No. Absent biasing factors the coin will not land at all. Some force has to cause it to land. That force will be biased to one side or the other. We just don't know which. — Isaac

I don't see how the biasing factor could be in the gravity that causes the coin to land, or in the toss, since the coin will start heads up or tails up randomly. It seems to make sense to me that the biasing factor will be in the coin since I find it impossible to believe that any coin could be absolutely perfect.

Why 100? If you want to reserve a special word for when one considers the probability 100%, why not another for 99%? One for 51%, one for 32%... What is it about 100% that warrants it's own word? I can't see the advantage of what you're advocating. — Isaac

I'm not advocating establishing percentages of certainty; I can't see how it would be possible. My point is that about any proposition which is not certain, we can feel certainty (believe) and uncertainty (doubt) to varying degrees. Scientists don't have to believe anything in order to practice science; they simply have to entertain provisional hypotheses and presuppositions.

...and a 'gut feeling' is different to a belief, how? — Isaac

A gut feeling is simply a feeling we can choose to go with or not. We don't need to believe that it is "true" one way or the other. If we did go with a feeling, and if that seemed to be the only possible guide in a context of uncertainty or undecidability, then I don't see that as being irrational.

Anyway, I've had about enough of repeating myself here: I know what I think about the best way to talk about these things; if you don't agree that's fine. All I've done is attempted to explain myself in response to questions about my ideas. So, I think we are done here.

It would mean, in my case, that I have no political beliefs at all. I would suddenly lack all sorts of beliefs about my family and friends and certainly people I know less well. Jimmy is kind. Hm, well, I don't know what he is like when he is abroad. — Bylaw

I believe this may be the objective the OP had in mind. Personally I can't see the sense in defining away a word. If we confine beliefs to those matters about which we are absolutely certain (not even 99.9999999999999%), then no one has any beliefs and we have a spare word.

I don’t see how they can change unless we are aware of them. If I have a belief that I’m unaware of it would never change. — praxis

Why do you think that?

I believe this may be the objective the OP had in mind. Personally I can't see the sense in defining away a word. If we confine beliefs to those matters about which we are absolutely certain (not even 99.9999999999999%), then no one has any beliefs and we have a spare word. — Isaac

Especially since belief is contrasted with knowledge already, whether one consider's knowledge to be beliefs arrived at rigorously (something along the lines of JTB) or a different category.

Scientists don't have to believe anything in order to practice science; they simply have to entertain provisional hypotheses and presuppositions. — Janus

Actually they do have to believe things. Or they would have little basis to focus their studies. Those not believing would be picking approaches, subjects and hypotheses at random, which would put them at a disadvantage in relation to anyone with a more practical approach. But the truth is they do believe things. That's the reality, if one uses the word in the ways it has been used

I don’t see how they can change unless we are aware of them. If I have a belief that I’m unaware of it would never change.
— praxis

Why do you think that? — Isaac

Because I don’t think that subconscious predictions are beliefs.

Could you sketch out how exactly, or point me to a source?
— baker

Basically, stories. We're quite easily fooled by stories, so whilst a social group seems indispensable for the construction of many complex beliefs, those social groups don't have to be real. — Isaac

The topic here were the epistemic implications of power relationships between people (Do I believe someone's argument because I am convinced by its rationality, or by the power of the person who made it?). You said this was surmountable. I asked, how. From what you said, I don't see that you explained that it is surmountable.

If I have a belief that I’m unaware of it would never change. — praxis

It's not clear this is the case.

If you knowingly change your stance about something, this could have implications for your other beliefs, over time, without you being aware of those implications at the time of the change.

...and a 'gut feeling' is different to a belief, how? — Isaac

One cannot justify it, not even to oneself. It's not based on a syllogism, and one cannot even construct a syllogism to support, in hindsight/ad hoc.

Actually they do have to believe things. Or they would have little basis to focus their studies. Those not believing would be picking approaches, subjects and hypotheses at random, which would put them at a disadvantage in relation to anyone with a more practical approach. But the truth is they do believe things. That's the reality, if one uses the word in the ways it has been used — Bylaw

What seems most plausible, or likely to be fruitful, could be chosen, without any commitment to believing it is true; and that choice would not be "random", as I see it. I agree with you that you could say this is believing, if you are using the ambiguous range of common usages of the term as your criterion, but I have acknowledged that from the start, and explained that sloppy terminology is just what I am advocating against.

So, I have explained how I see it (which I've only bothered to do in order to clear up what I have seen as misunderstandings of what I've been saying), I don't think it is very important anyway, and it doesn't matter to me if others disagree.

A prediction is a belief. — Isaac

It's telling that such a core fact of neuroscience should be so badly misunderstood.

@praxis is using the model displayed and dispelled at the start of the Feldman Barrett article, in a slightly altered form:

Event → Cognition → Belief

What we now know is that this sequence cannot be recognised in the processes of our neural networks. Phrasing it somewhat ambiguously, the event is already a belief, in that it is a prediction of the neural net.

Scientists don't have to believe anything in order to practice science... — Janus

:yikes:

Janus, you know better than to say something like that...

No need in taking it to be true that one's instruments have been calibrated. No need in taking it to be true that I'll get paid for my work performed. No need in taking it to be true that the lab will be there tomorrow when I return....

All those are simply likelihoods. Sure you can say that we believe them to be likelihoods. All I'm advocating is that we call what is certain (in the sense that we can't imagine what its being false could look like) knowledge, and that we call what we feel certain about belief. If we don't feel certain about something then it is subject to a blend of belief that it is true and doubt that it is true.

We're working from incommensurate understandings or notions of human belief. May not be much point in continuing this if we cannot agree on what the key terms mean. Hope your move worked out well for you!

Cheers, yeah it's worked out well. I love living on the land, where my neighbours are hidden from view, and cannot imagine going back to living on a little fenced plot with my neighbours right there.

I’ve read Barrett’s book on constructed emotion theory, but I was more thinking of thousand brains theory.



Assuming this theory is good, at what point in the neural process is there belief? In each cortical column or in the consensus of columns?

Presumably Markov blankets make an appearance at some stage in the thousand brains. That's the belief.

Because I don’t think that subconscious predictions are beliefs. — praxis

Any reason why not?

The topic here were the epistemic implications of power relationships between people (Do I believe someone's argument because I am convinced by its rationality, or by the power of the person who made it?). You said this was surmountable. I asked, how. From what you said, I don't see that you explained that it is surmountable. — baker

I'm not sure what I can do about that. We often believe arguments made by people more powerful than ourselves. Sometime this is appropriate (if their power is on their expertise), sometimes we only make the show of acquiescence because it's socially convenient, we need the support of others believing what we do. The solution to that is that those others do not have to be real for this effect to work. Stories.

I feel like I've just rewritten what I wrote before, but maybe if it's still not making sense, you might explain what's missing.

One cannot justify it, not even to oneself. It's not based on a syllogism, and one cannot even construct a syllogism to support, in hindsight/ad hoc. — baker

All beliefs are supported in hindsight.

praxis is using the model displayed and dispelled at the start of the Feldman Barrett article, in a slightly altered form:

Event → Cognition → Belief


What we now know is that this sequence cannot be recognised in the processes of our neural networks. Phrasing it somewhat ambiguously, the event is already a belief, in that it is a prediction of the neural net. — Banno

Exactly. The main problem I see with this attempt to separate out belief from prediction is that there's no special category remaining for belief to be.

There's nothing of which we 'feel certain' that is distinguishable from that about which we feel 99.9999% certain. There's nothing we form in awareness to distinguish from that which is formed in subconscious processing. There's nothing resulting from syllogism to fill what was otherwise a blank space. Basically there is no mental state which can correspond to the description of beliefs being offered such as to distinguish it from predictions, and assumptions (of the sort such that we believe larger objects cannot fit inside smaller ones). There's no dividing line between believing the table in front of me will hold my cup and believing God exists such as to delineate one as a different type than the other.

There's some (understandable) cherishing of the (unfortunately post hoc) construction process where one is aware of it, that leads to a desire to set it apart in type from the process where we are not. but there's no support for such a notion.

Assuming this theory is good, at what point in the neural process is there belief? In each cortical column or in the consensus of columns? — praxis

Firstly, Thousand Brains only deals with the NeoCortex, it still relies on the traditional functioning of the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex, and the perihinal cortex, particulalry for memory retrieval which is how relations between previous predictions are made (according to Hawkins). As such there's no real conflict between his model and that of Friston (whose model Feldman Barrett uses). The 'columns' in Hawkin's model are merely the means by which the predictions are made - thousands of options 'voted on'. The means by which the results of those predictions are stored as models (dynamic models, of course) is still the same hippocampus-cortical links that traditional models use to relate the results from one context to those of another (an image and a smell for example). So each column is still embedded in a cortical hierarchy from lower areas (say sensory) to higher ones (like beliefs). Each column, therefore is processing data not yet in the form of a belief (a belief that...) because there's no 'that' until the predictions have been related (to whatever the belief is about) and that happens (in Hawkin's model) after the voting process, where the hippocampus (or the entorhinal cortex, or sub-cortex depending on the type of memory) make the association on which we can act.

What seems most plausible, or likely to be fruitful, could be chosen, without any commitment to believing it is true; and that choice would not be "random", as I see it. — Janus

If you believe it is most likely, you have a belief. If you believe it is or stands a good chance of being most fruitful, you have a belief. You are deciding that these lines are more promisting than those lines of research because you have beliefs. The determination plausibility is a determination bases on belief. Plausible meaning (of an argument or statement) seeming reasonable or probable.

Which is why sentences like I believed it would be a fruitful line of research and it was. (or but it turned out not to be) make sense.

If I choose what I think is a plausible argument or conclusion it does not mean I doubt it. You have contrasted belief and doubt. That makes no sense to me.

Scientists, and the rest of us, have all sorts of beliefs that are about probabilities. Person A: I believe that gun control is better for the nation, but I am not 100% sure because American society is not exactly the same as other societies. I believe even more strongly X, but yes, if cornered I will admit I am not sure.

In fact it makes sense to say, I believe X, but I am starting to have some doubts. I read an interesting article against X, so I have to mull. But, I would still say I believe. Or 'I believe X is the case, but I am less sure than I was before I....'

We often believe arguments made by people more powerful than ourselves. — Isaac

Conversion (religious) by word or by sword! Aut consilio aut ense.

Argumentum ad baculum.

Argumentum ad verecundiam.

I find these two to be very persuasive modes of convincing people. The choices are: My way Or The Highway! :snicker:

In more explicit terms: Aye or Die! :snicker:

We all judge the beliefs expounded by others by assigning a 'level of rationality' to each one expressed.
How rational is it for an anorexic to believe they are too fat, when they appear to be almost skeletal?
How rational is it when a person states 'I believe 100% that a steel ball bearing will not float when I throw it into water?'
How rational is it when someone says, 'I believe 100% that I will win the national lottery one day' or 'I believe 100% that I am a superior human being to you and you should comply with my commandments or else I will be justified in killing you.'
How rational is it when someone says, 'I believe 100% in the lord god jesus christ .'
How many times have you had an exchange like:
'Oh I KNOW its true,' and the response is 'No, you just BELIEVE its true, you dont KNOW its true.'

I think a 100% belief that a steel ball will sink in water is as close as you will get to connecting 'belief' with 'fact.'
Any belief that does not have very strong empirical evidence to back it up, remains fully open to being assigned a 'measure of rationality,' by others. You will not escape that judgement based on a claim that you are not stating a belief, you are merely 'having a punt' or 'stating a conviction level.'

I doubt very much that a nazi getting tried at Nuremberg would have got a lesser sentence if he/she claimed that they killed others NOT because they BELIEVED their victims were inferiors but because they were 'betting' they were inferiors, with a 'certain confidence' level.

Each column, therefore is processing data not yet in the form of a belief (a belief that...) because there's no 'that' until the predictions have been related (to whatever the belief is about) and that happens (in Hawkin's model) after the voting process, where the hippocampus (or the entorhinal cortex, or sub-cortex depending on the type of memory) make the association on which we can act. — Isaac

Seems an arbitrary distinction, as though saying that when holding a cup in hand we can believe it’s a cup but we can’t believe in the cups texture or weight, the individual elements it’s comprised of.

Seems an arbitrary distinction, as though saying that when holding a cup in hand we can believe it’s a cup but we can’t believe in the cups texture or weight, the individual elements it’s comprised of. — praxis

We can very well believe in its texture and weight. It's not at that level of processing that these 'columns' are dealing with. All you're getting at the base of these columns are output signals from sensory and proprioceptive neurons, and in a constant stream, with a relatively high error rate. As data progresses up these columns, errors are corrected by backward acting inhibitors from cortices higher up the hierarchy. This is a one way system (hence we can reliably refer to it as s hierarchy). But at this stage it's still just noise detection, it's not "this cup is heavy". To get there you have to (so the theory goes) fire all the final neural clusters in each column with a tiny emission of neurotransmitter such that only those signals with sufficient volume (the highest 'vote') will create an action potential in one of the hippocampus-sub-cortex links to set off the chain of associations we have which form the concept "heavy" (depending on your theory of semantic memory - it's a moot point). But it's after the multiplicity that we get "rough", "heavy"...etc as actual beliefs about the cup.

I'm not sure what I can do about that. We often believe arguments made by people more powerful than ourselves. Sometime this is appropriate (if their power is on their expertise), sometimes we only make the show of acquiescence because it's socially convenient, we need the support of others believing what we do. The solution to that is that those others do not have to be real for this effect to work. Stories. — Isaac

You mean like, What would Aragorn do?

I feel like I've just rewritten what I wrote before, but maybe if it's still not making sense, you might explain what's missing.

I don't find your explanation believable. I suppose what you're saying is what people often do; in a sense, it's the essence of religion/religiosity; it's also why people can feel inspired by and find a feeling of confidence about life in the Harry Potter books, LOTR, or Star Wars, to name some notable examples.

I often wonder about the potential for real-world application of moral and other principles or "lessons" found in fiction. Bruno Bettelheim was probably the most famous (if not original) proponent of the idea that people learn to overcome real-world life problems through what is clearly fiction, ie. fairy tales. (Although given the limited resources an individual person has for experimenting and testing, the life advice given in "science based" help books might as well be fiction, too.)

Just because acting in a particular way worked out fine in the end for Frodo, doesn't mean doing something similar will work out fine for me as well. Of course, if a work of fiction is complex and nuanced enough, it provides scenarios that can accomodate such failure as well.

we need the support of others believing what we do. The solution to that is that those others do not have to be real for this effect to work. Stories.

As long as this is merely a description of what works for people, that's one thing. But to take it as a prescription?? To _deliberately_ pick a work of fiction and use some of the characters in it as one's "support group"? In my experience, this doesn't work.

Be that as it may, the framework is such that individual determinations contribute to a group determination. The individual determinations are determinations. In an election, I vote for the canidate that I determine will best serve my interests, and my vote contributes to a group determination. To claim that my vote isn't a determination is unfair and downright unAmerican.

On a related note, what do we believe when we experiece sensations but don't know what they are? Do we believe nothing, or do we beleive that we don't know? What do we believe when we can see two things, like the duck/rabit sketch?

If I choose what I think is a plausible argument or conclusion it does not mean I doubt it. You have contrasted belief and doubt. That makes no sense to me. — Bylaw

Exactly you may choose without either believing or doubting it.

An example of belief. Jan. 6 Hearings show that Trump believed he won. His staff told him there was no evidence for that. Yet Mr. Trump believed.

Yet Mr. Trump believed. — Jackson

I wonder whether he really believed, or whether it just suited him to claim that he won.