and rethinkings of semantics that threaten Plato and the gang. What happens if we lean in to such insights? Or what happens if we really think about how metaphor functions in philosophy? How is the possibility of grand, totalizing philosophy affected thereby? While Derrida is not only a linguistic philosopher, that approach toward his work has been helpful to me. He's something like Wittgenstein with Nietzschean exuberance-- without Nietzsche's creepier side.

This is content that needs time and aptitude. — Tom Storm

Indeed. And it isn't axiomatic that grokking Derrida is the best way to spend one's time. Some people just naturally monger concepts. They really are turned on by what are otherwise extremely dry issues. In the same way some people really like math. The Weierstrassian definition of a limit is a beautiful piece of engineering, if you ask them (I'm one of them). Most do not care in the least about linguistic philosophy or math. Which is fine, because they are only very indirectly practical, and a taste for such things may even be correlated with underachievement in economic terms.

I don't quite get non-expressionist or non-subjective. Can a movement be alembicated to sterility? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I'm passionately committed to elusiveness of meaning in such anti-practical contexts, but I feel like this motherfucker is as chill as possible. Art is some zen state of being. The opposite of business. Almost a negative theology of the (purified) idea of art. Probably the Japanese philosophers of nothingness are relevant here. IMV, this is a place where only modest claims or guesses make sense.

Gasché is writing for insiders. But here's a decent expositor. — igjugarjuk

That quote I do understand. And you have a talent for entertaining and pellucid explication.

Huh. I'm suprised that people find the Gasché passages tough. They're quite clear! Let's try:

Deconstruction starts with an interrogation of a variety of contradictions and aporias in the discourse of philosophy [Deconstruction looks for contradictions and jumbles in philosophy].

These are not contradictions and aporias proper, however, since the discourse of philosophy accommodates them without difficulty [Philosophy, for it's part, doesn't really seem to care about these contradictions and jumbles].

In addition to these contradictions and aporias, which pertain to the formation of concepts and to the development of philosophical arguments, deconstruction addresses many other discursive and conceptual inequalities that have never before been questioned by philosophy [But apart from the contradictions and jumbles, there's a bunch of other stuff too that philosophy doesn't really deal with].

All these aporias, differences of levels, inequalities of developments, and disparities characteristic of the discourse of philosophy, yet which do not seem to disturb the logic of philosophy, also contribute to the establishment of that logic [Although philosophy doesn't really deal with them, they are nonetheless vital to the functioning of philosophy].

All the gestures of philosophy - reflection and transcendentalization, all the themes of philosophy, but primarily those of subjectivity, transcendentality, freedom, origin, truth, presence, and the proper - are impossible without the differences and discrepancies that permeate philosophical texts [In fact, all of the really important concepts in philosophy, like subjectivity, freedom, origins, truth and so on, depend on these contradictions and jumbles].

Yet these same disparities also limit the scope of these gestures and of the purity and coherence of the philosophical concepts or themes [But just as philosophy depends on those contradictions, and jumbles those contradictions and jumbles also limit what philosophy can do and lay claim to].

And so on. Come on class, read slowly and with purpose!

That sounds too rhetorical or poetic for my practical taste. I attach much importance to conceptual clarity. A good workman keeps a neat set of tools, and a philosopher's tool are his concepts. — Olivier5

I think it's fair to say that Derrida can be annoyingly poetical and rhetorical. I'm on a Brandom kick lately, and he's almost too dry and longwinded and careful. But I like those norms in general.

That said, it's exactly a concern for conceptual clarity that makes Derrida interesting in terms of content. My interest in him is primarily for what he has to say about semantics. Especially when folks wax metaphysical about mind and matter and truth and so on, it's my suspicion that they only very vaguely know what they are talking about. For instance, you use 'clarity.' I also seek clarity. But this is a dead, literalized metaphor. What exactly do we mean by it ? Can we just mean easy to read? But surely some texts are more intrinsically difficult than others. Do we mean then as easy as possible? That seems more like it. A clear writer minimizes the discomfort in interpretation. But clarity is not the only value. We also value a motivating dramatic context. We want to feel with the author. That emotional framing is not obviously secondary, unless we simply unphilosophically assume that philosophical truth is as cold a fact as a telephone number in a phone book. Rightly or wrongly in aesthetic terms or our comfort, Derrida 'lives' his transcendence of various superstitions of philosophy (that it's only secondarily metaphorical or literary, that it's a solemn, serious business, ...) This is the main thing that pissed people off, IMO. Derrida is simply not an irrationalist. He's more serious about truth and reason than most people, just as Nietzsche was (hence his willingness to question the foundation of the philosophical project itself ( the idea of such a foundation?), perhaps the maximal philosophical gesture, its purity.) The same people who love Wittgenstein (just as indulgent in his own way) reject Derrida, seemingly because Derrida is more of a jester than a holy ascetic.

Nicely done and appreciated. :up:

That quote I do understand. And you have a talent for entertaining and pellucid explication. — Tom Storm

Thanks for the kind words! It keeps me chugging along. I also clarify my own understanding by digging for paraphrases and quotes. It's an endless task to be a little less confused.

And that perhaps deconstruction deconstructing itself would actually be an affirmation? — Moliere

Well put. In a way it's always doing this, because it's explicitly dependent upon the very ideas it challenges. It's even banal, since in general we've only ever had our own reason or rationality available for a critical examination of that rationality. What were Kant and Hume doing, after all ? Any science of science is a pseudo-paradoxical 'ologyology.' Yet Kant and Hume don't trigger folks the same way, perhaps because they are more familiar..and incorrectly assumed to be dead and safe.

In computer science, bootstrapping is the technique for producing a self-compiling compiler — that is, a compiler (or assembler) written in the source programming language that it intends to compile. An initial core version of the compiler (the bootstrap compiler) is generated in a different language (which could be assembly language); successive expanded versions of the compiler are developed using this minimal subset of the language. The problem of compiling a self-compiling compiler has been called the chicken-or-egg problem in compiler design, and bootstrapping is a solution to this problem.[1][2]

We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction.[2]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootstrapping_(compilers)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurath%27s_boat

wow, wiki.

wow, wiki. — Jackson

I thought you were afraid of me. Good to see you off your back, toy soldier.

wow

I'm passionately committed to elusiveness of meaning in such anti-practical contexts, but I feel like this motherfucker is as chill as possible. — igjugarjuk

I like elusiveness of meaning but prefer some kind of possibly humanesque organ weirdly represented in the visual art I admire.

I Googled the name and I dig his color schemes; and the room full of black canvases is ingeniously inventive.

Art is some zen state of being. The opposite of business. Almost a negative theology of the (purified) idea of art. Probably the Japanese philosophers of nothingness are relevant here. — igjugarjuk

I think this is what I had in mind when I said 'a secret koanic intent.' The notion of creating an unintelligible or negative space resonates.

A clear writer minimizes the discomfort in interpretation. But clarity is not the only value. We also value a motivating dramatic context. We want to feel with the author. That emotional framing is not obviously secondary, unless we simply unphilosophically assume that philosophical truth is as cold a fact as a telephone number in a phone book. — igjugarjuk

I'm fine with poetry that helps relate to the essence of an issue, even with some rhetoric. In any case even a dry text seemingly avoiding any rhetorical effects... is itself using dryness for rhetorical effect!

Rightly or wrongly in aesthetic terms or our comfort, Derrida 'lives' his transcendence of various superstitions of philosophy (that it's only secondarily metaphorical or literary, that it's a solemn, serious business, ...) This is the main thing that pissed people off, IMO. Derrida is simply not an irrationalist. He's more serious about truth and reason than most people, just as Nietzsche was (hence his willingness to question the foundation of the philosophical project itself ( the idea of such a foundation?), perhaps the maximal philosophical gesture, its purity.)

Purity from what? If nothing human is foreign to philosophy, sin is philosophical, and as many holy men have told us, philosophy is sin.

The same people who love Wittgenstein (just as indulgent in his own way) reject Derrida, seemingly because Derrida is more of a jester than a holy ascetic.

Personally, I hold Wittgenstein as a fake, an imposter, a very sad clown. I'd rather read from a funny one.

He's got all the looks of a true philosopher, so aesthetic is apt in this way. If this take seems harsh, let me add that he played in stiff Cambridge a useful role, that of the guy who points to the inherent vagueness of things. Things, such as concepts, are often more vague than scolars think.