Disappointed there's no Schrodinger's cat.

Deduction is part of determining what's really there. — Tate

But not part of seeing.

There's a lot here, and I'm not sure what to address.

There is a misguided picture of the mind, such that the eyes and associated neurones create an image using whatever input they find and this is what we see.

What happens is that the eyes and associated neurones build a model, and this is not what we see, but the very act of our seeing.

The first is a variation on the homunculus. The idea is that the brain constructs a model that the homunculus observes, giving rise to the mistaken notion that what we see is the model constructed by the brain.

The second removes the homunculus. The model is our seeing. What we see is the things in the world.

Disappointed there's no Schrodinger's cat. — Marchesk

Rather, there is - and there isn't.

Clever.

What happens is that the eyes and associated neurones build a model, and this is not what we see, but the very act of our seeing. — Banno

I think it's that the brain uses models that enhance the competence of the organism by creating expectations, which is just a theory.

There is such a thing as just focusing on the visual field. Artists do that a lot. I would say that is the act of just seeing.

Add onto that knowledge of what you're seeing and you have an analysis, probably involving some degree of language, memory, modeling of some kind, and definitely some deduction.

The first is a variation on the homunculus. The brain constructs a model that the homunculus observes, giving rise to the mistaken notion that what we see is the model constructed by the brain. — Banno

We don't know enough about consciousness to rule out some sort of homunculus. As long as we don't end up with an infinite regress of them, there's no good reason not to consider the possibility. We might imagine it as the mind's microprocessor, which is a little computer inside the bigger one.

We don't know enough about consciousness to rule out some sort of homunculus. As long as we don't end up with an infinite regress of them, there's no good reason not to consider the possibility. — Tate

If I understood him aright, @Isaac uses the notion of homunculi for methodological purposes in working on neural nets. So (doubtless this is a poor example) for the purposes of examining the net of the optic nerve, it may be understood as sending an image to the homunculi further in the brain.

But my understanding is that despite this, for Isaac and other neuroscientists it's neural nets all the way down. The homunculi are only there to simplify the calculation, and are ultimately dispersed.

One alternative is something like @Wayfarer may be proposing; a distinctly spiritual entity haunting the brain.

Deduction is part of sight,and probably all the senses to some extent. Do you agree? — Tate

My senses mean little without interpretation, I would have thought. And it's not often you look and have to ask yourself, what am I looking at?

But my understanding is that despite this, for Isaac and other neuroscientists it's neural nets all the way down. The homunculi are only there to simplify the calculation, and are ultimately dispersed. — Banno

The idea of main distribution board has been around for a while.

I've been reading about the evolutionary period when that would have first started: the development of the head. The head provides a main control dashboard for an organism, probably first enhancing the performance of predators.

One alternative is something like Wayfarer may be proposing; a distinctly spiritual entity haunting the brain. — Banno

And I think in idealism, the brain is haunting the spiritual entity (consciousness) and what we call matter is a representational icon or a 'product' of mind.

Neat.

Which brings us back to the point you made earlier, of explaining how it is that you and I seem to see the same stuff as we look out of our little cages. Why should that be?

I think, for @Wayfarer, god is lurking out there somewhere. Or an overmind of some sort.

That's fine, if it is what one likes. Seems to me to be simpler to just say that we are part of the same shared world.

distinctly spiritual entity haunting the brain. — Banno

Which is the capacity to discern meaning.

:100: The machine is in the ghost.

This is what I think Schopenhauer was commenting on - he is accusing Kant of ignoring this classical distinction and instead appropriating the term 'noumenal' to serve a different purpose in his own philosophy, without respecting the sense in which 'noumenal' was used in Greek philosophy. — Wayfarer

The question seems to be, is this a mistake, or a strategic choice of Kant's? Should it matter?

The noumenal object is, then, an object of the intellect (nous, noetic), in that it is something - a principle, or a deductive proof - which is understood by the intellect in a manner different to that of sensory knowledge. — Wayfarer

I see it. Is this not just a Platonic form or a Jungian archetype at work?

The theory holds that we all see instantiations of those forms in the 'physical realm'. I know I am racing ahead, but is it not argued also that there are some people who are able to apprehend, in some way, those forms/ideas directly?

As noted previously, the difference seems to be that for you this capacity is entirely distinct from our neurones, but I suspect it is just something they do.

Isn't the body/world collaboration a dualism? If we're asking whether there's an external material world, then we have to go beyond just the world as presented to ourselves and ask about the world itself. The world that's presumably much larger and older than we are. — Marchesk

But we already know there is a multitude of things external to our bodies; we perceive them as such. We can think of everything as being processes which go on, and we refer to the conceived totality of these "goings on" as "the world". We can also conceive of our perceptions of these things as processes going on inside our bodies. and in one sense this is true. But it does not follow that the things perceived are somehow in our bodies, in our heads or minds.Perception is a process involving things both interior and exterior to our bodies. There is no real inner and outer from the "point of view" of the world, there are only relative, localized instantiations of inner and outer.

What happens is that the eyes and associated neurones build a model, and this is not what we see, but the very act of our seeing. — Banno

The second removes the homunculus. The model is our seeing. What we see is the things in the world (as modeled). — Banno

I agree, but I added an important clarifying qualification.

Which brings us back to the point you made earlier, of explaining how it is that you and I seem to see the same stuff as we look out of our little cages. Why should that be? — Banno

God? Consciousness collapsing the wavefunction? A glitch in the Matrix? Time travel shenanigans? I do agree the world is what makes the same stuff the same. Not sure the world is entirely material.

Which brings us back to the point you made earlier, of explaining how it is that you and I seem to see the same stuff as we look out of our little cages. Why should that be? — Banno

Seems to me that the primary answer, by way of idealism, is the space no one has entered yet. And that is the idea of a mind-at-large which holds all perception together and allows us to share a coherent world of regularity. As you know, this is posited as 'God' by Berkeley in his version, 'immaterialism'. And I guess Schopenhauer would call this "will" - a striving, instinctive, non-metacognitive consciousness.

I think for many, this is one step too far.

As you know, this is posited as 'God' by Berkeley in his version, 'immaterialism'. — Tom Storm

The world is just a thought in the mind of God. And yet, Berkeley was also an empiricist.

I don’t think we’re brains. So I don’t see how it is possible that an experience is in the head, and more, that we can experience such an experience. Our eyes point outwards, away from the brain, therefor what we see is beyond the brain.

The reason eyes, ears, and other senses point outwards is because that’s where the rest of the world is. We are conscious of the world, not of consciousness. We experience the world, not experience. We perceive the world, not perception. All evidence points to there being no such veil between the boundary of the self and the rest of the world. Where the body ends the rest of the world begins. There is nothing between them. The contact is direct.

the difference seems to be that for you this capacity is entirely distinct from our neurones, but I suspect it is just something they do. — Banno

Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Edward Feser

So far as i can see there isn't an argument in that quote, just a set of dubious assertions.

You were programmed you to think that, Smith. — Tate

Most interesting! — Ms. Marple

Am I alone in being thus programmed or is everyone in the same boat?

Am I alone in being thus programmed or is everyone in the same boat? — Agent Smith

Everybody in the matrix is a program except for the real people.

Everybody in the matrix is a program except for the real people. — Tate

:lol: Indeed, excellent observation. I am an agent...of the system.

If I understood him aright, Isaac uses the notion of homunculi for methodological purposes in working on neural nets. So (doubtless this is a poor example) for the purposes of examining the net of the optic nerve, it may be understood as sending an image to the homunculi further in the brain.

But my understanding is that despite this, for Isaac and other neuroscientists it's neural nets all the way down. The homunculi are only there to simplify the calculation, and are ultimately dispersed. — Banno

That's right. We might borrow the language but not the function (when I say 'we' here, I perhaps ought to clarify that, in this branch research, I'm wearing my cognitive science hat, I worked with neuroscientists, but I did the cognition bit, not the 'cells and chemicals' bit).

One thing that's quite well-accepted now is that we have a hierarchical system in the brain, that data is 'passed' from system to system rather than a continual flow from sense to action. The use of 'model', or 'image' or such is essentially trying to capture the idea that the data leaving, say the V1 region of the occipital cortex is of a different kind to the data leaving a neuron within that region. Mainly it's to do with the degree of feedback mechanisms within and between systems such that it makes sense to call what passes from V1 to V2 an 'output' where it makes less sense to say that of what passes from a cluster within V1 to another cluster within V1. A person with damage to any specific region might have trouble with the sort of processing that region is responsible for, but it's impossible to predict which actual neurons within that region do what because they keep changing.

All this really just to explain the need for some terminology in a model of mental function which accepts hierarchical data processing. You're right to point out it's just a façon de parler.

our thoughts do have inherent meaning — Edward Feser

How so? I mean, this is not even a comparable analysis. Thoughts aren't entities capable of possessing inherent properties, and even if they were, what kind of analysis produced the conclusion that they had inherent meaning?

If I look at an ink mark, it has an effect on me that could be described as a 'meaning', it triggers other thoughts related to my history of interaction with that type of mark.

If any 'analysis' of thought were possible (and I'm not sure I'm ready to allow that in any case), then I don't see how it's 'meaning' would be recognised in any different way. It would similarly elicit a set of other, related thoughts based on my history of interaction with it.

How are you arriving at the notion that the way in which thoughts possess meaning is inherent?

It seems perfectly possible that I might think of the number 4 and it trigger all sorts of memories, relationships and intentions that are completely unlike any that might arise from your thinking of the number 4. So, just like an ink mark, there seems, on the face of it, nothing at all inherent about the meaning of the thought "4".

Thoughts aren't entities capable of possessing inherent properties, and even if they were, what kind of analysis produced the conclusion that they had inherent meaning? — Isaac

What did you just ask? Your question has 'inherent meaning' doesn't it? You didn't just blurt out random sounds (and in fact you're asking very good and meaningful questions.)

By ink marks, are you talking about Rorsasch tests? Let's keep it simple. You as a rational sentient being can interpret written words, and also you can interpret situations, life itself - all manner of things. That is something you bring to picture, not something in the picture itself. A string of characters means nothing to someone who doesn't understand the language it's written in - so the meaning isn't inherent in the character string, but in the mind of the observer who reads it. Same, ultimately, with situations, even with life itself.

So I think Ed Feser's point is a perfectly clear one: that neural processes, like marks or shapes or whatever, have no inherent meaning, but that we read meaning into them. We are meaning-creating and meaning-seeking beings. In fact, I aver, that is what it means to be 'a being'.

I think it's that the brain uses models that enhance the competence of the organism by creating expectations, which is just a theory. — Tate

A couple of more snippets from the book I'm currently reading, Mind and the Cosmic Order (I've quoted it a bit the last few days).

Sensations, beliefs, imaginings and feelings are often referred to as figments, that is, creations of the mind. A mental image is taken to be something less than real: For one thing, it has no material substance and is impossible to detect except in the mind of the perceiver. It is true that sensations are caused by electrochemical events in a brain, but when experienced by a living mind, sensations are decisively different in kind from electrons in motion. They are indeed “figments” because they exist nowhere except in awareness. As a matter of fact, they exist only as claims made by sentient beings, with no material evidence to back up those claims. Indeed, brain scans reveal electrical activity, but do not display sensations or inner experience. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 52) Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition

This is, of course, a reference to the hard problem of consciousness, but that is tangential to his main argument, which is that:

One of the most important insights of contemporary brain science is that the visual world is a constructed reality. When we look, what we hold in awareness is not an optical array but a mental construct, built from information in the array, which presents us with all that is of value to us in a scene. — ibid

Pinter makes a similar point in much more detail - that the objects of scientific analysis are mathematical representations of simples, like straight lines, force, weight, and so on. None of them have any inherent meaning, either, until a human observer combines them into a gestalt, a meaningful whole, which is the fundamental element of cognition.

One alternative is something like Wayfarer may be proposing; a distinctly spiritual entity haunting the brain. — Banno

Don't forget that in the origins of philosophy, what the philosopher always sought was to see 'what is' - which is the precursor to 'the essence'. Going back to the definition of 'nous' again:

In Aristotle's influential works, which are the main source of later philosophical meanings, nous was carefully distinguished from sense perception, imagination, and reason, although these terms are closely inter-related. ...In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. For him then, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. — Wikipedia

(I have to say, the more increase in my scant knowledge of Aristotle, the more impressed I am.)

I maintain that we as a rule don't see 'things as they are' but we see with eyes that are already conditioned by pre-conceptions, inclinations, and all manner of other factors. That Aristotelian principle became in the scholastics the basis of 'the rational soul' which is the element of the being which sees 'things as they truly are' - which we, the hoi polloi, as a rule, do not. So that 'spiritual element' eventually developed as 'the rational soul' of scholastic philosophy (although I'm still in the process of trying to grasp what became of that idea.) But the gist of it is, that nous is the faculty which grasps what truly is. It's one of the main tributaries of science itself.

I don’t think we’re brains. So I don’t see how it is possible that an experience is in the head — NOS4A2

Then what do you think consciousness is? Some etherial entity that extends beyond the body and somehow "contains" or "touches" the external world object that is said to be the object of perception?

We are conscious of the world, not of consciousness. We experience the world, not experience. We perceive the world, not perception. — NOS4A2

This doesn't say anything of relevance. The painting is of a woman, not of paint, but the painting is still paint, not a woman. There's no "direct connection" between the paint and the woman. So even if the experience is of an external world object (and you still haven't explained what it even means for an external world object to be the object of perception) it doesn't then follow that there is a "direct connection" between the experience and the external world object.

Note that I'm not saying that we "experience an experience" or "perceive a perception" (anymore than I'd say that the painting is of paint); I'm saying that experience is a mental phenomena, that there is no direct connection between mental phenomena and external world objects, and that the qualities of mental phenomena are not properties of external world objects.

None of this entails the kind of red-herring grammar ("we experience an experience") that you're trying to argue against. After all, when I dream I don't dream about dreams; I dream about eating an apple - and it's all just mental phenomena with no direct connection to external world objects.

All evidence points to there being no such veil between the boundary of the self and the rest of the world. Where the body ends the rest of the world begins. There is nothing between them. The contact is direct. — NOS4A2

See my post here about glasses, microscopes, telescopes, mirrors, and camera feeds.

I do wonder though, what is visualization if it's not "pictures in the head"? — Marchesk

Using your eyes.

Or preparing to.

Google Alva Noe 'Out of our Heads'.