Nietzsche denied absolute truth but was a very clear writer, while Kant was a very obscure writer who seemed to believe in all sorts of absolutes, including truth. Neither were postmodernists. — andrewk
But I still don't see it as a necessary consequence of the first, or vice versa. — andrewk
Neither were postmodernists. — andrewk
If both, which one irks you most? Or is it some other feature not mentioned here? — andrewk
I would like it if someone provided me with a good example of a post-modern philosophical theory that they dislike and why they dislike it — darthbarracuda
Nietzsche believed in truth, albeit of an unstable, contingent, perspectival and disposable variety. He believed in constant experimentation and argument. His Übermensch forever goes beyond and above. This is why they had to struggle, because truth was difficult but ultimately necessary to obtain through free-thinking and reason. As he wrote in Daybreak (1881): ‘Every smallest step in the field of free thinking, and of the personally formed life, has ever been fought for at a cost of spiritual and physical tortures… change has required its innumerable martyrs… Nothing has been bought more dearly than that little bit of human reason and sense of freedom that is now the basis of our pride.’ Far from being casual about truth, Nietzsche cared deeply about it. And any truth we held had to earn its keep. ‘Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts, on which our love and our trust in life depend, had to be sacrificed to it’, he wrote later in 1888 in The Antichrist.
Nietzsche believed truths had to be earnt. He believed we had to cross swords in the struggle for truth, because it mattered so dearly, not because ‘anything goes’. We had to accept as true even that which we found intolerable and unacceptable, when the evidence proved it so. All points of view certainly are not valid. Walter Kaufmann, who began the mainstream rehabilitation of Nietzsche after the Second World War, concluded in the fourth edition of his classic Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (1974): ‘Nietzsche’s valuation of suffering and cruelty was not the consequence of any gory irrationality, but a corollary of his high esteem of rationality. The powerful man is the rational man who subjects even his most cherished faith to the severe scrutiny of reason and is prepared to give up his beliefs if they cannot stand this stern test. He abandons what he loves most, if rationality requires it. He does not yield to his inclinations and impulses.’ — Patrick West
Is the beef with science or with those - often not scientists - that make philosophical claims about science, such as that science reveals the Truth? The two are very different things.Would you agree with the idea that "post-modern" philosophy, in particular, has a bit of a beef with science — darthbarracuda
It's not at all dumb, because many people assume that. But I also think the implication fails. Someone who says truth is a social construct may also add - or leave implicit - 'including any assertions about truth that I may appear to be making now'.This is probably a really dumb question, but doesn't the claim that notions of truth are social constructs imply that the person making such a claim has somehow attained a perspective that lies outside of that — Erik
Would you agree with the idea that "post-modern" philosophy, in particular, has a bit of a beef with science and has more proponents of scientific skepticism or relativism than those who think science discovers the real?
At any rate, phrases like "x is just a social construct" seem to be commonly found in post-modern thinkers and I wonder why that is or what exactly it means to be a social construct. Can a social construct itself be a social construct?
But it doesn't it seem, streetlight, that the term 'social construct' is tinged with a certain sense of arbitrariness? Even more than arbitrariness, actually, but downright maliciousness, especially when paired with typical hierarchical relations of power and domination that characterize almost every social and political configuration?
I shall be very happy if this book contributes to the wider diffusion of logical knowledge. The course of historical events has assembled in this country the most eminent representatives of contemporary logic, and has thus created here especially favorable conditions for the development of logical thought. These favorable conditions can, of course, be easily overbalanced by other and more powerful factors. It is obvious that the future of logic, as well as of all theoretical science, depends essentially upon normalizing the political and social relations of mankind, and thus upon a factor which is beyond the control of professional scholars. I have no illusions that the development of logical thought, in particular, will have a very essential effect upon the process of the normalization of human relationships; but I do believe that the wider diffusion of the knowledge of logic may contribute positively to the acceleration of this process. For, on the one hand, by making the meaning of concepts precise and uniform in its own field and by stressing the necessity of such a precision and uniformization in any other domain, logic leads to the possibility of better understanding between those who have the will to do so. And, on the other hand, by perfecting and sharpening the tools of thought, it makes men more critical--and thus makes less likely their being misled by all the pseudo-reasonings to which they are in various parts of the world incessantly exposed today.
Do you see them as liberative or oppressive? — Srap Tasmaner
Some of us still cling to the hope and the heritage of the Enlightenment. And for us, clarity is itself a value. — Srap Tasmaner
I am passionate about science and devote time to improving my skills in QM and GR, as well as learning more about Thermodynamics. But I do not believe that it reveals 'Truth'. That is a philosophical claim, not a scientific one. My interest and participation in science is driven by considerations that are part instrumental and part aesthetic, neither of which relies on a belief that science delivers Truth. — andrewk
You're right of course.Do you see them as liberative or oppressive?
— Srap Tasmaner
I find this very dichotomy oppressive. The scientific method is neither good nor bad. It's just a tool. It can produce good results in the hands of responsible people and bad results in the hands of irresponsible people. — Thorongil
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.