No. Absent biasing factors the coin will not land at all. Some force has to cause it to land. That force will be biased to one side or the other. We just don't know which. — Isaac
Why 100? If you want to reserve a special word for when one considers the probability 100%, why not another for 99%? One for 51%, one for 32%... What is it about 100% that warrants it's own word? I can't see the advantage of what you're advocating. — Isaac
...and a 'gut feeling' is different to a belief, how? — Isaac
It would mean, in my case, that I have no political beliefs at all. I would suddenly lack all sorts of beliefs about my family and friends and certainly people I know less well. Jimmy is kind. Hm, well, I don't know what he is like when he is abroad. — Bylaw
I don’t see how they can change unless we are aware of them. If I have a belief that I’m unaware of it would never change. — praxis
Especially since belief is contrasted with knowledge already, whether one consider's knowledge to be beliefs arrived at rigorously (something along the lines of JTB) or a different category.I believe this may be the objective the OP had in mind. Personally I can't see the sense in defining away a word. If we confine beliefs to those matters about which we are absolutely certain (not even 99.9999999999999%), then no one has any beliefs and we have a spare word. — Isaac
Actually they do have to believe things. Or they would have little basis to focus their studies. Those not believing would be picking approaches, subjects and hypotheses at random, which would put them at a disadvantage in relation to anyone with a more practical approach. But the truth is they do believe things. That's the reality, if one uses the word in the ways it has been usedScientists don't have to believe anything in order to practice science; they simply have to entertain provisional hypotheses and presuppositions. — Janus
Could you sketch out how exactly, or point me to a source?
— baker
Basically, stories. We're quite easily fooled by stories, so whilst a social group seems indispensable for the construction of many complex beliefs, those social groups don't have to be real. — Isaac
If I have a belief that I’m unaware of it would never change. — praxis
Actually they do have to believe things. Or they would have little basis to focus their studies. Those not believing would be picking approaches, subjects and hypotheses at random, which would put them at a disadvantage in relation to anyone with a more practical approach. But the truth is they do believe things. That's the reality, if one uses the word in the ways it has been used — Bylaw
A prediction is a belief. — Isaac
Event → Cognition → Belief
Scientists don't have to believe anything in order to practice science... — Janus
The topic here were the epistemic implications of power relationships between people (Do I believe someone's argument because I am convinced by its rationality, or by the power of the person who made it?). You said this was surmountable. I asked, how. From what you said, I don't see that you explained that it is surmountable. — baker
praxis is using the model displayed and dispelled at the start of the Feldman Barrett article, in a slightly altered form:
Event → Cognition → Belief
What we now know is that this sequence cannot be recognised in the processes of our neural networks. Phrasing it somewhat ambiguously, the event is already a belief, in that it is a prediction of the neural net. — Banno
Assuming this theory is good, at what point in the neural process is there belief? In each cortical column or in the consensus of columns? — praxis
If you believe it is most likely, you have a belief. If you believe it is or stands a good chance of being most fruitful, you have a belief. You are deciding that these lines are more promisting than those lines of research because you have beliefs. The determination plausibility is a determination bases on belief. Plausible meaning (of an argument or statement) seeming reasonable or probable.What seems most plausible, or likely to be fruitful, could be chosen, without any commitment to believing it is true; and that choice would not be "random", as I see it. — Janus
We often believe arguments made by people more powerful than ourselves. — Isaac
Each column, therefore is processing data not yet in the form of a belief (a belief that...) because there's no 'that' until the predictions have been related (to whatever the belief is about) and that happens (in Hawkin's model) after the voting process, where the hippocampus (or the entorhinal cortex, or sub-cortex depending on the type of memory) make the association on which we can act. — Isaac
Seems an arbitrary distinction, as though saying that when holding a cup in hand we can believe it’s a cup but we can’t believe in the cups texture or weight, the individual elements it’s comprised of. — praxis
I'm not sure what I can do about that. We often believe arguments made by people more powerful than ourselves. Sometime this is appropriate (if their power is on their expertise), sometimes we only make the show of acquiescence because it's socially convenient, we need the support of others believing what we do. The solution to that is that those others do not have to be real for this effect to work. Stories. — Isaac
I feel like I've just rewritten what I wrote before, but maybe if it's still not making sense, you might explain what's missing.
we need the support of others believing what we do. The solution to that is that those others do not have to be real for this effect to work. Stories.
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